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Chapter 1
Political Islam and the Arab 
uprisings
Paola Rivetti and Hendrik Kraetzschmar
Th is book emerges from the observation that much has changed in the fi eld of 
political Islam following the popular uprisings that rocked the authoritarian 
status quo in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2010–11, nowadays 
widely referred to as the Arab uprisings or ‘Arab Spring’. Prominent instances 
of such change include the dramatic rise to (and fall from) power of moderate 
Islamist political parties/groupings in Egypt and Tunisia – forces that had been 
violently repressed and/or dismantled by pre-uprising authoritarian regimes – 
the pluralisation of the fi eld of Islamist political players, including most notably 
the formation of Salafi  parties and their ascent to political prominence in 
electoral and institutional politics, the escalation of sectarian confl ict between 
the region’s Sunni and Shi‘a communities, exacerbated by war in Yemen, 
Syria and Iraq, and the emergence of the jihadi–Salafi  organisation al-Dawla 
al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, IS) which advances formal ruling pretentions 
over territories in Syria and Iraq: a new quality to such groups. All of these 
developments suggest that a renewed analysis and approach to the study of 
Islamist political and social actors are needed. While extant pre-uprisings 
scholarship had already noted part of these dynamics and devoted eff orts to 
their analysis – such as for instance the case of Salafi  participation in electoral 
politics,1 or the growing relevance of the sectarian variable in MENA politics2 
– it can hardly account for their development in the new environment that 
the Arab Spring has brought about. A cursory look at the scholarship available 
on the subject of political Islam post-2011 seems to suggest, in fact, that the 
uprisings constitute just one phase in the long history of Islamist political 
and social forces present in the MENA, a history characterised by periods of 
political opposition, inclusion and co-option by authoritarian leaders.3
However, although history may outweigh recent dramatic changes – and 
although old elites and pre-uprising institutions have remained in place and 
appear to be functioning in many of the countries that have experienced 
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political turmoil – things will hardly stay the same when it comes to contentious 
politics and state–society relations.4 Indeed, as of 2017, the whole region 
seems in fl ux both at the international level – with regional powers trying to 
impose their hegemony over other regional competitors – and at the domestic 
level, with many countries facing unstable national environments and prone 
to political crisis, authoritarian retrenchment and sessionist tendencies, such 
as in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.5 Moreover, as Gilbert Achcar noted, the mass 
protests that took place across countries from Morocco to Iran and the Gulf 
have instilled an unruly spirit within the MENA public, which is likely to play 
out in the longue durée.6 Alongside countries such as Egypt, where a military 
coup brought to power an even more repressive form of authoritarianism 
than had existed under erstwhile president Hosni Mubarak, in other contexts 
such as Morocco, the spirit of the 2011 uprising is still alive in the recurrence 
of popular protests ever since.7 In fact, while it is true that in many MENA 
countries a grim authoritarian cloud has overshadowed the glaring democratic 
horizon that brightened up the prospect in 2010–11, it is also true that the 
uprisings put in motion demands for change that go beyond the limitations 
imposed by the political elites’ defi nition of what a democratic space for 
political action ought to look like. Th e most recent protests in the Rif region 
of Morocco are signifi cant in this respect, precisely because they take place in 
a country that is considered to be among the most stable in the whole region, 
with an authoritarian ruling class that effi  ciently quells potential political 
instability through a mixture of reform and repression.8 While taking levels of 
contention to an international level, and transcending the boundaries of the 
nation-state, the pro-independence vote of Iraqi Kurds in September 2017 also 
represents an example of the popular demands for change put in motion by the 
uprisings of 2010–11. Indeed, these demands have developed ‘a life on their 
own’, overcoming well-established arenas of political action and contention, 
such as the nation-state.
What then is the regional and domestic impact of the Arab uprisings and 
their aft ermath on Islamist political and social organisations, their behaviour, 
programmatic development/outlook and their interaction with other domestic 
and transnational forces? Th is book is concerned with precisely these questions, 
epitomised by the concepts of ‘governance’, ‘pluralisation’ and ‘contestation’ 
spelled out in its title. Including a wide range of country-based case studies and 
covering countries from Iran in the east – whose ‘Green Movement’ of 2009–10 
was a prelude in many ways to the subsequent Arab uprisings – to Morocco in 
the far west of the MENA, the book off ers a comparative analysis of how Islamist 
organisations have been aff ected by and dealt with changes brought about by 
the uprisings and their longer-term implications. Drawing on original research, 
the individual chapters present an analysis of political Islam that is underpinned 
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by a rejection of ‘exceptionalist’ thinking, according to which organised political 
Islam (that is Islamist political parties, social movements, NGOs and charitable 
associations) is too peculiar to compare with non-Islamist social and political 
organisations. Exceptionalism contends that what makes Islamist actors unique 
is their ideology – that is, Islamism – which, according to this approach, plays a 
predominant role in determining Islamists’ choices and political strategies over 
‘rational’ and interest-driven calculations. It follows, as emphasised by Elizabeth 
R. Nugent,9 that scholars have rarely compared Islamist and non-Islamist 
political and social organisations. Once such example is the Sage’s Handbook 
of Party Politics, which focuses on a wide range of party ideologies and models 
from diff erent corners of the planet, yet hardly devotes any att ention to Islamist 
political parties, their experiences and workings.10
Th e lack of serious comparative engagement with Islamist social and 
political organisations is the result of a scholarly approach in political science 
that goes back to the 1960s and 1970s, and that tended to overlook Islamism 
as a meaningful socio-political force. As Volpi and Stein explain,11 Islamism 
hardly featured as an analytically relevant factor, as academic debates were 
dominated by modernisation and class theory. Indeed, wherever considered, 
Islamism tended to be dismissed as the expression of conservative social forces, 
historically obsolete and doomed to disappear. Th is nurtured the perception 
of Islamism and Islamist organisations as ‘exceptional’, contributing to their 
isolation from other social and political players.12 Th is treatment of Islamism 
as a tangential and temporary phenomenon changed only aft er 9/11. Th en, the 
dominant approach to its study became the prism of security, radicalism and 
terrorism, exposing the ‘exceptional’ propensity of Islam and Islam-inspired 
politics towards violence and radicalism, as well as their incompatibility with 
democracy.
Although this volume focuses exclusively on Islamist social and political 
forces, our contributions aim to facilitate dialogue and interaction with the 
scholarship that has examined other, non-Islamist political and social organisa-
tions in a context of change. Far from downplaying the relevance for Islamists 
of religion as a moral compass informing policy choices, the volume highlights 
that the behaviour of Islamist organisations is very similar to that of political 
parties and socio-political organisations more broadly in contexts of change, 
be they liberalisation, authoritarian resurgence or regime change. Our analyses 
and the fi ndings expose signifi cant parallels to studies conducted on other, 
non-religious political and social organisations in changing and (potentially) 
unstable environments, such as for instance communist parties in Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Anna 
Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong examine the post-1991 state-(re)
building in post-communist Central Asia and Eastern Europe, locating elite 
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competition at the core of this process.13 Th e structural constraints that aff ected 
intra-elite contention and consequently party politics in the region – such as 
access to the competition itself (thanks to the existence of some previous 
organisational structure upon which elite factions may claim their share of 
power, ideational and material resources), access to the administration and 
bureaucratic system and to international business networks and the ability to 
fi t strategic discursive and policy templates – apply to contexts where Islamist 
organisations have taken part in the process of institutional bargain post-
uprisings, as well as to sett ings where countries experienced regime change or 
where an intra-elite compromise could be found to assure continuity for the 
ruling authorities.14
Similarities revolve not only around context, however, but extend to the 
choices and behaviours of Islamist organisations too. When it comes to political 
parties, for instance, contributors to this volume underline that moderate 
Islamist parties have chosen to respect the political limitations imposed by 
higher authorities, such as a ruling monarch, in exchange for the possibility 
of governing and/or participating in institutional politics. As highlighted by 
the case of the Moroccan Hizb al-’Adala wa al-Tanmiyya (Party of Justice and 
Development, PJD) and its post-2011 rise to power, or the strategic choice made 
by the Bahraini Shi‘a political society Jamʿiyyat al-Wifaq al-Watani al-Islamiyya 
(Entente – National Accord Islamic Society, henceforth al-Wifaq) at the time 
of the Pearl February 14 protest movement in 2012, parties disassociated 
themselves from the protesters in exchange for continued political inclusion. 
Mohammad Masbah, who authored the chapter on the PJD in Morocco in this 
volume, talks about a ‘pragmatisation’ that underpinned the party’s post-2011 
choices, a statement that echoes Marc Valeri’s examination of the behaviour of 
al-Wifaq, as well as that of the mainstream Sunni Islamist opposition in Kuwait 
by Luciano Zaccara, Courtney Freer and Hendrik Kraetzschmar, despite the 
signifi cant diff erences that exist in the outcome of the three experiences and 
the fate of the parties/forces in question.
‘Pragmatisation for participation’ is similar to the strategy adopted by 
former communist parties in Eastern Europe during the post-1989 ‘transition 
period’ in response to both liberal democracy and the market economy. 
Margit Tavits and Natalia Lekti argue that ex-communist and left ist parties in 
Central Europe adapted to the free market mantra by promising (and, once 
in power, carrying through) cuts to public spending in order to survive as 
credible participants in the new institutional politics and to become viable 
political choices in the eyes of the electorate.15 In Hungary, for instance, the 
former Communist Hungarian Socialist Party (known by its Hungarian 
acronym, MSzP) was able to shed its pariah status in society at the beginning 
of the political transition, when it reoriented its economic policies, showing 
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commitment to democracy and the market economy.16 Once elected, the 
MSzP government implemented a stabilisation package that cut spending for 
social welfare and accelerated privatisation.17 In post-1989 Poland as well, the 
former ruling party – the Communist Social Democracy of Polish Republic 
(known by its Polish acronym SdRP) – remained a discredited political force, 
whose local party offi  ces were oft en robbed or att acked, and local members 
assaulted. Again, as with the MSzP in Hungary, its political fortunes changed, 
however, once it committ ed programmatically to market-economic principles 
and reforms.18 While a monarch imposing the rules of the game was absent in 
Eastern Europe, former communist parties were fi ghting for political inclusion 
and electoral success, by abiding by the limitations of a post-1989 political 
agenda pillared around capitalism and liberal democracy, avoiding appeals to 
nostalgia and socialist ideology, and actively engaging in tough and aggressive 
anti-welfare economic reforms.19 As Tavits and Lekti put it, these parties 
needed to show that their leaders were capable managers, rather than obsolete 
ideologues.20 In order to stand any chance of success in a changing political 
and economic environment, they pragmatically abided by the new rules of 
the game.
However, far from homogenising the trajectories of Islamist political parties 
and organisations in the region, the volume also explores cases in which 
political and social actors decided not to obey extant structural limitations, 
choosing exclusion from the formal political sphere instead. Th e chapter by 
Barbara Zollner on Egypt, for instance, highlights how strategic and rational 
calculations may motivate the decision of Islamist parties to stay out of the 
formal political sphere, thus off ering a diff erent perspective on ‘pragma-
tisation’ as the ability to maximise one’s interests in a given environment. 
Indeed, pragmatisation and obedience to extant rules in exchange for political 
inclusion do not necessarily overlap, as Nathan Brown reveals in the case of 
Kuwait, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt.21 Brown explains that here, Islamist 
organisations have preferred to protect their credibility as oppositional 
forces or critics of the ruling elite by staying away from the formal political 
game, which would have imposed strict limitations on the scope of their anti-
establishment critique and possibly co-opted them. Again, this choice is not 
confi ned to Islamists, especially in the case of political parties/organisations 
that operate in authoritarian environments. Looking at the case of Zimbabwe, 
which is compared against all countries that experienced an authoritarian 
presidential election between 1990 and 2008, Tavishi Bhasin and Jennifer 
Gandhi explain that opposition parties oft en choose electoral boycott s rather 
than participation to avoid complying with political limitations that they do not 
agree with or accepting circumstances they do not see as favourable.22 When it 
comes to politically unstable contexts – such as those that experienced regime 
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change and subsequently free elections in the MENA region in 2010–11 – or 
to contexts characterised by competitive authoritarian elections, boycott s may 
also represent a powerful bargaining chip for political parties to maximise 
their interests in a new, or quickly changing, environment.23 In other words, 
structural and environmental factors seem to be determinant, although not the 
only ones to be relevant, in the electoral strategy that oppositional forces choose 
but, while there is a robust scholarship on this topic produced by specialists in 
the region, only a few scholars have engaged in cross-area comparisons.
Th e uprisings did not exert a uniform impact on Islamist social and political 
organisations in the MENA. Far from it, their impact has in fact varied 
according to the domestic context in which Islamists found themselves and 
their situation (that is repressed, oppositional, co-opted by the ruling elite or 
in power). As Volpi and Stein highlight, post-uprising shift s in state–society 
relations did not aff ect quietist Salafi  organisations in the same way as they 
aff ected those Islamists that sought state power.24 Following this same line 
of argument, Stein insists that it remains crucial to reject a ‘one size fi ts all’ 
approach to Islamism, also questioning the idea of Islamism as the only 
electoral and political alternative to the ruling parties available in Muslim-
majority societies. 25 Not only is Islamism not the only game in town, but the 
opening up of the political sphere post-uprising has also forcefully highlighted 
the increase of competition in the ideational-political market.
Th is volume brings together chapter contributions that cover a wide range 
of diff erent types of Islamist social and political organisations that enjoy 
diff erent relationships to state power, from those aspiring to conquer it (those 
Volpi and Stein would label as ‘statist’ or Ewan Stein26 would call ‘pseudo-
democratic’), to those (quietist) Salafi  forces that have traditionally disengaged 
but have strategically reconsidered their options, to those that engage in 
charitable work within civil society and are virtually indiff erent to political 
programmes promoting participation in elections and institutions. Moreover, 
in terms of ideological variations, this volume spans a broad spectrum of 
Islamist actors/groupings, ranging from political players that Kamran Bokhari 
and Farid Senzai label as ‘participators’ – that is, those forces that accept 
democracy and see it as compatible with Islam – to ‘rejecters’ and ‘condition-
alists’ – respectively, who reject or accept democracy but with limitations 
on, for instance, the extent of women’s rights.27 Amidst these variations, the 
volume brings together contributions exploring how environmental changes 
have impacted on the menu of political action available to Islamist actors, 
and explores the decisions and behaviours of Islamists when confronted with 
factors such as decreased/increased political competition with other Islamist 
and non-Islamist political organisations, possibilities for alliance building, 
changes in the discursive framing of political choices and access to transna-
tional fi nancial networks.
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Themes and chapter contributions
Following on from the above, this volume identifi es four trajectories that, 
broadly speaking, have characterised the evolution of Islamist organisations and 
politics since the uprisings. Th ese concern fi rst, the transformation of Islamist 
political parties from parties of the opposition to parties of power (although 
with diverse fortunes) and the challenges of political and economic governance 
that this brings with it; second, the pluralisation of domestic Islamist actors and 
the growth of intra-Islamist competition and confl ict; third, the concomitant 
rise in levels of societal polarisation along ‘secular–Islamist’ lines in many Arab 
states and its impact on both Islamist and ‘secular’ domestic players; and fi nally, 
the resurgence of sectarian discourse and confl ict in the region, particularly 
between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam. While these four trajectories are not new, 
they have arguably acquired new impetus in the wake of the uprisings, as an 
eff ect of the restructuring of institutional and public spheres via constitutional 
reforms, new and fairer elections, authoritarian retrenchment or liberalisation, 
and the ongoing competition for regional hegemony, which translates into war 
and sectarian confl icts. Th e volume discusses these trajectories in twenty-one 
chapter contributions grouped into four thematic parts.
Comprising six chapters, Part I of this volume, entitled ‘Islamists and 
issues of political and economic governance’, touches on a range of questions 
pertaining in the broadest sense to Islamist organisations in power, to issues 
of Islamist governance as well as contention to it. Th e contributions by 
Mariz Tadros, Paola Rivett i/Alam Saleh and Truls Hallberg Tønnessen all 
examine questions of governance, albeit each with a focus on diff erent sets 
of actors and policy arenas. Exploring the workings of the short-lived Morsi 
administration, Tadros highlights the challenges it faced in reconciling its 
doctrinaire positions with the need for compromise and inclusivity during 
Egypt’s early post-transition period. Focusing on the case of Iran, Rivett i and 
Saleh turn their att ention to intra-elite discourses on the rights to political 
participation post-‘Green Movement’. Shunning culturally relativist interpre-
tations, the authors highlight how both progressive and conservative forces 
draw on ‘secular and religious epistemologies’ extant in Iran’s legal system 
to advocate an expansion of participatory rights, thus shaping a common 
ground for negotiating the governance arrangements necessary to guarantee 
political and institutional continuity aft er the dramatic polarisation that the 
repression of the Green Movement created. Moving outside the confi nes 
of conventional state structures, Tønnessen, meanwhile, sheds light on the 
nature of ‘rebel governance’ by the IS in the territories it controls/controlled 
in Iraq and Syria, asserting that the group’s insistence on being a state was 
driven as much by ideology as by rivalry with other jihadi–Salafi  groupings 
in the region.
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Resistance to governance, in turn, takes centre stage in the chapter by Wanda 
Krause and Melissa Finn. Th e authors explore Islamic and Islamist women in 
Qatar who are active in the charity sector and/or affi  liated with organisations 
such as the Qatari al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB), and 
what they label as their ‘refusal’ to submit to oppressive policies and the status quo 
through, among other things, day-to-day mobilisation of citizenship. Th rough 
their ethnographic study, the authors question conventional conceptions of 
resistance with their focus on institutionalised and/or organised expressions of 
contention defi ned exclusively in opposition to the state. For Krause and Finn 
expressions of a ‘silent’, yet resilient, resistance by Islamic/Islamist women were 
strengthened, in fact, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, and may constitute a 
signifi cant governance challenge to Qatari rulers in the longer-term.
Th e last two chapters of this section, by Angela Joya and by Nazlı Bilgili and 
Hendrik Kraetzschmar, hone in on issues of economic governance, and here in 
particular on the appropriation of, and resistance to, neo-liberal orthodoxy 
that gained traction in the economic policies of MENA regimes from the 
1970s onwards. In her class analysis of the Egyptian MB, Joya contends that 
the rise to prominence of an ikhwani entrepreneurial class during Sadat’s 
infi tah (open door) policies of the 1970s in no small measure explains the 
group’s endorsement of free market principles, which it then sought to 
implement following the electoral victory of Muhammad Morsi in the 2012 
presidential elections. Focusing on the case of Turkey, meanwhile, Bilgili and 
Kraetzschmar highlight how the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by 
successive Erdoğan governments since the early 2000s constituted a key source 
of inspiration for the emergence of an Islamic left ist current, which sought to 
critique market orthodoxy from within the parameters of Islamic teachings. 
Th e two chapters thus problematise the relationship between Islamism 
and capitalism, highlighting the breadth of positions extant on market-
economic policies within Islamism itself and the contention surrounding its 
adoption. Indeed, whilst Bilgili and Kraetzschmar’s chapter demonstrates 
how capitalism serves as a lever to critique the forces in power, Joya’s chapter 
makes apparent its unquestioned acceptance by mainstream Islamist actors, 
thus revealing the continuity of orthodox market-economic policies under 
Islamist rule post-Arab uprisings.
Part II of the volume, entitled ‘Islamist and secular party politics’ comprises 
six chapter contributions that examine Islamist parties located in broader 
multi-party environments where they interact and compete with a range of 
rival ideological forces. Taking on a relations approach, according to which 
strategies, interests and choices are the result of complex interactions with a 
set of diverse players, the chapters examine the Islamists’ interplay with the 
ruling powers (chapters on Morocco, Bahrain), other Islamist forces (Kuwait, 
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Egypt), and so-called ‘secular’ political parties (Tunisia, Egypt). Honing in on 
the cases of Morocco, Egypt, Bahrain and Kuwait, the chapter contributions 
by Mohammed Masbah, Barbara Zollner, Marc Valeri and Luciano Zaccara, 
Courtney Freer/Hendrik Kraetzschmar reveal, among others, just how diverse 
and context-specifi c the fortunes were of Islamist parties post-2011, with no 
uniform trend discernible. In some cases, the Arab uprisings and their aft ermath 
facilitated the rise to prominence of Islamist parties, as demonstrated by 
Masbah in his analysis of the Moroccan Hizb al-’Adala wa al-Tanmiyya (Party of 
Justice and Development, PJD), which has not only won successive elections 
since 2011 but also managed to lead two consecutive coalition governments. 
For Masbah, this success of the PJD is only partly rooted in its astute electoral 
outreach and mobilisation, and has much to do with the party’s pragmatism 
towards the monarchy as well as in the formulation of policy. In other cases, 
meanwhile, the longer-term plight of Islamist parties has been rather less 
clear-cut, or even progressively worse. Zollner’s chapter on Egypt’s Islamist 
party landscape, for instance, highlights how the coup d’état of 2013 and the 
restructuring of the political system under Abdel Fatt ah al-Sisi heralded a rapid 
reversal in the electoral/political fortunes of both moderate Islamist and Salafi  
parties. Th is development also resonates with the plight of the mainstream 
Islamist political societies in Bahrain, which, according to Valeri, fell victim 
to the regime’s brutal crackdown during the 2011–12 demonstrations and its 
skilful att empts at cloaking the protests in a sectarian mantle. Th is holds true 
for the most prominent Shi‘a Islamist political society, al-Wifaq, whose cadre 
faced harassment and arrest from 2011 onwards and whose operating licence 
was fi nally revoked in 2016, as well as for the country’s main Sunni Islamist 
political societies who in the post-uprising era failed to transform themselves 
into a credible political force independent of the Palace and its infl uence. In 
Kuwait, meanwhile, Zaccara, Freer and Kraetzschmar reveal how the Arab 
uprisings elsewhere impacted particularly on the country’s main Sunni Islamist 
political associations. Th e authors assert that, whilst the overall contagion of 
the Arab uprisings on Kuwaiti politics was limited due to local specifi cities, a 
clear link can be discerned between the political/electoral strategies pursued 
by the country’s Islamist political associations and both the experience of 
(exclusionary) Islamist governance in Egypt under Morsi as well as the 
ensuing regional crackdown on the MB organisation from 2013 onwards. To 
ward off  threats to their own survival in light of these regional developments, 
the authors highlight how Sunni Islamist associations sought shelter in the 
formation of broader cross-ideological alliances as well as in the expression 
of moderate reform demands that fell well short of calling for regime rupture.
Th e fi nal two chapter contributions of Part II by Anne Wolf and Hendrik 
Kraetzschmar/Alam Saleh move the investigative locus away from a focus 
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on Islamist parties to a discussion of the oft -evoked ‘secular–Islamist’ binary 
in MENA party politics. Focusing on the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the 
two contributions stress that ascribing fi xed ideological markers, such as 
‘Islamist’ and/or ‘secular’, to MENA political parties misrepresents the wide 
ideological fl uidity and policy overlap detectable between the two, particularly 
on matt ers pertaining to the role of religion in politics. In the case of Tunisia, 
for instance, Wolf demonstrates how the allegedly ‘secular’ Hizb Nida’ Tunis 
(Call of Tunisia Party) is in reality home to a plurality of religious expressions 
and policy positions that render questionable any such labelling. Th is view 
is also replicated in the chapter by Kraetzschmar and Saleh, who reveal that 
in discourse and policy, most of Egypt’s so-called ‘secular’ parties seek to 
dismiss the charge of being ‘anti-religious’/‘anti-Islam’. In both cases then the 
authors fi nd that confl ict between Islamist and non-Islamist political parties is 
intimately linked to elite competition and survival, and to the struggle around 
the defi nition of national identity and the interpretation of national history. 
Islam seems to be crucial in the political expression and rhetoric of all actors, 
and the actual contention seems to evolve around the appropriation of it.
Entitled ‘Intra-Islamist pluralisation and contention’, Part III of this volume 
explores the diff usion of Islamist players/movements in the post-uprising era 
and the growing contestation (for votes/ideological high ground) among them. 
Th e examination of this theme revolves around four chapters and two levels of 
analysis. Focusing on single-country cases, the fi rst two chapters look at the case 
of Tunisian Islamism (Francesco Cavatorta) and Egyptian Salafi sm ( Jérôme 
Drevon). Th e two chapters demonstrate how the pluralisation of political actors 
engaged in national politics has not only strengthened the traditional competition 
between Salafi  and moderate Islamism – whether symbolised by the Egyptian 
MB or Tunisia’s Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance Party) – but how competition has 
been on the rise internally as well, between Egyptian and Tunisian Salafi  organ-
isations/parties respectively. Th is intra-Islamist competition – be it among Salafi  
forces or between Salafi s and moderate Islamists – has been multi-dimensional 
in character, involving electoral and broader political strategies as well as matt ers 
of doctrine and political outlook.
Comprising the chapters by Ibrahim al-Marashi and Katerina Dalacoura, 
the second level of analysis, in turn, problematises the trajectories of political 
Islam at the intersection between the national and the transnational. In a 
nutshell, it reveals the close inter-connect between local and regional-level 
dynamics and how the two have shaped opportunities for engagement, plurali-
sation and contention for a plethora of Islamist state and non-state actors in the 
post-2011 era. Focusing on the local eff ects of broader regional developments, 
the chapter by Ibrahim al-Marashi, for example, reveals just how litt le infl uence 
the region-wide growth in Shi‘a solidarity – particularly in the wake of the civil 
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war in Syria and the rise of the IS – has had on intra-Shi‘a relations within 
the national sett ing of Iraq. Indeed, rather than being informed by solidarity 
and cooperation, al-Marhasi’s analysis exposes how confl ict and the pursuit 
of narrow self-interested politics remain the hallmark of interactions between 
Iraq’s principle Shi‘a Islamist parties.
Th e chapter by Katerina Dalacoura, in turn, explores the dialectic eff ect of 
national and regional developments on the plight of key exponents of ‘third-
worldist’ (Iran and Hizbullah), ‘radical’ (al-Qaeda and the IS) and ‘moderate’ 
(al-Nahda and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) Islamism. In her bird’s view account 
of the international relations of the MENA, Dalacoura contents that each of 
these strands of Islamism has undergone considerable change since the Arab 
uprisings of 2011. Whilst state-breakdown and regional confl ict precipitated 
a ‘delegitimisation’ of third-worldist Islamism and the growth of sectarianism, 
they also created the necessary opportunities for jihadi–Salafi st groupings to 
make a forceful entry onto the regional political stage through their conquest 
of large swathes of territory in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Th e rise to power, 
meanwhile, of moderately Islamist political players in Egypt and Tunisia has, 
according to Dalacoura, aff ected not only the country’s foreign policies but the 
regional balance of power more widely, motivating a reaction on the part of 
both domestic constituencies and international powers that have considered 
them as possible threats.
Part IV of this volume, entitled ‘Th e Sunni–Shi‘a divide’, fi nally, tackles the 
issue of sectarian politics and confl ict in the post-uprisings era. Comprising 
three chapters, it explores the dynamics of Sunni–Shi‘a identity politics in 
some of the countries most aff ected by sectarian contention and confl ict, 
including Yemen (Vincent Durac), Syria (Laura Ruiz de Elvira Carrascal & 
Souhaïl Belhadj) and Iraq (Chérine Chams El-Dine). Sectarianism has been 
one of the most evident regional dynamics strengthened by the uprisings, 
notably as a consequence of the growing geopolitical competition between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, which overlaps with the broader regional Sunni and 
Shi‘a camps. Th e chapters challenge the notion of sectarianism and a simplistic 
representation of it, and search for the causes of the ongoing confrontation 
in specifi c grievances rather than in doctrinal tensions between Sunni and 
Shi‘a Islam. However, the authors recognise the performative infl uence that 
representing the confl ict as a sectarian confrontation may have in making it 
so. In order to tease out this conundrum, all three chapters turn to history and 
to an in-depth examination of the political relevance of identity politics to the 
wider population and political elites. Th e case of Yemen is paradigmatic in this 
regard, and Durac off ers material to refl ect on the balance between specifi c 
local grievances and their role in driving the Houthi rebellion, and the broader 
regional sectarian dynamics. Th e chapter on Syria by Ruiz de Elvira Carrascal 
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and Belhadj also digs into the history of Syrian nation building to reveal that 
sectarianism has always been part of Syrian politics – particularly under Hizb 
al-Baath al-‘Arabi al-Ishtiraki (Arab Socialist Baath Party of Syria) rule – and 
that the current circumstances have re-signifi ed sectarian identities rather than 
created them.
Th is section, however, also makes room for critical voices, demonstrating that 
anti-sectarian identities and mobilisations have been present in the countries 
under scrutiny. Ruiz de Elvira Carrascal and Belhadj remind us in this regard that, 
whilst Syria’s present conundrum is steeped in sectarian rivalry and acrimony, 
identities in the country remain multiple, with the nation and nation-state 
constituting a key point of reference for many Syrians despite years of sectarian 
warfare. Looking at the case of Iraq, Chérine Chams El-Dine also fi nds evidence 
of anti-sectarian sentiment and behaviour in the Arab Spring-inspired protest 
cycles that gripped the country between 2011 and 2012 and again from 2015 
onwards – a sentiment that survives despite the recent pro-independence vote 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. Th is, claims Chams El-Dine, is evident, among others, in 
the rise to prominence of new politicised actors (youth and ordinary citizens) 
and discourses which – particularly in the protest cycle of 2015–16 – sought to 
counter the growth in sectarian politics post-2003 by resorting to slogans and 
banners that were explicitly secular and nationalist in character.
Th e concluding chapter, authored by Jillian Schwedler, wraps up this edited 
volume by proposing a new approach to the study of political Islam. Schwedler 
puts forward the notion of ‘Islamistness’ to call for an ‘oblique’ entry point to the 
analysis of environments and contexts, rather than of Islamist organisations and/
or political parties. While the examination of single political groups is a worthy 
enterprise when it comes to explaining their evolution or strategic choices, it 
does not help us overcome ‘old’ categories of analysis which, in the post-2011 
region, ought to be questioned. Th e insistence on the ‘moderate–radical’ binary, 
for instance, may allow scholars to frame an organisation’s policy choices, but 
tends to obscure the complex intersection of values, strategic consideration, 
ideological genealogies, as well as the varying degrees of ‘Islamistness’, that 
inform those choices. Echoing the contributions made by Rivett i /Saleh, Wolf 
and Kraetzschmar/Saleh in this volume, Schwedler calls, in fact, for going beyond 
the current binary options that inform scholarship on political Islam (Islamist/
secular, pragmatic/ideological, Islamist/non-Islamist), and for making space for 
nuances and the contemporary presence of Islamist and secular, or non-Islamist, 
ideational and political forces to explain social phenomena. Consequently, she 
proposes a shift  in the focus, moving from an examination of single organisations 
and groups to an examination of contexts and events. Contextual to her eff ort 
of renewing well-established analytical approaches, Schwedler also proposes 
an innovative categorisation of the chapters included in the volume. Instead of 
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regrouping the chapters according to the trajectory they consider, be it the rise to 
power of Islamists and the challenge of governance or the Sunni–Shi‘a divide, as 
they do indeed in the book, she identifi es other salient categories for reading the 
collectivity of chapters and the contribution that they make to the ‘Islamistness’-
centred approach that she advocates.
Notes
 1. As highlighted in Joas Wagemakers (2016), ‘Revisiting Wiktorowicz: categorising and 
defi ning the branches of Salafi sm’, in Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (eds), Salafi sm 
Aft er the Arab Awakening: Contending with People’s Power. London: Hurst, pp. 7–24.
 2. As noted in Chapter 19 on Syria.
 3. A very original analysis and account of this historical trajectories, intertwined with 
elements of introspection and personal biography, is off ered by François Burgat (2016), 
Comprendre l’islam politique: une trajectoire de recherche sur l’altérité islamiste, 1973–2016. 
Paris: La Découverte.
 4. Raymond Hinnebusch (2015), ‘Change and continuity aft er the Arab uprising: the 
consequences of state formation in Arab North African states’, British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 42:1, pp. 12–30, and (2017), ‘How Europe contributed to MENA’s failing 
states system and how MENA blowback threatens Europe, in Richard Gillespie and 
Frédéric Volpi (eds), Routledge Handbook of Mediterranean Politics. London: Routledge, 
pp. 60–71.
 5. Th is volume went to press in the aft ermath of the so-called ‘independence referendum’ 
in Iraqi Kurdistan on 25 September 2017. While the regional implications of the pro-
independence vote are still unclear, the event itself is another testament to the ripple 
eff ects of the Arab uprisings on domestic politics, particularly in Syria and Iraq.
 6. Gilbert Achcar (2015) ‘What happened to the Arab Spring?’ Jacobin, 17 December, 
<htt ps://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/achchar-arab-spring-tunisia-egypt-isis-isil-
assad-syria-revolution/> (last accessed 13 September 2017).
 7. Fatim-Zohra El Malki (2017), ‘Morocco’s Hirak movement: the people versus the 
Makhzen’, Jadaliyya, 2 June, <www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/26645/moroccos-hirak-
movement_the-people-versus-the-makhn> (last accessed 13 September 2017).
 8. Habibulah Mohamed Lamin (2017), ‘Protests grow over police actions in Morocco’, Al 
Monitor, 4 July, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/protest-police-morocco-
rif-hoceima-popular-movement.html> (last accessed 14 September 2017) and Maati 
Monjib (2017), ‘Th e relentless tide of Morocco’s Rif protests’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 21 June, <htt p://carnegieendowment.org/sada/71331> (last accessed 
14 September 2017).
 9. Elizabeth R. Nugent (2017), ‘Islamists aft er the “Arab Spring”: what’s the right research 
question and comparison group, and why does it matt er?’ POMEPS Studies, 26, <htt ps://
pomeps.org/2017/04/27/islamists-aft er-the-arab-spring-whats-the-right-research-ques-
tion-and-comparison-group-and-why-does-it-matt er/> (last accessed 13 September 2017).
10. Islamist parties are in fact mentioned only once in the whole volume, on page 391, and no 
dedicated space is allocated to their analysis. See: Richard S. Katz, and William J. Crott y 
(2006) (eds), Handbook of Party Politics. London: Sage.
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   13 05/01/18   6:47 PM
14 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
11. Frédéric Volpi, and Ewan Stein (2015), ‘Islamism and the state aft er the Arab uprisings: 
Between people power and state power’, Democratization, 22:2, pp. 276–93.
12. Simon Bromley (1997), ‘Middle Eastern exceptionalism: myth or reality?’ in David Pott er, 
David Goldblatt , Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis (eds), Democratization. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, pp. 321–44.
13. Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong (2002), ‘Reconceptualizing the state: 
lessons from post-communism’, Political Th eory, 30:4, pp. 529–54.
14. As noticed and analysed in Chapter 3 on Iran and Chapter 9 on Egypt.
15. Margit, Tavits and Natalia Letki (2009), ‘When left  is right: party ideology and policy in 
post-communist Europe’, American Political Science Review, 103:4, pp. 555–69.
16. Anna Grzymala-Busse (2002), Redeeming the Communist Past: Th e Regeneration of 
Communist Parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and 
Diana Morlang (2003), ‘Hungary: socialists building capitalism’, in Jane Left wich Curry 
and Joan Barth Urban (eds). Th e Left  Transformed in Post-Communist Societies: Th e Cases 
fr om East-Central Europe, Russia and Ukraine. New York: Rowman & Litt lefi eld, pp. 61–98.
17. Morlang, ‘Hungary: socialists building capitalism’.
18. Jane Left wich Curry (2003), ‘Poland’s ex-Communists: from pariahs to establish-
ment party’, in Jane Left wich Curry and Joan Barth Urban (eds). Th e Left  Transformed, 
pp. 19–60.
19. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past.
20. Tavits, Letki, ‘When left  is right’.
21. Nathan J. Brown (2012), When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab 
Politics. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
22. Tavishi Bhasin and Jennifer Gandhi (2013), ‘Timing and targeting of state repression in 
authoritarian elections’, Electoral Studies, 32:4, pp. 620–31.
23. Staff an Lindberg explains that this is particularly true when all opposition forces are 
united in support of the electoral boycott . Staff an I. Lindberg (2006), ‘Opposition parties 
and democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Contemporary Afr ican Studies, 24:1, 
pp. 123–38.
24. Volpi, Stein, ‘Islamism and the state aft er the Arab uprisings’.
25. Ewan Stein (2014), ‘Studying Islamism aft er the Arab Spring’, Mediterranean Politics, 19:1, 
pp. 149–52.
26. Ewan Stein (2011), ‘An uncivil partnership: Egypt’s Jama’a Islamiyya and the state aft er 
the Jihad’, Th ird World Quarterly, 32:5, pp. 863–81.
27. Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai (2013), Political Islam in the Age of Democratization. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   14 05/01/18   6:47 PM
Part I
Islamists and issu es of political and 
economic governance
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   15 05/01/18   6:47 PM
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   16 05/01/18   6:47 PM
Chapter 2
Participation not domination: Morsi 
on an impossible mission?
Mariz Tadros
Much Western literature interpreted the events that led to the overthrow of 
president Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 as a counter-revolution involving a 
military conspiracy against a civilian-led government1 or as a backlash by an 
illiberal intelligentsia to a political party – Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala (Freedom 
and Justice Party, FJP) – whose religious reference point they found threatening,2 
or as a case of the intransigency of Mubarak’s deep state. While each of the above 
propositions largely singles out one particular actor as responsible for Morsi’s 
ousting, this chapter examines the period leading up to the events of July 2013 
through the lens of a relational approach,3 exploring in depth the circumstances 
around the negotiations of interests across diff erent stakeholders. Particular 
att ention will hereby by paid to al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, 
MB) whose political wing, the FJP, and its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, had won 
elections to parliament and the presidency in 2011–12, and had earlier promised 
to pursue a policy of musharka la moughalaba (participation, not domination) 
vis-à-vis other political forces once they assume power. During his short-lived 
tenure in offi  ce between July 2012 and July 2013, President Morsi faced three 
critical challenges to enacting such a policy: negotiating the terms of rule in 
relation to the power structures internal to the MB as a movement and political 
party (FJP); negotiating the power-sharing claims of the opposition and fi nally, 
the limits of reconciling doctrine with inclusivity. To be sure, these challenges 
were set against the backdrop of a broader struggle of changing political alliances, 
allegiances and (informal) agreements between the MB and the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in ever-changing political sett lements, as well 
as the role of the deep state particularly with respect to the police force. However, 
while the latt er themes have been addressed profusely in the literature on de-
mocratisation in Egypt,4 there has been more limited scholarship around the 
challenges of these three unfolding power confi gurations.
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In exploring the negotiation of power relations between the MB and the 
opposition post-June 2012, this chapter argues that the sites for struggle 
throughout the Morsi presidency revolved not only around the distribution of 
cabinet posts and ministerial portfolios (as important as they were) but were 
also doctrinal in nature, revolving around contending visions of sovereignty, the 
nature of the social contract, and the political community. Th is is particularly 
evident when comparing the political thought of the MB prior to the 2011 
Egyptian uprising with that adopted by the group and its affi  liate party, the 
FJP, around the constitution negotiated in 2012 under their leadership. While 
avoiding a consequentialist approach that suggests that the draft  constitution 
was an enactment of the movement’s political thought, this author nonetheless 
suggests that there are striking resonances between the two that merit careful 
examination. Th e constitution did become a litmus test for consensus 
building, and it will be argued that its theocratic underpinnings undermined 
the prospects of reconciling non-Islamists’ conceptions of democracy with 
those of the MB/FJP.
Contending claims for musharka
Th e MB, like other political actors in Egypt, has recognised that engaging 
in coalition-building necessitates arriving at a common ground with other 
opposition forces. To this eff ect, the movement has sought to show that 
the principles of power sharing are grounded in its doctrinal and political 
thought. Th e jurisprudential principle of musharka la moughalaba, emanating 
from a long process of fi qh5 engagement, was fi rst articulated as the MB’s 
stance in relation to power-sharing in November 2010 prior to the last par-
liamentary elections under former president Hosni Mubarak (r.1981–2011). 
Rashad al-Bayoumi, the Deputy Supreme Guide of the MB, emphasised 
in an interview with Al Sharq al-Awsat newspaper on 26 February 2011 – 
a week aft er the ousting of Mubarak – that the MB is committ ed to the 
principle of musharka and that ‘we don’t have any ambitions of leadership or 
domination’.6 In March 2011, prior to the constitutional referendum, the MB 
also affi  rmed its position of being one of musharka la moughalaba, professing 
that it neither aspired for a majority in parliament nor for the nomination 
of a presidential candidate. Some believed the MB would retain this stance 
even aft er its political wing, the FJP, won a plurality of seats in the parliamen-
tary elections of 2011–12. Shortly thereaft er, in June 2012, parliament was 
dissolved by a SCAF order following a Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) 
ruling that had deemed the elections unconstitutional on technical grounds. 
Th e same month, the MB/FJP fi elded Mohamed Morsi as its candidate for 
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the upcoming presidential elections. Morsi then went on to win the election, 
becoming Egypt’s fi rst democratically elected president. At the time, Morsi’s 
victory was met with celebration by the country’s Islamist political parties and 
factions, and greeted with cautious optimism on the part of many belonging 
to various non-Islamist social and political forces. By the time Morsi assumed 
the presidency in the summer of 2012, however, Egyptian society had 
become deeply polarised between those who believed that the new president 
was a triumph for Islam and more broadly for the Muslim ummah and that 
he would bring prosperity for the Egyptian people, and those who believed 
that the country would now move towards theocracy and a renewed form 
of authoritarianism. A third constituency of Egyptians in-between the two 
positions, and widely referred to as the ‘lemon squeezers’,7 had put aside their 
discomfort with the MB’s ascent to power, regarding the group as the lesser of 
the two evils compared to Morsi’s rival in the presidential elections, Ahmed 
Shafi q. Shafi q, who narrowly lost to Morsi in the poll, had been a key minister 
in the ousted Mubarak regime. Th e ‘lemon squeezers’ were willing to give the 
Islamist-dominated legislature and Morsi the benefi t of the doubt and, like 
the rest of the population, hoped that the MB’s assumption to power would 
mark a new democratic era in the country’s history.
As Morsi’s presidential victory was premised on a very slim margin of 
votes, there was a need to complement the political constituency base from 
below with elite support from above through the formation of a power-sharing 
administration. And indeed, at the time there were numerous contending 
political forces internal and external to the MB that had expressed aspirations 
for participating in the new Morsi government. Th e power confi gurations at 
the time were informed not only by a political will to integrate various political 
contenders into a broad-based government, but also a political capacity. For 
one thing, the extent to which Morsi enjoyed suffi  cient political autonomy so as 
to make decisions independently of the MB was from the outset questionable. 
Ever since the establishment of the FJP in April 2011, its relationship to the 
MB had been a source of deep contention for those within and outside the 
movement. Th ere was a faction within the movement that endorsed the idea 
of a clear separation of roles between da‘wa (the remit of the MB) and political 
work (the remit of the party). Such a division of labour never worked so neatly 
on the ground, however, because leaders held multiple hats in both the MB 
and the FJP and because the movement’s guidance bureau continued to serve 
as the higher decision-making power on all matt ers, including those pertaining 
to the FJP, and because of the monopolisation of power in the hands of key 
fi gures such as Khayrat al-Shater.8 It is argued here that the new president’s 
ability to put into practice musharka la moughalaba is likely to have been 
aff ected by the tensions between a party in offi  ce and a parent movement 
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perceived to be a reference point for all followers of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In other words, Morsi may have had to negotiate within the MB the kind of 
political concessions that he would then be able to make to the opposition. 
Such a double loop negotiation process (within the presidential offi  ce and 
the movement) may have limited his manoeuvring space. Th e MB also had its 
own vested interests in keeping Morsi under check. As Bassem Ezbidi noted in 
this regard,
the risk for the Brothers is that the Morsi presidency gradually evolves 
into an independent centre of power, resting on control of institutions 
and direct access to other centres of power within the state (such as 
the military), with the Brotherhood becoming simply a privileged lobby 
among other lobbies.9
In addition to the fear of an independent presidency that would not be 
accountable to the MB, there were also the high aspirations among the 
movement’s movers and shakers who sought reward for their roles and contri-
butions towards the Brothers’ success at the polls by being off ered positions in 
the new government, whether at national, governorate or local levels.10
Pressures on Morsi were also compounded by political forces and parties 
external to the MB who had openly supported Morsi’s candidacy and now 
expected that the pledges the president-elect had made prior to winning 
offi  ce would be kept. Th ese included two core groups: the Salafi s and other 
Islamist political parties and factions on the one hand, and the non-Islamist 
political opposition, including the youth revolutionary forces, on the other 
hand. From a realpolitik perspective, Salafi s may have been perceived by the 
MB as the more important ally with whom to exercise musharka la moughalaba 
on account of their political weight on the streets and in parliament, as well 
as their ideological proximity to the group. Indeed, the Salafi s had won a 
quarter of the seats in the 2011–12 parliament and had a large constituency of 
dedicated members and followers on the ground. However, the Salafi s lacked 
a unifi ed political leadership, their members bearing allegiance to diff erent 
leaders, political parties and movements. Such diversity posed challenges 
for the Salafi s arriving at a common political denominator on all occasions 
and under all circumstances. Yet in the run-off  between Shafi q and Morsi, 
Salafi  parties unanimously endorsed the latt er over the former. In return for 
this electoral support, these Salafi  parties expected Morsi to share political 
power in accordance with their remarkable electoral weight. So for instance, 
prior to Morsi’s announcement of his new government Nader Bakar, the 
spokesperson for Hizb al-Nour (Party of Light, PL)‎, had indicated that they 
had put forward the names of highly competent Salafi  leaders for ‘three or 
four [ministerial] portfolios’.11 Th is is corroborated by a statement made by 
Nasser Abas, a leading fi gure in the FJP who, also prior to the formation of 
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the fi rst Morsi government, had stated that the PL requested they be given the 
ministerial portfolios of education, health, industry and trade.12 According to 
political analyst Ali Abd al-‘Al, the expectation was that Morsi would assign 
some leading Salafi s a number of prominent cabinet posts, and they were left  
in shock when he eventually only off ered them a single ministerial post, that of 
Minster of Environment. Th ey promptly rejected the off er.13
Following on from this initial blow to Salafi  expectations, relations between 
the presidential offi  ce and Egypt’s Salafi  parties remained rocky throughout the 
MB’s year in power, being marked by episodes of both support and contention.14 
For example, when the MB came under assault from a counter-coalition of 
non-Islamists in December 2012 for the issuance of a presidential decree that 
concentrated the legislative, judicial and executive powers in his hands (see 
below), a large section of the country’s Salafi  parties showed solidarity with 
the president and the movement. Th is may have given the strategists within 
the MB the impression that the Salafi s would, when push comes to shove, side 
with the Brothers. However, as became evident in June 2013, Salafi  support 
was by no means a given, when its largest political party, the PL, joined the 
mass protests by non-Islamist opposition forces against Morsi and his admin-
istration. Arguably, one of the key drivers responsible for this move by the PL 
had to do with the MB’s unfulfi lled promises of power sharing.15
As for Egypt’s non-Islamist political parties and movements, meanwhile, 
the MB perhaps had less reason to respond to their demands for power sharing 
than to those expressed by the Salafi s at the time. Th is is because whilst the 
latt er political grouping could evidence a strong constituency of supporters on 
the ground, that of the non-Islamist political forces was, relatively speaking, 
much more scatt ered and considerably smaller. Nonetheless, the basis for 
the non-Islamist political opposition’s claim to inclusion in any MB-led ad-
ministration can be traced back to the so-called Fairmont Agreement, which 
was forged in June 2012 prior to Morsi being offi  cially declared the winner 
of the presidential elections. While run-off  elections had been held on 16 
and 17 June, the Electoral Commission did not announce the offi  cial results 
until 24 June. In the intervening days,16 a meeting took place at the Cairene 
fi ve-star Fairmont Hotel that extended into the late hours of the night. Th e 
meeting was att ended by leading fi gures of the MB, including Morsi himself, 
and a number of representatives from non-Islamist political parties and 
forces, including among others Hizb Misr al-Qawmiyya (Strong Egypt Party, 
SEP) and leading fi gures from youth revolutionary forces such as the 6 April 
Youth Movement’s co-founder Ahmed Maher, blogger Wael Ghonim, Shady 
al-Ghazaly Harb, Wael Khalil and Islam Lotfy, among others.17 Th e discussions 
at the meeting centred around the kind of guarantees (or concessions) the MB 
was willing make to the opposition in return for their endorsement of Morsi’s 
candidature against his opponent Shafi q. Th e conditions that were agreed at 
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the time were as follows: that, if elected, Morsi, upon assuming the presidency, 
would (1) launch a ‘national unity project’,18 (2) form a ‘national salvation 
government’ that included representatives from all political forces and be 
headed by an independent political fi gure, (3) select a presidential team that 
refl ected Egypt’s diverse political arena and (4) ensure a diverse and repre-
sentative membership on the constituent assembly responsible for draft ing 
Egypt’s new constitution.19 In eff ect what was agreed at the Fairmont Hotel 
was that non-Islamist political parties and youth coalitions would politically 
endorse the MB’s presidential candidate and mobilise their supporters to this 
eff ect, in return for an inclusive political sett lement that would be enacted in 
the event of a Morsi victory. Whereas with the Salafi s no quid pro quo deal 
was publicly announced, the terms that were reached at the Fairmont Hotel 
were made public at a press conference on 22 June 2012. It could be argued 
that the Fairmont Agreement was of limited political weight since the non-
Islamists who signed it had very limited ability to mobilise a constituency in 
favour of Morsi and because the agreement was largely one intended to block 
a military candidate from coming to power rather than premised on a genuine 
partnership. However, the announcement by Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Watani 
(National Salvation Front, NSF)20 less than two months aft er Morsi assumed 
power that the MB and the new administration had failed to comply with the 
commitments it made at the Fairmont Hotel contributed to turning what 
were once partners against the military into opponents bent on holding the 
incumbent regime to account.21
Against this backdrop of growing disillusionment with the MB and the Morsi 
government, the process of forging the country’s new post-uprising constitution 
was seen as strategically important in infl uencing the trajectory of the country 
and the distribution of power in the new body politic. Th is included the MB 
itself, whose strategic choices in the constitution-draft ing process were guided 
by both pragmatic power-political considerations as well as by the organisation’s 
own doctrine. Indeed, whilst in no way suggesting doctrine was a key driver on all 
policy issues, it constitutes an under-studied dimension of the negotiations that 
shaped the constitution-draft ing process. Focusing on the 2012 constitution, the 
following pages highlight how the doctrine of musharka la moughalaba played 
into the MB’s approach to the new constitutional text.
The constitutional conundrum: the doctrinal 
limits of musharka
Th e craft ing of a new constitution under President Morsi in 2012 was meant 
to mark a new social contract between state and people post-Mubarak, and 
conclude the country’s transition to democracy. Th e new constitution itself 
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was to be draft ed by an assembly elected by parliament whose composition 
was to be inclusive, mirroring the diverse socio-political forces in society. In 
the end, however, the constitution-draft ing process was marred by controversy 
and a walk-out by non-Islamist forces, who perceived the draft  constitution 
as a strong move towards theocracy. What thus was meant to be based on the 
principle of musharka ultimately turned into an episode of moughalaba, with 
a boycott  of the draft ing process by most non-Islamist actors/forces and the 
passage of a draft  constitution by an Islamist-dominated constituent assembly. 
It is suggested here that the controversies surrounding the draft  constitution 
and the eventual walk-out by non-Islamist actors was partly the consequence 
of ideological struggles.
Although Morsi had vowed before assuming offi  ce to forge an inclusive 
government and engage in consensus politics, once elected he sought at 
any cost to fast-track the formulation of a new constitution, even if it meant 
compromises in the pursuit of participatory processes. Arguably, this urgency 
lay in a process that had begun months prior to his assumption of offi  ce. On 
14 June 2012, the SCC announced the dissolution of the fi rst freely elected 
post-Mubarak parliament on grounds of its unconstitutionality. In the absence 
of a parliament, it would eff ectively mean that the next president of Egypt 
would have both the executive and legislative powers concentrated in his 
hands, including the right to declare war, for example. Th is prospect increased 
the anxiety of some members of the non-Islamist political forces, including 
leading parties such as Hizb al-Misri al-Dimuqrati al-Ijtmaʿi‎ (Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party, ESDP) and Hizb al-Misriyeen al-Ahrar (Free Egyptians 
Party, FEP), who were concerned that the next president would be bestowed 
with near absolute power. Consequently, they conveyed their concerns to 
the SCAF, which responded on 18 June 2012 – a day aft er the presidential 
elections – by issuing a constitutional decree that further butt ressed the powers 
of SCAF at the expense of any future president. Th e constitutional decree 
gave SCAF four principle powers: (1) the right to legislate in the absence of 
parliament; (2) the right to declare war and a state of emergency; (3) control 
over internal governance of all matt ers associated with the armed forces and all 
levels of leadership including its commander, and (4) the power to infl uence 
the selection criteria for identifying the members of the constituent assembly 
responsible for the draft ing of Egypt’s new constitution. On 24 June, Morsi’s 
victory over Shafi q as president was formally announced. From his victory 
onwards, Morsi was under extreme pressure from all political forces, Islamist 
and non-Islamists alike, to retrieve the powers that were usurped by SCAF. 
Th e only option for him to do so was to annul this constitutional decree once 
president and to replace it with a new one. On 12 August, Morsi did just that, 
announcing a new constitutional decree that annulled the one issued by SCAF 
on 18 June. Morsi also appointed General Abdel Fatt ah al-Sisi as new Minister 
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of Defence, and side-lined Field Marshall Tantawy, the Commander of the 
Armed Forces who had presided over the transition phase as head of SCAF. 
Th is, however, caused the non-Islamist political forces to turn against Morsi, 
accusing him of concentrating power in his hands in an absolutist manner via 
a constitutional decree that he had issued unilaterally. Hence, President Morsi 
found that the only way in which he could legitimately claim these powers 
was to have a constitution drawn up that would defi ne and bestow upon him 
the right to rule, replacing the decrees and counter-decrees that had been 
unilaterally issued up to that point.22
As for the draft ing process of the new constitution, whilst there were many 
points of contention over the composition of the Constituent Assembly as well 
as the design of the new constitutional text itself, it was doctrinal matt ers that 
became a prime source of tension between the MB and its political opponents. 
Islamist members of the Assembly, such as Amany Abou al-Fadl, pointed out, 
for instance, that there were att empts by the ‘liberals’ to impose on everyone 
supra-national frameworks that were antithetical to Islamic Shari‘ah, such as 
United Nations international conventions and treaties, which undermined 
the negotiation process.23 Waheed Abdel Meguid – a non-Islamist political 
analyst and Constituent Assembly member who had initially endorsed 
the election of Morsi and participated in the Fairmont Agreement but who 
later withdrew from the assembly – also sheds light on how the process of 
negotiations got stalled.24 His account, like that of Ghozlan, suggests that there 
was a general sense of goodwill at the beginning of the inauguration of the 
new Constituent Assembly in 2012. However, Abdel Meguid considers that 
the question of the relationship between state and religion had from the outset 
led to the emergence of two camps, a pro-Islamist and a non-Islamist one. 
Th is polarisation revolved not only around the balance of powers or matt ers 
of policy, but around doctrinal diff erences that appeared at the time irrecon-
cilable. Constitutional articles around which there was contention (no less 
than thirty) were thus broad and varied, ranging from matt ers to do with the 
scope of powers of the military, the nature of regulation of the press and media, 
the rights of farmers, workers and children. However, the most contentious 
matt ers around which constituent members batt led were to do with the 
relationship between religion and the state.25 According to Abdel Meguid, the 
Salafi s, supported by the MB, proposed a number of measures that would give 
the state a more Islamic character, such as making more explicit the jurispru-
dential sources of governance and increasing the power of al-Azhar to oversee 
legislation to ensure its compatibility with Islamic Shari‘ah. Many non-Islamist 
political forces, meanwhile, vehemently objected to these proposals, partly 
on doctrinal grounds. Th e Muslim Brotherhood decided that rather than take 
these contentious proposals straight to voting, and therefore jeopardise the 
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image of the Constituent Assembly as inclusive, they would initiate a number 
of informal mediation sessions. Th ese mediation sessions, according to Abdel 
Meguid, comprised a small group of members from within the Constituent 
Assembly, including representatives from the MB, the Salafi s, non-Islamist 
political fi gures, al-Azhar and the Coptic Orthodox Church. Th e aim was to try 
and reach consensus over a wording that would be acceptable to all. According 
to Abdel Meguid’s account, these mediation sessions made only slow progress 
and were cut-short/jeopardised by the president’s decision on 7 November 
2012 that the draft  constitution had to be completed within less than three 
weeks.26 Indeed, Morsi’s decision caused consternation among non-Islamist 
Assembly members, who felt that the draft ing process was being rushed at 
the expense of fi nding a tenable compromise on proposed articles that would 
further Islamcise the state and its governance. Consequently, on 14 November 
2012, eleven constituent members from across the political spectrum of 
non-Islamist parties announced their resignation from the assembly, in 
addition to all the representatives of the various Christian denominations, 
who had already resigned.27
Ultimately, Abdel Meguid’s account of the constitution-draft ing process 
suggests that att empts at engaging in consensual politics around the 
contentious issue of the relationship between religion and the state through 
mediation sessions failed because, in the end, there were ideological limits of 
accommodating musharka la moughalaba when these touched on fundamental 
doctrinal positions espoused by the MB and the Salafi s in relation to Islamic 
governance. Indeed, the constitution that was ultimately draft ed, and put to a 
popular vote, was not only the result of a pragmatic desire by the MB not to 
lose the Salafi s as allies in and outside the Constituent Assembly, but in large 
measure informed by the political thought of the group itself. As concerns 
the former, it is important to note that the Salafi s had been highly critical and 
oppositional to the MB on a number of other occasions, including for example 
the MB’s leadership of parliament, accusing Mohamed al-Beltagy of not giving 
them suffi  cient opportunity to speak.28 However, when the constitution 
draft ed during 2012 came under fi re, against the backdrop of the withdrawal 
of the Christian church establishment and non-Islamist forces, the Salafi s 
came out in full and open support of the MB. For example, prominent Salafi  
Sheikh Yasser al-Borhamy on the website Ana Salafi  fully endorsed the draft  
constitution, explaining the strong alignment that existed between the MB and 
the Salafi s in blocking att empts by the ‘secularists’ to block the deepening of 
the application of the Shari‘ah.29
Th e strong infl uence of the MB’s political thought within the 2012 
constitution, meanwhile, is manifest fi rst and foremost in the number of 
glaring similarities between ideas around what is meant by a ‘civil state with 
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an Islamic reference’, articulated by the group in previous decades, and some 
of the articles introduced in the draft  constitution. Indeed, an examination of 
the MB’s political thought in the decades prior to their assumption of offi  ce 
suggests that the genesis of such articles lay in broader ideas around Islamic 
governance.30 While historically a plurality of positions and stances can be 
found within the MB on issues of governance, pluralism and inclusivity,31 
this plurality of views ultimately did not feature in the discussions around 
the constitution. Instead, the MB presented a unifi ed position within the 
Constituent Assembly on matt ers of Islamic governance. Notable cases in point 
concern for instance the MB’s proposed formulations for Articles 2, 4 and 219 
of the draft  constitution, all of which combined served fi rst to privilege Shari‘ah 
as God’s law over human agency, second, to deepen the purpose and place of 
Shari‘ah as a system of governance and third, to privilege the clergy by giving 
them oversight over the application of the Shari‘ah on all legislation passed in 
parliament. Article 2 of the 1971 constitution had identifi ed Shari‘ah as the 
principle source of legislation. Th e fact that the constitution of 1971 spoke 
of Shari‘ah principles as opposed to compliance with Shari‘ah jurisprudential 
laws and regulations gave the Egyptian judiciary a certain scope of fl exibility 
in interpreting what the principles of Shari‘ah are. In fact, this wording has 
historically enabled the SCC to circumvent Shari‘ah law and issue progressive 
judgements.32 In the constitutional discussions of 2012, non-Islamists 
proposed that Article 2 of the constitution of 1971 remain unaltered in the 
new constitution. Whilst the MB consented to retaining Article 2 intact, they 
did, however, propose the addition of a new article, Article 219, which sought 
to specify the principle sources of Shari‘ah stipulated in Article 2. Article 
219 stated that ‘[t]he principles of Shari‘ah include general evidence and 
foundations, rules and jurisprudence as well as sources accepted by doctrines 
of Sunni Islam and by the larger community’.33 Unlike the 1971 constitution, 
the proposed Article 219 of the 2012 constitution thus made it explicit that 
legislation was meant to be compatible not only with the principles of the 
Shari‘ah but with the laws as dictated by Islamic jurisprudence. Hence this 
removed possibilities for fl exibility in interpretation and potentially moved 
the judiciary towards compliance with the laws as required by Islamic juris-
prudence in their rulings. It also meant that, if this article was to be applied, 
any future parliament would have to ensure that all legislation would comply 
with the precepts and laws stipulated in Islamic jurisprudence. While there is a 
degree of fl exibility and variation between, and within, the diff erent schools of 
jurisprudence, nevertheless, there are limits. For example, criminal law would 
have had to comply with the hudud precepts.34
As draft ed, Article 219 of the 2012 constitution bore strong congruence 
with the political thinking of Sheikh Yussuf al-Qaradawy. Al-Qaradawy remains 
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revered as a high authority and source of learning within the MB, so much so 
that he was once nominated to assume the role of Supreme Guide of the group 
(its highest political leadership).35 As al-Qaradawy argued:
The Islamic state is a constitution or legitimate state that has its own 
constitution to which it refers for governance and a law to refer to, and 
its constitution is represented in the principles and laws of the Shari‘ah 
as came down in the Qur’an and the Sunna in terms of doctrine, ‘badat, 
ethics and mo’amlat’.36 
Th e deepening of the premise of Shari‘ah law in governance was also supposed 
to inscribe the principle of the supremacy of God’s inscriptions over human 
agency. Even if inscribed in writing, it is the sovereignty of God’s laws, not the 
sovereignty of the people that governs. Again, al-Qaradawy argued that:
by the Lord of the people, the King of the People, and the God of the 
people. Neither he [ruler] nor others from among people can cancel 
these rulings or freeze them. No king, nor president nor parliament, nor 
government nor revolutionary council nor central committee nor people’s 
conference nor any power on earth can change from the constant [non-
changeable] rules of God.37
Sallah al-Sawy, a leading MB thinker, had also argued in his writing before 
the 2011 uprising that the supremacy of Shari‘ah over any human-made law 
makes for a superior political order. He had argued that legislation must be 
based on God’s laws in an absolute way, and to share this sovereignty with 
the people is shirk (to associate partners with Allah, to be a polytheist) and to 
base the law on the sovereignty of the people, as in Western democracies, is a 
form of kufr  (apostasy). A system of democracy is not an end solution but is 
to be accepted only in the transitional phase, because it is anathema to the full 
application of God’s sovereignty.38 Al-Sawy further argued that representative 
legislatures that do not rule in accordance with Shari‘ah should have a singular 
purpose: to pronounce the sovereignty of God in the draft ing of legislation. 
Any legislation that does not comply with Shari‘ah should be regarded as null 
and void. Resistance or opposition to the application of Shari‘ah is considered 
a form of kufr .39
Finally, Al-Qaradawy argued that because liberal democratic orders are 
premised on decision making by consensus, this sometimes leads to unprincipled 
decisions being made. Undoubtedly, such reasoning carried important bearings 
on the functioning of the Constituent Assembly delegated with the responsibility 
of drawing the 2012 constitution. In view of opposition from some non-Islamist 
forces to the proposed deepening of Shari‘ah rule in the constitution, it was not 
surprising that there was resistance from within the MB to the notion of consensus 
building as a process of drawing up the new constitution. Indeed, from the 
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perspective of some of the MB’s key political thinkers, it is the application of God’s 
law, not what the political community agree, that renders governance legitimate.40 
Th e fact that Shari‘ah is enacted through writt en laws through, a Constitutional 
Court, for example, as al-Qaradawy and Tawfi q al-Wa ‘i (see below) proposed, 
does not obliterate its religious character.
Article 4 of the draft  constitution, meanwhile, had also stirred concern among 
non-Islamist forces for the establishment of an Islamic theocracy. It stipulated 
that the opinion of al-Azhar was to be taken in all matt ers pertaining to Islamic 
Shari‘ah. In view of the necessity of bringing all laws in compliance with the 
Shari‘ah, al-Azhar’s scope of infl uence would have been potentially unlimited. 
Indeed, Article 4 of the constitution had created a supra-elite class that assumed 
a policing role over the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the state, 
scrutinising legislation for Shari‘ah compliance, in accordance with members’ 
own interpretations. It is ironic that when the MB explained their notion of 
a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’ in their writings prior to the ousting of 
Mubarak, they had oft en emphasised that their vision of an Islamic state was 
not a religious one because of the absence of the meddling of a religious elite 
in politics. Prominent MB political thinker al-Wa‘i had argued, for instance, 
that one element that makes the Islamic state a ‘civil’ and not a ‘religious’ 
one is that governance is not mediated through the powers of the clergy, but 
through writt en legislation in accordance with the principles of the Qur’an and 
Sunna. Where matt ers arise that do not have clear rulings, they are to be sett led 
through shura (consultation) or the principles accorded in the Qur’an and 
Sunna. However, the standing of the ‘ulama in an Islamic government does not 
suggest a disconnection from the sources of power. Al-Qaradawy noted in this 
regard that unlike the clergy in former theocratic Europe, in Islam the concept 
of men of religion (clergy) is non-existent and that instead there are specialised 
‘ulama in Islamic matt ers, and that their responsibility is to provide advice and 
direction for all Muslims, and the state must create the enabling environment 
for them to do so.41 He further contends that, in an Islamic system, the principle 
of the supremacy of Shari‘ah is higher than the supremacy of the law because 
no law-making legislature can deviate or violate the content of the Shari‘ah. 
Accordingly, no institution within the state is empowered to change or delay 
the implementation of the laws of the Shari‘ah.42
Whilst sponsored by Islamist parties/forces in the constituent assembly, 
the inclusion of both aforementioned articles, 4 and 219, were received with 
great hostility by a majority of non-Islamist forces, who perceived them as 
signifi cant moves towards a theocratic system of government. Indeed, no single 
article contributed more to triggering the withdrawal of non-Islamist members 
of the Constituent Assembly from the process than the proposed Article 219. 
So for instance, the Coptic Orthodox representative on the assembly withdrew 
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in November 2012, aft er internal pressure from Coptic civil society upon its 
representatives to step down from the Constituent Assembly on account of 
the proposed content of Article 219. All three main denominational Christian 
churches in Egypt then issued a joint statement decrying the non-inclusive 
nature of the constitution and its articles.43 Th is then snowballed into a wave of 
withdrawals including a number of renowned intellectuals, the representative of 
the April 6 Movement, and representatives of key-non-Islamist political parties.
Th e trigger for the withdrawal of non-Islamist members from the Constituent 
Assembly was hence at least in part ideological. Ultimately, when key representa-
tives of diff erent social, political and cultural forces and actors are missing from 
the Constituent Assembly, this creates a legitimacy defi cit. Faced with defectors 
from the Constituent Assembly, the MB therefore decided to go ahead anyway 
without them, confi dent in their mobilisational capacity to win a constitutional 
referendum, if put to the people. As is now known, the draft  constitution passed 
the referendum vote, garnering the support of 63.8 per cent of those who went to 
the polls.44
The signifi cance of doctrinal moughalaba
Doctrinal moughalaba does not account for the downfall of the MB. In fact, no 
single factor or actor has such att ributable power, since it is a highly complex 
constellation of factors that led to the mass uprising of Egyptians in June 
2013 and the ensuing military intervention on 3 July. Ultimately, doctrinal 
moughalaba witnessed in the constitutional saga was neither predictable nor 
inevitable. It was unpredictable because, though the MB’s political thought 
on issues of governance, pluralism and inclusively was profusely disseminated 
prior to their assumption of offi  ce, the change of context could have led to a 
shift  in positions. It was not inevitable that the MB’s doctrinal stance would 
lead to the assumption of a position of moughalaba in the constitutional 
debates since it was also subject to the movement’s own bargaining power and 
that of its allies and opponents.
However, the exercise of moughalaba politics on the part of the MB in 
relation to the constitution is signifi cant on other grounds. First, it contributed, 
among other factors, to the coalescing of the opposition into a unifi ed counter-
movement against the MB. While it is impossible to disentangle the many 
batt les of contestation between the MB and other political forces in Egypt 
in the period leading up to the 3 July 2013 rupture, the Brothers’ doctrinal 
positions in the constitution-draft ing process certainly helped deepen the 
country’s growing polarisation between Islamists and non-Islamists. Indeed, 
the hardening of stances in relation to the handling of the constitutional 
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debates was mutual. On the one hand, when Mahmood Ghozlan was asked 
in December 2012 how he perceived the walk-out of major political factions, 
he said it did not bother him because the rule of democracy is to go by the 
majority and not the minority.45 He also asserted that he saw this walk-out as a 
form of blackmail: that they either get their way or they walk away, especially 
since the process had been going on for fi ve months. He believed that the 
Islamists cared more for the good of the country by remaining committ ed 
to the constitution-draft ing process, while the others were exploitative and 
ill-willed towards an Islamist president.
Ahmed Maher, the leader of the April 6 Movement, who pulled out of the 
Constituent Assembly, meanwhile, criticised the 50–50 principle guiding 
the composition of the assembly on the basis that there were at least four 
diff erent political forces in Egypt, not two. According to him, the 50–50 was 
a cover up for majoritarian politics and not intended to give equal weight to 
the plethora of political orientations that have a presence in Egyptian political 
life.46 Technically, Morsi did not have a direct political role in informing the 
process of drawing Egypt’s new constitution, since the task was assigned to a 
100-strong Constituent Assembly. However, he did have the right to veto the 
constitution by not signing the document. Should he withhold his signature, 
the constitution would not be put forward to the people for a vote. Its passing 
through a people’s referendum without consensus being achieved among the 
main political, social and economic forces in the country thus suggests that the 
policy of moughalaba prevailed. Ultimately, this contributed to a mobilisation 
of factions and political forces and their coalescing into a counter-coalition that 
would put aside its diff erences and unite in opposition to the Morsi presidency.
Second, by ignoring the ideological underpinnings paving the way potentially 
for theocratic constitutionalism, narratives of democratisation in Egypt ran the 
risk of giving a simplistic account of a country that was in transition, no matt er 
how rocky, before the democratisation process was halted in July 2013. Consti-
tutional theocracy, as defi ned by Hirschl, has four key elements: (1) adherence 
to some or all core elements of modern constitutionalism, including distinction 
between political and religious authority, (2) endorsement of a state religion, 
(3) the constitutional enshrining of the religion, its texts, directives and inter-
pretations as a (or the) main source of legislation and judicial interpretation of 
laws – essentially, establishing that laws may not infringe upon injunctions of the 
state-endorsed religion; and (4) religious bodies carrying more than symbolic 
weight, and certain judicial oversight powers.47 While many narratives of Egypt’s 
post-Mubarak era astutely point to the dangers of civilian rule emanating from 
the military, they seem to overlook the dangers to civilian rule emanating from 
the institution of a theocratic form of governance. Th e constitution was one site 
for the deepening of the legitimacy of religious rule. Against the backdrop of 
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the highly authoritarian nature of the current Egyptian regime in power (as of 
summer 2017), it is possible to reduce the story of the failure of the transition 
phase to the ousting of the MB and President Morsi from power. Fahmy and 
Faruqi, for instance, dedicate a whole volume to examining how ‘intellectuals 
and activists so demonstrably committ ed to the cause of civil society, freedom 
and democracy in Egypt – indeed to the very impulses that inspired the 2011 
uprising – come to abandon those commitments’ [by mobilising against the MB 
and siding with the military aft er the ousting of President Morsi from power].48
Th e analysis of events presented here is neither meant to vindicate 
Egyptian intellectuals or activists nor to vilify the Morsi-led government. 
Rather, it seeks to highlight that at that critical juncture in Egypt’s history 
(2012–13) the sites for struggle revolved not exclusively around policy 
choices or balancing diff erent powers, as signifi cant and central as these 
were, but they were also doctrinal/ideological. Th e latt er made President 
Morsi’s mission of remaining committ ed to, and implementing, musharka la 
moughalaba even more challenging. By exposing the theocratic underpin-
nings of the constitution inaugurated in January 2013, the chapter raises 
questions as to how far the regime had been committ ed to a civilian and 
inclusive form of governance in the fi rst place.
Conclusions
Th e notion of musharka la moughalaba originally conceived in the context of 
negotiating the terms of participation of the MB in the 2010 parliamentary 
elections (before they withdrew) was premised on jurisprudential (fi qh) 
grounds for pursuing the politics of participation through power-sharing. In 
the context of Morsi’s assumption of the presidency in July 2012, there were a 
number of challenges in pursuing this policy. Th e fi rst challenge was internal, 
associated with negotiating the sources of presidential power in relation to the 
FJP and its mother organisation, the MB. Th e extent to which Morsi enjoyed 
the power to negotiate power-sharing deals with various stakeholders indepen-
dently of the MB is highly questionable. Indeed, the expectations and aspirations 
of MB leaders for a tangible reward aft er years of repression and mobilisation 
would have put no small measure of pressure on the prospects and possibilities 
of sharing power with external claims-making actors. Th e principle of musharka 
la moughalaba informed the negotiation of the Fairmont Agreement with a 
wide array of opposition fi gures and parties prior to Morsi’s assumption of the 
presidency. Th e agreement was an offi  cial one, which stated very clearly that in 
return for support of Morsi’s candidature, the new president would pursue an 
inclusive governance strategy once in power. Meanwhile, once in power, the 
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MB claimed that they remained committ ed to power sharing but that it was the 
opposition that did not want to share the burden of government.
While of a more informal nature, there also seemed to be a tacit agreement 
that in return for the Salafi s’ endorsement of the MB in the presidential elections, 
they too would be incorporated into any power-sharing governance arrangement. 
As with the non-Islamist opposition, Salafi s also protested the exclusivist hold 
of the MB on power and yet when the Brothers entered into clashes with the 
non-Islamist opposition in front of the presidential palace in November 2012, 
the Salafi s showed solidarity with the Brothers. In view of their highly diff erenti-
ated leadership, ultimately those that rose against the Brothers in June 2013 were 
driven by an opposition to their policy of moughalaba la musharka.
Th is said, the challenge of musharka la moughalaba was not one only of 
realpolitik nor was it of poor tactical judgement, it was also doctrinal. Th e 
political thought of the MB prior to the assumption of power was not a predictor 
of the ideological or political positions that it would take upon assuming 
offi  ce, given that the power dialectics were highly complex. However, some 
key political choices, such as those informing certain proposed constitutional 
provisions, were underpinned, in some part, by the doctrinal position of the 
MB on matt ers to do with state, society and governance. Indeed, as highlighted 
above, there is a glaring resonance between the political thought of the MB 
on ‘a civil state with an Islamic reference’ (developed prior to the Egyptian 
uprising) and Articles 4 and 219 of the constitution promulgated in 2013 
under their leadership. While caution is needed to avoid a teleological reading 
as to how doctrine infl uences political choices, on the other hand, failure to 
recognise congruence between a rich and well-developed body of doctrine and 
the political stances taken may led to a reductionist analysis of why musharka 
was not pursued at certain critical points in Egypt’s post-uprising period, such 
as that of the draft ing of the constitution.
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Chapter 3
Governing after protests: the 
case for political participation 
in post-2009 Iran
Paola Rivetti and Alam Saleh
While driving on Bakeri Expressway in Tehran in 2016, one of the two authors’ 
friends, A., recalled a protest during the summer of 2009 when the people 
of Iran took to the streets, giving form to what has since come to be known 
as the ‘Green Movement’.1 In June 2009, and for months later, protests took 
place in several cities across the country against the re-election of Mahmood 
Ahmadinejad (r.2005–13) as president of the republic, an election that the 
protesters considered rigged. Th e ‘Green Movement’, or the fi tna (sedition) 
as it is called by the forces that countered it, constituted the fi ercest challenge 
yet to the stability of the Islamic Republic. What started as a dispute over 
the election results spiralled, as the months passed by, into a comprehensive 
confrontation between the opposition and Ahmadinejad’s government, with 
radical fringes aiming their critique at the regime itself.2 As A. recalled:
We were in Parkway [an important junction in North Tehran where 
portraits of martyrs from the Iran–Iraq war are at display], and people 
were shouting ‘Basiji vaghei Hemmat bodo Bakeri’ (the real bassij were 
Hemmat and Bakeri) against the bassij3 that had beaten up their brothers 
and sisters during the protests. The reality is that if Bakeri and Hemmat 
were alive, they would protest with us to defend the truth and honour of 
the Islamic Republic, which they created, and to allow people to protest: 
how do you think the revolution happened?4
Th is short excerpt of a longer conversation speaks directly to the relevance 
of the issue of political participation in the Islamic Republic, whose political 
system synthetises authoritarian and democratic characteristics and subsumes 
political participation as a fundamental trait of its history and genealogy, thus 
off ering fertile ground to build arguments in favour of expanding it. According 
to the constitution, in fact, Iranians can participate in national politics in a 
number of ways, from voting to protesting, all of which are rights included in 
the fundamental law.5 Th ese rights are based on values that do not only resonate 
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with the Islamic Republic’s historical legacy and revolutionary genesis. Th ey 
are also religiously legitimised by a specifi c reading of Shi‘ism as a ‘theology of 
discontent’ and rebellion, which turns important religious celebrations, such 
as Ashura and ta‘zieh, into ‘theatres of protest’. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that such religious celebrations have been politicised and utilised to spread 
revolutionary ideas during the 1970s.6
Political participation, and the right to it, are at the core of what Saïd Amir 
Arjomand defi nes as ‘constitutional politics’, namely ‘the struggle for the 
defi nition of social and political order [which] takes place among groups and 
organizations whose interests align them behind diff erent principles of order’.7 
In fact, political participation, both as a principle and a right, is contested yet, 
crucially, mobilised by pro-regime and oppositional8 forces alike. Invocations 
supporting the expansion of the public sphere and the right to political par-
ticipation may come from opposed sides, urging the regime to become more 
inclusive. Although they may have contrasting goals and diff erent nuances, 
such invocations can have the similar eff ect of challenging, to a varying degree, 
the current status quo.
Our contribution explores such challenges. It argues that the right to 
political participation is a cornerstone of Iran’s governance which, echoing 
Janine Wedel, Cris Shore, Gregory Feldman and Stacy Lathrop,9 is understood 
as the ensemble of principles and notions sustaining the procedures and 
structures that govern the interaction between the state and society. It follows 
that governance in a hybrid regime, such is the Islamic Republic,10 is sustained 
and regulated by ideational devices that transcend authoritarianism and come 
to terms with ‘non-authoritarian notions’ such as political participation.
Th is chapter diverges from the rest of the literature on rights and political 
freedom in Iran. Broadly speaking, most of the literature focuses on the issue 
of cultural relativism and Islam versus the universality of rights and secularism, 
and whether the institutions of the Islamic Republic (the government, the 
judiciary system, the security forces, etc.) respect the citizens’ rights, which 
come under diff erent labels, be they human rights, women and/or minority 
rights.11 Complementary to such perspective, scholarship on Iran has also 
examined the eff orts of progressive and reform-minded groups and individuals 
critical of the regime to reconcile Islam and diff erent types of rights. Mahmood 
Monshipouri and Mehdi Zakerian, for example, focus their analysis on 
the struggle of social actors such as NGOs, student groups and women to 
accommodate a secular and a religious understanding of human rights.12
Th e authors of this chapter take a diff erent approach. Rather than examine 
how ijtihad (the Islamic interpretation) may be stretched to translate secular 
liberal rights, we draw on the work of Arzoo Osanloo, Mehran Tamadonfar, 
Naser Ghorbannia among others, arguing that Iran’s legal system is built on 
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both secular and religious epistemologies, and that actors willing to advocate 
for the expansion of rights may build on either. Th e concepts of politico-civil 
rights and democratic participation are inscribed in the history and politics 
of Iran, and refl ected in its hybrid legislation.13 It follows that the right to 
political participation is part of a common background that both oppositional 
and conservative forces share, although diff erences exist. By examining how 
it is articulated by diff erent political forces, then, the authors seek to reveal 
the heterogeneous and contested nature of law-making in Iran, questioning 
the notion of a Shari‘ah-based legislation that is, by nature, unchangeable, or 
changeable thanks only to religious ijtihad.
Th e analysis at hand focuses on the post-2009 period; that is the period 
following the tenth presidential election in Iran. Th is election saw un-
precedented political action and radicalised discourses and demands for 
political participation. Like the Arab uprisings two years later, it produced a 
suspension of political limitations, off ering an opportunity to voice discontent 
and articulate diverse ideological visions present in society.14 Th is moment 
of exceptionality was followed by an authoritarian backlash, however, and 
the post-2009 securitisation of the public sphere, along with exclusionary 
politics and divisions within the elite and the population that ensued from the 
repression,15 led public fi gures from a diverse range of political backgrounds – 
individuals that the regime regards both as insiders and outsiders – to question 
the discrepancy between the behaviour of the government and the principles 
enshrined in the constitution.
Th e 2009–10 protests were a watershed moment in the history of the Islamic 
Republic: what governance arrangements were possible aft er the society and 
the ruling elite became so polarised as an eff ect of their de facto exclusion from 
the ruling institutions and the public sphere? Th is chapter shows that the eff ort 
to refashion governance aft er the protests reignited the constitutional debate 
around the foundation of the Islamic Republic, emphasising its epistemo-
logical plurality. Individuals calling for the overcoming of social and political 
polarisation, in fact, built their claim on both the secular and the religious 
nature of Iran’s governance structure, rather than stressing its religious tenets 
exclusively. Th is suggests that in order to explain the ‘pragmatic’ approach to 
governance, dilemmas pillared around individual and collective rights that 
Islamists in power might adopt, it is necessary to complement theories centred 
on Islamic moderation, or analyses pivoted on Islamic liberalism, with a richer 
and multi-sourced understanding of the intersection between politics and 
religion. Adopting such a broadened perspective, the following pages will fi rst 
discuss the centrality of demands for political participation and rights in the 
history of Iran. Th is is then followed by an analysis of how Iran’s legal hybridity 
has provided a fertile environment for reclaiming political participation as a 
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fundamental right encoded both in history and the law. In a third and fi nal 
section, the chapter illustrates how both oppositional and pro-regime forces 
have utilised a common historical background and legal plurality to advance 
the demand for a more inclusive political environment, tolerant of diversity, in 
the post-2009 era.
The genealogy of the ‘right to political participation’
The historical and political background
According to Henry Steiner,16 while political participation is widely recognised 
across a broad spectrum of countries as a right, its translation into legal 
provisions has encountered obstacles that are connected to what he calls 
the diff erent ‘theories of political participation’ that dominate in diff erent 
countries. Th e principle of political participation grants citizens the right to 
take part, directly or through representatives, in the conduct of public aff airs 
by voting in elections and by infl uencing governmental decision making. Th e 
right to political participation itself, therefore, includes diff erent modes of 
participation. While some, such as the right to vote, go unquestioned in the 
majority of national polities, others, such as the right to organise protests and 
voice dissent publicly, may be a matt er of political contention at the national 
and international levels. As will become apparent below, in Iran the right to 
political participation constitutes a pillar of Iran’s dominant political culture, 
yet also remains a deeply divisive and contested right.
Th e notion of rights (hoquq, sing. haq) has consistently featured across 
the history of modern-day Iran. Constitutional rights, human rights and civil 
rights are notions around which political participation, mobilisations, reform 
and claims of legitimacy have revolved. Th e public memory of historical events 
is oft en based on a rights-centred perspective. Such a memory is important 
because it informs ordinary citizens’ understanding of their own history and 
political agency, becoming relevant to the regime too. Two historical events 
are of particular importance in the Iranian context: the constitutional and 
the Islamic revolutions. Th e constitutional revolution (1905–11) is usually 
regarded as the event that brought notions such as constitutionalism, political 
equality and ruler’s accountability to Iran. Yadullah Shahibzadeh asserts 
that this event popularised a democratic language promoting the idea that 
‘the people’ consists of citizens with equal political and civil rights (mellat) 
and encouraged Iranians to think and talk about their society through a 
new vocabulary pillared around the notion of rights.17 Fakhreddin Azimi 
argues that the constitutional revolution incardinated in ordinary Iranians’ 
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worldview the idea that the ruler is bound by a legal framework and has to 
deliver ‘decent governance’.18 Th e memory of the constitutional revolution 
is still powerful in today’s Iran.19 Intellectuals and politicians consistently 
refer to it in order to legitimise their claims about rights and the rule of law.20 
Although such claims have oft en sprung from the most progressive pockets 
of the elite, or the so-called reformist factions, the historical memory of 
the constitutional revolution is also used by conservative political forces. 
In this case, ideas such as nationalism and the right to self-determination, 
along with religious democracy, are celebrated. Th e fi gure of Sheik Fazlollah 
Nouri – a prominent religious scholar who supported constitutionalism 
yet denounced its later perversion into a Westernised and secular political 
project – is particularly relevant to the conservative reading of the event, 
also because Nouri was eventually condemned to death by the more ‘liberal’ 
constitutionalist factions.21
Th e memory and legacy of the 1979 revolution too present a struggle 
for rights by reformist/progressive, conservative and pro-regime forces 
alike, although diff erences exist between them. Indeed, while all forces 
emphasise the role of popular protests in defying the dictatorship of the 
Shah (estebdad), the conservative reading underlines more forcefully the 
role of Islam as the source of inspiration for such justice-seeking political 
actions. For example, in a speech to a bassij gathering in October 2011, the 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei contextualised the experience of the Islamic 
revolution in a political and religious eff ort to att ain a superior religious form 
of mardomsalari, or democracy. While he recognised that diff erent political 
ideologies, from liberalism to socialism, have positive aspects, he argued 
that Islam is the sum of them all and that the revolution had implemented 
their positive aspects through Islam. It follows that more than a struggle for 
rights, liberal freedoms and social justice, the revolution was a struggle for 
Islam.22 Reformist and progressive forces, on their part, propose a reading 
of the revolution emphasising its rights-oriented and justice-seeking nature, 
oft en turning celebrations commemorating the revolution into an occasion 
to reaffi  rm demands for political inclusion. In a tense political environment, 
characterised by a steady contention against the conservative forces, during 
his speech on the twenty-fi ft h anniversary of the revolution, the reformist 
ex-president Mohammad Khatami (r.1997–2005) warned the conserva-
tives that ignoring the desire for political participation and inclusion, and 
perpetuating exclusion of political forces critical of the regime, betray the 
ideals of the revolution and alienate popular support.23 A similar argument is 
suggested by a political advertisement circulated aft er Hassan Rouhani was 
elected to the presidency of the republic for the fi rst time in 2013. Th e advert 
conveyed a message of national reconciliation and political tolerance aft er 
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the 2009 crisis and featured excerpts from speeches by prominent political 
personalities from Iran’s history, from Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 
1979 revolution and the fi rst Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, to the 
former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (who nationalised Iran’s oil 
company and was overthrown by a coup orchestrated with the help of the 
UK in 1953), and Ayatollah Taleqani (a democratic leader during the 1979 
revolution), who talk about the right of Iranians to be the ‘masters of their 
own future’.24 Th ese examples suggest that the right to political participation 
is relevant to the memory of diff erent political forces in Iran, which use it to 
both voice criticism of the regime and celebrate it.
Legal hybridity
While historical public memory plays an important role in engendering 
demands for rights, it is not the only source available to extend demands for 
more inclusive political participation. In fact, the codifi cation of the law in the 
post-revolutionary era, despite claiming to return to Islam, is characterised by 
legal pluralism and references to a number of epistemologies, both secular and 
religious, which also off er an opportunity to extend such demands.
Arzoo Osanloo explains in this regard that, aft er the 1979 revolution, a 
willingness to bridge the structure of the newly established republican state 
and the ideological underpinnings of Shari‘ah could not solve the dilemma 
of how to administer the new law. As a legal codifi cation became necessary, 
the leaders of the Islamic Republic decided to administer Shari‘ah through the 
European civil law system, which had been the model of judicial organisation 
during the previous regime.25 Additionally, Mehran Tamadonfar notes that the 
legislation derived from Shari‘ah primary sources was developed by scholars 
who focused on the area of private law and had very litt le to say about public 
law or aff airs of the state. Th ese private laws traditionally formulated rules that 
could resolve disputes around sales, contracts and matt ers of worship, and 
could not be stretched to include areas such as governance, administration or 
fi nance.26 Th e irony here is that those supposed to bring down the corrupt, 
Westernised legal system inherited from pre-1979 Iran, with its corollary of 
morally corrupted values, contributed to reinforcing it.27
It follows that what was made available to the population was a hybrid legal 
system that includes both Islamic, Shari‘ah-based provisions and the secular 
remnants of the pre-revolutionary regime. Th is allowed the coexistence of a 
double legal epistemology, one based on religion and one based on a liberal 
and secular understanding of rights. Counter-hegemonic discourses or 
critiques that are pillared around the notion of rights may therefore combine 
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the two. On such basis, Osanloo emphasises in her work that the expansion 
of women’s rights in realms such as divorce or child custody goes beyond any 
eff orts to reconcile Islam and liberalism or expand religious interpretation, 
as it is usually asserted within scholarship. Rights advocates, in fact, draw on 
legal hybridity – or what Osanloo terms ‘Islamico-civil law’ – and oft en on 
the secular nature of legal provisions, to make claims to the Islamic republican 
state and its institutions.28
Beyond women’s rights, another instance of such legal hybridity is the 
contested participation of Iran in the secular and liberal international legal 
order on the matt er of human rights. Th e Islamic Republic has ratifi ed multiple 
international rights conventions yet, at the same time, these rights regimes 
face strong and ongoing criticism from the country’s political elites. As Iran 
ratifi ed international conventions and treaties, it had to establish domestic 
institutions tasked with guaranteeing their implementation and respect.29 
Th is is the case for example with the Sett ad-e Hoquq-e Bashar (Iranian 
High Council for Human Rights, IHCHR), which was established aft er Iran 
became a signatory to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in 1975.30
Th is council embodies Iran’s compliance with international norms, but is 
also used to denounce the fl aws of liberal–secular international law and elevate 
an Islamic understanding of rights, while reversing the accusations of rights 
violations made against Iran in the international arena. An example of this 
are the declarations of Mohammad Javad Larijani, secretary of the IHCHR, 
at the presentation of the fourth report on human rights in Iran authored by 
United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur Ahmad Shaheed in 2013. In order 
to reverse the UN allegations, Larijani accused Western governments of also 
being violators. As reported by Iran’s PressTV, these counter-accusations were 
echoed by other Iranian experts, who pointed at the repression of anti-austerity 
protests by European governments as examples of such violations,31 thus 
implicitly recognising human rights as a norm worth respecting. In yet another 
speech, however, Larijani strongly criticised the liberal international norm itself 
of human rights, along with the UN. In response to accusations of human rights 
violations, he asserted that those allegations have the sole purpose of justifying 
the very existence of the UN and, consequently, safeguarding US and European 
world hegemony, of which the UN are an agent.32 Th e Islamic Republic, Larijani 
argues in the same intervention, built a socio-political system based on Islamic 
rationality, rather than secular liberal rationality. Yet as discussed in this chapter, 
its legal system is signifi cantly informed by secular laws.
Th e celebration of the superiority of Islamic human rights is a common 
theme. Th ey are seen as more complete and comprehensive because they have 
a divine and thus infallible meta-foundation, whereas universal human rights 
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have a human origin that is epistemologically fl awed. As one deputy of the 
parliament’s Commission for National Security and Foreign Policy (CNSFP) 
argued: ‘universal human rights are materialistically defi ned, and they consider 
only the worldly rights of human beings, but Islam considers both: worldly 
rights and also moral and aft erlife rights’.33 Th ese words are echoed by Morteza 
Rezaeian, a contributor to the website Hawzah.net – a website established by 
state-sponsored religious centres in Mashad and Qom providing interpreta-
tion (tafsir) of the Qur’an34 – who asserts that:
[a]ll the articles brought up in the declarations of human rights exclusively 
refer to the material aspect of human life and there is no sign of human 
moral rights, while in the school of Islam, the human’s social identity is 
recognised in morality and beliefs, and it holds that moral and ethical 
rules are rights of spiritual life and are stabilised in the human, and when 
they are, material rights will be retained as well in a proper manner.35
Th e presence of the double epistemological nature of Iran’s law is here 
evident, and institutions such as the IHCHR have a double function. On the 
one side, they keep Iran embedded in a secular and liberal international legal 
order. On the other side, they give Iran’s policymakers involved in that very 
international order a forum to condemn it, while glorifying a nativist–Islamic 
version of human rights. However, to those willing to condemn the Islamic 
Republic’s human rights record and the state’s authoritarian interventions, 
the IHCHR provides the opportunity to do so on a secular basis, because the 
Council implicitly recognises that the liberal international norm of human 
rights, exemplifying eff ectively the institutional and legal hybridity of Iran’s 
governance.
Contending the right to political participation
The challenge from outsiders
As discussed, disputes around the right to political participation are core to 
domestic politics and law-making in the Islamic Republic, given its history 
and the opportunities for reclaiming rights provided by its legal hybridity. 
Additionally, the end of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8) resulted in the emergence 
of a less securitised socio-political environment, precipitating the spread of 
contentious practices and political ideas. Since the end of the war in 1988 in 
fact, major socio-economic changes have occurred, along with the blooming 
of limited political plurality. At the elite level, these transformations originated 
from within the so-called Islamic left  since the early 1990s, namely when it was 
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marginalised by rival political factions causing a rethink about its standpoints 
on a number of issues.36 As a corollary of elite factionalism, a quasi-institution-
alised and routinised network of intellectuals, academics, theologians, jurists, 
political strategists and journalists associated with the Islamic left  – among 
whom were Abdolkarim Soroush, Abbas Abdi, Said Hajjarian, Akbar Ganji, 
Mohsen Kadivar, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and others – critically 
reviewed their previous positions and turned to a rights-friendly, almost 
liberal, vision of the world.37 Th e 1997 election of the reformist Khatami to the 
presidency catapulted such visions into the wider public sphere, enraging the 
conservative establishment, which reacted with arrests, repression and gheyr-e 
khodi. Khatami’s supporters and like-minded intellectuals were labelled as 
gheyr-e khodi, or outsiders, in order to emphasise that their ideas were alien 
to the principles of the Islamic Republic and fell outside the constitution. 
On such basis, the Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a hard-liner, called for ‘shutt ing 
the mouth’ of reformist intellectuals and their supporters.38 Khatami’s two 
consecutive governments allowed for the emergence of, and gave resonance 
to, demands for enlarging political inclusion and participation. Aft er Khatami’s 
mandates came to an end and a conservative government under Mahmood 
Ahmadinejad was elected, these demands survived and, to some extent, were 
radicalised, creating the necessary social and activist environment for the 
‘Green Movement’ protests.39
Th e role played by legal hybridity in legitimising such demands for political 
participation and legal reform is well represented by the reliance on liberal 
and secular rights, as enshrined in international conventions, by the campaign 
group Yek Milyun Emza bara-ye Laghv-e Qavanin-e Tab‘iz Amiz (One Million 
Signature Campaign, OMSC). Th e OMSC sought to collect one million 
signatures in support of granting women equal legal status with men, thus 
departing from the Islamic principle of complementarity between men and 
women. For the two years since its establishment in 2006,40 it endured harsh 
repression by conservative authorities and security forces. Noushin Ahmadi 
Khorasani, one of the founders of the campaign, explains that ‘the reconcilia-
tion of Islam and feminism in the Campaign is the reconciliation of feminism 
with millions of Muslims who live with their religion, but who do not seek to 
draw their power, identity, and legitimacy from it’.41 She continues:
[t]he fi fth generation of ‘circumstantial’ feminists we see in Iran today 
are not, by and large, a group that fi rst asks whether or not something 
is Islamic before deciding what to make of it. They are not anti-Islamic, 
but they have distanced themselves from struggles over political and 
religious authority (the Islamic Republic claims both), and they base 
their activities on their practical demands rather than on concerns about 
identity or ideology.42
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Ahmadi Khorasani states that the campaign is not interested in contributing 
to the project of Islamic feminism either, because it is not ‘willing to value 
ideological correctness over the primary demands of women’.43 Th e campaign 
took inspiration from the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was ratifi ed by the Iranian 
parliament in 2003 but later rejected by the Guardian Council for its incompat-
ibility with Shari‘ah. Th e resilience of the inspiration provided by the CEDAW 
is also evident in the statement of the Coalition of Iranian Women’s Movement 
for Voicing their Demands in the Election, which regrouped activists from 
the OMSC following repression. Th e coalition detailed its demands to the 
candidates of the 2009 presidential election, the fi rst one being the ratifi cation 
of the CEDAW.44
Alongside legal hybridity, Iran’s revolutionary legacy also provided the gheyr-e 
khodi with the necessary ideological grounds for advancing their criticism, and 
demands, of the regime. One such example concerns the declarations of the two 
‘accidental leaders’ of the ‘Green Movement’, Mir Hussein Moussavi and Mehdi 
Karroubi, who despite their participation in the revolution and institutional life of 
the Islamic Republic, are considered outsiders by the conservative elite in power.45 
Th ey have consistently referred to the national history and revolutionary legacy 
to justify their demands for change and political participation. For instance, in his 
statement number 18, Moussavi states:
[w]e are still standing tall and proud on the fi rst anniversary of the tenth 
presidential elections despite our whipped body, which endures bruises 
and imprisonments. Our demands are the same: freedom, social justice 
and the formation of [legitimate] national governance. We are confi dent 
of victory, hoping for the will and support of God, because we have not 
demanded anything other than the restoration of our national rights 
. . . Today, people know those who have trampled on the basic rights of 
the nation. People are aware of repeated violations of human rights and 
the lack of human dignity within the judiciary and intelligence division. 
People are aware of how far the totalitarians have advanced in desecrating 
common national legacies, especially with regards to fundamental 
human rights.46
Poor respect for the law and the constitution, which is understood as the 
source of rights, is equated to un-Islamic and anti-revolutionary att itudes. 
In his statement commemorating the anniversary of the birth of the ‘Green 
Movement’, Karroubi asserts that:
This year we were unfortunately lacking in the [recognition of the] 
people’s rights under the Constitution. Instead, these fundamental rights 
were replaced by extreme repression through brutal force, which had 
no regard for the sanctity of life. Despite all this darkness and bitterness, 
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we still remain hopeful that the train which has been derailed from the 
foundations of our Constitution, our Revolution and our Imam, will return 
to its original path; that the wrong-doers repent and, in doing so, pave the 
way for dialogue and interaction.47
He continues:
Who from the beginning [could have] interpreted the assertion of justifi ed 
demands and the inquiry into [our] votes to be counter to the velayat-e 
faqih?48 Why, by means of the velayat-e faqih, has a hatchet been taken 
to the very roots of the Constitution and the Islamic Republic, both of 
which were founded on the people’s votes? Why has the authority of the 
velayat-e faqih been so greatly extended? I doubt that so much authority 
and power were given to the Prophets themselves, or the infallible [Shiʿa] 
Imams. I even doubt that God considers himself to have the right to 
deal with his servants in the same way [that the Supreme Leader does]! 
Historically, Shiʿa Islam considers criticism of the ruler not only necessary 
but a requirement based on the Sharia law stipulation that describes 
advising the leader of Muslims.49
Karroubi and Moussavi not only appeal to the revolutionary legacy to 
legitimise their demands. Th ey also draw on Iran’s legal hybridity, given that 
they discuss the constitution and the rights guaranteed by it as both a worldly 
and a religious matt er. Ironically, Karroubi suggests that the current amount 
of power vested in the Supreme Leader Khamenei exceeds that of God. Th ey 
both pledge loyalty to Islam, the revolution and Khomeini, and place those 
who ordered and carried out the repression of the protests in 2009 outside 
of the constitution and the revolutionary tradition. In so doing, they seek 
to reclaim the revolution and its ideals, based on people’s democratic rights, 
somehow reversing the accusation that they are the gheyr-e khodi, or outsiders 
in Iranian politics.
The challenge coming from the insiders
As discussed, the repression of the 2009 protests became a real watershed 
moment in Iran’s contemporary history and gheyr-e khodis were not alone 
in questioning the Supreme Leader Khamenei and the government on their 
respect of Iranians’ rights. In fact, khodi people, or the insiders, have been critical 
too.50 A substantial blow to the regime came from amidst the martyrs’ families. 
In Iran, the memory of the Iran–Iraq war is perpetuated and reproduced by 
the daily remembrance of the martyrs or shahidan (sing. shahid). Not only are 
the capital Tehran and other minor cities full of murals and portrayals of those 
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who gave their life in the war, but a potent ensemble of museums, mausoleums 
and civil rituals is tasked with keeping their memory alive. Considering this, 
the critical stance that some of the family members of well-known martyrs 
took aft er the repression in 2009–10 represented a signifi cant challenge for the 
regime, which had to face disapproval coming from a category of khodi par 
excellence.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, one slogan chanted during the protests 
in 2009–10 was ‘Basiji vaghei Hemmat bodo Bakeri’,51 meaning that the real 
bassij were those who gave their life to defend Iran during the war, as the 
martyrs Mohammad Ebrahim Hemmat and Mehdi Bakeri had done, and not 
those who repressed their brothers and sisters during the peaceful protests. 
Th e Bakeri family is famous in Iran as it gave three young brothers to the 
struggle fi rst against the Shah and later against Iraq. Hamid Bakeri’s daughter 
Assieh, during a speech at the University of Tehran in the autumn of 2009, 
declared that ‘[i]f my father and my uncle were alive today, they would have 
not tolerated these atrocities carried out in the name of the martyrs by the 
bassij against the people. If they were alive today they would be in prison’.52 
Other family members too reacted to the crackdown on protesters by raising 
criticism of the regime. Assieh’s mother, Hamid Bakeri’s widow Fatemeh 
Amirani, publicly criticised Ali Jafari – the commander of the Islamic Revo-
lutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) whom her husband had commanded during 
the war – for repressing the protests. In a public lett er to Jafari, she described 
the re-election of Ahmadinejad as a coup d’état and warned that the violence 
against protesters would only cause damage to the regime, which would 
eventually lose its legitimacy. Confi rming that today’s bassij are diff erent from 
the bassij during the Iran–Iraq war, Amirani also wrote that the asymmetry of 
power between the Shah’s regime and the people was less dramatic than the 
one in the Islamic Republic today, where one side ‘has all the means of power 
and the other side [the people] [is] without any power’.53 Th e sister of the three 
martyred Bakeri brothers, Zahra, also made her voice heard in a lett er to the 
Iranian authorities, in which she compared imprisonment during the Shah’s 
time and aft er the revolution. She concluded that, while today family members 
have no right to talk to lawyers or have information, before the revolution they 
could even talk to international human rights organisations and denounce 
unlawful detentions.54 Th e Bakeri family paid for their outspoken criticism 
with arrests and harassment, along with members of other martyrs’ families 
such as the Hemmat family.55
Other examples of ‘internal criticism’ have come from two well-known 
intellectual fi gures, namely Mohammad Nourizad and Emad Afrough. 
Nourizad is a former columnist of the hard-line newspaper Keyhan and a fi lm 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   47 05/01/18   6:47 PM
48 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
director, while Afrough is a conservative intellectual and former MP. Nourizad, 
who was imprisoned aft er his initial criticism of the crackdown, wrote fi ft een 
open lett ers to Khamenei in which he defended the right of the people to 
protest and have their criticism answered, not merely repressed: ‘I am saying 
that when it is accepted . . . that protesting is people’s rights, this protest will 
not necessarily lead to our downfall. We should understand this not take this 
right away from people.’56
Afrough pushed his criticism so far as to discuss and criticise the rule of 
the Supreme Leader during an interview on state TV in January 2012. While 
talking about the notion of mardomsalari dini (religious democracy), he 
emphasised that it is composed of two distinct aspects, namely religious rule 
and its democratic legitimacy, underlining that religious rule has to be accepted 
by the people. He then discussed the notion according to which divine and 
human government are bridged together through a leader, as indicated by the 
role models of the Imam Ali and Khomeini, and today by Khamenei. During 
this discussion, however, he declared that ‘there must be guarantees [as] the 
country can’t be ruled by one single leader, by one single person’. He added 
in fact that ‘we have to rule considering the people’s rights’ and called for an 
active questioning of the rule of the Supreme Leader who has to respond, or 
else be ‘automatically dismissed’.57
Criticism came from the security forces as well. Hossein Alaei, a retired 
IRGC general and a war hero, authored an op-ed published in January 
2012 in the newspaper Etela‘at in which he implicitly compared the current 
situation in Iran with the one during the Shah’s time. He suggested that the 
Shah and Khamenei might have commonalities when it came to the way they 
treated political opponents, and referred to the house arrest of dissidents, 
implicitly talking about Karroubi and Moussavi. Th e article featured a series 
of questions such as ‘If, instead of placing some [prominent political fi gures] 
under house arrest, sending others to exile, and jailing political activists [the 
Shah] had opened a dialogue with them, would [he] have been forced to fl ee 
the country?’58 Th e lett er sparked debate and criticism of Alaei, against whom 
sit-ins and open lett ers were organised and published. He later declared that 
his op-ed had been misinterpreted.
Like outsiders, insiders too have drawn on secular and religious references 
to justify demands to extend the right of political participation to dissidents 
and excluded political fi gures. Highlighting that being insiders does not 
necessarily equate with supporting the violent repression of the ‘Green 
Movement’ or being anti-democratic, they have in fact referred to the right of 
the people to protest and to the tenets of a democratic government, invoking 
principles of legal plurality and discussing historical examples relevant to 
today’s Iranian elite.
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Conclusion
Like the Arab uprisings, the ‘Green Movement’ represented an exceptional 
juncture in recent history, at which Iranian society was able to express a 
diverse range of political opinions without signifi cant limitations. However, 
this moment did not last long and soon violent repression quashed the street 
protests. What governance is possible aft er such disruptive/repressive events? 
As this chapter has sought to illustrate, calls to enlarge political participation 
have aimed to overcome social and political polarisation, resulting in the 
strengthening of both the secular and the religious legal-political epistemolo-
gies that inform Iran’s governance system. Indeed, in line with scholars arguing 
that the Islamic Republic has paradoxically accelerated a process of secu-
larisation,59 this chapter has demonstrated how secular and liberal referents 
have been mobilised in order to reclaim the right to political participation 
by diff erent categories of citizens and political elites following the 2009–10 
repression. As securitisation has threatened to close down the public sphere in 
the post-2009 era, secular-inspired demands for political inclusion expressed 
by ‘insiders’ of the regime have become even more signifi cant in highlighting 
the plurality of Iran’s governance foundations.
While this ‘secular’ discourse has by no means surpassed Islam as the 
predominant source of legitimacy for the ruling elite, or as a moral compass 
in society, this analysis suggests that a number of ideological and linguistic 
frameworks are at work, articulating the need to strike a ‘governance balance’ 
between the regime’s security and the right to political participation.
Based on these fi ndings, this chapter calls for a pluralistic approach to the 
study of the choices that Islamists in power make when it comes to governance, 
emphasising that the ideological foundations informing governance arrangements 
are hybrid. Th erefore, they off er a diversifi ed epistemological background to 
building the case for revising governance arrangements beyond Islam, even in 
contexts that are seemingly rigid, such as that of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
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Chapter 4
The group that wanted to be a 
state: the ‘rebel governance’ 
of the Islamic state
Truls Hallberg Tønnessen
Th e Arab uprisings of 2011–12 have not only given a number of moderate 
Islamist actors increased political infl uence within state institutions and the 
opportunity to rule for the fi rst time in their history. State collapse and frag-
mentation of authority in the wake of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and 
the outbreak of civil war during the Arab uprisings in Syria, Libya and Yemen 
have enabled various Islamist insurgent groups to become de facto rebel rulers 
over large swathes of territory and populations. Of the insurgent groups in Iraq 
and Syria, al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, hereaft er IS) stands out for the 
breadth and extent of its rebel governance, and one of the most characteristic 
features that distinguishes IS – not only from other insurgent groups in Iraq 
and Syria, but also from al-Qaeda affi  liates in other countries – is its consistent 
insistence on being not only a group, but also a ‘state’.1
Th is chapter focuses on the rebel governance of IS, mainly in its strongholds 
of Iraq and Syria. Th rough a brief overview of the history of IS and its 
predecessors, the chapter demonstrates that establishing territorial control 
and an ‘Islamic state’ has been a consistent focus and defi ning characteristic 
of the group. It also illustrates how the group’s insistence on being a state has 
had important repercussions on its rebel governance. Th e chapter argues that, 
although there are other factors such as ideology, one important reason why 
the group insisted on operating as a state was its rivalry with other rebel groups. 
Both the establishment of IS and the Caliphate were att empts by the group to 
establish its political and religious authority in a context where it competed 
with a range of other insurgent groups and non-state actors.
A history of rebel governance
Establishing both some degree of rebel governance and an Islamic state have 
been a constant and central focus, and a defi ning characteristic, not only for 
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IS, but also for its predecessor, al-Qaeda fi  al-‘Iraq (Al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI), 
almost since its inception in 1999 when the Jordanian Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi 
(the founder of AQI), established a training camp for fi ghters hailing from the 
Levant (al-Sham) in Herat, Afghanistan.2 According to the central al-Qaeda 
leader Sayf al-ʿAdl, who helped al-Zarqawi establish his camp and served 
as al-Qaeda’s ambassador to al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan, in Herat he wanted 
to establish a ‘complete social structure (mujtama‘ mutakamil)’.3 Th e idea of 
establishing an Islamic state was in fact central to the ideology of al-Zarqawi 
himself. In May 2004, commenting on the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq from 
the US to an interim government led by Ayad Allawi, he said that his aim was 
to establish a Dawlat al-Qur’an (Qur’an state) in Iraq.4 In an interview with 
al-Zarqawi, released posthumously, he stated that the group’s aim was the es-
tablishment of Dawlat al-Islam (Islamic state) in Iraq and then to spread it to 
other Muslim countries.5
Th e history of the group also reveals that it consistently sought to establish 
some degree of territorial control and governance, however elusive, each time 
it had the opportunity to do so. Th e following historical overview of the group’s 
rebel governance illustrates how these eff orts were att empts by the group to 
exploit power vacuums and fragmentation of authority.
One of the very fi rst examples of the group’s rebel governance can be 
found almost immediately aft er the offi  cial establishment of al-Zarqawi’s 
group in Iraq, under the name of al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Monotheism and 
Jihad, also known by its Arabic acronym TWJ) in April 2004. Following the 
US withdrawal from Fallujah aft er the off ensive against the city in April–May 
2004, the Sunni Arab insurgents became the de facto rulers of Fallujah for some 
months until Iraqi and Coalition forces retook control of the city in November 
2004. In the months between May and November 2004, the de facto rulers 
of Falluja were the city’s religious leadership along with the insurgents who 
aligned in the Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin or Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC).6 
Th is council was founded in May 2004, shortly aft er the departure of the US 
forces. Its leader was Abdullah al-Janabi, who had served as Imam of one of the 
mosques in the city. Among the insurgent groups who were represented on 
the council were al-Zarqawi’s TWJ, Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna and Jaysh al-Islami fi  
al-‘Iraq (Islamic Army in Iraq). TWJ was represented on the council by Umar 
Hadid, a native of Fallujah.7
According to Abdullah al-Janabi, this council was established partly due to 
the power vacuum created by the US withdrawal. He claims that it was founded 
by the inhabitants of Fallujah to preserve the security and to defend the city.8 
Sources from AQI, on the other hand, claim that the MSC was founded by 
Umar Hadid and that the council was to become a nucleus of an Islamic 
government in Fallujah by implementing the principle of al-Hisba (al-amr 
biʾal-ma ʿruf wal-nahy ʿan al-munkar, or Commanding Right and Forbidding 
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Wrong) and replacing religious leaders not subscribing to the group’s ideology 
with younger ones that were infl uenced by Salafi sm.9 Abu Azzam, who was 
the overall Amir for TWJ in Fallujah, described this phase as the second phase 
of the struggle in Fallujah: the fi rst phase was the military struggle against the 
US forces, the second was against those who deviated from the right path (ahl 
al-zaigh wa al-dalal) and the ‘bats of darkness’ (khafafi sh al-zalam).10
Th e TWJ sources may have exaggerated the group’s infl uence on the council, 
but other sources confi rm that TWJ controlled several districts in Fallujah, in 
particular the al-Jolan district. Th e descriptions of how TWJ att empted to turn 
these areas into Islamic mini-states are reminiscent of how IS later elevated 
these local experiments to a national level. Inhabitants who sold or drank 
alcohol were publicly fl ogged, women were forced to don full body covering, 
while movie theatres, music stores and hairdressers were closed or destroyed.11 
TWJ also tried to eradicate the Sufi  tradition, which was widespread in Fallujah, 
and forbade the locals from venerating the graves of Sufi  saints.12 Insurgents 
were afraid of potential spies and executed civilians under the pretext that they 
collaborated with the enemy.13
Th ere are several other examples of AQI’s territorial ambitions prior to 
the establishment of al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi  al-ʿIraq (Islamic State of Iraq, 
henceforth ISI) in October 2006. Each time it acquired control of a limited 
territory and its people, ISI tried to found Islamic mini-states in these areas 
by forcing the inhabitants to follow the group’s strict interpretation of Islam 
and of Shari‘ah. For instance, when AQI, together with the insurgent group 
Ansar al-Sunna, took over the city of Haditha in 2005 – exploiting a power 
vacuum that had arisen following the withdrawal of US forces from the city 
– they temporarily established what was described by visiting journalists as 
a ‘Taliban state’ where alcohol and ‘un-Islamic’ music were banned, women 
forced to cover themselves, and alleged criminals publicly punished.14 
Likewise, when in April 2005 AQI took control of Husaybah, a small town 
close to the Syrian border in Anbar, it forced women to wear niqab and 
closed music stores.15 Repeatedly, AQI sought to butt ress its control and 
govern by killing those who opposed al-Qaeda or could represent a threat to 
its position of power.16
Th ese eff orts towards territorial control and governance became more 
pronounced aft er AQI and several lesser-known insurgent groups announced 
the establishment of ISI on 15 October 2006. It was announced that the 
leader of ISI was the previously unknown Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, and its 
new spokesman urged the Sunni community to pledge allegiance to him as 
amir al-mu’mineen (Commander of the Faithful).17 Such names and honorary 
titles signal ISI’s territorial, Caliphate ambitions. First of all, by referring to 
itself as a state (dawla) and not an emirate (imara) ISI indicated that it had 
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ambitions to expand its territorial hold.18 Second, amir al-mu’mineen is usually 
an epithet associated with the Caliph. Indeed, the long-term ambitions of ISI 
were evident in the very fi rst statement the group issued. In it, ISI compared 
its territory to the fi rst Islamic society established by the Prophet Muhammad 
in Medina, claiming that they extended Shari‘ah over an area that was the same 
size, if not larger, than the state Muhammad had established in Medina.19
Although in 2006 ISI claimed that its ‘state’ was established in the Iraqi 
provinces with a considerable Sunni Arab population, in reality the group’s 
control over territory at the time remained elusive and scatt ered. It was not 
until 2013–14, in the wake of escalating confl icts in Iraq and Syria, that the 
group was able to establish continuous territorial control over larger areas 
and populations. In April 2013 the group proclaimed that it had established 
a presence in Syria and that its new name would be al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi  
al-ʿIraq wa al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, henceforth ISIS). A 
year later, on 29 June 2014, the fi rst day of Ramadan, the ISIS spokesman Abu 
Mohamed al-Adnani announced that the group had changed its name again, 
this time to IS and that its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was proclaimed the 
Caliph for all Muslims in the world, not only in Iraq and Syria.20
Defi nitions: rebel governance and Islamic state
What then, if any, are the key characteristics of statehood att ributable to 
IS and to what extent does the group’s insistence on being called a ‘state’ 
carry repercussions on its rebel governance? To answer these questions, it 
is fi rst necessary to unpack what is meant by ‘rebel governance’ and explore 
whether the activities of IS can be described as such. According to Nelson 
Kasfi r ‘rebel governance’ can be defi ned broadly as ‘organizing civilians for 
public purpose’.21 He also singles out three conditions that must be met 
for an insurgent group to be defi ned as engaging in rebel governance, all of 
which are present in the case of the IS: (1) territorial control, (2) a resident 
population and (3) violence or the threat thereof.22 It has been estimated that 
IS at its territorial highpoint in 2014 controlled somewhere between 12,000 
and 35,000 square miles in Iraq and Syria respectively and an estimated 
population of about between 8 and 10 million people in total.23
Off ering a more detailed defi nition of ‘rebel governance’, and one that is 
more noticeably in line with conceptions of statehood, Mampilly considers it 
as ‘the development of institutions and practices of rule to regulate the social 
and political life of civilians by an armed group’.24 Th is can include most of 
the functions oft en associated with states, such as a monopoly of power/force, 
a judicial structure, taxation, health and an educational system.25 As will be 
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illustrated below, IS did at least att empt to provide most of these functions in 
areas where it had established fi rm territorial control.
From Mampilly’s defi nition it is clear that the distinction between 
governance by rebels and by states might be blurred. Indeed, following the 
tradition of Charles Tilly and Mancur Olson, who see war-making as state-
making, there exists a large literature on how rebel governance represents 
embryonic or de facto states that could evolve into more consolidated state-
constructions.26 Some, like Stephen M. Walt, have argued that IS could be 
seen as an example of such a ‘revolutionary state-building organization’ that 
potentially over time could be integrated into the international system, such 
as the revolutionary regimes established following the French, Russian and 
Chinese revolutions.27 Others have pointed to groups like Hizbullah, which 
over time moderated some of its most extreme views, and became integrated 
into the political system.28
Th is said, caution is in order to not construe rebel governance with fully 
fl edged statehood and to remain sensitive to the diff erences that exist between 
the two. One of the key diff erences between rebel-ruled and regular states, 
for instance, is that while the rebels might possess empirical (or internal) 
sovereignty, they lack the juridical (or external) sovereignty conferred to 
states through recognition by the international community of sovereign states. 
Rebel rulers therefore have to operate outside the international system and in 
a territory where another state retains full sovereign de jure rights to exercise 
violence in order to defend its territory.29 In the literature on so-called ‘quasi-
states’ and ‘de facto states’ it is usually assumed that these states aim to seek 
international recognition and sovereignty. Indeed, according to several of the 
defi nitions of the concepts, to seek international recognition is one of the main 
criteria in order to be categorised as a ‘quasi-state’30 or a ‘de facto state’.31
Th is is where the approach of IS to statehood stands out and is somewhat 
paradoxical. On the one hand, it presents itself as having, or seeking, several of 
the trappings of a modern state, with its own bureaucratic structures organised 
under the auspices of a government,32 providing public goods to, and taxing, 
the population living in its territory, having its own fl ag,33 its own currency,34 
and even having its own ‘anthem’ (or nasheed, an acapella chant).35 On the other 
hand, it is ideologically opposed to the very notions of nationalism and nation 
states, does not respect internationally recognised borders and thus challenges 
the very basis of the Westphalian system of sovereign territorial states.36 Indeed, 
following the establishment of the Caliphate, IS released a movie claiming to 
have eradicated the border between Syria and Iraq, and thus dismantling the 
post-World War I Sykes–Picot order where the colonial powers had divided 
the Muslims into several smaller states.37
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In contrast to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan established by the Taliban 
in 1996 – which sought but failed to obtain international recognition from 
the United Nations38 – IS has neither sought, nor obtained, international 
recognition by any state and has not established any embassies elsewhere.39 
Instead, IS claimed that its declaration of the Caliphate abolished the 
sovereignty and the authority of all other ‘emirates, groups, states and orga-
nizations’, as they were replaced with the authority of the Caliphate.40 Th us, 
based on the most widely accepted defi nition of statehood – the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933 – IS cannot be defi ned as a state, as it is lacking willingness 
or ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’.41 It does, however, fulfi l 
the other requirements for statehood, including a permanent population, a 
defi ned territory and a government.42
Th is status of IS as a non-sovereign entity, operating within two sovereign 
states (Syria and Iraq), has also had a bearing on the nature of its rebel 
governance. Th rough its propaganda, the group has att racted foreign fi ghters 
to travel to the actual territory of the Caliphate by depicting it as the realisation 
of a utopian ideal society. In fact, the group’s challenge to the existing order 
not only att racted many foreigners to travel to the group’s territory, but it also 
precipitated a military off ensive by members of the international community 
seeking to rob the group of its territorial control. Undoubtedly, this interna-
tional off ensive against IS has aff ected its rebel governance, and this in two 
fundamental ways. For one, it has impeded its ability to provide basic public 
goods and services to the population under its control. At the same time, it 
has precipitated behaviour by IS that is increasingly based on coercion and 
intimidation in order to suppress any resistance against the group and deter 
potential spies and collaborates with the US-led international military coalition 
against IS.43
Why did IS want a ‘state’?
Why then was it so important for the group to establish and operate as a 
‘state’-like structure in parts of Iraq and Syria? As illustrated above, the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state has been a long-term goal of the group, with this 
state serving as a nucleus for a new Islamic caliphate centred on Baghdad.44 In 
addition, the establishment of both ISI in 2006 and the IS and the Caliphate 
in 2014 w framed as a religious duty incumbent upon the group. For instance, 
when the group established ISI in 2006, it used as a legitimation for its right 
to establish a state the fact that it controlled, and established Shari‘ah, in an 
area that was the same size, if not larger, than the fi rst Islamic state established 
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in Medina.45 Likewise, when the group announced the establishment of 
the Caliphate in 2014, its spokesman Adnani said that they had a religious 
obligation to establish a ‘state’ as they were in a position to do so.46
As for the timing for the establishment of the IS and a Caliphate, Will 
McCants argues – mainly based on an account of the defected Chief Judge 
of ISI, Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi – that ISI was established on an apocalyptic 
timetable because al-Zarqawi’s successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri believed 
that the apocalypse was imminent, and that the Caliphate hence had to be 
established prior to the apocalypse.47 Brian Fishman, meanwhile, posits that 
ISI was established mainly following the advice from top al-Qaeda leaders to 
establish an Islamic state under the leadership of an Iraqi, not a foreigner like 
the Jordanian Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi.48
It can, however, also be argued that rebel rivalry constituted a critical factor 
in the establishment of ISI as well as of the IS and the Caliphate. As mentioned 
above, ISI was established in October 2006, at a time when there were serious 
discussions concerning a US withdrawal from Iraq, and ISI leaders repeatedly 
described the establishment of the group as an att empt to preempt other Sunni 
actors trying to exploit the power vacuum an eventual withdrawal would 
create, ‘stealing’ (in the words of ISI) the fruits of their eff orts.49 Uthman Abd 
al-Rahman, the offi  cial in charge of ISI’s Shari‘ah Commission, stated in this 
regard that one of the most important reasons for establishing ISI was to fi ll 
the void created by the political, military and security failures of the US and 
its Iraqi allies.50 Abu Ayyub al-Masri, meanwhile, claimed that although they 
had planned the establishment of ISI for a long time, the timing was partly to 
pre-empt other Sunni actors from declaring the existence of a federal Sunni state 
in the Sunni Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq.51 Likewise, the withdrawal of 
the Syrian regime’s forces from northern and eastern parts of Syria in 2012–13 
led to a fragmentation of authority, with a host of diff erent rebel groups 
competing to gain control over these territories and their resources.52
Finally, the creation of IS, and especially the pronouncement by the group 
of a Caliphate, was not only an att empt to exploit its recent military success 
and momentum aft er the conquest of Mosul in June 2014. It was also an 
att empt to outbid other Syrian and Iraqi insurgent groups in att racting foreign 
and local recruits. Th e establishment of the Caliphate was especially related to 
the long-standing competition between IS and the al-Qaeda organisation for a 
position of hegemony within the broader global jihadi movement.53 To restore 
the Caliphate has been a long-term goal not only for groups like al-Qaeda, but 
for the broader Islamist movement ever since the abolition of the Ott oman 
Caliphate in 1924.54 By claiming to have realised this utopian ideal, IS 
att empted to outbid al-Qaeda and other competing factions and to assert itself 
as the hegemonic group within the broader jihadi movement.55 Moreover, by 
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demanding all Muslim organisations, including al-Qaeda, swear allegiance to 
its newly proclaimed Caliph, IS sought to expand the group’s authority to the 
rest of the Muslim world, thus far beyond its actual territorial control.
A trademark common to all three of the above cases is that the withdrawal 
– or the potential thereof – of a unifying enemy (US forces, Syrian regime 
forces, and Iraqi regime forces) from certain territories resulted in fi erce 
competition between diff erent rebel factions for control over those 
territories. Th e ensuing fragmentation of authority also led to what Mara 
Revkin has described as ‘competitive sovereignty’, with several actors seeking 
a monopoly of legitimate violence in the same area.56 As will be illustrated in 
the following pages, this rivalry and competition to establish a monopoly of 
violence in rebel-held territories had important repercussions on the rebel 
governance of the Islamic State.
Repercussions on rebel governance
So why does it matt er that IS perceives itself to be a state of some sort? As 
discussed above, although IS cannot be defi ned as a ‘state’ according to in-
ternationally recognised conceptions of statehood, its insistence on being 
a state carries important repercussions on its governance and its behaviour. 
So for instance, it can be argued that, by laying claim to the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, IS subscribes to 
a Weberian conception of statehood. Th us, like most states, IS protects its 
territories militarily from ‘external’ aggressors/enemies (be they Kurdish, 
Shi‘a-dominated militias, foreign nations involved in the international coalition 
against IS, other rebel groups or the Syrian and Iraqi regimes). Internally, as 
well, it polices the territory in order to guarantee that it is governed according 
to the group’s strict interpretation of Shari‘ah through its religious police force 
known as al-Hisba. Th e group has also established a legal system through its 
many Shari‘ah courts, doling out harsh sentences to those who do not abide by 
the group’s stringent laws.57
Apart from a monopoly on violence, IS has also sought to monopolise the 
delivery of a range of basic services and educational provisions to the residents 
of the territories it controls. Th e goal here is to secure local (passive) support 
by ensuring that the residents are dependent on IS, which constitutes the sole 
provider of security, order and basic commodities, like bread,58 petrol and 
education.59 Education, in fact, has become organised in, and implemented 
through, the group’s very own Ministry of Education (Diwan al-Taʿleem), 
which introduced a comprehensive programmes and new curriculum so as to 
indoctrinate children to become model citizens of this new ‘Islamic state’.60
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Lastly, like any state, IS levies taxes on the population in the territories under 
its tutelage, mainly through zakat, an Islamic tax imposed on Muslims who can 
aff ord it, but also on all goods, on agricultural produce, on trucks transiting 
through IS-controlled territories and cash withdrawals for instance.61 At least 
according to the propaganda of the group, this tax is redistributed to poor 
Muslims living within the groups’ territory.62 A special tax, known as jizya, 
meanwhile, is levied on all Christians living in IS-controlled areas.63
Together these aspects of rebel governance are clearly meant to butt ress 
IS’s control and legitimacy within the territory it controls as well as its claim 
to statehood. Arguably, however, they are not only that, but also borne out of 
rebel rivalry; that is out of a desire to establish the group’s authority vis-à-vis 
other rival factions operating within the same territory. In 2006, for instance, 
ISI sought to establish a monopoly of violence by targeting and intimidating 
those insurgent groups that did not want to join this new ‘state’ and swear 
allegiance to its leader, al-Baghdadi.64 Th e group’s insistence on being a state 
enjoying a monopoly of violence clearly constituted a watershed moment 
in the relationship between ISI and the other Sunni Arab insurgent groups 
in Iraq. Although there had been skirmishes between AQI and other groups 
prior to the establishment of ISI, they were by and large bound together in a 
tactical alliance against their common enemies, the US armed forces and Shi‘a 
militias in Iraq.65
However, following the establishment of ISI there was a rapid rise of rebel-
on-rebel violence as ISI targeted those rebels who did not accept the authority 
of the group and its leader, al-Baghdadi.66 Th is in turn spurred several insurgents 
to turn against ISI in order to defend themselves from the group’s att ack.67 As 
Sunni Arabs began to turn against ISI, it forced the group into a negative cycle 
where its att empts to force the Sunni community not to go against it only 
increased their willingness to cooperate with the US forces in order to gain 
protection from ISI att acks. Th is drew ISI into a spiral of violence against the 
Sunni community, which turned into such a vortex that in September 2007 
the group announced that it would prioritise att acking Sunnis who had turned 
against them.68 Th is dynamic constitutes a clear example of rebel rivalry. 
Indeed, several studies have found that rebel rivalry tends to increase violence 
against co-ethnic civilians.69 Paul Staniland, partly based on the case of ISI, 
argues that, when an armed group decides to become the hegemonic actor 
within a larger insurgency, the group may att ack the other insurgents in order 
to eliminate its rivals.70
Likewise, there are several reports on how in 2014 IS sought to enforce 
its authority in the territories occupied by systemically killing prominent and 
infl uential leaders who had challenged, or bposed a potential challenge to, 
the group’s monopoly of power.71 In both Raqqa and Mosul, for instance, IS 
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distributed a ‘city charter’ (wathiqat al-madina) which stipulated that councils, 
associations, political or armed groups other than IS were prohibited.72 
Residents who had escaped from the Mosul area claimed that in the months 
following its takeover IS had arrested between 20,000 and 25,000 individuals, 
mainly residents who either had an infl uential position within Mosul before the 
arrival of IS in 2014, or did not obey its authority.73 Th e insistence on being, and 
behaving like, a de facto state also led IS to pursue a more exclusionary method 
of governance, particularly vis-à-vis other Sunni insurgent groups. Indeed, 
it neither sought nor accepted off ers of cooperation from other Sunni Arab 
insurgent groups, who have collaborated to a much larger extent with other 
actors in their rebel governance and have set up joint governing institutions.74 
A case in point is Jabhat al-Nusra (currently part of the organization known as 
Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham), a group that was initially established by ISI and with 
the same goal of establishing a Caliphate, yet which adopted a more gradual and 
conciliatory approach to achieving this goal that placed emphasis on making 
local allies through cooperation and power-sharing. So for instance, Jabhat 
al-Nusra was one of the leading groups behind the creation of the various 
Shari‘ah Commissions (al-Hay’a al-Sharʿiyya) in Syria’s Aleppo and Deir al-Zur, 
together with other Islamist-leaning insurgent groups.75 Ultimately, however, 
the increasingly dominant position of IS in Syria and Iraq, and its proclamation 
of the Caliphate in 2014, prompted Jabhat al-Nusra to abandon its gradual and 
inclusivist approach for a more assertive and exclusionary one. For one thing, 
this is evident in an audio-recording of Jabhat al-Nusra’s Amir, Abu Mohamed 
al-Julani that was leaked shortly aft er ISI had established its Caliphate. In it, 
al-Julani asserted that the time had come to establish an Islamic Emirate in the 
Levant (al-Sham).76 Poignantly, it is also evident in Jabhat al-Nusra’s changed 
approach to rebel governance post-2014. Whilst prior to 2014, the group had 
avoided unilateral control of areas in Syria, following the rise of IS in Syria, Jabhat 
al-Nusra began to assume a more forceful position on the issue of statehood, 
especially in its stronghold in the Idlib province.77
To behave like a state by insisting on seeking a monopoly of violence is, 
however, a risky gambit for IS. Th is exclusionary approach, in fact, tends to 
alienate potential allies and foster resistance and rebellion against IS in the 
population living in areas that it controls. Th is was particularly illustrated by the 
Sunni Arab rebellion against ISI in 2007, which was one of the most important 
factors explaining why ISI was driven out of the Sunni-dominated province 
of Anbar in 2007–8. Likewise, since 2014 several reports have highlighted 
the unpopularity of IS and the local resistance against it, which the group 
has managed, however, to curtail by violent means.78 Th e exclusionary rebel 
governance of IS stands in contrast to Jabhat al-Nusra’s more gradual approach, 
which seeks cooperation with other Sunni Arab groups instead of claiming to 
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be a state and forcing others to submit to it. Th is approach to governance is 
also more in line with recommendations from the al-Qaeda leadership, and the 
recent territorial losses of IS and with it the likely demise of its Caliphate will 
likely strengthen this approach to rebel governance.
Conclusion
To establish an Islamic state and engage in some form of rebel governance – 
defi ned by IS as the implementation of Shari‘ah and the restructuring of the 
territory based on the principle of al-Hisba – has been one of the defi ning char-
acteristics of the group since its inception. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
main diff erence between the rebel governance of IS and that of its predecessors 
is not ‘rebel governance’ in itself, but its scope and the group’s ability to 
implement it, given the very diff erent context the various incarnations of the 
group have operated within.
IS constitutes but one example of how the upheaval and collapse of the 
old state structures in the aft ermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011–12 has 
enabled various non-state actors to exploit the ensuing political vacuum and 
fragmentation of authority. Th e same phenomenon can be observed in several 
other countries aff ected by the turmoil generated by the Arab uprisings. It has 
enabled jihadi insurgent groups in countries like Yemen, Libya and Mali to 
engage in rebel governance to various extents.79 Moreover, the phenomenon is 
not restricted to jihadi groups, as for instance both Shi‘a and Kurdish militias 
have exploited the political vacuum created in the wake of the shrinking state 
authority in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen to increase their territorial 
control.80 As such, the rise and rebel governance, of IS and other jihadi–Salafi  
groups are primarily a symptom, and not a cause, of a much deeper crisis of 
weak states in the region.
What is more, the fragmentation of authority in Iraq and Syria has resulted 
in increased rebel rivalry, with several (insurgent) actors competing to exploit 
this vacuum and establish a monopoly of violence on the same territory. As 
argued in this chapter, the establishment both of ISI and of IS and the Caliphate 
can partly be explained by rebel rivalry, with groups att empting to outbid other 
insurgent groups, particularly al-Qaeda, in both the global and local contest of 
recruitment and att ention. Th is illustrates that it is not suffi  cient to study only the 
ideology of IS, or similar groups, in order to understand its behaviour. It is also 
necessary to study the context the group operates within and its relationship to 
other competing groups. To establish an Islamic state and a Caliphate has been 
a long-term ambition for IS, yet the actual timing of the establishment was more 
infl uenced by intra-rebel dynamics and an att empt to outbid its competitors, 
primarily al-Qaeda, in the context of state fragmentation and failure.
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Chapter 5
Islamic and Islamist women 
activists in Qatar post-Arab 
uprisings: implications for the 
study of refusal and citizenship
Wanda Krause and Melissa Finn
Th is chapter challenges two widely held views about Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) activists mobilised by Islamic principles. First, the authors 
contest the idea that the activists’ grounding in Islam and their pursuit of 
political change necessarily makes them ‘Islamists’ and thus that they ipso facto 
seek to contest and/or (re)appropriate the state.1 Th e authors also challenge the 
view that activists’ location in states of authoritarian rule invariably reduces 
the status of such actors to ‘subjects’, when they might otherwise be citizens. In 
the fi rst view, Islam is thought to produce particular forms of political agency 
and, in the second view, authoritarianism is seen to deny other forms of political 
agency, thus rendering people subjects without political subjectivity. Eva Bellin, 
for example, argues that resilient or robust authoritarian states in the MENA 
deploy multiple mechanisms to keep people subdued, such as punishing 
autonomous political action, bolstering elite hostility to the germination 
of progressive ideas, or repressing and/or corporatising civil society.2 Th e 
authors agree that these dynamics exist in Qatar, but also that resilient au-
thoritarian arguments do not tell the whole story, nor do they capture the 
activisms with broad-based impact that are irreverently refusing state control 
mechanisms. Bellin writes that ‘the strength, coherence, and eff ectiveness of 
the state’s coercive apparatus’ determine revolutionary success, failure or non-
occurrence.3 Although activist women in Qatar advanced refusal as a means of 
political mobilisation before the Arab revolts in 2011, their refusals since 2011 
confi rm the strategic importance of Qatari Islam-centred women’s activism and 
its unique features for the study of political Islam and citizenship. In the analysis 
that follows, the authors investigate several ways in which Islamic and Islamist4 
women activists in Qatar obfuscate state att empts to erase minority presence, 
expand networks and sisterhood, challenge Western state manipulation of 
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MENA politics, and fi ll the gaps left  by insuffi  cient state provisioning. Some 
of these actions fi t the Qatari state policy agenda and enable the status quo, 
such as the perpetual neglect of state provisions, while others refuse, and 
therefore subvert, state policy focuses and status quo political dynamics. Some 
of the activists studied are women who embrace Islamic principles to create 
change, and others are Islamist women activists formally affi  liated with the 
Qatari al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB). Although Islamic 
women activists in the MENA are political subjectivities in exile, or, to put 
it diff erently, actors forced into the spaces and politics of marginalisation, 
social control, discomfort and/or alienation, the authors argue that their 
mobilisations of citizenship ultimately weaken and undermine the coherence 
and eff ective of the state’s (and patriarchy’s) coercive mechanisms. Many 
women interviewed have built networks and civil society by defying the dis-
empowerment and perceived illegitimacy imposed on them by others. Pushed 
to the margins of systems of hierarchical ‘powering over’, the women studied 
are invested in personal development, and challenge work environments in 
order to bolster systems of ‘powering for’ or ‘giving power to’ others.
Another view in MENA studies that this chapter challenges is the argument, 
or allusion, that Arab political agency ebbs and fl ows depending on the extent 
to which it expands or shrinks liberal democracy, and that women’s agency 
is centrally state-created and therefore state-deferent.5 It is suggested that 
because the Arab world lacks liberal democracy, Arabs are subjects without the 
claims-making authority, rights and capacities of citizens. Citizenship in the 
Arab world, as elsewhere, is mobilised by what people do, and is not reducible 
to membership endowed by the state.6 Th ere is also a reductionist focus in 
this literature on prominent moments of political activism or well-known civil 
society movements as the primary sites of political agency. Th e authors argue 
that the expansion of mutual aid, communitas, and solidarity7 – core features 
of citizenship mobilisation – are enabled by self-proclaimed women activists 
holding membership in formal social movements, and by people who do not 
see themselves as explicitly activists, but rather as do-gooders, or what Asef 
Bayat calls ‘non-movements’.8
Writings on the Arab uprisings tend to affi  rm and re-inscribe an ‘a priori 
landscape of domination and resistance’, even though this untenable dichoto-
misation is not supported by empirical nuance derived from ethnographic or 
qualitative inquiry.9 Sherry Ortner has observed that ethnography is a solution to 
the ‘thinness’ of the literature on resistance and its ‘bizarre’ refusal to know, write 
about and engage the lived worlds of those who resist, including their internal 
politics, cultural richness and subjectivity.10 An ethnography, or qualitative 
study that examines the specifi cities of the context is, itself, an engagement or 
mobilisation of epistemological, methodological and cultural refusal.11
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Islamic and Islamist women activists and their diverse activities give form, 
weight and evidence to many alternative forms of citizenship mobilisation. 
Such women are chipping away at oppressive policies and practices of the 
autocratic regime by fi nding intelligent ways to keep contacts, building critical 
political infrastructure and tools for engagement, and expanding hope. Islamic 
women activists are injecting the political realm with knowledge, capacities 
and communitas: qualities that show responsibility to others, and thus, con-
comitantly, an expectation that the government responsibly protect in kind.12
Citizenship as refusal of the status quo
Citizenship in Qatar is given meaning through the collective organisation 
of Islamic and Islamist women activists, and the non-movements of Muslim 
women leading deliberate action that is politically salient without having an 
expressly political design. Given the decades-long entrenchment of theories 
regarding the resilience of authoritarian structures in the MENA region, the 
documentation of Muslim women activists’ refusing status quos is, in fact, the 
documentation of an empirically verifi able politics of hope. Such documenta-
tion is also epistemological investment in hope, as such, that (when observed 
and justly att ended to), situates, mobilises and advances an entirely diff erent 
knowledge production politics that underscores the importance of premising 
theory on nuance, multiple angles and intellectual honesty.
For Carole McGranahan, refusal is diff erentiated from resistance insofar 
as resistance oft en has as its impetus complex recognition of, and desire to, 
erase diff erent forms of domination. Refusals, on the other hand, are a politics 
of troubled consciences that say ‘no’ to status quo conditions and apologies, 
and that refuse to be aspirational in what are considered the ‘right’ ways to be 
aspirational.13 Th is distinction fi ts aptly with leading scholarship on Islamic 
women’s agency.14 Refusal is the redefi ning of an outcome, the rejection of 
anticipated reaction, non-fi xedness, building att achments, optimism, indulging 
in possibility, the embracing of complexity and contradiction, selfl ess gift -giving, 
the conferring of privilege and safety, an emphasis on dialogism, equitable 
exchange, a redirection of levels of engagement, the staking of claims, the 
negation of status(es), and a generative wilfulness.15 Whereas resistance can be 
mobilised by class struggle, refusal involves redirection towards multiple levels 
of individual and collective engagement that ignore the specifi c affi  liations 
and identities that keep rights and recognitions in abeyance. Refusals can be 
generative, strategic or deliberate moves towards practices or communities 
that may or may not be responding to authority. Private abstentions are not 
anti-social, they are a new form of social because when known, they galvanise 
people who can identify with them.16
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Qatar’s Islamic women activists diff er from most other Islam-centred 
individuals and groups studied in this volume because they seek a diff erent 
kind of power (‘power to’ and ‘power for’ rather than ‘power over’). Th eir work 
provides evidence of a diversifi cation within Islam-focused movements that 
seeks innovative expressions of the Islamic vision, but this work is not individ-
ualist, ideologically parochial or hijacked by neo-liberal rationalisations. On 
the contrary, they reveal a stronger propensity for collaboration, rather than 
competition with secular forces. Th e authors argue that regardless of gender, 
and regardless of a person’s sliding scale position between Islam (do unto 
others) and Islamism (do unto Muslims), activism qua charitable giving of 
oneself is citizenship mobilisation. Islamic women activists especially perceive 
a duty to mitigate the impact of economic divides and refuse economic and 
political power structures as they are. Th e concept of tawheed (the unity of God, 
or, unity, as such, manifested by divine presence) is concretely expressed in the 
work of these activists when they collaborate to defend the poor, neglected 
and disaff ected. Since the divine breath is perceived within Islamic circles to 
be blown into all human beings (secular or religious), and therefore the unity 
of people helps express the already existent unity of God, collaboration and 
mutual aid are not just expressions of citizenship-imbuing capacities, they are 
also expressions of tawheed itself. Collaboration, where it exists, is therefore 
not only a subversion of the inevitable outcome of capitalist social relations 
in producing systems of deep inequality and equity, it is the realisation of a 
divine mandate imposed by tawheed as the fundamental force regulating all 
existence.17 Unlike other social movements described in this volume that 
use tawheed to separate people on ideological grounds, the solidarity among 
Islamic women activists in Qatar towards others shows how tawheed is used for 
spiritual, political and economic empowerment.
Further, the Islamist women in this study are not pursuing the ascendancy 
of an expressly Islamic political framework within the state of Qatar, and 
therefore they diff er from other movements of politically concerned Islamic 
actors where refusal (or resistance) is oft en primarily focused on the 
relationship between citizen and state. Instead, their refusal is local and trans-
national in nature, and sometimes in participation with the state, as a way to 
defy other state meddling guided by hope and optimism for the future. Islamic 
and Islamist women activists want to create change within the state and society 
for the bett erment of the marginalised, and this enables their claims as citizens 
and blunts their apparently inextricable status as subjects. Middle Eastern 
women are not passive actors in the public domain demanding recognition 
from the state or the reinscription of patriarchal social relations.18 Rather, such 
activists do their work by state side-stepping state provision (ignoring the 
singular central importance of the state for the delivery of wellbeing) and by 
building networks that are predominately women only.
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Although the women activists’ discourse does not explicitly use equal 
rights language and the women do not explicitly seek to reconfi gure the gender 
relations power imbalance, their mere participation in networks to expand 
citizenship building capacities in society, such as communitas and giving aid to 
the severely marginalised, serves to break down signifi cant gendered barriers. 
Th rough their participation, they create avenues for women to become 
empowered and to empower others. Th eir encroachment on institutions once 
dominated by men, moreover, helps to expand civil society and support new 
lines of thinking on post-oil era conservatism.
Whereas resistance implies conscious defi ance of and opposition to political 
or social superiors in an asymmetrical power relationship, Islamic and Islamic 
women activists reject the idea that open opposition is necessary; they wilfully 
insist on the possible over what is probable, and reimagine (and reclaim) 
power motivated by Islamic ideals. Th e margins of power still wield power. 
Michel Foucault argues that power must be de-linked from a framework of 
domination and possession, because power permeates all life and, in its myriad 
forms, produces new forms of desires, objects, relations and discourses.19 
Colin Gordon argues that Foucault sees power as ‘an omnipresent dimension 
in human relations’ because it is ‘never a fi xed and closed regime, but rather an 
endless and open strategic game’.20 Power can be wielded by anyone and, the 
authors argue, can be reclaimed through refusal. Foucault captures the essence 
of refusal quite poignantly, even if by implication, when he writes:
[a]t the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, 
are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather 
than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an 
‘agonism’ – of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation 
and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyses both 
sides than a permanent provocation.21
In the context of this chapter, therefore, the power of the state is agonistic 
due to the omnipresent presencing of dissenters; the reality is that power-
holders can never crush the will of refusal among an entire mass of people, 
in toto. MENA-region elites do not wield power as an essential freedom, 
despite the dogged nature of their pursuit or possession of their freedom(s). 
Rather, their power is confronted by the stubborn refusals and uncoopera-
tive challenges of activists, politically engaged actors, or non-conformers to 
the rules of engagement; people who resolutely pursue their own freedom in 
their own ways.
Muslim women in the MENA oft en do not struggle for power as a resis-
tance-focused endgame. Th eir invincible agonism can be essentialised and 
insuffi  ciently appreciated by the false dichotomy of resistance or compliance 
to authorities. A more judicious framing of women’s agency in Qatar is 
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captured in the concept of refusal, as counter-hegemonic and communitas-
enabling powers and subjectivities that germinate in the MENA. Women 
activists are att entive to the nuances of their own struggle and to the fact 
that power is not possessed, but rather a process enabled by individuals and 
groups. Power as process is seen in the dynamics of patriarchy that unfold 
from the household to the state levels; women recognise the systemic forces 
that oppress them and act to change the conditions aff ecting their lives.22 In 
this sense, power is not defi nitively expressed in the concepts ‘of powering 
over’ or ‘being powered over’, but also ‘power to’ as a generative or productive 
power to accomplish, ‘power with’, which invokes a sense of the whole being 
greater than the sum of the individuals, and ‘power from within’ as the spiritual 
strength and uniqueness that resides within us.23 Women in Qatar also express 
‘power for’, which is understood by the authors as selfl ess gift -giving and 
social and political exchange, that turn values about power relations on their 
heads.24 Islamic women activists structure civic principles and reform into 
their activism, and ground their grass-roots mobilisation on basic democratic 
principles that blunt hierarchies found in other parts of Qatari society.25
Jean Bethke Elshtain affi  rms that the activation of a woman’s participatory 
capability must begin with her immediate concerns.26 Hence, studies must 
focus on struggles around such concerns and, indeed, Islamic and Islamist 
women orient their activism to redress lack and marginalisation vis-à-vis 
resources and rights. Th e authors make a distinction here between women who 
champion empowerment by promoting mutual aid, solidarity and communitas, 
fulfi lment, self-worth, intellectual growth, the acquisition of skills, and secure 
wellbeing for Muslims, and Islamic women who champion such things for all 
members of society.
McGranahan argues that refusal can have active and passive forms: refusal 
gives citizenship (refusal intends citizenship) and citizenship is given through 
refusal (citizenship is the outcome of refusal). In our study, we have found that 
refusal may be an intended driving force behind the mobilisation of mutual 
aid, communitas and solidaristic actions. In most cases, however, Islamic and 
Islamist women activists in Qatar do not explicitly intend refusal. Rather, the 
outcomes of their actions denote refusal. And these outcomes produce diff erent 
ontologies of social and political becoming and belonging.27
Th e authors scrutinise three case studies that illustrate the positive roles 
played by Islamic women activists in citizenship mobilisation, and some of 
their individual and cumulative actions that garner connections, expand pos-
sibilities and transform the rules of social and political engagement in the 
Qatari political order.28 Th e Qatari context did not escape the spirit of the Arab 
revolts, as assumed by most theorists focused on actions directed at the state, 
largely because acts of refusal reveal that the focus went beyond the Qatari 
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state itself to the region. Political action in Qatar is not reducible to how actors 
interact with the state, how the state uses and works through activists to protect 
or overthrow leaders, strengthen or weaken ties with American allies, or gain 
or challenge power, for example in Syria. In the following pages, the authors 
address some nuances that are missed in these readings of Qatar.
Islamic and Islamist women activists
In the Qatari case, the women interviewed are not part of an Islamic movement 
or group, nor do they seek to extend power to a particular Islamic ideology. 
Instead, they reimagine and reclaim power by using Islamic principles to guide 
their refusal of self and other marginalisation. Th eir refusals have signifi cant 
import for the conception of citizenship in the Arab world. Unlike secular 
feminism, Muslim women activists do not see religion as a private matt er,29 
and throughout the interviews30 most women expressed a dislike of the term 
‘feminism’. For these women, feminism is synonymous with the emulation of 
perceived Western values where people pursue liberation from religious and 
cultural foundations. Th e term ‘Islamic feminism’ has gained some popularity 
and has been employed to describe women’s activism within an Islamic 
parameter that also questions aspects of the traditional Islamic orthodoxy.31 
Isobel Coleman reasons that the heart of Islamic feminism is to push the 
gates of reasoning on Islamic jurisprudence (ijtihad) open, and that ‘Islamic 
feminists are now combing through the centuries of Islamic jurisprudence to 
highlight the progressive aspects of Islam’.32
Directly referencing the Qur’an and Sunna gives Islamic feminists and 
activists leverage, and arguably comprises the most eff ective means for the 
defence of basic human rights to education and access to public places in 
the Islamic world. Th is is particularly important in contexts where women’s 
mobility and access is tightly monitored and severely constrained by extremist 
groups, repressive states or local traditions. Th e importance of such a tactical 
methodology takes on added value given that (liberal) secularism is suff ering 
credibility in the Muslim world. Indeed, women activists in Qatar rely on these 
sources to help women achieve greater control over their lives in areas where 
cultural perceptions and decision making tend to perceive the status of women 
harshly. Since women are most oft en caught in the crossfi re on, or placed in the 
crosshairs of, criss-crossing identity and morality, women of inter-sectional 
backgrounds and various class statuses oft en carefully calculate the risk of 
being outspoken on issues aff ecting women’s and girls’ rights.
Women activists draw upon sources and traditions pithily described by Talal 
Asad as the Islamic ‘discursive tradition’.33 Th ere is competition in this tradition 
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to develop the most compelling (meta)-narratives by referencing coherent 
and ongoing traditions linked to specifi c frameworks or histories built in the 
corpus of Islamic or Islam-focused scholarship.34 Th rough this competition 
for legitimacy, turning the narrative tradition in particular directions can help 
secure women’s rights. Islamic feminism does not, however, lead necessarily to 
a liberal movement. It can be entirely illiberal. Many halaqat (religious study 
circles) that the authors att ended have leveraged highly valued and esteemed 
Qur’an and Sunna scripts to argue for greater mobility and rights, and to defend 
constrictions of women’s mobility and rights – all by women for women and all 
for women’s bett erment and protection.
Reformist Islamic feminism and non-feminist Muslim women activists and 
thinkers engage in three distinct kinds of refusal that have implications for our 
understanding of them and their ability to engage with each other. Islamic and 
Islamist feminists focus on women’s intellectual development by engaging 
in intellectual refusal where they lean heavily on Islamic scripts, the Sunna 
and wider traditions and practices that will ensure women’s wellbeing and 
empowerment. Non-feminist Muslim women activists partake in a diff erent 
kind of refusal, which is to either ideologically engage texts in halaqat to 
protect themselves from the ills of society and to stay bonded (thus building a 
new world in their own mind’s eye), or they refuse to engage the texts entirely, 
leaning heavily on good works (doing khayr) as a means of empowering 
themselves through action. Th ese three forms of refusal can produce liberal 
and illiberal outcomes, however, wherein the path charted by one side is 
considered disempowering or even harmful to the worldview advanced by the 
other side.
Th e tendency in current research on political Islam to focus on well-known 
social movements in fact obscures some of these nuances, as well as the 
broader trajectories and developments that are emerging organically from 
the political subjectivity development and citizenship mobilisation of actors 
on the margins. Th ere are two main focuses of this literature: a fi rst, which 
examines the perceived backwardness or progressiveness of Islamist groups 
and organisations (or their pursuit of violence for political ends), and a second, 
which studies the importance of state-directed Islam-focused political projects, 
Islamic state formation (or changes in leadership at the state level), and/or the 
institutionalisation of Islamic law and Islamic social alternatives.35 Th e work 
of Islamic and Islamist Qatari women activists cannot be placed eff ectively 
in these boxes, and yet what they are doing has implications for the role of 
Islam in the public sphere; that is the political life of Islamic societies or the 
impact of Islam on the political as such. Th us, while many researchers, and 
Qatari women themselves, tend to be reductionist about women’s contribu-
tions, seeing them in very limited ways, Islamic and Islamist women activists 
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in Qatar (and elsewhere) are in fact playing a critical role in political change, 
and in counter-acting (and sometimes appropriating or leveraging) the more 
ambitious masculine expressions of political Islam. Th e authors predict 
that productive social and political transformations in Qatar will result not 
necessarily from the story of politicised Islamic players, but also from women 
who are motivated by Islamic principles to do good locally, regionally and 
internationally (for example, by refusing unequal power relations). Much 
of their work has transnational impact. Such activists are engaged in the 
empowerment of others, and the scale of their impact is unmatched because of 
the funding they receive from public and private donors. Th rough the avenues 
of networks and organisations, women enable women, men and young 
children to achieve basic rights to bett er living conditions, food and clothing, 
education and skills training. As one woman asserts, ‘[w]e are helping more 
than 2.5 million inside and outside Qatar’.36
Th e impact of women’s critically signifi cant work is lost in the prominent, 
politicised and epistemologically problematic focus on the state and the 
activism of Islamist men, wherewith women’s activism becomes marginalised. 
Far from being motivated by only piety or practical considerations related 
to the private realm, and far from being inconsequential to larger political 
processes and citizenship development, women’s actions give momentum to 
positive developments that other activists have failed to accomplish. Women’s 
pursuit of and drive for change in Qatar have been insuffi  ciently theorised and 
as such, the impact of women’s activisms and actual grass-roots transforma-
tions remain in abeyance.
Women in Qatar during and post-uprisings
Islamic and Islamist women activists operate in a constraining political 
context in Qatar. Women working in the public sphere have to network and 
collaborate with men because, as one Islamist activists put it, ‘no one wanted 
to participate with a woman’s organisation’.37 Such activists are therefore forced 
to choose between working with organisations that are not women-led, or 
working from home in their own networks of women. Activists feel that they 
have to be careful talking about taboo issues such as domestic violence, forced 
prostitution and other human rights issues such as the traffi  cking of children 
as camel jockeys because Qatar is a small and conservative society.38 When 
enquiries are made about these issues, many participants and experts simply 
reply that such issues do ‘not exist in Qatar’.39 Women activists are extremely 
cautious when discussing these issues because opening up about them might 
jeopardise their work. As one participant clarifi ed ‘everyone knows everyone 
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here’.40 And another stated, ‘the women work so hard, I do not want anything 
you [the interviewer] write to aff ect them or what they’re doing; they are just 
doing good from the kindness of their hearts’.41
Qatar’s (non-elite) women activists do not actively challenge government 
policies, nor are their initiatives state-led, and all research respondents 
underscored that there is no women’s movement in Qatar. When addressing 
policies that marginalise women, women in Qatar tend to rely on elite women 
to push the boundaries of what is acceptable, while navigating tradition and 
rigid religious interpretations of women’s roles. Overt activism by non-elites 
in this context is ineff ective. Islamic women activists in Qatar do not take to 
the streets in protest. During the uprisings, people took to the streets on only 
a few occasions, and their numbers in one case comprised barely one hundred 
men. Protests are banned and, where they arise, are immediately squashed. 
Analysis of civil society activity through a Western (feminist) lens, moreover, 
that envisions progress and development through the expansion of liberalism 
captures a mere fraction of activity that empowers people in Qatar.
In the vast majority of cases, women activists in Qatar are focused on charity 
fundraising for social justice activism. Many women say that their motivation 
lies in simply doing khayr (good deeds).42 Th is is captured by a participant who 
says, ‘I do much more than my post. I feel obliged.’43 Another woman clarifi es 
that her work is simply for the sake of humanity: ‘When you help people, you 
feel that you are human’.44 In the latt er case, the woman’s activism is not about 
empowering women, but rather all people. In some cases, impact is not aligned 
necessarily by a specifi c motivation. One networker clarifi ed that she never 
intended to partake in activities, but became involved because people in need 
came to her.45 Qatari women activists, such as those who give to their societies 
through charity institutions or charitable infrastructure, are tackling some of the 
most controversial aspects of their society, oft en by skirting the state, and this 
particular form of refusal through quiet circumvention helps them avoid being 
politicised by state and society. In this chapter, the authors examine three key 
examples of Islamic and Islamist women’s activism in Qatar, and provide a clearer 
picture of their political contributions during and aft er the Arab uprisings.
Th e fi rst form of activism sought to mitigate, in the Qatari context, state and 
mass att empts to squash Shi‘a infl uence. As a research respondent explained, 
nine of the twelve Shi‘a places of worship or gatherings (ma’tam) in Qatar had 
been closed over a ten-year period without explanation, or due to claimed 
infrastructure issues.46 Civil society activities normally held in places of Shi‘a 
worship were suspended. As a result, during the uprisings, ‘suitable’ imams 
for Ashura were diffi  cult to locate. To our knowledge, to date, nothing has 
been published on the confi nement of religious expression of the Shi‘a (who 
comprise 10 per cent of the population) in Qatar.
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During the Arab uprisings, Ashura was observed in Al-Hilal district, but 
otherwise all other religious gathering was non-existent for the occasion. Fear 
was purposefully created and escalated when a Shi‘a leader and two young 
men, all of whom had purportedly never been to Iran, were deported to Iran 
for their religious activism. Hence, the Shi‘a community encountered great 
diffi  culties locating a suitable Imam because of growing fears that Shi‘a Imams 
were gaining increasing infl uence in Qatar, Bahrain and beyond. Yet during the 
uprisings, student groups, including a group of Shi‘a female students, mobilised 
themselves in response of the systematic confi nement and constraining of 
Shi‘a gatherings. Th ey moved their religious learning circles to private places; 
and they took these actions even though many others (born and raised in 
Qatar, but without Qatari passport or formal citizenship membership) had 
abandoned the gatherings for fear of state action. Th e activists confi rmed that 
their objective was not to resist the state, but rather to develop their religious 
learning communally.47 Krause identifi ed a repeated fear among several Sunni 
research respondents that Iran was seeking to overtake Qatar (and the MENA 
region), and some of the same respondents narrated a highly contestable 
historic reading of Sunni and Shi‘a relations in the region, and particularly in 
Bahrain, that supported their fears. In her study on the Indian and Pakistani 
diaspora in the UAE, Neha Vora argues that, although several of her research 
respondents raised in the UAE also fear that, at some point, they will need 
to leave their homes, their experience of marginalisation compels them to 
challenge their non-inclusion.48 Like the subjects of Vora’s analysis, Shi‘a 
women activists’ simple acts challenging their non-inclusion are forms of 
refusal that help constitute them as political agents of change and solidarity.
Th e second form of activism identifi ed was that of Sunni members of the 
Qatari MB, or wives of Brotherhood members, who sought to overthrow 
secular despots in neighbouring countries and/or had affi  liation with Islamist 
groups that joined the uprisings. Sunni women activists off ered their support 
through charity. Th ese women activists exhibit overt referentiality towards the 
states within the region. Th e activists’ att empts to disrupt authoritarian rule in 
the MENA has aligned well with the Western state pursuit of regional power 
and the overthrow of particular regimes including the al-Assad regime in Syria 
and the al-Qaddafi  regime in Libya.
Opposing the offi  cial positions of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, the 
Qatari state, under Hamad al-Th ani, enabled the MB, among others, to send 
resources to the Syrian opposition. For these Sunni women activists, the 
concept of ‘powering for’ means pursuit of change to the MENA governance 
status quo, and not the expansion of a feminist objective. Th e purpose of 
their charity fundraising work was to create regional change, and to expand 
freedoms for Islamists in their countries of citizenship. Th ey enjoyed immense 
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freedom gathering in their homes to pursue religious learning and kinship 
building. Although Islamist groups in neighbouring countries such as the UAE 
segregate themselves according to nationality, the women of this study would 
gather from diff erent Arab nationalities to study together. Th e women did not 
fear reprisal for their activities and pursued a sense of common purpose with 
distinct peers who shared their larger development and political aspirations.
Th ese acts of refusal by Sunni activists against foreign states were not 
necessarily designed to support the rise of Islamism, but rather to expand 
freedoms in home countries such as the freedom of religious expression, 
the ability to gather communally, and to reverse the debilitating neo-liberal 
policies and economic marginalisation instituted by corrupt secular rulers. 
Hence, despite being co-opted into a system by US forces to empower the 
Syrian resistance, MB-affi  liated women’s activism facilitates several layers of 
subversion of Western investment in proxy confl ict for greater geopolitical 
control over the MENA region, such as expanding pan-Arab and pan-Islamic 
connectedness and identifi cations intra-nationally and transnationally.
A third form of activism identifi ed was that of Islamic women activists 
who pursue ‘power for’ (others) motivated by Islamic objectives. A key 
form of these activists’ eff orts included garnering generous endowments 
and charitable contributions. Qataris frequently give without being referent 
towards, or dependent on the state; such giving is used to undermine status 
quo conditions faced by the urban and rural bidoon poor. Bidoon is an Arabic 
term used to designate those who lack formal citizen’s membership. Th e bidoon 
in Qatar are less empowered to refuse their marginalisation compared to the 
bidoon in the UAE because the latt er have, relatively speaking, more power to 
clamour and build networks of solidarity to mobilise political change, whereas 
the former in Qatar have not built critical infrastructure for this purpose. 
Islamic women activists give in charity and heart to the bidoon in poor locales, 
and thus extend help as citizens and non-citizens to marginalised non-citizens. 
Th is act of refusal is signifi cant because these women are not targeting Muslim 
populations, but rather any population in need, nor are they att empting to 
articulate adherence to an Islamist ideology and thus are not working within 
the typical Islamist framework of distributing charity in order to recruit for 
their ideology. Before, during and aft er the uprisings, a group of women 
att ended to the material needs of bidoon youth and children motivated by a 
sense of religious obligation and the att ainment of spiritual succour from 
giving. A woman who would invest her time in helping sick people who were 
without healthcare stated, ‘I love to help sick people. When you see a smile on 
the baby or their parents’ face, it is precious – it is religion.’49 A woman who 
teaches the Qur’an explains that she gives charitably of her time for the sake of 
God.50 Another woman acknowledged the great discrepancy between the acts 
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of giving and receiving, and noted that giving is an essential part of Islam. She 
says she role-models the behaviour she seeks to fi nd in others by promoting 
giving as an Islamic practice.51
Exemplary among these activists was one who played a crucial role in 
repatriating child jockeys earlier drawn from traffi  cking rings and the bidoon. 
Pursuing human rights, she noted that her activism ‘was centred on the study 
of Islamic law that dignifi ed and protected human beings and rejected [their] 
exposure to exploitation’.52 Signifi cantly, activists working for the plight of 
the bidoon subscribe to, and are motivated by a discourse on progress and 
development not prominently featured in Western and secular frames about 
the uprisings and rights-based activism. Many activists perceive the conditions 
that produced the Arab uprisings to have been fomented by a lack of religious 
practice and economic disparity. For many research respondents, harkening 
back to Islamic principles enables their pursuit of equality and political agency: 
‘I always believe that change starts from the person itself, and all of us should 
work together to protect Man and maintain mankind’s dignity and humanity, 
which are dignifi ed by Allah in His Holy book.’53
For many women interviewed, citizenship is about participating in the 
facilitation of change not in relation to the state, but in relation to oneself because, 
as one activist put it, collaboration is essential for personal development. As 
Saba Mahmood has argued, feminist scholarship overemphasises politically 
subversive forms of agency and has ignored other modalities of agency whose 
signifi cance is missed ‘within the logic of subversion and resignifi cation of 
hegemonic terms of discourse’.54 Islam-centred political actions and their 
signifi cance for any att empt to reconceptualise the meaning of citizenship are 
similarly not reducible to actions of the state or the work of men. Mahmood 
argues that this overemphasis results from feminism’s teleology of progressive 
politics on the analytics of power.55 Such focuses obfuscate or exclude the 
critically sensitive work of activist women, and their pursuit of noble values 
and goals that directly or indirectly support the impulse of the uprisings. Th e 
inclusion of the activist work of Qatari women moreover helps to interject on 
traditional assumptions about citizenship that male elites and their actions are 
the model citizen reference points, and that citizenship, as such, like war, is 
supposed to contain and transcend woman qua woman.56
Yet the values of women activists give us clues about what might lie ahead for 
Qatar. While Islamic and Islamist women’s activism may be largely directed at 
helping others or supporting movements outside Qatar against secular despots, 
their work productively builds discontent in Qatar and beyond regarding 
men and leadership. Th ere is a relationship, for example, between women’s 
activisms and refusals of state neglect of people by isolated and communal acts 
of negation, and women’s refusal of men, in private and public spheres, as the 
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primary reference point for power mobilisation.57 Th e centrality of the state 
and men as the hubs of referentiality in action is frequently, though not always, 
critically undone, unacknowledged, unsupported, or dissented (refused) by 
Qatari women.58 Islamic women activists in Qatar are not necessarily in pursuit 
of validation by the state for their status as citizens or mobilising their action 
through their status (or lack of it). Th is is similar to the ways such activists act, 
not necessarily in pursuit of a raised status vis-à-vis men or in relation to their 
reduced status as women, but rather in leaving status, as such, unacknowledged 
by making claims on (against), about, or for men (in the name of, or for the sake 
of one/many men, or on behalf of men).
Islamic women activists make claims by expanding their knowledge, and 
they advance refusal by peaceful reconciliation with struggle motivated by self-
knowledge and collaboration.59 Several women pointed out that many women 
pursue education in an eff ort to acquire freedom from patriarchy entrenched 
through Salafi  thinking and traditions.60 As one elite female organisational 
leader confi rms, ‘there is going to be more women in the market with less 
qualifi ed men. It goes back to the way men are raised in Qatar. Th ey are more 
spoiled than women.’61 Another research respondent quoted a Hadith (saying 
of Prophet Muhammad) concerning corruption and failure among male 
leadership, and role reversals in leadership during the end times, saying that 
politics becomes reprehensible ‘when your most evil ones are your princes and 
when your decision is in the hands of your women’.62 Challenging the dominant 
Islamist view that women are incapable in positions of authority and therefore 
that civilisations will decline in end times (when women take on leadership 
roles), the research respondent turns the perceived leadership lack on its head: 
‘men are not acting as men anymore. Now maybe it’s a problem of how they are 
raised, they sleep. Ladies are always fi ghting for rights, they are so motivated 
to learn and develop.’63 She is not concerned with the secular dictators of the 
Middle East, but rather with the Gulf male rulers. In an interesting study on 
values in Qatar that infl uence change in organisations, Al Dulaimi and Saaid 
conclude that masculine aspects were negatively correlated with an aff ective 
commitment to change. On the other hand, they state that femininity bett er 
correlated with productivity and a readiness to embrace change.64
Islamic women activists’ refusals add nuance to the study of politically 
relevant action motivated by the Islamic parameter. Th ey show how Islamic 
actors work with, or entirely refuse, the state’s presence to bring good, and 
they underscore recent turns in critical citizenship studies. Such activists 
transform the rigidity of linking citizenship to the state’s endowment of formal 
membership or substantive provisioning, and instead empirically substantiate 
citizenship as action or what people do. Th e fascinating Qatari case study diff ers 
from those of other MENA societies because it does not fi t comfortably into 
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the state resistance/acceptance dichotomy. Th e impulse of the uprisings has 
not been perpetuated by direct contestation between societal actors and the 
Qatari state, but rather through state–societal actor collaboration, overtly and 
tacitly in ways that support the overthrow of the status quo across the Middle 
East. Women have used also their agency and self-determination to create new 
opportunities through collaboration that defi nitively reveal the failings of the 
state by side-stepping it and fi lling in the gaps in areas it has neglected.
Conclusion
Th rough the lens of refusal among Islamic and Islamist women in Qatar it is 
possible to gain insight into how Muslim women pursue change in ways that 
diff er from their male counterparts. Qatari women seek to transform the 
status quo through quiet circumvention, and they entertain and mobilise their 
troubled consciences at social injustice by going around the state or taking its 
offi  cial place. Such women exemplify what refusal means in their own context, 
by pursing alternative ways to be aspirational that leave the status of authority 
unacknowledged, by redefi ning the outcomes of action through redirection, by 
building att achments between people, by taking up possibilities as a mantra for 
action, by indulging in optimism, by selfl essly giving, by conferring the safety 
of others and by engaging in dogged wilfulness against all odds. Th e refusals 
of Islamic women activists in Qatar to structure the nature of their political 
subjectivities and mobilisations of citizenship beyond traditional readings of 
the concept, tied as it is to membership within a given geographical locale by 
a generous state.
When Islamic and Islamist women are challenging their exclusion and 
others’ exclusions from substantive citizenship by charitably off ering provisions 
that should otherwise be provided by the state, they are engaging in acts of 
refusal. When such women activists pursue religious freedoms secretly in 
defi ance of the rulings of a leader or dictator in power, they are engaging in 
acts of refusal as gift s of citizenship.65 Th eorisations of citizenship, political 
subjectivity in exile and refusal are advanced by the work of women who may 
not necessarily be subverting state policies, but are indeed putt ing stress on an 
unjust status quo or reading the status quo in ways considered important for 
their own sense of freedom and emancipation. Although elite women oft en 
receive the prominence and att ention given to women’s participation in Qatar, 
non-elite Islamic and Islamist women activists are slowly creating openings 
and enhanced opportunities for women. Certainly, their non-elite class status 
matt ers in the approach they choose. Most are unwilling to risk their livelihood, 
security or position in this Gulf country by pursuing overt forms of resistance. 
Th ey are not in a position to take overt action. However, social and economic 
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class does not defi ne them as non-risk takers or passive actors, as they do seek 
ways to disrupt the status quo. Th e uprisings have injected a renewed vigour and 
importance to activisms that have been quietly unfolding in private in Qatar. 
One activist noted, for example, that she was previously not permitt ed to lead 
a delegation to meet with men abroad on issues covered by her specialisation, 
or to address sensitive issues with men. Now, she says, authorities have left  her 
alone to pursue her interventions in collaboration with men.
Many women activists in fact feel that men are no longer their equals, and 
that they have ascended above them; that by merit and education they are more 
capable of taking on leadership roles. What the future holds for political change 
in Qatar and the region does not rest merely with men. It is the authors’ view 
that the future is being writt en by women. It is highly possible, as a result of the 
eff orts of activist women, that politics in the MENA will take a completely new 
trajectory. Islamic and Islamist women activists are charting new directions 
as Al Dulaimi and Saaid have identifi ed, in which their femininity correlates 
with a politics that is less about dominance and compliance, and instead about 
productivity and a readiness to embrace change.66 As Mahmood suggests:
[it is important] that we leave open the possibility that our political and 
analytical certainties might be transformed in the process of exploring 
non-liberal movements . . . , that the lives of the women . . . might have 
something to teach us beyond what we can learn from the circumscribed 
social-scientifi c exercise of understanding and translation.67
Indeed, if refusal is writt en as a feminist project about epistemological 
engagement with the lived realities of people, including Arab women activists, 
then one act of refusal and citizenship is to let the Islamic and Islamist women 
activists speak for themselves, even if from the margins and from a status of 
infl uence that is only recently emerging.
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Chapter 6
Is Islamism accommodating 
neo-liberalism? The case of 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Angela Joya
As in other Arab Spring countries, the Egyptian uprising of 2011, and the 
subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections, precipitated the rise to 
power of political Islamists. In the fi rst free and fair lower and upper house 
elections of 2011–12, the newly created Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala (Freedom 
and Justice Party, FJP)1 – an al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) 
affi  liate – won signifi cant pluralities of both the vote and seats. A litt le later, in June 
2012, the FJP/MB’s presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsi, beat his nearest 
rival, Ahmed Shafi q, in the second round of voting, thus completing the group’s 
eff ective domination over the country’s executive and legislative institutions.2
Th is chapter is concerned with the economic policy and performance of 
the MB/FJP during its brief period in power between 2011 and 2013. It argues 
that, while the Arab uprisings off ered new opportunities for political participa-
tion and policy formulation to the MB, and its FJP affi  liate, their failure to off er 
a radically progressive vision of the economy contributed in no small measure 
to their ousting from power. While initially the MB/FJP tried to reconcile with 
other parts of the ruling class, it appeared their strategy was not supported 
by Mubarak-era capitalists or the military. To be sure, Islamists have faced a 
challenging environment and serious dilemmas pertaining to social justice and 
political rights as well as the economy in the post-uprising period. However, 
the nature of these dilemmas was context-specifi c, and so were the range of 
limited options available to them. Under new political circumstances – and 
having only recently entered the echelons of power – the MB/FJP not only 
had to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, but also ward off  
challenges to its hold on power from rival elite groups, most notably from 
the powerful Supreme Council of the Armed forces (SCAF) as well as from 
Mubarak-era capitalists.
Th e chapter is divided into four sections. Section one examines the literature 
on political Islam and its relationship with the changing global economy. Section 
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two discusses the evolution of the MB in Egypt from 1952 to the period of 
economic liberalisation in 1991, and examines how the group pursued its 
economic interests in a context where the main areas of the economy were 
dominated either by businessmen close to erstwhile president Hosni Mubarak 
(r.1981–2011) or by the Egyptian military. Section three then analyses the 
2011–13 era in which politics was dominated by the MB/FJP and the short-lived 
Morsi administration.3 It scrutinises the economic policies adopted by the MB/
FJP and the Morsi government and their impact on the Egyptian population. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the downfall of the MB/FJP and its 
implications for the group’s businesses and their economic power.
Islamism and neo-liberalism
Infl uential studies of Islamist movements take the history of Islam as a crucial 
point of departure4 and, although they may acknowledge the socio-political 
contexts of the rise of Islamism, Islam tends to take centre stage as their 
explanatory tool. As such, they assume the primacy of religious beliefs as the 
guiding principle of all Muslims who live in a totality called the Muslim world.5 
Likewise, Islamist movements act in ways that express past historical practices 
which lie at the core of Islam, and which were formed centuries ago. As such, 
they tend to emphasise the role of ideas and explain Islamic movements’ actions 
as ‘an expression of a religious essence abstracted from time, place and social 
context’.6 In this chapter, the author intends to shift  the focus to the contextual 
specifi city in explaining the actions of Islamist movements, especially in the 
context of the expansion of capitalist social relations in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) and beyond.
A number of issues emerge in the study of Islamist movements and 
capitalism.7 First, the question emerges as to how to best study political Islam 
without falling into the trappings of Orientalism whereby groups that fall under 
political Islam are seen purely through the lens of religion. In their comparative 
study of political Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia, Vedi R. Hadiz and Boo 
Taik Khoo trace the source of Islamic politics to struggles over the state and 
material resources. Th e degree to which political Islam was integrated into the 
post-colonial state and economy determined the outcome of Islamic politics 
in society. In other words, where Islamic forces were integrated into the state, 
as in the case of Malaysia, they posed less of a threat to the state and dominant 
class. In Indonesia, meanwhile, where Islamic forces were excluded from 
politics, tensions between Islamist forces and the state have continued. Hadiz 
and Khoo suggest that the study of political Islam should not focus solely on 
religion, but rather on political groups who are seeking power and contesting 
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the state and political economy of a specifi c society.8 Doing so goes some way to 
‘de-sacralising’ the MENA region, where most emphasis is placed on religion, 
by shift ing focus to political struggles and material interests.9
Second, the response of political Islam cannot be understood solely as a 
development situated in the contemporary period. Th e decline of political 
Islam can be traced back to the nineteenth century when the modern state 
began to emerge in places like the Middle East as old trade routes experienced 
a decline. Islamists who had retained a powerful position as the ‘ulama 
(the Islamic clergy) within pre-modern states began experiencing a loss of 
power not only over material resources but also over ideology as modern 
education replaced mosques as an extension of the modern state. Th is 
historical decline continued into the twentieth century as nationalist forces 
succeeded in establishing secular states in the post-colonial period. While 
in some cases – such as Malaysia – Islamists were integrated into the post-
colonial state and economy, in most cases they were excluded and pushed to 
the periphery. Economic development policies oft en empowered nationalist 
capitalists while marginalising the merchants, traders and small businesses 
who formed the core support base of Islamists. In the latt er cases, political 
Islam retained its relevance through the charitable work pursued by Islamist 
organisations in society. Moreover, in instances where the post-colonial state 
was seen as faltering, political Islam tended to re-emerge as a dominant force, 
sometimes through direct confrontation with the state, as was for instance 
the case in Syria in 1979–82 when al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi  Suriyya (Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood, SMB) challenged the secular Baathist regime and was 
subsequently broken and its leadership exiled. In short, the struggle over the 
state in the post-colonial period remained a dynamic process between political 
Islam and secular-nationalist state actors.
Th us, ever since independence from colonial rule Islamists have been 
competing for power over the state and the economy, while ideologically 
struggling to remain relevant. In terms of historical evolution, political Islam 
emerged as a strong opponent to the secular state, overtaking its social welfare 
functions and challenging its legitimacy. At the same time, political Islam 
off ered a critique of the corruption and failure of the secular state to respond 
eff ectively to socio-economic challenges such as poverty, unemployment, 
housing and health. As such political Islam presented itself as part of the 
resistance to corrupt rulers and authoritarian states.
In the late 1970s, political Islam experienced a surge in popularity as the 
rise in global oil prices and the crisis of state capitalism weakened the post-
colonial state’s legitimacy across the MENA. On the one hand, the oil crises of 
the 1970s resulted in the delegitimation of economic and secular nationalism, 
and facilitated new processes of capital accumulation that privileged Islamic 
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economic actors organised through Islamic banks and investment companies. 
Th is shift  aff ected the way political Islamists viewed the global economy and 
their place within it. On the other hand, domestic struggles between the right 
and the left  resulted in political elites empowering Islamists to defeat left ists. 
Th is resulted in the spread of political Islam to professional syndicates and 
student unions. In the 1980s, the state continued to retreat by cutt ing budget 
allocations to social services, which resulted in a vacuum for political Islamists 
to fi ll, as happened in the case of Egypt.10
Th e crisis of the secular state in the new millennium off ered new openings 
where Islamists could vie for political power. Th e strategies adopted by 
Islamists varied: some pursued power through engaging in the political process 
while others opted for outright confrontation. Aft er two decades of neo-liberal 
policies, it was clear that economic liberalisation had further discredited the 
secular-nationalist state and its ability to respond to the needs of citizens. 
However, at the same time Islamists had adapted to free market strategies, 
carving out economic spaces of infl uence for themselves, particularly in small 
and medium-sized enterprises and Islamic fi nance.11
Th us, while the period of neo-liberalism represented a political opening for 
Islamism, it also complicated its ability to present itself as an alternative to the 
secular capitalist forces that had captured the state since independence. Th is 
raises the question of whether Islamism can still be seen as anti-systemic or if it 
has accommodated itself to the hegemonic system of neo-liberal capitalism. Some 
scholars argue that, because of their conception of politics, Islamist politics and 
practices may lend themselves to accommodating the capitalist system: Islamists 
do not recognise social class, but rather treat society holistically. Th is leads 
them to restrict themselves to a moral rather than a socio-economic critique of 
capitalism.12 Moreover, both off er protection and respect for private property.
Furthermore, long-standing confl icts over identity in the MENA re-emerged 
forcefully in the post-1990 period as post-colonial states failed to create a strong 
sense of national identity. As the promises of citizenship and its associated benefi ts 
declined, political Islam fi lled the gap by reasserting Islamic identity and an Islamic 
model of state, society and economy. However, Islamists face the challenge of 
articulating a qualitatively diff erent vision of state and economy that can meet the 
needs of Islamic ummah (community) within a capitalist global economy.13
States, markets and society in the Muslim world
In Islam, the market is not conceptualised as a self-regulating mechanism that 
is autonomous from society. Rather, the economy is very much shaped by 
broader social concerns, such as the welfare or wellbeing of the community, 
as opposed to merely that of the individual. In contrast to this, capitalist social 
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and economic thought argues that ‘Homo economicus must be freed from 
restrictive or irrelevant social practices in order to get on with the business of 
generating “utility”. ( . . . ) Homo economicus was secular, materialistic, and 
ultimately on his or her own’.14
Recently, however, scholars have argued that Islamic fi nance and capitalist 
free markets are very compatible,15 and Islamists argue that they can tame 
capitalism by emphasising morality, social justice (through charity and zakat) 
and targeting corruption in the sphere of the market. Islamists view the socio-
economic structures of capitalism as fundamentally sound, while fl aws are 
att ributed to particular individual practices and behaviours, which can be 
curbed by Islamic morality. Here, the state plays an important role in regulating 
the markets and thus ensuring social justice and fi ghting monopolies.
Islamic economic thought expresses preference for small and medium-sized 
businesses over large-scale industries. Th e result has been that Islamic thought 
has not suffi  ciently debated, or theorised on, how to respond to global economic 
forces, thus preventing Islamist parties from devising eff ective Islamic economic 
policies. Moreover, whilst embracing the free market, the economic policy of 
Islamists remains burdened with contradictions. So for instance, whilst adopting 
market-led economic strategies, litt le serious thought has gone into how to meet 
goals of social justice as well as meaningful employment.16 Consequently, they 
risk alienating their traditional support base, which sees no diff erence between 
secular and Islamist profi t-maximising business practices.
As it stands, it is not solely Egypt where such problems of marrying the 
market with ideals of Islamic justice remain a challenge. A number of other 
countries where Islam plays an infl uential role in social organisation have 
moved towards globalisation in an uncertain and pragmatic way, refl ecting 
their fears and unpreparedness to eff ectively understand, or respond to, the 
forces of the market. In the post-uprisings MENA, political Islam has adapted 
to neo-liberalism and free market ideas, sometimes at the expense of its own 
legitimacy. Th us, while Islamists have adopted variations of Islamic fi nance 
as an alternative to ‘Western’ economic practices, it is not clear that Islamic 
fi nance remains shielded from capitalist imperatives of competition, profi t 
maximisation and exploitation.17 Th e danger then that Islam may lose its 
‘doctrinal connection to social justice is a powerful rallying point’.18
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution, the state and the 
struggle for power
Under erstwhile president Gamal Abdel Nasser (r.1956–70), the statist 
economic focus on large-scale industry marginalised small and medium-size 
businesses as well as the large landed classes, groups among which the 
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Brotherhood enjoyed substantial support. In the 1950s, under the infl uence 
of Sayyid Qutb – who encouraged a holy war against non-Muslim rulers in 
Muslim lands – the Brotherhood became the enemy of the post-colonial state, 
especially aft er the att empted assassination of Nasser by Islamists. Qutb was 
executed in 1954 and the group was banned from political activity until 2011, 
leading to the emigration of many Brothers to the Gulf States. Adapting to 
these new circumstances, the MB focused its activism at the societal level. It 
began pursuing informal politics through its charitable work, which facilitated 
the dissemination of its political message.
With the coming to power of president Anwar al-Sadat (r.1970–81), the 
MB experienced a turn in its fortunes. To consolidate his power, al-Sadat 
needed Islamists to defeat the communists and left ists who had dominated 
state institutions and the ruling al-Itt ihad al-Ishtiraki al-‘Arabi (Arab Socialist 
Union, ASU) since Nasser’s rule. He thus took a more lenient stance towards 
the group, allowing for its re-emergence as a socio-political player in Egyptian 
politics. By mid-1975, all imprisoned Brothers had been released and many 
exiled MB cadre returned home. Besides providing an opening to MB cadre for 
employment in educational and state institutions, such as university campuses 
and professional syndicates, al-Sadat’s economic programme of liberalisation 
– known as infi tah (open door) – also paved the way for the organisational 
and economic rebirth of the MB. Infi tah eased regulations in order to att ract 
private foreign capital to Egypt and encouraged the import–export trades, 
which expanded opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses and 
merchants.
For the MB the consequences of this economic policy were multiple. 
As infi tah facilitated the growth of ‘importers, fi nanciers, middlemen and 
profi teers’, it resulted in a process of class formation among the ranks of the 
Brotherhood and their social base.19 While some took advantage of the opening 
to engage in economic gains,20 others established networks with public sector 
managers to gain contracts. Al-Sadat’s restitution of private property also 
facilitated the revival of Brotherhood landed families, most of whom assumed 
leadership positions within the group. Th e group’s private hospitals catered to 
rich clients and its services were of high quality in contrast to the fl edgling 
state hospitals in Egypt. Infi tah policies also resulted in the emergence of a 
consolidated middle class affi  liated with the MB and engaged in the fi nancial 
sector. Th ese new Islamic economic actors were labelled as the infi tahi classes.
One signifi cant inroad by MB members was in the realm of fi nance, resulting 
in a clash between the statist faction of the ruling class and the Brotherhood 
in the mid-1980s. Infi tah policies had facilitated the rise of informal fi nancial 
institutions, known as Sharikat Tawzif al-Amwal al-Islamiyya (Islamic Money 
Management Companies). Th ese Islamic investment companies, linked to the 
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nouveau riche rather than to the older, elitist Brotherhood, marked a new era in 
the economic participation of Brotherhood supporters. Popular among small 
depositors and workers in the Gulf States, Islamic investment companies amassed 
billions of Egyptian pounds in savings that were invested in various domestic 
and international markets. Aft er Hosni Mubarak assumed power in 1981, the 
rising infl uence of the MB in the realm of fi nance came to be increasingly seen 
by the regime as a direct threat to the state. State banks were starved of savings 
as depositors opted for Islamic investment companies instead. As global oil 
prices declined, competition to att ract the remitt ances of workers in the Gulf 
intensifi ed. Finally, Mubarak enacted a new investment law in April 1988 that put 
an end to Islamic investment companies, while transferring their capital into the 
Central Bank of Egypt. Consequently, most of the Islamic investment companies 
had collapsed by May 1988.
Th e 1980s also saw the MB expand its infl uence in the sphere of social 
services. As state budgets shrank, the state was unable to off er employment 
to university graduates or continue to provide adequate social services. Th e 
Brotherhood took over, off ering charity programmes and social services to rural 
and impoverished urban areas of the country. Eventually, the 1980s witnessed 
the transformation of the Brotherhood from a religious into a politically active 
group, which began seriously contesting the state and the economy from this 
point onwards. Th e rise in its economic power was reinforced by the group’s 
ideological infl uence. Using its economic power, the Brotherhood began 
establishing Islamic publishing houses – the largest being Dar al-Shuruq – 
which fl ourished in the 1980s and 1990s.
As Egypt embraced new rounds of economic liberalisation in the 1990s, 
the opportunities for Brotherhood businesses did not expand as they did for 
those businessmen and women close to President Mubarak and affi  liated 
with the ruling Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati (National Democratic Party, 
NDP). Th e Brotherhood watched as public resources were siphoned off  by 
NDP businessmen and state bureaucrats, while the military enjoyed protected 
markets. Th e Brotherhood and its members, meanwhile, felt increasingly 
marginalised in the economic realm dominated by NDP capitalists. Operating 
under emergency law, which was re-enacted by Mubarak repeatedly throughout 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the MB thus concentrated its activities on building 
its support base by expanding its social services and charity work.21 As such, 
the MB fi lled the vacuum left  in social services delivery by a state pursuant of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/Word Bank-induced neo-liberal policies. 
In 1992, when an earthquake struck the slum areas of Cairo, the MB was fi rst to 
deliver aid and relief for those aff ected. Slow in its response to the earthquake, the 
government, meanwhile, accused the MB of exploiting the disaster for political 
gains and asked the group to cease all relief work in this case and stop pretending 
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to function like a ‘parallel state’.22 Acknowledging the emergence of the MB as 
a potent social force, the regime thus sought to curb its societal outreach and 
charitable activities.
Since the 1980s, the MB has become an ardent believer in the free market. 
Part of this has to do with the group’s economic evolution in the absence of 
state support, reinforcing its belief in the power of free markets to expand 
opportunities for wealth creation. However, while promoting the free 
market, the MB is also aware of the infl uences of expanded consumerism, 
unemployment and the social ills that may result from free market economics. 
To remedy the eff ects of economic liberalism, the Brotherhood has shift ed 
its approach from charity provision to individual responsibility, spirituality, 
self-help and voluntarism.23
In the 2000s, however, the MB increasingly lost its traditional touch with 
the population as it concentrated its eff orts and aid strategically on winning 
political offi  ce through participation in associational and parliamentary 
elections. As Emad Siam argues, in the period following the 2011 uprising 
the Brotherhood changed its tactics of charity provision by off ering one-off  
help during the month of Ramadan to voters in exchange for their votes, thus 
resorting to clientelistic relations in very obvious ways, a move that alienated 
the youth wings of the MB.24 While the offi  cial Brotherhood organisation 
abandoned its traditional social justice roles in favour of seeking political offi  ce 
through new pragmatic ways of reaching the electorate, its previous popular 
engagement in charity and social services provision was handled by a new 
type of organisation with greater space for youth political activism.25 While 
at odds with the group’s older generation of leaders over political strategy and 
democracy within the group, the Brotherhood’s youth played a crucial role in 
the Egyptian uprising and subsequently in mobilising the vote that secured 
parliamentary and presidential success for the group’s affi  liated party, the FJP.
The Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi administration and 
neo-liberal economic governance
When the MB/FJP took power following the Egyptian uprising of 2011, the 
country faced serious socio-economic challenges. In February 2012, Egypt 
was faced with a budget defi cit, a balance of payments defi cit and depleting 
foreign reserves. Foreign direct investment levels fell from $13 billion per 
annum to $8 billion aft er the uprising. Th e budget defi cit stood at 10 per cent 
of GDP, and Egypt’s foreign reserves declined from $32 billion in February 
2011 to $16 billion in February 2012.26 Th e government had to rely on its 
existing reserves for imports, public sector salaries and subsidies. Tourism was 
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also negatively aff ected by the uprising. To make matt ers worse, Egypt was 
downgraded multiple times by the credit ratings agencies, which adversely 
aff ected its borrowing capabilities and import activities. Th ese challenges were 
compounded by the need to absorb 700,000 graduates into the labour market, 
who were competing for 200,000 jobs prior to the uprising and who were now 
competing in a context of far worse unemployment.27
To deal with these post-uprising socio-economic challenges, the MB/FJP 
– and from June 2012 onwards, the Morsi administration – eff ectively had two 
policy options at their disposal: they could advocate/support the government 
taking an interventionist role in the economy, or a laissez-faire approach. In 
the end, dominant fi gures within the MB/FJP, such as Khairat al-Shater and 
Hassan Malek, supported a laissez-faire approach arguing for a ‘liberal, market 
economy with a business-friendly climate’.28 Th e economic development 
policy, which was laid out in the FJP’s 2011 electoral programme, was to 
a large extent informed by these two individuals and others around them.29 
As their businesses expanded, Brotherhood capitalists became increasingly 
supportive of the neo-liberal ideas that emerged in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. A peek into the business life of Brotherhood members reveals the 
extent of their infl uence within the economy. Al-Shater and Malek themselves, 
for instance, own a joint business empire that spans seventy large companies 
in land reclamation, real estate, construction, clothing, food and furniture and 
other sectors. Given their vast business interests and networks, the MB, and its 
affi  liate the FJP, ‘had a keen interest in reproducing existing patt erns of capital 
accumulation developed under Mubarak’.30
Like its Turkish counterpart in the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ( Justice 
and Development Party, also known by its Turkish acronym AKP), the FJP/
MB had an interest in promoting small and medium-size components of 
capital, albeit within the framework of neo-liberalism. While Mubarak had 
promoted large-scale economic sectors such as communications, construction, 
agribusiness and energy, it appears the Morsi/MB-led government between 
2012–13 promoted medium to small-scale consumer commodities such as 
for instance furniture, clothing and food. Furthermore, the MB fi rmly believed 
that its emphasis on welfare and social justice would reduce the adverse eff ects 
of neo-liberalism on society.31 Th e group’s long-term (twenty-year) economic 
plans were laid out in the 2012 Nahda (Renaissance) Project, which sought 
to shift  Egypt’s economy from one based on rentier capitalism to what they 
coined as ‘productive’ capitalism. It was hoped that the Renaissance Project, 
a brainchild of al-Shater, would, if successful, lead to high levels of economic 
growth, lower levels of unemployment and off er solutions to poverty.32 Critics 
saw the Renaissance Project as representing more of a wish list than a real, 
concrete plan to deal with challenges facing the Egyptian economy and society. 
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Th us, when the project was declared a failure by the MB/FJP’s opponents, the 
MB/FJP did not dispute this fact.33
What then led to this failure of the group’s economic strategy? One reason 
may have been the group and its businessmen’s idealistic view of the free market 
without realising the extent of power struggles that lay under the foundations 
of free markets. Th is naïveté was obvious in the priorities set out by the Morsi 
government as well. Th is said, initially, the Morsi administration att empted 
to implement a modest version of its free market agenda. Elaborating further 
on MB/FJP’s immediate economic strategy, Ahmed Soliman, the FJP’s then 
Assistant Secretary General, stated in an interview with Fatima al-Saadani on 
12 March 2012, that the main goal was to shift  the economy from one with an 
onus on services to one based on production.34 To this end, the MB/FJP focused 
on developing agriculture, livestock, industry, energy and mining through the 
following strategies: (1) rationalising energy subsidies by supporting labour-
intensive industries and removing support from energy-intensive industries; 
(2) improving tax collection; (3) expanding agricultural land area by bringing 
new land under cultivation; (4) spreading out the revenues from tourism to 
benefi t Upper Egyptians, and (5) encouraging the establishment of Islamic 
banks alongside existing commercial banks. It is noteworthy though that 
Soliman cautioned against challenging the legality of privatisation deals that 
were made under Mubarak in order to ensure protection of private property.35
Th roughout 2012, meanwhile, many MB/FJP entrepreneurs were forging 
regional links and promoting their businesses. Th eir main area of economic 
focus was hereby small-scale manufacturing, which the MB/FJP hoped to 
develop in collaboration with Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states.36 Th us, in 2011–12 al-Shater toured Malaysia, Th ailand and 
Turkey, consulting on ways to improve social services and boost the Egyptian 
economy and deal with other pressing issues such as population density in 
Cairo, garbage collection and transport.37 In addition, in April 2012, Hassan 
Malek, a senior Brotherhood member, launched the Egyptian Business Devel-
opmental Association (EBDA) with the aim of promoting the textile and food 
sectors.38 Th eir hope was to open up factories in these sectors and absorb large 
numbers of Egypt’s unemployed workers.39
Later on, the Morsi administration came to the realisation that escaping 
the neo-liberal logic was not as easy as it may have appeared at fi rst. Th us, we 
notice a shift  away from the initial policies of relatively controlled markets to 
the status quo neo-liberal policies of the Mubarak era. It is noteworthy that 
this later advocacy of the free market became a key pillar of economic policy, 
as manifest in the government’s eff orts to secure aid from the IMF and other 
foreign donors at a lower interest rate, as well as in its endeavours to protect 
private business and fi nancial markets, cut the budget defi cit, increase profi ts 
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from state land sales, increase the value-added tax (VAT) on local and imported 
goods and make it easier for small and medium-sized enterprises to lend money 
to facilitate job creation.40 While these policies do not particularly refl ect a 
continuation of the laissez-faire strategies that were promoted under Mubarak, 
critics (including some former MB members) point out how the intrinsic 
marriage of power and capital remained intact under MB/FJP rule.41 One 
journalist at the time described the FJP/MB leadership as being ‘evangelical in 
their support of private enterprise, the stock market and full engagement with 
the global economy’.42 In an interview with multinational investors, al-Shater 
also expressed his support for the free market in the following terms: ‘We 
believe in a very, very big role for the private sector.’43
As a result of this embrace of a neo-liberal free market strategy, the Morsi 
administration was perceived by the public as failing to address the issue of 
socio-economic justice (redistribution). Th e MB/FJP had argued that social 
justice goals would be achieved through zakat or charity. In a country where 
over 25 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line, an anti-poverty 
policy much more eff ective than zakat was needed to tackle the issue as well as 
gain political legitimacy for the group.44 Some MB/FJP proposals mentioned 
in their election programme of 2011 were to increase government revenues 
by revisiting the price of Egyptian energy exports to Israel, repossessing 
formerly state-owned lands that were privatised under Mubarak and making 
zakat payments compulsory.45 Th ese proposals did not, however, off er a 
radical alternative to neo-liberalism. Instead the MB/FJP opted to go aft er the 
Brotherhood’s competitors by targeting their wealth, while positioning their 
own members within state institutions and the economy. Equally importantly, 
as part of their initial compromise with the Egyptian armed forces, the MB/
FJP supported SCAF’s Decree no. 4 of 2012, which off ered immunity from 
criminal charges to Mubarak-era capitalists.46
Th us, during its year in offi  ce (30 June 2012–3 July 2013), the Morsi ad-
ministration straddled the challenge of bringing its economic policy in line 
with Islam while also keeping investors calm. As a result, the administration’s 
economic agenda appeared less as a coherent set of policies that would have 
set Egyptian society and economy on a radically new path, and more as a set 
of ideas, which continued to reproduce results (unemployment, inequality, 
wealth disparity) similar to those of the neo-liberal policies of the Mubarak era. 
A number of contradictions remained at the heart of the MB/FJP administra-
tion. While it was claimed that through their Renaissance Project, the MB/FJP 
government would deal with chronic unemployment, rentierism, corruption 
and poverty, no plan was put in place to allow for the realisation of these goals. 
While the initial focus on reviving manufacturing and reducing monopolies 
may have come across as Keynesian, the Morsi government ultimately shift ed 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   99 05/01/18   6:48 PM
100 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
its focus to establishing fi scal restraints using typical neo-liberal strategies of 
reducing subsidies, cutt ing public sector wage bill (reform of the bureaucracy) 
and disciplining the workforce.47 To be sure, the latt er policy shift  may refl ect 
not so much the Morsi government’s ideological commitment as it refl ects the 
realities of structural power of international fi nancial institutions and existing 
domestic elite.
While economic challenges remained unresolved, the MB/FJP became 
more fully consumed by the political struggles of the day. Th us the power 
struggle between the military and the Brotherhood took centre stage for the 
group following the parliamentary elections of 2011–12, when the military 
sought to curtail the growing infl uence of the Islamists. Aft er the FJP’s 
sweeping win in the 2011–12 parliamentary elections, the MB/FJP demanded 
that it be given the chance to form a new cabinet. However, the SCAF insisted 
that its appointed cabinet would remain in power until aft er the presidential 
elections on 23–4 May 2012. Th is move by SCAF prevented the MB/FJP from 
taking political decisions that may have undermined the interests of the more 
dominant factions of the ruling class, that is the military and Mubarak-era 
capitalists. In late March, the MB threatened that it might fi eld a presidential 
candidate if the FJP was not allowed to form a cabinet immediately. As the 
military hesitated in meeting this demand, the MB announced the candidacy 
of al-Shater for the presidency. Th is increased tensions between the military 
and the Brotherhood, as the latt er was seen to have a strong chance of winning 
the presidency, which would have placed the Brotherhood in control of the 
state and signifi cant policy-making power. Soon, fears of a possible coup began 
circulating. On 14 April 2012, al-Shater was disqualifi ed from running in the 
presidential elections, leading to the nomination of Morsi as the next-in-line 
presidential candidate for MB/FJP. Th e group’s focus remained on short-term 
economic goals rather than long-term economic development strategy.
The demise of the Muslim Brotherhood
Th e fate of the MB/FJP and the Morsi administration was sealed when the 
group tried to undermine the interests of the other fractions of the ruling 
class by reorienting the Egyptian economy through alliances with Qatar and 
Turkey. Th is move would have marginalised Egypt’s main regional backer, 
Saudi Arabia, but more importantly, it would have reduced the infl uence of 
the armed forces and Mubarak-era capitalists in some of the planned new 
mega-economic projects, such as the Suez Canal expansion and the Red 
Sea economic zone project.48 Clearly, the MB/FJP’s rise to power was not 
welcomed by the incumbent capitalists and military elite. Th e military was 
more powerful, given its historical legacy with state building, and enjoyed 
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stronger legitimacy linked to the security of the state, while the MB did 
not enjoy a similar degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the general public, as 
the state had for decades associated the group with terrorism and painted 
it as an enemy of the state. Given this lack of popularity, Morsi was under 
scrutiny as soon as he assumed power in June 2012. Th e actions of Morsi 
and the MB/FJP in the course of their one-year reign further damaged the 
relationship between the people and the Brotherhood. To begin with, the 
Brotherhood were seen as power-grabbers rather than power-sharers. Morsi’s 
November 2012 decree, granting him powers over the courts, turned many in 
the Egyptian judiciary against him. By December 2012, public anger against 
the MB turned into mass protests by women, Coptic groups and liberals.49 Th e 
media turned against the Brotherhood aft er the Palace protests of December 
2012 when Brotherhood supporters shot a journalist. In short, during its 
reign, the MB/FJP and Morsi administration alienated the media, the police50 
and the judiciary.
Th us, backed by a popular movement, the military removed the Morsi ad-
ministration from offi  ce in July 2013.51 Th e Brotherhood leadership, including 
al-Shater and Malek, were rounded up on various charges and their assets frozen. 
Charges against the leadership included corruption and money laundering. To 
further undermine the infl uence of the MB/FJP, the military-backed interim 
government that took over following Morsi’s ousting closed down the Brother-
hood’s medical facilities, schools and community associations. A court ruling 
banned the MB, ordering its dissolution and confi scating its funds and offi  ces. 
By late 2013, the group was designated as a ‘terrorist organisation’.52 A year 
later, in 2014, a court ruling also ordered the dissolution of the FJP.
With the benefi t of hindsight, scholars and journalists have compiled a list 
of weaknesses of the Brotherhood that contributed to its fall from power. To 
begin with, the MB/FJP did not off er a viable alternative economic programme 
to that of Mubarak’s neo-liberalism. With minor adjustments to limit imports, 
they retained the broader neo-liberal framework for job creation and growth 
and thus did not resolve the imbalanced power relationship between labour 
and capital. Politically, moreover, it is widely agreed that the Brotherhood un-
derestimated the power of competing elites and did not think of power-sharing 
as an option to stay in power. Th e Brotherhood did not embark on restructur-
ing the institutions of the state and instead decided to work with the existing 
institutions, but with its own personnel. Th is meant that the underlying 
authoritarian nature of state institutions remained in place. Th e group was 
overconfi dent about the extent of power it had gained through the electoral 
process and thus underestimated the balance of power vis-à-vis other elites and 
society in general. Also, it did not take the demands of the uprising for social 
justice, accountability and reform seriously. In short, these failings discredited 
the group, revealing massive gaps in their economic and political programme.
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Conclusion
Th is chapter contextualised the evolution of the MB within the changing 
global economic context, as well as within the process of state formation 
and domestic political struggles in Egypt. As such, it approached the study 
of the MB through class analysis, highlighting how the group has engaged 
in political and economic struggles in order to gain power and expand their 
networks beyond Egypt. It was argued that, given the transformation of 
the Brotherhood into a faction of the ruling class, the group did not see any 
contradictions in advocating the neo-liberal policies that had shaped Egypt’s 
political economy since 1991. Comparing the MB/FJP economic agenda with 
that of the Mubarak era, Magda Kandil, an economist with the IMF, made 
the following observation: ‘It’s very easy to confuse their economic platform 
with the previous regime: private-led growth, free market economy, scaling 
down the role of government, empowering the private sector’, she says. ‘Th e 
big diff erence is which private sector you are talking about.’53 Th us, while the 
group’s economic agenda may not appear as outright neo-liberal, because 
of its call to combat monopolies and regulate markets, the MB/FJP did not 
necessarily att empt to restructure economic relations but rather wanted to 
tamper with markets in order to allow more room for Brotherhood-affi  liated 
businesses. Th is fact was not missed by most Egyptians who were closely 
observing the MB/FJP’s performance aft er the elections.
From the perspectives of ordinary Egyptians, the group failed to consider 
the demands of the uprising for social justice, jobs and democracy. Th e 
Brotherhood’s political decisions had serious repercussions in the economic 
realm as the MB/FJP failed to formulate a radical critique of neo-liberalism 
and instead opted to work with it, while promoting virtue and morality. As 
one journalist argued, for the electorate the group’s appeal to religion and 
identity was insuffi  cient to solve the real problems of poverty, unemployment, 
housing, education and health.54
As the Brotherhood refl ects on its political and economic failures, it may 
serve the group well to reconsider what it overlooked during its time in power: 
that politics is conducted through compromise and power sharing with other 
factions of the ruling class and that those who rule in public offi  ce will be held 
accountable to the electorate. More importantly, the Brotherhood needs to 
seriously rethink whether the free market is reconcilable with Islamic doctrine 
in ways that will not undermine the Brotherhood’s social base; otherwise, the 
group will lose its ideological claim to being the party of faith.55
Th e case of the Brotherhood’s economic policies raises serious questions 
about the compatibility of neo-liberalism with the social aspects of Islam that 
promote social justice and the collective good. For groups like the Brotherhood 
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to recover from their current crisis, they will need not only to reckon with the 
power of their rivals, but also to fuse economic policies with Islam in ways 
that can actually deliver radical, progressive alternatives. Otherwise, from 
the perspective of the population, the Brotherhood is no diff erent than the 
dictators who served before them.
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Chapter 7
A critique from within: the Islamic 
left in Turkey and the AKP’s 
neo-liberal economics
Nazlı Çağın Bilgili and Hendrik 
Kraetzschmar
Whilst it was during the fi rst years of the Republic – the 1920s – that the ruling 
Kemalist elite decided Turkey should follow the Western model of a secular 
state, it was only much later in the 1980s that an export-oriented, neo-liberal 
economic model was adopted, ending the state capitalist, protectionist system 
that had been in place before. Widely embraced, at the time this neo-liberal 
model received only marginal criticisms from some radical left ist and Islamist 
groups, among which was Milli Görüş (usually translated as ‘National Outlook’), 
which rejected Westernisation and big industry capitalism. Th is rejection did 
not stem, of course, from adherence to Marxist/left ist principles but was driven 
by the movement’s close connect to the small bourgeoisie of Anatolia, and its 
view that small indigenous entrepreneurship was to be empowered as a means 
to combat the prevalence of Western imperial capital in Turkey, which had kept 
the country weak and subordinate. Th us, it is only with the rise of Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (the Justice and Development Party, also known by its Turkish 
acronym AKP) – which was established by so-called reformists from within 
Milli Görüş as the result of an internal split in 20011 – that Western-oriented, 
neo-liberal economics became fi rmly embedded in the political programme of 
the Islamist camp.
Th e AKP itself swept to power in the 2002 parliamentary elections on the 
heels of a serious fi nancial crisis in 2000–1, that left  the country’s economy 
in tatt ers, leading to massive job losses, a devaluation of the Turkish lira and 
a staggering rise in infl ation and poverty. Punishing the preceding coalition 
government – and coalition politics more broadly – the Turkish electorate 
voiced their fury at the economic crisis caused by political mismanagement 
by handing the AKP the fi rst absolute majority in parliament for decades and 
thus the opportunity of forming a single-party government. Addressing the 
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economic crisis, once formed, the new AKP government pursued a number 
of policies aimed at recovery. Th ese included strengthening political and 
economic ties with Western powers, advancing/accelerating EU membership 
and boosting economic growth through neo-liberal policies, such as the sale 
of state companies, lower corporate taxes and improved protection of foreign 
investors.2 Following IMF-induced austerity and restructuring measures, the 
AKP eventually succeeded in returning the country to economic stability 
and growth. Indeed, in the period between 2002 and 2015, Turkey witnessed 
robust annual growth rates of 4.7 per cent on average.3
Internationally, the AKP’s neo-liberal turnaround of Turkey’s economy was 
hailed at the time as a big success, whilst domestically it was rewarded with 
consecutive victories in the 2007, 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections. 
Now in its fi ft eenth consecutive year in power, the AKP has, moreover, not 
only been able to consolidate power, but also facilitated the enrichment 
and empowerment of the country’s Islamic bourgeoisie, which was once 
marginalised by secular state forces, including the military and the judiciary.
However, this accumulation of power in the hands of the AKP admin-
istration, and the pursuit of neo-liberal economic policies, has not remained 
unchallenged. Indeed, growing criticism of the AKP more widely in society, 
particularly in the wake of the 2013 Gezi Park protests, has been matched by 
voices from within the Islamic community, criticising the AKP for its neo-liberal 
policies and for having forgott en the major teachings of Islam regarding social 
rights, equality and justice. Most ardent in its criticism of the AKP’s neo-liberal 
politics is hereby the so-called Islamic left , which – albeit a small group – has 
att racted signifi cant public interest and media att ention, particularly for its par-
ticipation in a series of popular protests, including those at Gezi in 2013, but 
also for two other reasons. First, defi ning itself as opposition from within, the 
Islamic left  has developed an economic counter-narrative to that of the AKP 
which sees no contradiction – in Islamic terms – in the pursuit of economic 
policies based on the principles of neo-liberalism. Th e Islamic left , meanwhile, 
critiques the general perception that Islamist politics is inherently rightist and 
that the Islamic economic model is closer to capitalism than it is to socialism. 
Second, the Islamic left  has been widely viewed as a potential ally of other secular 
and left ist critics of the AKP, thus raising the hope that the ‘Islamists versus 
secularists’ polarisation plaguing Turkish politics can eventually be overcome.
Th is chapter discusses the Islamic left ’s criticism of the AKP government’s 
neo-liberal economic policies and the alternative socio-economic and 
political models it off ers. Although att ention has already been paid to the 
religious sources used by the AKP to justify its neo-liberal policies, litt le has 
as yet been writt en on the Islamic left  and its theologically founded critique 
of neo-liberalism. Th is omission is even more signifi cant because the Islamic 
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left ’s religion-based criticism of the AKP’s policies aligning Islam with neo-
liberalism4 is unique not only in the Turkish context but by regional standards 
too, as even in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2010–11 neo-liberalism 
remained largely an unquestioned economic orthodoxy in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). Katerina Dalacoura observes, for instance, how 
the Islamist parties voted into offi  ce in post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia 
did not challenge, or transform, the neo-liberal economic structures that 
had been put in place by presidents Mubarak (r.1981–2011) and Ben Ali 
(r.1987–2011).5 Indeed, it is remarkable that Islamist-led administrations 
elected in free and fair elections aft er the uprisings did not aim to displace 
neo-liberalism which, during the previous authoritarian era, had led to glaring 
socio-economic inequalities and the development of a patronage-driven 
economy benefi ting the few.6 Th is appears particularly troublesome given 
that popular demands for social and economic justice were characteristic of 
the uprisings across the region.
Th e apparent unwillingness of incoming Islamist-led administrations – 
which theoretically and historically were expected to be critical of the West and 
its free market economy – to opt for a radical change in economic policy has 
been interpreted as a sign that political Islam in the region was moderating and 
adopting Turkey’s AKP as a model of governance.7 Th is assertion seems to fi nd 
confi rmation in a public opinion survey conducted by the Turkish Economic 
and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) just aft er the Arab uprisings (19 
October–15 December 2011) in sixteen regional states,8 which revealed that 
61 per cent of the respondents agreed that Turkey could act as an economic 
and political model for other MENA countries. Among those respondents 
32 per cent justifi ed their arguments by pointing to the democratic system in 
Turkey, while 25 per cent argued that its economy was what made Turkey a 
potential model for other MENA countries.9
Whilst outside perceptions of the AKP government thus remained 
relatively positive, particularly for many of the protesters and activists who 
had led the Arab uprisings and who sought a new model of governance for 
post-authoritarian rule, in Turkey itself the AKP had started to face increasing 
criticism from the early 2010s onwards for its declining performance in both 
the economic and political spheres. As mentioned above, one such criticism 
emanated from a rising Islamic left , whose critique of AKP economic politics 
was couched in theological terms. Drawing on a range of in-depth interviews 
conducted with representatives of the Islamic left ,10 this chapter spells out the 
key theological foundations of its criticism of the AKP’s neo-liberal economic 
policies, illustrating that the Islamic left  refers mainly to the Qur’an and early 
Islamic history in its assertion that Islam is on the side of the poor, needy 
and the oppressed. Moreover, by examining the Islamic left ’s discourse, this 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   109 05/01/18   6:48 PM
110 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
chapter sheds light on the heterogeneity of the Islamic community in Turkey, 
a country that is frequently, and mistakenly, represented as being torn between 
strictly ‘secular’ and ‘Islamic’ poles.
The AKP’s neo-liberalism and its discontent
Since its inception in 1970, Turkey’s largest Islamist movement, Milli Görüş, 
has been represented in Turkish politics by diff erent political parties at 
diff erent times, given that Islamist parties have repeatedly been closed down 
by the Constitutional Court for violating the tenets of secularism enshrined in 
the country’s constitution. Once of litt le signifi cance, these Islamist political 
parties gradually rose to visibilaity and prominence during the second half 
of the 1990s with the emergence of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, known 
by its Turkish acronym RP) under the leadership of Necmett in Erbakan. 
In the 1995 general elections the RP managed to secure a plurality of seats 
in parliament, which eventually led in 1996 to the formation of an RP-led 
coalition government headed by Erbakan.11 Th e country’s secular state elite, 
and more specifi cally the army, were highly disturbed by the formation of 
this fi rst ever Islamist-led administration and ended its term in power by 
forcing Erbakan, the decades-long-leader of Milli Görüş, to resign as prime 
minister in 1997.12 Th e RP government’s inability to survive then led in 2001 
to a signifi cant split within Milli Görüş, with the formation of the AKP by 
younger reform-minded members who sought a clear ideational break with the 
parent movement. As such, the AKP adopted a fi ercely pro-Western and pro-
democratic stance that downplayed its Islamist credentials, and that was aimed 
at broadening the party’s support in society, including among the country’s 
liberals. Economically, meanwhile, the AKP moved distinctly to the right of 
the RP. Indeed, although the economic model proposed by the RP – known 
as Just Order – had not rejected capitalism per se, it had remained strongly 
in favour of a state-regulated market economy within which interest would 
be forbidden. Th e AKP, meanwhile, pushed this path towards acceptance of 
market economic principles within the Islamist movement further yet, by fully 
embracing neo-liberal and pro-business polices.13
When the AKP was voted into offi  ce for the fi rst time in 2002, it worked 
hard to prevent a resurgence of the economic crisis of 2000–1, strictly 
adhering to the prescriptions demanded by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the European Union (EU). Over the following years Turkey then 
experienced an economic boom, manifest in solid infl ation-free growth rates 
of on average 4.7 per cent and the rise of a new conservative bourgeoisie.14 
Known as the second-generation bourgeoisie – given that they are latecomers 
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compared to the Istanbul bourgeoisie that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s 
– these Islamic-oriented Anatolian capitalist groups emerged only in the 
post-1980 period, gaining prominence under AKP rule.15 In the world of the 
AKP and this emergent pious bourgeoisie, Western-style free-market capitalism 
and secular politics were not incompatible with Islamic precepts, and hence 
there was no room for any perceived threats to the Turkish/Muslim way of 
life from the West.16 In fact, it was the contradiction between this view and 
the RP’s Just Order that had alienated these capitalist groups from the RP and 
encouraged the emergence of the AKP in 2001.17 Most members of this new 
bourgeoisie operate in the construction sector, which has come to serve as the 
locomotive of the AKP’s neo-liberalism.18 Indeed, the AKP’s developmental/
economic policies are heavily based on mega-construction projects, such as 
the construction of a third international airport in Istanbul, a shopping mall in 
Gezi Park, and a third bridge across the Bosporus. For the AKP – and Erdoğan 
in particular – these projects constituted the hallmark of its legacy and the 
benchmark of successful developmental policies.
For all its fanfare and international admiration, the AKP’s economic agenda 
and transformation of the Turkish economy did not, however, come without 
its domestic critics. Indeed, the 2013 Gezi Park protests19 – the largest anti-
government protests Turkey had witnessed under AKP rule – originated as 
a reaction to the AKP’s neo-liberal interventions in the public space and its 
developmental agenda.20 As Göle states, ‘constructing a shopping mall in the 
middle of Gezi Park meant private capital’s confi scation of a public space, of a 
park open to all’.21 When the bulldozers initially gathered around the park, a 
small group of environmentalists and left ists – which also included members 
of the Kapitalizmle Mücadele Derneği (Association of Struggle against 
Capitalism, known as Anti-Capitalist Muslims in short and ACM hereaft er) 
an Islamic left ist group – were the fi rst to react, staging a sit-in at the park. 
What mobilised the masses22 thereaft er, and led to large-scale anti-government 
demonstrations, was the perception that the authorities had used excessive 
violence against the initial protesters and that the government appeared to 
be ignoring their demands. Th e demography of the protesters at the time was 
wide-ranging and cut across Turkish society, comprising mostly urbanites of 
the coastal cities, the young and the educated.23
Although the Gezi protest in 2013 against the AKP and its neo-liberal 
politics was broad-based, bringing millions to the streets, in the ensuing par-
liamentary elections of 2015 ( June/October), the AKP nevertheless managed 
to retain power, largely because of its ability to mobilise electoral support 
from the country’s lower-middle classes, as well as the more conservative 
segments of society, who had labelled the anti-government protesters at Gezi 
as looters and vandals. For some, this ability to maintain electoral support 
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among the lower-middle classes – that is, those benefi ting least from the 
AKP’s economic programme – appeared puzzling. A closer reading of the 
AKP’s strategy reveals, however, that the party in government has always 
been at pains to balance its neo-liberal economic policies with a healthy dose 
of welfarist policies, particularly for the poor. A case in point concerns, for 
instance, the establishment of the Housing Development Administration 
(known by its Turkish acronym TOKİ) which provides aff ordable housing 
for lower and middle-income groups on public land. Following the same 
logic, the AKP government also reformed the country’s public health24 and 
education systems, making both, as Tim Dorlach argues, more accessible and 
egalitarian in character.25 Indeed, although signifi cant inequalities persist, 
both systems have undoubtedly become more inclusive under AKP rule. As 
Dorlach furthermore explains, under the AKP ‘social security and labour 
market regulations were retrenched, while social assistance was expanded’, 
meaning ‘less welfare protection for workers but [its] expansion for the poor’.26 
Reforms to the social security system thus sought to integrate ‘all sections of the 
population, not only the formally employed but also the informally employed 
and unemployed’.27 Although previously offi  cial employment was necessary to 
receive social security, a new law introduced in 2006 meant that henceforth 
any Turkish citizen could benefi t from the social security system irrespective 
of his/her employment status.
Th e AKP thus pursues neo-liberal economic policies that simultaneously 
work to satisfy the needs particularly of the impoverished sections of society, 
without advancing a return to state welfarism. Th is is being done by ‘institu-
tional diversifi cation and pluralisation of welfare provision in the country’, 
and, as Eder explains, by encouraging ‘charity groups’ and ‘philanthropic 
associations’ to take over ‘some state functions or the state subcontracting its 
welfare provision duties to the private sector’.28 Scholars working on Turkey’s 
political economy have referred to this balancing of neo-liberal economic 
policy with social security assistance as ‘neoliberalism with a human face’,29 
‘social neoliberalism’30 or ‘neoliberal populism’.31
A new oppositional pole: The rise of the Islamic left
Th e so-called ‘Islamic left ’ in its current form is widely associated in Turkish 
politics with a group of intellectuals and theologians, the most prominent 
of whom is Ihsan Eliaçık,32 as well as a number of groupings, including most 
notably the aforementioned ACM as well as the so-called Emek ve Adalet 
Platformu (Labour and Justice Platform, LJP hereaft er). Collectively, they 
charge the AKP and its neo-liberal policies for advancing solely the interests 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   112 05/01/18   6:48 PM
Neo-liberalism and the Islamic left in Turkey 113
of the country’s rich and of being indiff erent to the plight and rights of the 
working classes. Although similar criticism has been voiced by various other 
civil groups and political parties, the Islamic left  is unique in the sense that they 
present their criticism with an explicit Islamic frame of reference.
As regards to the term ‘Islamic left ’ itself, whilst being widely used by 
outsiders and in the media, it is viewed with scepticism by some, though 
not all, of those associated with the current. Eliaçık notes in this regard, for 
instance, that the label would be deemed surprising, and even controversial, 
by many in Turkey, where Islam is automatically associated with centre-right 
economic politics.33 Th e LJP as well rejects the label ‘Islamic left ’ and being 
positioned within it. According to them, the left  is too didactic and overbearing 
towards people and this contradicts the LJP’s ultimate goal of empowering the 
people and voicing their demands rather than controlling them.34 Th e ACM, 
meanwhile, appears not to be averse to being identifi ed as ‘Islamic left ’, given 
that their ideas are left ist ideas based on Islam.35
Whilst the Islamic left  cites Islam as the main source of its ideas, their un-
derstanding of it is ostensibly diff erent from that of the traditional mainstream 
expressions of Islam prevailing in Turkey. According to one ACM research 
respondent, for instance, Islam can be interpreted, and hence applied, to 
real-world politics and society in various ways. Indeed, throughout history 
humankind has witnessed examples of what it coins as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
interpretations of religious scripture (Qur’an and Sunna), although the latt er 
have ultimately proved dominant. Any readings of Islam that justify oppression, 
dominance and capitalist profi t-driven politics are deemed ‘negative’ and those 
emphasising equality, social justice and the rights of the oppressed ‘positive’. 
Th at negative interpretations of Islam have prevailed in the modern era is, 
according to the group, linked to the fact that it best serves the interests of the 
rich and powerful.36
According to the Islamic left , historically meanwhile many Muslim scholars 
and leaders, including the Prophet himself, espoused a ‘positive’ interpretation 
of Islam, and hence even though such interpretations appear nowadays new 
and unusual in the Turkish context,37 they are in fact merely a resurrection of 
a proper understanding of Islam. For members of the ACM the sole diff erence 
between then and now is that the group nowadays borrows from left ist and 
Marxist terminology in its economic discourse, using, for instance, terms 
such as ‘social class’ and ‘exploitation’. Indeed, although the ACM strives to be 
recognised and included within the Muslim community in Turkey, it appears 
unwilling to alter the left ist terminology it uses, even though it is aware that 
this terminology is controversial and considered to be too left ist by many 
conservative Muslims, particularly in the Anatolian heartland. However, 
according to ACM research respondents, the use of left ist terminology is 
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inevitable. In fact, ijtihad, the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna that 
provides the legal language of Islam, was completed by Muslim jurists during 
pre-capitalist times and hence does not refl ect upon the problems generated 
by capitalism. It follows that in the contemporary era, when capitalism poses 
the greatest threat to social equality and justice, left ist terminology is more 
appropriate than the Islamic language generated before capitalism.38
Th e appearance of the Islamic left  in the Turkish public sphere can be traced 
back to Ramadan 2011, when a number of young religious people criticising 
the Islamic community’s indiff erence to existing inequalities in society 
organised ‘modest ift ars’39 in public spaces (streets and parks) to protest the 
‘luxurious’ hotel ift ars40 that have become increasingly popular among the 
country’s emerging pious bourgeoisie. Th rough these ‘modest ift ars’, the Islamic 
left  sought to criticise the extreme consumerism, splendour and extravagance 
that it felt characterised the lives of the strata of the bourgeoisie that had become 
richer and more powerful on the heels of the AKP’s ascendancy to power.
Almost a year later, in 2012, these left -leaning young religious people 
att racted public att ention once more, this time by organising a 1,100 people-
strong march from Fatih Mosque to Taksim Square in Istanbul as a part of 
the celebration of the International Workers’ Day (1 May).41 Led by Eliaçık, 
organisers of the march named themselves the Kapitalizmle Mücadele Korteji 
(Cortege of Struggle against Capitalism). Later on, they evolved into the 
ACM, by which the group is nowadays known. Th is process of evolution from 
a cortege into an association involved a series of disengagements due to several 
disagreements within the Islamic left ist community, and because there were 
those who did not want to take part in any formal associational activity.
As the preceding narrative made apparent, the Islamic left  hence constitutes a 
heterogeneous current in Turkish politics – although this is not widely recognised 
by the Turkish public in general – involving several distinct groupings and actors/
activists. As well as the ACM, which is relatively popular and well-known, the 
current comprises the aforementioned LJP which was established in 2011 – thus 
before the ACM – and which is also an infl uential group within the Islamic left . 
One of the major societal issues the LJP advances, concerns the problems facing 
workers and the homeless. Alongside its engagement in street activism, members 
of the LJP also regularly organise talks by important thinkers of the current with 
the aim of furthering the group’s intellectual development. In the words of its 
members, the major distinction between the LJP and ACM is that, unlike the 
latt er, they are not ideological in outlook. Moreover, they argue that, unlike the 
LJP, the ACM seeks to att ract public att ention through controversial public acts 
and symbols. A case in point, according to LJP members, was the ACM’s choice 
of route on the May Day in March 2012, which lead them from Fatih Mosque to 
Taksim Square, two iconic places in Turkish social life, the former for the pious 
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and the latt er for the seculars. ‘We also walked on 1 May’, LJP members say, ‘but 
we walked with the workers’.42
Th e Islamic left  att racted even more public att ention as an oppositional actor 
to the AKP in the wake of Eliaçık’s and the ACM’s involvement in the 2013 Gezi 
Park protests. Indeed, the occupation of the park by diff erent societal groups, 
and the communal life that took place in the park throughout the protests, is 
interpreted by members of the ACM and Eliaçık43 – who had their own tents in 
the park – as a successful example of the oppressed uniting against oppression. 
For representatives of the ACM this union could, in fact, have acted as a fi rst 
step in overcoming the growing secular–Islamic polarisation in Turkey.44
At the time, public opinion tended to view the protesters in the park as of 
a mostly secular persuasion. Agreeing with this perception, Eren Erdem – a 
well-known thinker and established author of the Islamic left  and currently 
an MP of the centre-left  Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, 
also known by its Turkish acronym CHP) – explains that the protesters were 
in the park to criticise the government not only for planning to cut down 
trees and build a hotel and mall in their place, but also for interfering in their 
private lives. To back up his assertion, Erdem points to – in his view – the 
most popular slogan used during the protests in the park, which was ‘cheers, 
Tayyip’ (the fi rst name of Erdoğan).45 Emrah Çelik, who interviewed the 
protesters, similarly explains that except for the ACM and a few other religious 
individuals, the bulk of religious people who supported the protests at the 
beginning eventually withdrew their support due to the violent methods and 
secular-leaning slogans used.46 In these circumstances, Erdem believes that 
the appearance of the Islamic left  in the park was a sign that it was ready to 
fi ght for the protection and freedom of diff erent groups and lifestyles within 
Turkish society.47 Left ist and secular protesters’ gathering around their praying 
comrades during Friday prayers in the occupied park also raised the hope 
that the secular–Islamist bifurcation of Turkish politics could be overcome.48 
In his analysis of the Gezi protest movement, Çelik corroborates this view, 
illustrating that hopes for an end to ideological polarisation were widespread 
among participating university students who criticised the instrumentalisa-
tion of ideological binaries and advocated freedom for all people and lifestyles, 
be they religious or secular.49
Societal att empts at overcoming polarised politics were also evident in the 
yeryüzü sofr aları (usually translated as ‘earth tables’), which were organised 
by the ACM aft er the evacuation of the park and att racted a diverse range of 
att endees from across society, including secular, religious, Turkish, Kurdish, 
Alevi and Sunni participants. Indeed, when the protesters were pushed out 
of Gezi Park by the security forces, the ACM adopted two approaches to the 
pursuit of cross-ideological cooperation that had characterised the Gezi spirit: 
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yeryüzü sofr aları and park forums. As Ramadan 2013 commenced just aft er 
the park had been evacuated, the ACM used this occasion as an opportunity 
to revive its ‘moderate ift ars’, this time inviting anyone feeling the ‘Gezi spirit’ 
and thus targeting an ever more heterogeneous group of att endees. Th e fi rst 
such ift ar table was laid on Istiklal Avenue in Taksim, and proved extremely 
popular, so much so that its extension to Taksim Square itself was only stopped 
by police intervention.50 Although not organised by ACM itself, the park 
forums, meanwhile, were also strongly supported by the group as arenas of 
direct democracy. Once forced out of Gezi Park, the protesters decided that 
every evening they would meet at a diff erent park in Istanbul to exchange ideas 
for a more democratic, egalitarian and tolerant political system in Turkey.51 
Among ACM members, these park forums raised the hope that they would 
eventually empower civil society vis-à-vis the state and political society (that 
is the country’s principle political parties), the latt er of which were thought 
to have been the key drivers and benefi ciaries of societal polarisation. 
Eventually, these hopes failed to materialise, however, as political parties and 
party representatives quickly succeeded in establishing themselves as the 
dominant protagonists at the park forums. For ACM, the Gezi Park events, 
and particularly the park forums, hence turned out to be a disappointment.52
Unlike the ACM, the LJP meanwhile did not participate in the Gezi protests 
as a group/platform. Nonetheless, on the initiative of the LJP, religious people, 
who called themselves the opposition within the Islamic community, met 
during the protests in order to discuss the latest developments. Th ey also 
draft ed a statement criticising the government’s violent crackdown of the Gezi 
protests, for which they solicited signatures from within the Muslim intelli-
gentsia. Th e aim was to show that voices critical of the police’s excessive use of 
violence and of the government’s obstinacy were existent within the Muslim 
community too. Although thirty-eight renowned Muslim intellectuals signed 
the statement, other Islamist intellectuals harshly criticised the document, 
highlighting the contentious and marginal status the Islamic left  enjoys within 
the Islamic community in Turkey.53
The Islamic left’s economic and political alternatives 
to neo-liberalism
As concerns their programmatic outlook, the main goal uniting the disparate 
forces and thinkers of the Islamic left  is the establishment of economic and 
social justice in the world. And like their secular counterparts, the Islamic left  
identifi es capitalism as the main obstacle to achieving both. In the manifesto of 
the ACM, for instance, capitalism is defi ned as ‘the enemy of Allah, humanity, 
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nature, the poor, the hungry, the downtrodden’.54 According to members of the 
ACM, capitalists are hegemons and they are the reasons behind oppression, 
injustice and wars in the world.55 Th e LJP in its programme mentions more 
specifi cally neo-liberalism as the main problem today, defi ning it as the new 
ideological form of capitalism that requires eradication.56
As mentioned above, unlike the secular left , the Islamic left  draws on Qur’anic 
sayings in its critique of capitalism and its advancement of an alternative 
economic model based on equality and social justice. Th e Qur’anic expression 
lahu al-mulk – which is Arabic for ‘property belongs to God’ – hereby forms 
the main point of reference of this critique and for the argument that Islam 
mandates common ownership of the means of production. For representatives 
of the Islamic left , in fact, belonging to God in religious terms actually means 
belonging to the public, although Eliaçık in his interview with the author cir-
cumscribes this tenet by asserting that it does not pertain to private homes 
and possessions. According to him, anything that has a surplus value and that 
generates income – such as for instance land, mines, farms, gardens, vineyards 
– should belong to society. Eliaçık criticises the pious bourgeoisie for their 
capitalist att itude which for him means ‘ok, the moon, the sun and the stars 
belong to God but land is mine, oil is mine’.57
Following this interpretation of lahu al-mulk, the ACM argues that, on the 
basis of their labour and contribution to profi t generation, factory workers 
should become share-holders in the companies they work for. Th ey should 
have access to signifi cant fi nancial information, such as how much profi t the 
company makes and how much their managers earn. In the view of the ACM, 
Islam is forthright about the rights of workers. Th ey point out a number of 
Islamic principles on the issue such as, for instance, ‘woe to those who give 
less than due’ or ‘give the worker his wages before his sweat dries’.58 As regards 
these principles, ACM members believe that ownership of the means of 
production is a critical concern of Islam and they criticise Turkish Islamists for 
having ignored this religious prescript for decades. Although Turkish Islamism 
has a history of questioning certain aspects of capitalism – especially before 
the rise of the AKP – it has been hostile to communism too, which is known 
to be secular and atheist. Indeed, it is this latt er hostility which has arguably 
prevented the emergence of a more radical criticism of capitalism by many 
Islamists.59
According to the economic model advocated by the Islamic left , then, no 
segment of society should suff er from economic inequality. In this regard, 
Eliaçık shows appreciation for the Soviet economic model, which provided all 
its citizens with basic goods such as jobs, inexpensive housing, free healthcare 
and education. As he points out, the Soviet model is ‘truly appropriate for 
Islam’ in that sense.60 Erdem, as well, defi nes Islam as a worldview that defends 
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a classless egalitarian socio-economic structure.61 However, although Eliaçık, 
Erdem and others within the Islamic left  highlight the detrimental impact 
of property ownership and a class-based society, they do not propose an 
economic model that is an exact copy of socialism. Th e LJP, for instance, asserts 
that they have a reading group, which seeks to develop an Islamic economic 
model that is not based on socialism. Moderate in its objectives, the LJP in 
fact states that complete equality is almost impossible to achieve and hence, 
rather than aim for revolutionary change of the system, they strive to reduce 
extant inequalities within the existing order.62 Eliaçık also makes it clear that 
he imagines a socio-economic order without private property, yet that this ‘is 
not exactly like socialism either, in the sense that it includes entrepreneurship 
and private initiative’.63 Interestingly, Eliaçık confesses that he does not exactly 
know how such a mixed system comprising certain tenets of each economic 
model – sharing in socialism and production in capitalism – would look like, 
let alone how it could be established.64
Th is said, there is another discernible diff erence between socialism and 
the economic (and political) model advocated by the Islamic left , and this 
pertains to the role of the state in politics. As Erdem notes in this regard, for 
instance ‘[c]ertainly not in economic terms but in politics, I am liberal in 
terms of minimising the state’.65 Th is quest for a minimal state, in fact, is shared 
as a political ideal by all actors and groupings of the Islamic left , who view 
it as a precondition for the maximisation of individual liberties. By ‘minimal 
state’ the Islamic left  insinuates two things: (1) a state that is kept away from 
non-political social and religious issues; and (2) a state whose institutions 
are limited in their involvement in the decision-making process, and that 
maximises citizens’ participation in politics. With regards to the former, for 
instance, Eliaçık argues that individual basic goods should be available to all, 
whether that is shelter, access to healthcare, education or a means of earning 
one’s livelihood. However, as for who should be responsible for providing 
these basic goods, he goes on to argue that the state should get involved only if 
society cannot manage to deliver protection and a secure life on its own.66 With 
regards to the latt er conception of a ‘minimal state’, meanwhile, the Islamic left  
strives for a more decentralised political system in which the decision-making 
process functions in a bott om-up manner. Th e justifi cation for this is found 
in the Qur’anic expression la illaha ila Allah, meaning ‘there is no deity but 
God’ in Arabic. In fact, this verse is commonly referenced by the Islamic left  
to reject the authority of the state and other institutionalised power-holders. 
While Erdem suggests that this expression advocates anarchy, given that it 
asks for the abolition of the state,67 the ACM’s interpretation is less radical, 
suggesting that it refers to the principle of shared administration where no 
human being would be given absolute authority over others. Along these lines, 
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members of ACM argue that parliamentary democracy and its major institu-
tionalised protagonists – political parties – are nothing but tools of control and 
repression to keep people pacifi ed by giving them the illusion of participating 
in politics through voting, when in fact their voice does not count. Indeed, 
by voting, citizens elect ‘so-called’ representatives whom they mostly do not 
know in person, and because of this physical/emotional distance between 
MP and voters, the former feels greater loyalty to the party leadership than 
to his/her constituents.68 Moreover, in the view of the ACM, party leaders 
across the board pursue their own interest, rather than the collective good, 
caring more about vote shares in elections than the problems and concerns 
of their voters. Based on these ideas, the ACM rejects any engagement with 
the country’s extant political parties both at the level of individual members 
and as a group, asserting that such engagement would cost the group its 
political independence and credibility. It follows that they reject representa-
tive parliamentary democracy per se, preferring instead the establishment of a 
plebiscitary democracy, or, if that is not possible, at least greater direct citizen 
engagement in decision-making processes.69
Alongside the Qur’anic term la illaha ila Allah, the other scriptural source of 
inspiration guiding the political views of the Islamic left  concerns the so-called 
‘Medina Contract’, which was writt en in AD 622 as the constitution of the fi rst 
Islamic state established by the Prophet and his followers in Medina. Th e text 
is widely believed to be an early example of a social contract which, rather than 
being imposed by the ruler, that is the Prophet, was prepared and signed by both 
the Prophet and all other members of civil society in Medina. Th e contract itself 
is thought to advocate the establishment of a religiously pluralistic state that 
accepts Muslims and non-Muslims alike as equal members of one nation, the 
ummah.70 Taking the Medina Contract as their point of reference, the various 
actors of the Islamic left  all argue that in their calls for equality and justice they 
do not draw a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Rather they 
concentrate on one societal distinction: that between the oppressor and the 
oppressed.71
Conclusion
Th is chapter explored an intellectual/ideological current – the Islamic left  – 
which, although few in numbers, has undoubtedly att racted signifi cant public 
att ention and expressed one of the most fundamental criticisms of the AKP’s 
neo-liberal economic politics to date. Identifying themselves as marginalised 
actors within the Islamic community, the heterogeneous collection of thinkers 
and groupings comprising the Islamic left  has developed a critique of the 
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AKP’s understanding of Islam with its emphasis only on conservative social 
values and worshipping practices. Referring to the Qur’an, the Prophet and 
early Islamic history, the current argues that over time Islam has been distorted 
to serve the interests of the powerful. Hence, Muslims have come to forget 
that Islam, by nature, emphasises economic and social justice. Indeed, besides 
active opposition to the government in street politics and social media, the 
current is known for its radical perspective on Islamic principles. Interpreting 
today’s mainstream Islamism as a distorted model of Islam, the Islamic left  
pairs what it refers to as ‘true Islam’ with left ist arguments and terminology, 
and argues that Islam in its essence is closer to left ist calls for equality and 
justice than to conservative and capitalist right-wing politics.
What then is the future of this current in Turkish politics? Whilst diffi  cult 
to predict, this chapter has revealed a number of challenges the Islamic left  
will need to overcome, if it is to stand any chance of broadening its societal 
base. For one thing, the Islamic left  remains highly heterogeneous, with 
signifi cant interpersonal and policy divisions plaguing the current. So long 
as these divisions prevail, it is unlikely for the current to gain traction with 
a broader public. Th e rejection of institutionalised politics by some, and 
their reluctance to ally with established political parties, may also prove 
detrimental to the advancement of their agenda and ultimately of their aim 
to overcome the secular–Islamic binary in Turkish politics. Lastly, as this 
chapter illustrated, although the Islamic left  is unequivocal in its criticism of 
the existing neo-liberal economic and political order, it has yet to present a 
detailed alternative model of society, politics and the economy. Indeed, both 
in terms of economics and politics the Islamic left  has yet to speak with one 
voice, let alone formulate clear-cut proposals on how a classless political 
society infused by Islamic scripture would look.
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Chapter 8
Rise and endurance: moderate 
Islamists and electoral politics in the 
aftermath of the ‘Moroccan Spring’
Mohammed Masbah
On 25 November 2011, Morocco held its fi rst parliamentary election aft er 
the constitutional reforms that had been initiated by King Mohamed VI in 
response to the popular protests that had rocked the country in the wake 
of the Arab uprisings. Th e moderate Islamist Hizb al-’Adala wa al-Tanmiyya 
(Party of Justice and Development, PJD), which had been in opposition 
ever since its creation in 1996, received 27 per cent of the votes, winning 
107 out of 395 contested parliamentary seats. Th is victory transformed the 
PJD into the largest parliamentary party in Morocco by far, and catapulted 
its Secretary General Abdelilah Benkirane into the post of prime minister 
(PM) of a coalition government. Five years later, at the election of 7 October 
2016, the dominance of the PJD was confi rmed by an even more impressive 
victory than that of 2011, with the PJD obtaining 31.6 per cent of the popular 
vote and a total of 125 parliamentary seats. Several days later on 11 October 
2016, King Mohamed VI charged Benkirane with the formation of his second 
consecutive administration.1 In the following fi ve months, however, Benkirane 
was unable to forge a new coalition government, causing the longest period of 
political deadlock in the reign of Mohamed VI. Consequently, the king used 
a controversial reading of Article 47 of the constitution to dismiss Benkirane 
on 17 March 2017, replacing him with another PJD leader and former foreign 
minister Saad Eddine El Othmani. Only a few days later a new PJD-led 
coalition government was announced, comprising the al-Tajammu‘ al-Watani 
lil-Ahrar (National Rally of Independents, RNI), al-Haraka al-Shaʿbiyya 
(Popular Movement, PM), al-Itt ihad al-Dustouri (Constitutional Union, CU), 
Hizb al-Taqqadum wa al-Ishtirakiyya (Party of Progress and Socialism, PPS) 
and al-Itt ihad al-Ishtiraki lil-Quwat al-Shaʿbiyya (Socialist Union of Popular 
Forces, SUPF). Th e second consecutive PJD-led coalition government since 
the Arab uprisings of 2011 was hence formed.
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Th e sustained electoral success of a single political party across consecutive 
elections, and consequently its endurance at the helm of government – in this 
case of the PJD – is unique in the political history of Morocco. Over the last 
two decades, the country’s traditional political parties have tended to decline 
in popularity as a result of their participation in government. In contrast, 
the PJD was able to increase its electoral support between 2011 and 2016, 
and succeeded in maintaining a position at the helm of government for two 
consecutive mandates, a feat that has eluded all other political parties during 
the era of King Mohamed VI.
Th e PJD also represents a unique case for Islamists in the Arab world. 
Following the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011, Islamist political parties 
ascended to power as a result of the political opening in Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia, yet only a few years later all of them had been removed from offi  ce, 
except in Morocco. Indeed, the PJD is the only Islamist party in the Arab world 
to have both survived a full term in offi  ce, and won subsequent re-election with 
an increased majority. In Tunisia, for example, Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance 
Party) won the 2011 parliamentary elections, but went on to lose the 2014 
poll. Similarly, the Egyptian al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, 
MB) and its affi  liate, Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala (Freedom and Justice Party, 
FJP) were overthrown by a military coup d’état in 2013 aft er only one year in 
power. Th is renders the PJD an excellent, and unique, case to study the rise to, 
and endurance in, government by moderate Islamist parties post-2011.
Although much has been writt en about how and why Islamist forces moderate 
their ideology and behaviour through political participation,2 far fewer studies 
are available on the survival of Islamist forces once they have reached executive 
power. Focusing on the case of the PJD in Morocco, this chapter aims to explain 
how Islamist parties rise to power, shed light on the challenges they face as rulers 
in an authoritarian sett ing, and explore how, once in government, these challenges 
aff ect both the party itself and the wider political sett ing. Th e central question 
addressed in this chapter thus concerns the structural and agency-related factors 
that explain the Moroccan PJD’s rise to power in 2011, as well as its resilience at 
the helm of government between early 2012 and early 2017.
Drawing on political process and rational choice theories, as well as the 
literatures on political parties in the Arab world, this chapter argues that the 
PJD’s emergence as a relevant political actor, and its remarkable endurance at 
the helm of government between 2011 and 2017, can be best explained as a result 
of three factors. First, its rise and endurance was made possible by the unique 
circumstances that characterised Moroccan politics in the post-2011 period. 
As elsewhere in the region, in 2011 the regime had come under signifi cant 
pressure from the Moroccan street to initiate political reform. To relieve the 
pressure, the monarchy initiated a series of political reforms that included a new 
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constitution and the organisation of early parliamentary elections, which were 
relatively free and fair in comparison to previous polls. Whilst pre-2011 the 
PJD had been allowed to participate in Moroccan politics within proscribed 
lines,3 they were able to capitalise on the 2011 political opening by taking 
advantage of the regime’s short-lived crisis in 2011 and, once in power, by 
carefully navigating the political space between conciliation with the Palace and 
the retention of independence from it. Th is strategy enabled the party to avoid 
being fully co-opted by the Palace while in government, and as such helped it 
to retain its popularity among constituents and the broader public. Second, 
the PJD benefi ted from the prevalence of a fragmented party system, charac-
terised by the declining performance of the main traditional parties including 
Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party, IP) and the SUPF. While the electoral 
popularity of these parties has declined as a result of the weakness of their party 
machinery and loss of credibility among their core constituencies, the PJD was 
able to build and sustain a strong organisational structure and base, as well as 
taking advantage of the vacuum left  by these traditional parties to broaden its 
electoral appeal.4 Th ird, the pragmatism of the PJD is an element contributing to 
its ‘optimal’ rational choices. Over the course of the past twenty years, the PJD 
has learned how to balance between abiding by the political rules established by 
the monarchy and craft ing a political discourse that is able to att ract voters. Th is 
was based on a strategic calculation that relies on the PJD’s retaining its loyalty 
to the king, while at the same time denouncing the hegemony of the regime. 
It seems that this method has resonated with many PJD voters, who want to 
hear a party denouncing corruption within the regime without confronting the 
monarchy. As Mohamed El Hachimi has observed, this PJD pragmatism was 
the result of a long process of learning, which has led the party to moderate 
its position ideologically, obliging it to accept political participation in an au-
thoritarian political system.5 Accordingly, through ‘rational’ and ‘calculated’ 
choices, the PJD benefi ted the most from the 2011 political opening and turned 
it to its advantage. A pragmatic party, the PJD understands the reality of power 
politics in Morocco and, at times, has demonstrated its willingness to sacrifi ce 
its Islamist philosophy for power-political considerations.6
The PJD’s rise to power
2011: Transforming the crisis into opportunity
Returning to the fi rst argument presented above, it is suggested here that 
the ascendancy to power of Morocco’s PJD cannot be properly understood 
without positioning it within the broader political context of 2011. Before 
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2011, in fact, the PJD leadership was preparing for the prospect of further 
repression, rather than planning to win a parliamentary election.7 Yet due to 
the popular protests that erupted in Morocco in February 2011 – the so-called 
‘Moroccan Spring’ lead by the 20th February Movement8 – the PJD’s fortunes 
changed dramatically, enabling it ultimately to emerge as the governing party 
in the post-Spring era. Indeed, while across the region most Arab states 
responded to the democratic protest movements of 2011 with increased 
repression, the monarchy in Morocco opted for a diff erent tactic: bowing 
to the storm. Th e actions of the monarchy followed a patt ern of adapting 
to public pressure in order to maintain stability and survive.9 Accordingly, 
the monarchy was quick to respond to the protests with a series of reform 
measures. First, it soft ened its security-oriented approach. So for instance, 
police repression of the demonstrations was measured and low-level, thereby 
avoiding an escalation of the protests and allowing the population to vent its 
anger. Second, the monarchy adopted a series of political reforms to address 
some of the protesters’ demands for greater popular participation. Only three 
weeks aft er the protests of 20 February 2011, King Mohamed VI gave a speech 
at which he promised ‘genuine’ constitutional reforms.10 Ratifi ed by popular 
referendum on 1 July 2011, these constitutional reforms included signifi cant 
amendments, such as granting greater space for public freedoms, expanding 
the powers of the government and upgrading parliamentary oversight of 
the government. By the same token, however, the king retained important 
powers, such as his role as head of the military and security apparatus and his 
powers to conduct foreign policy, as well as a largely symbolic maintenance 
of his title as ‘commander of the faithful’, granting him religious legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, the king did agree to delegate some of his former prerogatives 
to a prime minister to be designated from the largest party in parliament, with 
the power to appoint ministers, dissolve the lower house of parliament11 and 
direct the country’s internal aff airs.12 Following the constitutional reforms, the 
king called for early parliamentary elections, which were held in November 
2011 and won by the PJD. Th at vote was judged by international observers13 
to be more honest and transparent than any previous elections.
Although remarkable in the speed of its ascendance to power, the PJD’s 
path towards governmental responsibility was not straightforward. Moderate 
Islamists faced both internal and external pressures during the early period of 
the ‘Moroccan Spring’ in 2011. Indeed, early on the PJD offi  cially declined to 
join street protests because it believed that this could risk the trust-building 
with the monarchy, while at the same time it used the threat of exit from formal 
politics to enhance its bargaining power vis-à-vis the monarchy.14 Activists who 
took part in the 20th February Movement, as well as many of the PJD’s own 
rank and fi le, harshly criticised the PJD leadership at the time for declining to 
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join the protest movement. Even worse, two prominent leaders resigned from 
the party’s political bureau on 19 February 2011 because they refused to obey 
the party’s decision not to join the protests.15 Several ordinary PJD members 
followed the same patt ern and disobeyed the leadership’s instructions, opting 
to participate in the protests. At the time, the party was on the verge of a major 
internal split.
To maintain a balance between pressures from street protests and the 
constraints of being a loyal opposition party, the PJD eventually decided to 
combine both of them by channelling grievances within the confi nes of the 
formal political sphere. By mid-2011, the PJD proposed a ‘third way’ – based 
on the premise of a genuine partnership between the monarchy and the PJD – 
that promised to bring about more far-reaching reforms than those proposed 
by the Palace without the disruption that might be caused by uncontrolled 
popular upheaval.16 Th is ‘third way’ approach was then put to the test in March 
2011, when the PJD and its allies in civil society launched an initiative called 
Nida’ al-Islah al-Dimuqrati (Call for Democratic Reform, CDR).17 Th e creation 
of this networking structure was motivated by a desire to build an alliance that 
would project the PJD’s infl uence well beyond the immediate political sphere 
and into society.18 It also sought to serve as a structure of coordination between 
the various affi  liates of the PJD – the party itself, Harakat al-Tawhid wa al-Islah 
(Movement of Unity and Reform, MUR), the PJD’s youth and student sections 
Chabibabte al-’Adala wa al-Tanmiyya ( Justice and Development Youth, 
JDY) and Monadamat al-Tajdid al-Tulabi (Students’ Renewal Organisation 
in Morocco, OREMA), its labour union al-Itt ihad al-Watani li-Choghl bi 
al-Maghrib (National Labour Union in Morocco, UNTM), and its women’s 
forum Muntada al-Zahra’ (Azzahrae Forum). Th is initiative had three main 
objectives: (1) to establish an alternative political platform for open debate and 
public deliberation, (2) to work towards peaceful social mobilisation, and (3) 
to allow for participation without being involved directly in street protests.19 
From March until the November 2011 elections the CDR, led by the PJD, 
organised hundreds of public meetings all over the country, to a much greater 
extent than the other formal political parties.20 According to a PJD leader, this 
approach bridged the gap between confl icting views within the party, and 
enabled its leadership to remain consistent vis-à-vis both its constituency and 
the Palace.21 Indeed, arguably it was this move that saved the PJD from paralysis 
during the 2011 protests, enabling the party to build up its own resources so 
as to benefi t fully from the political opening provided by the new constitution 
and the subsequent organisation of relatively free and fair elections.
As for the 2011 parliamentary elections themselves, there are two factors 
that explain the PJD’s relative success in mobilising electoral support. Th e fi rst 
factor pertains to the monarchy’s permissive att itude towards the PJD during 
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the elections. Because of the crisis triggered by the mass protests of February 
2011, the monarchy sought allies among the country’s political and social 
forces in order to ward off  the threat posed by the ‘Moroccan Spring’. As part 
of this strategy the monarchy decided not to curb the PJD’s activities so as 
to discourage the party from joining the street protests and retain it within 
the orbit of pro-regime parties. Instead, the regime focused on controlling the 
street protests that were already occurring, in which offi  cially the PJD played 
no part. Th e second factor, meanwhile, pertains to the PJD’s public discourse, 
which at the time resonated particularly well with the urban middle class; a 
portion of society that aims for political change without risking stability. 
Tapping into this sentiment, the PJD’s electoral discourse revolved around 
‘fi ghting corruption and authoritarianism’, whilst preserving the monarchical 
system of government. Consequently, the PJD fared particularly well among 
the urban middle classes and more specifi cally the upper middle class in the 
big cities such as Rabat, Tangier and Casablanca.
Th e authorities’ relative non-interference during the 2011 parliamentary 
elections, together with the commitment of the king himself to respect the new 
constitution, thus to some extent produced the conditions for the subsequent 
electoral success of the PJD and its rise to power. As will become apparent 
below, however, these conditions coincided with additional structural factors 
that facilitated a PJD victory in 2011. Th ese pertain fi rst and foremost to the 
fragmented nature of Morocco’s party system and the weakness of some of its 
traditional (opposition) parties.
Morocco’s fragmented party system
In her monograph on political parties in North Africa, Lise Storm described 
how the party system in Morocco has historically been fragmented and char-
acterised by ongoing electoral volatility.22 Since its inception in the 1990s, 
the PJD has operated in this fragmented party system and benefi ted from its 
fl aws. In Morocco, political parties are divided between a secular-nationalist 
camp (IP and SUPF) and the so-called ‘royal’ or ‘administrative’ parties. 
Th e latt er include parties such as the Hizb al-Asala wa al-Muʿassara (Party 
of Authenticity and Modernity, PAM), the RNI, CU and PM, all of which 
are characterised by the lack of a real social basis. As noted by Eva Wegner, 
the most decisive characteristic of these ‘royal’ parties is their unconditional 
support for the king’s political initiatives, although the monarchy is not 
directly associated with any of them.23 With litt le grass-roots support to draw 
upon, for the most part these parties tend to rely on support from the so-called 
Makhzen (the Moroccan establishment) – a nebulous network of actors loyal 
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to the Palace, with the Ministry of the Interior constituting its backbone – to 
achieve electoral results. Moreover, they operate mainly in rural areas, which 
remain marked by high levels of illiteracy, either by buying votes directly or 
by operating indirectly through the mobilisation of local authorities in favour 
of certain candidates. Th e obvious reason behind the creation of royal-rural 
parties is to counterweigh the growth of nationalist and Islamist parties, whose 
constituency is mostly urban and middle class.
Although the PJD itself emerged from out of al-Haraka al-Shaʿbiyya 
al-Dustouriyya al-Dimuqratiyya (Popular Democratic and Constitutional 
Movement, PDCM) – a party created in the late 1960s by Abdelkarim Khatib 
and a politician close to the Palace – its social base diff ers sharply from that 
of the administrative parties and overlaps signifi cantly with that of other 
nationalist parties, and hence its electoral advances in 2011 occurred mostly 
at their expense, and here particularly at the expense of the left ist SUPF. 
Following the failure of the short-lived SUPF-led gouvernment d’alternance 
experiment between 1997 and 2002 by former PM Abderahman Youssoufi , 
and aft er the nomination of a technocratic prime minister in 2002, the SUPF 
declined in electoral popularity. Th e truth is that among the nationalist parties, 
the SUPF lost most from the alternance experiment. Th e reasons behind its 
decline are (1) related to the SUPF’s failure at the time to take credit for its 
policies as a result of the monarchy’s appropriation of all positive political 
developments,24 and (2) because the competition among its leaders for key 
positions fatally weakened the party’s internal coherence. By 2007, the SUPF 
had lost half of its seats in parliament, its leadership was divided and, above 
all, it had lost its traditional support base (the urban electorate, trade unions, 
employees and civil servants). As a result, the SUPF’s electoral base shift ed to 
a constituency similar to that of the administrative/royal parties; that is the 
rural voters.25 In the 2016 elections, the SUPF and other left ist parties failed to 
garner seats in large urban districts, except in very few cases, and the seats they 
won were restricted to three marginal regions out of the twelve regions of the 
kingdom.26
Th e decline in support for the SUPF and other left ist parties among urban 
middle class citizens in the 2000s benefi ted the PJD. Th e PJD advanced 
electorally in the same areas that used to be strongholds of the left  between the 
1970s and 1990s and that experienced, from 2002 onwards, a gradual shift  in 
voter allegiances towards the Islamists.27 Indeed, by 2016 the majority of voters 
in key cities, such Casablanca, Mohammedia and Agadir – which constituted 
traditional strongholds of the left  – had shift ed in allegiance to the PJD. Th is 
shift  in voter allegiances towards the PJD was not replicated, however, in 
the rural areas of the country, where the PJD remains poorly represented in 
comparison to the royal-rural parties. As highlighted above, this is largely due 
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to the predominance of the ‘royal’ or ‘administrative’ parties in rural constitu-
encies, which are able to hold sway in the countryside by means of electoral 
manipulation and their close connection to the Makhzen.
Taming the Islamists: The royal recipe
As we have seen, the PJD’s rise to power in 2011 occurred within the context of 
the new political opportunities opened up by the ‘Moroccan Spring’ as well as the 
country’s fragmented party system and the depletion of the traditional political 
left . It was also possible, however, due to the monarchy’s long-standing policy of 
pre-emptive inclusion, which facilitated the electoral entry of the PJD in the fi rst 
place and has allowed it to participate in mainstream politics ever since.
As noted by Michael Willis and others, the Moroccan monarchy – much 
more so than pre-Spring Tunisia and Algeria – has a long tradition of taming 
opposition parties through pre-emptive inclusion within the formal political 
sphere.28 Th is approach works by allowing the opposition to benefi t from 
being formally included in mainstream politics without really gaining power, 
which remains in the hands of the Palace. Th e monarchy’s calculus is hereby 
straightforward: by allowing moderate Islamists to partake in the country’s 
politics they bind potential challenges into the regime’s fold and force them 
to play by the rules of the game.29 As part of this strategy as well, the regime 
resorts at times to mild to severe repression to tame opposition parties that it 
considers to be a real threat to royal interests.
Th e regime’s approach of pre-emptive inclusion had been pursued by the 
previous King Hassan II (r.1962–99), and remains a key feature of the reign 
of King Mohamed VI. In the early 1990s, for instance, Hassan II believed that 
Morocco was on the brink of a major political crisis as a result of economic 
hardship due to consecutive seasons of drought that resulted in a low growth 
rate. To relieve pent-up societal pressure, Hassan II launched a constitutional 
reform in 1996, and one year later he appointed the former opposition leader 
and head of the left ist SUPF, Abderahman Youssoufi , to the position of prime 
minister. A similar strategy of inclusion was adopted towards the country’s 
moderate Islamists. By the mid-1990s, the regime had worked to include 
(partially) some components of the Islamist family, through the already-extant 
PDCM, which in 1998 changed its name to PJD.
Th e monarchy’s approach of dealing with the country’s Islamists is based on 
the idea of ‘peeling’ the moderate Islamists away from the ‘hardliners’.30 While 
seeking to include moderate Islamists, the monarchy uses repression against 
the most radical Islamist forces, such as the so-called ‘jihadi–Salifi sts’. Yet far 
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from being a black-and-white approach, the coeffi  cient of ‘repression-inclusion’ 
varies according to several variables pertaining to the country’s Islamists’: 
(1) their level of loyalty to the monarchy, (2) their degree of pragmatism, (3) 
their level of acceptance of the regime’s political rules and (4), the strength 
of the political party in question. It appears that for the monarchy to date, 
the PJD is the only Islamist party in Morocco that meets all of these criteria. 
For example al-ʿAdl wa al-Ihsan ( Justice and Charity Organisation, JCO) 
possesses the fourth and partially the second. Hizb al-Badil al-Hadari (Civili-
sational Alternative Party, CAP) and Hizb al-Ummah (Party of the Ummah, 
PU), partially possess the fi rst three criteria, but their party machine is weak.31 
From the perspective of the regime, it is clear why the PJD appeared as the best 
option for selective inclusion: it presented itself as a pragmatic Islamist party 
playing according to the rules of the game with an eff ective party machine, and 
above all with professed loyalty to the monarchy.
Despite this, the monarchy’s relation with the PJD has not always been 
smooth. In fact, on occasions the regime has relied on repressive measures to 
curtail the PJD and to remind it of the regime’s red lines. Th is was evident, 
for instance, in the aft ermath of the 2003 Casablanca terror att acks when 
the government accused the Islamists of moral responsibility for the atrocity 
and blamed them for having created a climate enabling the bombings to take 
place.32 As a result, the authorities seriously contemplated the dissolution of 
the PJD, and when this idea was discarded, pressured its leadership to limit 
the party’s participation in the 2003 elections33 because of fear of an Islamist 
electoral tide.34
Moreover, instead of dissolving the PJD, the Palace opted for a tested recipe 
to contain it: the creation of loyal parties that would safeguard the fragmented 
nature of Morocco’s party system and ensure that no single political party was 
able to muster a parliamentary majority. In 2008, Fouad Ali El Himma, a close 
friend of the king and then-minister delegate of the interior, resigned from 
the government in order to establish the PAM. A few months later, the PAM 
obtained more than a third of the 22,000 contested seats in the 2009 local 
elections. Obviously, the creation of the party was meant to help contain the 
PJD’s electoral rise.35 In this respect, the establishment of the PAM refl ects the 
monarchy’s response to a profound crisis in the Moroccan party landscape; in 
particular, the diffi  culties faced by traditional secular parties in maintaining, or 
renewing, their legitimacy36 in the eyes of their constituencies and the resulting 
decline in voter turnout at the expense of a surging PJD.37
In the aft ermath of the 2011 mass demonstrations, the PAM, meanwhile, 
lowered its profi le following popular accusations that it was polluting the 
political sphere and subsequent calls for its prohibition. By May 2011, El 
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Himma had resigned from the party and joined the royal cabinet. Again 
this played into the hands of the PJD. Since the PAM lost the support of the 
Makhzen, the PJD could easily outperform it in the 2011 elections. Since then, 
the PAM has been used as a substitute player that the regime calls upon to 
counterbalance the PJD in the absence of real opposition from the country’s 
traditional secular-nationalist political parties (SUPF, IP).
Understanding the PJD’s resilience in government
Since its fi rst ascendancy to power in the aft ermath of the Moroccan Spring, 
the PJD has led a full-term coalition government (2011–16) and, aft er 
winning re-election in 2016, was able to forge a second broad-based coalition 
government under its leadership, albeit at a price. Indeed, as highlighted above, 
the price for remaining at the helm of government was the removal from 
offi  ce of its charismatic leader Abdelilah Benkirane and his replacement with 
a more pragmatic fi gure within the PJD, Saad Eddine El Othmani, as well as 
the relinquishment of key government portfolios to pro-Palace non-partisan 
technocrats. So, for instance, some of the most important government 
ministries, such those of the Interior,38 Foreign Aff airs and Education, went 
to pro-Palace personalities. Th e PJD, meanwhile, had to make do with lesser 
ministries, which combined control as litt le as 6 per cent of the government 
budget, while ministries held by non-partisan technocrats, the CU and RNI 
control more than 85 per cent of the budget.39
Nevertheless, the PJD’s survival as the principal governing party since 
2011 is rather unique in the history of Morocco and clearly challenges the 
premise that participation in government electorally weakens ruling parties as 
a consequence of their limited ability to enact the reforms demanded by their 
constituents and/or take adequate credit for those implemented. In the case of 
the SUPF, as we saw, the party’s move from opposition to government in 1997 
weakened the party machine and divided its leadership, thus precipitating its 
electoral demise. By contrast, once in government the PJD not only managed 
its internal confl icts despite the pressures of governing, but ultimately also 
benefi ted from its position in power and capitalised electorally on it, as evident 
in its 2016 performance.
Although its longer-term popularity and success in government under new 
leadership and in a new coalition are hard to gauge, it is possible to pinpoint a 
number of agency factors that help explain the PJD’s resilience in government 
between 2011 and 2016. Th ese pertain to the following: (1) the fl exibility of 
the PJD and its balancing act between loyalty to the king and its maintenance of 
grass-roots support, (2) the ‘latent’ secularisation of the party due to separation 
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between the party and the religious movement, (3) their relative success in 
building sustainable cross-ideological alliances with other secular parties, (4) the 
preservation of the party machine by strictly separating party and government 
positions, and fi nally (5) the pursuit of an eff ective PR campaign.
Pragmatism
Th e PJD is a model of a pragmatic Islamist party, one which considers political 
interest as more important than ideology. Th is is a key factor in understanding 
the PJD’s relative success in government as of 2017. Th is pragmatism is born out 
of political necessity in order to survive within the regime sett ing. Th e monarchy 
in Morocco retains control over key state positions, including the Ministry of 
the Interior, which remain the strongest component of the Moroccan establish-
ment and as Michael Willis reminds us, Morocco represents a case where the 
progressive transparency of elected institutions does not necessarily equate 
with meaningful democratisation.40 Th is means that any governing party that 
seeks to successfully advance its political agenda needs to cooperate with the 
monarchy.
Th e PJD understands this political reality and has thus proclaimed on many 
occasions that any genuine reform must be implemented in cooperation with 
the monarchy and other relevant actors, such as the Ministry of the Interior. Th e 
party has also reiterated its loyalty to the monarchy, with Benkirane incessantly 
‘advertising’ his loyalty to the king to the extent that he was accused of being 
‘more royalist than the king’.41 Th us, the party’s leadership has understood its 
interest in cooperating with the monarchy to remain in government, since even 
from its position within government, it does not hold all the power it needs to 
carry out any major political and economic reforms.42
Consequently, the governing PJD has chosen to support most of the king’s 
initiatives for the purpose of normalising its presence within the formal political 
sphere and building trust with the monarchy.43 In pursuing this strategy, the 
PJD has had to make concessions in favour of the Palace. As alluded to earlier, 
this pragmatism was visible, for instance, during the PJD’s management of 
the political impasse that lasted between November 2016 and March 2017. 
When Benkirane failed to form a new government, the PJD had the option of 
refusing to accept the king’s dismissal of Benkirane and hence returning to the 
opposition benches or calling for early elections. In the end, however, the PJD 
opted to give up its leader and form a weak coalition government that would 
please the Palace, as a price for remaining at its helm. Th is pragmatism was also 
visible aft er the dismissal of Benkirane in March 2017. Indeed, in his search 
for coalition partners, the new PJD prime minister, unlike his predecessor, 
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has not shied away from approaching the PAM, thus off ering seats at the 
cabinet table to a party that has been one of the prime rivals of the PJD. Yet 
another example of PJD pragmatism, this time during the tenure of Benkirane, 
concerns the PM’s willingness to forsake his constitutional prerogative to 
nominate hundreds of key state positions to the king. Moreover, when the IP 
withdrew from the fi rst PJD-led coalition government in June 2013, the party 
ceded several of its cabinet portfolios to technocratic Palace-backed ministers 
who henceforth controlled strategic positions in government.44
Conversely, while remaining loyal to the monarch as head of state and to the 
monarchy as the unifying institution for the country, the PJD has also criticised 
the king’s entourage several times, although mostly indirectly. Th e PJD has used 
metaphors in its media narrative to att ack the royal Palace without naming it 
directly. In an interview with Al-Jazeera journalist Ahmed Mansour in 2012, 
for instance, Benkirane used the terms of tamassih wal ʿafarit (crocodiles and 
ghosts) to explain to Moroccan citizens why he failed to deliver substantial 
reforms.45 Th ese terms allude to the Palace and its allies in the administra-
tion allegedly trying to undermine PJD eff orts to implement the reforms 
they had set out to undertake. Later the party used another term, al-tahakum 
(hegemony, or control), to denote the same problem. In an interview with 
al-Aoual website in July 2016, Benkirane explicitly linked the Palace, and more 
precisely one of the king’s closest friends and advisor Fouad Ali El Himma, of 
being the orchestrator of al-tahakum. He even alluded to Mohamed Oufk ir – 
the Minister of the Interior during the reign of Hassan II who plott ed the coups 
in 1971 and 1972 – to argue that the king’s entourage might contain some anti-
monarchic elements because of their greed for power.46
Th is ambivalent position of professing loyalty to the king, while at the 
same time criticising his entourage, was an eff ective political tactic that helped 
Benkirane and the PJD maintain an ‘optimal’ balance between remaining on 
good terms with the monarchy and retaining legitimacy and support from its 
constituents. In fact, this ambivalence has persisted in other forms as well. Th e 
PJD, for instance, has consistently threatened that it could ‘un-moderate’.47 
Th is was clear on several occasions, such as for instance during the campaign 
to support the constitutional amendments in 2011 when the party announced 
that it would vote ‘no’ to the new constitution if it contained provisions against 
having Islamic references in the charter.48 Th is dual position of working within 
the government and maintaining an oppositional discourse has been a source 
of contention with the Palace, and might be one reason behind Benkirane’s 
eventual dismissal in 2017. Indeed, according to one source in the Palace, who 
confi ded to the Jeune Afr ique magazine in summer 2016, the king’s displeasure 
with PM Benkirane stemmed in large measure from the fact that the latt er was 
pro-monarchy on weekdays, but an ‘opponent at weekends during his meetings 
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within his party’.49 Th e tactic of loyalty to the king, while at the same time 
denouncing tamassih wal ʿafarit and al-tahakum, seems to have been eff ective 
in att racting voters who wanted a ‘clean’ party that denounces the corruption 
of the regime without risking the stability of the country. As of 2017, it is also 
evident of course that this strategy came at a price, with relations between the 
PJD and the Palace being increasingly strained.
‘Latent secularisation’
Th e second factor that might explain the PJD’s survival in government is its 
ideological moderation. Since coming to power, a shift  in the PJD’s political 
behaviour has been noticeable. Th e relatively new pragmatism of Islamist 
activists has oft en been interpreted as a tactic to reach power. However, this 
view neglects the fact that Islamist movements are active agents operating 
within their own societal contexts.50 Th is is evident with regards to the PJD 
whose Islamist rhetoric has seen a signifi cantly metamorphosis over the years 
towards ‘latent secularisation’. By ‘latent secularisation’ this author refers to 
processes in which an Islamist party (1) quits its religious mother organisation, 
(2) divides its religious activities from its political ones, and (3) explicitly 
recognises its ‘mundane’ nature, which means that its political activities are 
based on rational calculations rather than purely religious objectives. By 
contrast, the concept of ‘moderation’ broadly speaking refers to a trajectory in 
which parties renounce the idea of violence and accept the notion of political 
participation in mainstream politics. While moderation thus signifi es the 
reverse process of radicalisation, secularisation constitutes the reverse process 
of ‘Islamisation’, and refers to movement towards a post-Islamist discourse 
that revolves around concepts of citizenship as well as cooperation with other 
secular parties. As such, all secularised Islamist parties are moderate, but not all 
moderate Islamist parties are secularising.
As for the PJD, the process of ‘secularisation’ started in the aft ermath of 
2003 Casablanca terrorist att acks. During that period, Islamists were under 
pressure from the regime and in order to maintain their legal recognition, the 
PJD at the time made a strategic move: separating the party from the social 
movement that had created it, the MUR. Th is separation between party and 
mother organisation was, however, not total; it was rather a division of labour 
that concerned three sectors: activism, speeches and leadership.51 Indeed, 
the PJD and MUR established a complementarity agreement that placed the 
PJD in charge of the political struggle and representing Islam, whilst leaving 
the MUR in charge of da‘wa (preaching) and education.52 Th e separation of 
the MUR and the PJD signalled the end of proselytising and the beginning 
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of politics for the PJD.53 A decade later, the Tunisian Islamist al-Nahda 
would emulate the Moroccan model of separation between party and parent 
movement. In March 2015, al-Nahda invited leaders from the MUR and PJD 
to discuss the Moroccan model of separation between da‘wa and politics,54 and 
a few months later adopted the same division of labour.55 As demonstrated 
by Suveyda Karakaya and A. Kadir Yildirim, the separation between the party 
and the religious movement was not purely tactical moderation, but rather 
a strategic separation, and includes ideological moderation. Th is implies 
that the PJD shift ed its whole ideological platform to a more moderate and 
mainstream political party to respond to societal changes (economic liberalisa-
tion, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) and to 
gain greater popular support.56
Since that time, the PJD has arguably been transformed into a quasi-secular 
political party with an Islamic fl avour. A good example of this is seen in the 
party’s positions vis-à-vis the permissibility of music festivals. Before 2011, the 
PJD criticised music festivals as being a tool of moral corruption and a way 
to distance youth from their Islamic identity.57 Once in offi  ce, meanwhile, the 
PJD avoided commenting on this issue. Another example concerns the PJD’s 
electoral programmes. For instance, when comparing its electoral programmes 
of 1997 and 2016, one can easily observe the progressive dilution of its Islamic 
identity. In 1997, the PJD’s Islamic identity was accentuated and was the 
epicentre of its electoral programme, while by 2016 it became ephemeral 
and diluted. In the 2016 electoral programme, the PJD explicitly cited that it 
‘separates between religious and political sphere ( . . . ) and that its political 
praxis is done through political tools which are based on human and relative 
understanding that is one possibility of reform among others’.58
Th e PJD ‘rediscovers’ from time to time its Islamic identity to please its 
constituency, but it does not pursue an ‘Islamising’ agenda. In fact, during its 
fi rst term of offi  ce the PJD avoided any ideological clash with secular rivals. 
Th is could be explained as the result of pragmatic calculations. Because the PJD 
requires the support of other secular parties to form and sustain a governing 
coalition, it has learned in due process that it is in the party’s interest to avoid 
ideological quarrels. During its mandate at the helm of government, the PJD 
rarely commented on ideological matt ers, such as, for example, the decision 
by the Ministry of Interior to ban the Burqa in January 2017.59 As a PJD leader 
told this author, the party did not want to ‘provoke the government formation 
by creating an ideological contradiction with our secular partners and this is 
the reason why we did not answer to such provocations’.60
In parallel, the PJD managed to build trust with its constituency thanks to 
its moral credentials. Shortly aft er its ascendance to power, the PJD updated 
its ethics procedures and tightened its internal auditing. Th is self-regulation 
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and discipline allowed the party to have an eye on its elected offi  cials. Th e 
image the party tries to portray of itself is that of a non-corrupt organisation 
which, unlike the other parties, has resisted the temptations of power because 
of its strong moral values stemming from its religious grounding. Combined 
with its Islamic identity, the PJD att racted a portion of conservative segments 
of society who wanted to vote for a ‘clean’ party 61 and people of maakoul 
(trustworthiness).
The formation of cross-ideological alliances
Beyond ideological calculations, the PJD also understood that it was to 
its advantage to maintain strong alliances with other secular parties to 
avoid isolation and to achieve common objectives.62 Th is is because the 
PJD understands that being in government in Morocco requires coalition 
partners and does not mean yielding sole power. In June 2016, for instance, 
a well-known PJD minister told this author that if the party were to gain the 
absolute majority of seats in the 2016 election, it would still include other 
parties in a coalition government because it would teach them ‘how to control 
the lust of power and to lift  doubts about Islamists’ putschist mindset’.63 Th is 
seems to be a strategic decision made by the PJD leadership that goes beyond 
electoral calculations. Indeed, building alliances with secular parties seems to 
serve the aim of achieving three objectives: (1) maintaining the PJD’s position 
in government, (2) isolating its main rival, the PAM (and hence the Palace) 
and (3) sending positive signals to the regime and foreign observers about the 
PJD’s pragmatism and inclusiveness.
Th e PJD’s approach in dealing with secular parties was to avoid ideological 
quarrels and instead work to build a common language about fi ghting 
al-tahakum and pushing through political and socio-economic reforms. Hence, 
in its formation of both the 2012 and the 2017 governments, the PJD has voiced 
objections to secular parties based not on their ideology, but rather on political 
considerations. One anecdote is that the PJD complained that the secular 
parties, such as the PM, SUPF, CU and RNI, wanted to enter the government 
coalition in 2016 at any price. Th e move was seen by observers as an att empt not 
only to isolate the PJD within parliament but also to dilute its presence in the 
government itself by thus forging a broad-based coalition government.64
Th e PJD has also worked to strengthen its alliance with its key secular allies, 
the PPS and IP. In April 2016, the PJD signed a strategic alliance with the PPS. 
Th e alliance implied that both parties would remain in government or go 
into opposition together.65 In reality, this move was just symbolic because the 
PPS needed the PJD more than the other way around, considering the PPS’ 
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weakness (seven seats in the 2011 parliament, half of which lost in 2016). In 
addition to this, the PJD succeeded relatively speaking, in isolating its main 
opponent, the PAM. Between mid-2013 and the end of 2015, the IP was a 
strong ally of the PAM, before re-allying itself with the PJD (even if, in the end 
it did not join the government coalition).
The party machine and PR
One of the main factors that might explain the PJD resilience in government is 
its ability to maintain a functional party machine and an eff ective communica-
tion strategy. In the 2015 regional and local elections, the PJD swept up almost 
all large and medium cities,66 allowing local PJD leaders to deliver services to 
citizens and maintain constant contact with their constituencies. At the same 
time, the PJD showed litt le appetite for accepting key state positions at the 
national level. Th ese are high-level positions in the bureaucracy that constitute 
the backbone of the state. Before 2011, the king appointed most of these 
positions and this was a tool of patronage that the regime used to strengthen the 
loyalty of incumbent elites. Th e new constitution of 2011, however, transferred 
this prerogative to the prime minister, who is now entitled to propose candidates 
for state positions who are nominated by the king only symbolically. During its 
fi rst term in government, the PJD avoided proposing its own members to key 
administrative positions so as not to clash with the Palace, which still maintains 
de facto control of the state administrative machine. Th is allowed the party 
to keep its national leadership focused on preserving the party machine and 
reinforcing its constituencies at the local level without being immersed in the 
everyday management of the administration.
Moreover, once in government, the PJD has maintained a successful media 
strategy. Th anks to its presence in diff erent conventional and non-conventional 
media outlets, the ruling Islamists outperformed other parties on this front. 
Benkirane’s monthly meetings in parliament became popular because they were 
broadcast live on national television and garnered a wider audience than other 
politicians in the country. Th e PJD’s website att racts hundreds of thousands of 
viewers every month and outperforms those of all other parties.67 Th e party’s 
presence on social media, meanwhile, is also noticeable. Th e PJD youth section 
is active on social media and specifi cally on Facebook, labelled by its opponents 
as Kataib PJD (PJD’s Facebook Brigades). Th e PJD’s Facebook activists have 
played a key role in defending their party’s achievements in government, while 
harshly att acking and seeking to discredit the party’s opponents. Th eir criticism 
was so eff ective and extensive that it pushed Aziz Akhannouch – the Minister 
of Agriculture and head of the RNI, a party ruling in coalition with the PJD – to 
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express his concern about the role of PJD youth activists in derailing policy 
implemented in his ministry.68
Th e PJD’s media strategy has allowed it to reach to the public and widen 
its infl uence in society. Social media has also provided a space for direct 
communication with citizens without passing through state-sponsored or 
conventional media, which were critical of the PJD. Most importantly, the 
PJD has used the media to defend itself when it felt that it was under pressure 
from the Makhzen.
Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the PJD was able to survive in government largely 
due to its pragmatic instinct, which allowed it to transform the 2011 crisis 
into an opportunity. In a tumultuous political environment, the PJD not only 
managed to keep its ranks unifi ed and avoid internal schism, but also benefi ted 
from a weakened and fragmented political sphere. Th e Palace’s approach of 
relying on technocrats and its creation of the PAM has led to an unintentional 
weakening of the traditional parties, such as the SUFP. Th e regime’s strategy 
of countering the Islamists through the PAM backfi red aft er the 2011 protests. 
Th e PJD seems to be the main benefi ciary of the ‘Moroccan Spring’, even if it 
did not participate in the protests. Th e PJD went through a strategic adaptation 
and has opted for pragmatic positions rather than ideologically driven ones. 
Accordingly, the PJD has succeeded in broadening its alliances with other 
secular parties, keeping in check its main rival (the PAM) and seizing the 
opportunity of being in offi  ce to strengthen the party machine.
Th is said, the 2017 dismissal of Benkirane and the path charted by the new 
PJD prime minister will, of course, aff ect the party. Indeed, thus far the party’s 
achievements are intimately linked to the charismatic leadership of Benkirane, 
who enjoys considerable popularity within the party and beyond. Th e future 
of the PJD – and with it that of Benkirane – will be charted at its next national 
conference scheduled for the end of 2017 which is likely to entail two potential 
scenarios.69 First, it could see the renewal of Benkirane’s leadership for a third 
term as the head of the PJD, a move that would surely be interpreted by the 
party’s rank and fi le as a reaffi  rmation of the PJD’s independence from palace 
interferences. Th e second scenario could see the eruption of confl ict over key 
leadership positions within the PJD which might lead towards a schism in the 
party. As of now, there are no indications as to which scenario will prevail.
Beside this internal challenge, the PJD will also face another challenge 
coming from the Palace. Th e relation between the two continues to fl uctuate 
between cooperation and non-cooperation. Th is will probably endure in the 
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near future as the confl ict of interests grows. It seems likely that the Palace 
does not aim to wage an open war against the PJD, but its long-term strategy is 
to curtail the PJD by diluting its infl uence in government while preparing the 
soil for the resurgence of loyal parties such as the PAM and the RNI at the next 
election. Whether the Palace will eventually succeed with this strategy will be 
largely down to the ability of the PJD to remain internally cohesive, eff ective in 
government and able to retain the loyalty of its electoral support base.
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Chapter 9
Does participation lead to 
moderation? Understanding 
changes in the Egyptian Islamist 
parties post-Arab Spring
Barbara Zollner
Is it still important to consider the issue of participation and moderation in 
post-Spring Egypt? Th e question of inclusion and moderation was at the 
heart of debates about the prospect of the ‘taming’ of Islamist movements and 
political parties throughout the early 2000s, that is at a time when democrati-
sation seemed to be a possibility, albeit a distant one. In the post-Spring era, 
which saw the return of an authoritarian regime under President Abdel Fatt ah 
al-Sisi, there seems to be litt le taste for discussing whether there is still scope 
for the inclusion of Islamists in the political system.
Yet there is good reason to stipulate an ongoing relevance of this topic, 
particularly when studying Egypt’s Islamist parties in the post-Spring sett ing. 
First, the change of context, that is from a semi-authoritarian multi-party 
system under Mubarak to a democratising system during the Arab uprisings 
and fi nally to a much more politically restrictive framework under al-Sisi, 
allows us to investigate the trajectories of Islamist parties and, in reference 
to pre-Spring analyses, to appraise their commitment to democratic values.1 
A second reason is related to the fact that there are a range of Islamist parties 
in post-Spring and post-coup Egyptian politics. Aside from al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) and its subsidiary Hizb al-Hurriyya 
wa al-’Adala (Freedom and Justice Party, FJP), which were banned following 
the military coup of 2013, there exists a wide spectrum of religious-based 
parties, which is, as Marc Lynch rightly remarked, ‘uncharted’.2 When mapping 
these, one encounters a paradox. Salafi  parties, which are ultra-conservative in 
their religious interpretations and are regarded as fundamentally incompatible 
with a democratic stance, participated in the fi rst post-coup parliamentary 
elections of 2015. Many of the so-called moderate Islamist parties, on the other 
hand, boycott ed these elections, thus deliberately excluding themselves from 
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the formal political contest. Th is brings us to a third reason for why it remains 
important to engage with the ‘participation-moderation’ debate. Returning to 
previous assessments allows us to debate whether the conceptual framework 
continues to hold traction.3 Indeed, the post-Spring constellation of Islamist 
parties provides us with material to refl ect on the issue of strategic versus 
ideological moderation and that of sequencing which, as Jillian Schwedler 
points out, constitute key aspects of the moderation debate.4
Th e aim of this chapter is to critically examine the ‘participation-moderation’ 
thesis and, moreover, to engage in an original analysis of the political trajectories 
of Islamist parties in post-Spring Egypt. Focusing on those Islamist parties that 
demonstrated considerable infl uence in the period of democratic transition, in 
particular the 2011–12 parliamentary elections as well as the post-coup parlia-
mentary elections of 2015, we can see that Salafi  parties chose to participate for 
strategic reasons, while reformist Islamist parties opted for non-participation. 
While the ‘participation-moderation’ thesis remains a good starting point for 
analysing Islamist movements, this chapter reveals that the model has conceptual 
limitations with regards to predicting ideological reform.
Pluralisation of Islamist parties in post-Spring Egypt
Egypt saw a sharp increase in new political parties in the post-Spring era. About 
eighty new parties received their offi  cial licence in 2011, with slightly fewer 
new registrations of Islamist parties compared to those on the secular side.5 
Overall, the spectrum of Islamist parties experienced a pluralisation, when 
more than thirty were registered in the course of 2011, of whom about twenty 
took part in the contest for seats in the parliamentary elections of the same 
year. Th ese included not only the MB-linked FJP, but also so-called reformist 
Islamist parties that are, for the most part, Brotherhood off shoots such as Hizb 
Misr al-Qawmiyya (Strong Egypt Party/SEP or simply Strong Egypt), Hizb 
al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current Party, ECP) and Hizb al-Wasat (Centre 
Party/CP, or simply al-Wasat). Furthermore, the post-Spring transition also 
saw the fi rst-time formation of Salafi  parties, among them the Alexandria/Delta 
based Hizb al-Nour (Party of Light/PL, or simply al-Nour) and Hizb al-Bina’ 
wa al-Tanmiyya (Building and Development Party, BDP), which represents 
the offi  cial outlet of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, also known simply 
as IG), as well as subsequent off shoots of these parties, notably Hizb al-Asala 
(Authenticity Party/AP, also simply al-Asala) and Hizb al-Watan (Homeland 
Party/HP, also simply al-Watan). Beyond these, Table 9.1 illustrates that a large 
number of Islamist parties appeared on the formal political scene post-2011. 
Only a few of them gained seats, but the mere fact that a range of Islamist 
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Table 9.1 Islamist parties in the post-Spring era
Party name
Legalised/
banned
Theology-based 
orientation
Political 
spectrum6
Hizb al-‘Adala al-Ijtima’iyya (Social Justice 
Party)
1993 Socialist Left
Hizb al-Amal al-Islami al-Misri (Egyptian 
Islamic Labour Party)
2011 Reformist with socialist tendencies Left
Hizb al-Amal al-Jadid (New Labour Party) 2011 Reformist with socialist tendencies Left
Hizb al-Asala (Authenticity Party) 2011 Salafi Centre-right
Hizb al-Bina’ wa al-Tanmiyya (Building and 
Development Party)
2011 Salafi  (GI) Right
Hizb al-Fadila (Virtue Party) 2011 Salafi  Right
Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and 
Justice Party)
2011; banned 2013 MB; orthodox tendencies among 
leadership
Centre-right
Hizb al-Islah al-Misri (Egyptian Reform Party) not Orthodox with reformist tendencies Ultra-right
Hizb al-Islah wa al-Nahda (Reform and 
Renaissance Party)
2011 Reformist tendencies; remains orthodox 
on key issues
Centre-left
Hizb al-Islah wa al- al-Tawʿiyya (Reform and 
Awakening Party)
2011 Socialist Ultra-left
Hizb al-Islami (Islamic Party) not Salafi Ultra-right
Hizb al-Jihad al-Dimuqrati (Democratic Jihad 
Party)
2012 Salafi Centre-right
Hizb al-Misr al-Fatah (Young Egypt Party) 2011 Socialist Left
Hizb al-Misr al-Mustaqbal (Egypt’s Future 
Party)
2011 Reformist with revolutionary tendencies Left
Hizb al-Muhafi dhin (Conservative Party) 2011 Orthodox Right
Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance Party) 2011; merged with Hizb 
al-Wasat in 2013
Reformist with orthodox tendencies Right
Hizb al-Nasr (Victory Party) 2011 Sufi 
Hizb al-Nour (Light Party) 2011 Salafi  (al-Da‘wa al-Salafi yya) Ultra-right
Hizb al-Raya (Flag Party) 2013 Salafi Ultra-right
Hizb al-Riyada (Pioneer Party) 2011 Reformist tendencies; remains orthodox 
on key issues
Centre-left
Hizb al-Sha’ab (People Party) not Right
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Misri 2011 Sufi  (al-‘Azamiyya)
Hizb al-Takaful (Solidarity Party) 2011 Right
Hizb al-Tawhid al-Arabi (Arab Unifi cation 
Party)
2011 Socialist leanings with orthodox 
tendencies
Left
Hizb al-Umma (Umma Party) 1983 Socialist Left
Hizb al-Wasat (al-Wasat Party) 2011 Reformist with orthodox tendencies Centre-left
Hizb al-Watan (Homeland Party) 2012 (off shoot from 
Hizb an-Nour)
Salafi Right 
Hizb Misr al-Qawmiyya (Strong Egypt Party) 2012 Reformist Centre-left
Hizb Misr al-Thawra 2011 Revolutionary Ultra-left
Hizb Nahdat Misr (Egypt Renaissance Party) 2011 Reformist with orthodox tendencies Centre-right
Hizb Shabab Misr (Youth for Egypt) 2005 Reformist with strong orthodox 
tendencies
Centre-right 
Hizb Sout al-Hurriyya (Voice of Egypt) 2011 Sufi sm
Hizb al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current Party) 2011; merged with 
Hizb Misr al-Qawmiyya 
in 2014
Reformist Centre-left 
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parties aimed for inclusion in the political process shows a shift  in their strategic 
thinking and behaviour insofar as participation in formal processes became a 
viable option for them, which allowed them to bring forward their political 
agenda.
Abdel Fatt ah al-Sisi’s ascendance to power in 2013 had a considerable 
impact on the Egyptian party landscape. Because of changes to electoral 
laws, the authoritarian shift  under al-Sisi has reduced the infl uence of 
parties, both locally and nationally.7 Beyond this, Islamist parties underwent 
considerable contraction in terms of their presence in the political system. 
Most obviously, the FJP and its mother organisation the MB were banned 
in the course of the autumn of 2013. Th is left  a vacuum in Islamist presence, 
which was only partially fi lled by Salafi  and other reformist parties. In fact, 
only al-Nour managed to secure seats in the 2015 parliamentary elections, 
although its presence decreased.8 Also, a number of Islamist parties folded, 
partly because of the pressures of regime change and partly because they could 
mobilise only limited support. Table 9.1 indicates the disappearance of these 
parties, with notable changes to the reformist fi eld. Not unexpectedly, smaller 
Islamist parties were pushed to consolidate, merging with parties that held 
similar political views and oft en competed for the same constituency. Among 
them were the ECP, which joined Strong Egypt, and al-Nahda Party, which 
joined al-Wasat. Following this consolidation, two reformist parties remain 
meaningful players in the fi eld of Islamist actors: Strong Egypt and al-Wasat. 
On the other end of the spectrum, meanwhile, we can detect some changes 
due to intra-organisational tensions which have led to off shoots forming. Th e 
case of al-Nour is of note here, whereby Emad Abd al-Ghaff our, one of 
the founders of the party, moved on to establish al-Watan in late 2012.9 Yet 
the increase in numbers due to spits and off shoots is rather marginal, and it is 
likely that small and medium-sized parties will either disappear or, once again, 
merge with larger parties. Overall, the post-Spring era presents us with a varied 
spectrum that will, despite al-Sisi’s seemingly anti-Islamist policies, continue 
to infl uence Egyptian politics in the years to come.
Ideological moderation of Islamist parties?
Th e participation of Islamist parties in post-2011 politics demonstrates that 
it is necessary to distinguish between strategic and ideological moderation.10 
When applying this diff erentiation, we can observe three trajectories. First, 
the case of the FJP shows that participation can have a negative eff ect on 
intra-organisational reform. Second, the political decisions and subsequent 
actions of reformist Islamist parties, such as for instance al-Wasat and Strong 
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Egypt, are evidence that moderation – particularly ideological and value-based 
moderation – can lead to non-participation. Finally, whilst remaining dedicated 
to the electoral process, the trajectory of Salafi  parties, among them al-Nour 
and the BDP, demonstrates that there is evidence of strategic moderation, but 
litt le indication of substantial, micro-level ideological reform.
Th e post-Spring development of the FJP is an example of strategic 
moderation, which, paradoxically, came at the expense of ideological 
moderation. Being largely dependent on the directives of the MB leadership, 
the case of the FJP shows that the opportunities aff orded by formal political 
participation in the post-Mubarak era undercut a rising reformist tendency 
within the organisation and thus played into the hands of an ‘old guard’ that 
had continued to dominate the group’s Guidance Council.11
What makes the case of the MB confusing is the fact that socio-religiously 
orthodox and politically conservative members who, for decades, dominated 
the MB’s leading Maktab al-Irshad (Guidance Council), did not show much 
interest in political participation throughout the Mubarak period, rather 
focusing on changing Egyptian society by acceding to conservative socio-
religious norms. Th e MB’s politics of opposition to the regime at the time was 
driven by a reformist faction that had gradually built up its strength since the 
late 1980s.12 As such, they developed a presence in professional syndicates and, 
beyond that, att empted to gain seats in parliament either through alliances with 
other parties, as in the elections of 1984 and 1987, or by running independent 
candidates, such as in the elections of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010.13
Th e formation of al-Wasat in 1996 exposed open rift s between reformists 
and the MB’s conservative leadership. Th e trigger was an att empt by reformists 
to formulate a party platform in 1996 with the aim of obtaining legal recognition 
by state authorities. Not only did the MB leadership see the initiative as a 
challenge to its authority, but it also rejected ideas in the platform document 
that suggested equal political rights for women and for minorities. Th ese 
ideational diff erences led to an intra-organisational crisis that resulted in the 
departure of several members, most notably Abu al-‘Ala al-Madi. He continued 
to run al-Wasat as an alternative to the MB, albeit gaining legal recognition 
only in 2011.
In August 2007 reformists and the Guidance Council, this time under 
the leadership of Mahdi ‘Akif, once again clashed in another party platform 
debate. At the centre of this crisis was again the formulation of the goals of a 
future political party, but also the issue of the political rights of non-Muslims 
and the equal status of women.14 Th e tension between reformists and conser-
vatives culminated in the controversy over the succession of ‘Akif. With the 
election of Mohamed Badi‘a, the Guidance Council took a clear stance against 
Mohamed Habib, the Deputy Murshid, who was sympathetic to reformists. 
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Th ese events show that, although att empts at reform gained so much ground 
that they reached the echelons of the MB’s executive, reformists failed sub-
stantially to change the organisation. It is for this reason that a number of 
experts who reviewed the level of the MB’s ideological moderation, among 
them Carrie Wickham and Eric Trager, critically remarked that, despite much 
intra-organisational debate, conservative political-religious att itudes were not 
suffi  ciently re-addressed.15
Th e fi nal round of this intra-organisational batt le played out in the 
post-Spring period. It is then that the religiously, socially and politically 
conservative leadership prepared to participate in formal political processes. 
Th e Guidance Council regarded the creation of a political party as a strategic 
opportunity to infl uence the transition process. Members of the reformist 
faction such as Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Futuh, Islam Lutfi  and Mohamed 
Habib, meanwhile, rejected the step, taking the position that any decisions 
over the creation of a party, or indeed regarding the status of the MB as a 
social movement or political foundation, needed to be debated collectively 
in the Shura Council as the MB’s central democratic organ.16 Th e Guidance 
Council fended off  this challenge by pressing forward with the establishment 
of the FJP which thus became a political mouthpiece of the conservative MB 
leadership. Moreover, by placing an emphasis on organisational cohesion, 
leading members of the reformist tendency were forced to leave aft er a short 
and intense batt le over the organisation’s direction, while others, among them 
Issam al-Arayan and Sa’ad Katatny, chose to conform (and were then rewarded 
with leadership roles in the MB and FJP).17
Islam Lutfi , Mohamed al-Qassas, Ahmad Abd al-Gawad, Hani Mahmud, 
Mohamed Aff an, Ibrahim Za’afrani and Mohamed Habib left  the MB. A 
similar fate befell Abu al-Futuh, who pointed out that his expulsion in April 
2011, following his announcement that he intended to run as a candidate in 
the presidential elections of 2012, was not due to his having broken with MB 
directives at the time but was rather due to his persistent diff erences with the 
group’s leadership.18 Th is deep rift  also aff ected the MB, and by extension, 
the FJP along generational lines, not least because many young MB activists 
were ideationally closer to reformist circles. When the conservative leadership 
att empted to conscript them into the FJP, it triggered a dispute about the 
right of MB members to support political parties other than the FJP or, as a 
young female MB activist emphasised, the right not to support any party.19 
Th e Guidance Council enforced its authority, which led to the departure of a 
number of MB youth and student leaders. By the end of 2011, there was litt le 
intra-organisational contestation to the Guidance Council, which continued 
to imprint its ideological understandings upon the FJP.
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Th e strategic choice to participate in democratic processes gave the 
MB the opportunity to pursue a religious vision in negotiations about the 
constitution of the state and its formal institutions. According to the offi  cial 
MB position, its idea of the state was both civic and Islamic.20 Th is relates to 
the position that legal interpretation and legislative powers of a parliament 
are allowed in areas where the Qur’an is not explicit or in areas that are not 
considered part of Sunni legal consensus. In these terms, the MB ideology 
shows a degree of temperance, one that allows a state to be defi ned as 
Islamic while being at the same time civic. Still, the MB and its subsidiary, 
the FJP, have retained an ideological vision that remains religiously 
orthodox and vested in socially conservative concepts. Th is is particularly 
obvious on contested issues such as the equal status of women and equal 
citizenship rights for non-Muslim minorities.21 Th e FJP’s political success 
during 2011–13 was seen by the MB leadership as a public validation of its 
strategic choices. Being the dominant political force, there was no incentive 
for ideological moderation. Yet this set party and mother organisation on a 
course of confrontation with the military on the one hand and with other 
political parties and movements on the other hand.
If the participation-moderation model suggests a sequential development 
whereby political inclusion leads to strategic and eventually to ideological 
reform, the trajectory of reformist parties disproves it. As seen above, in the 
case of the reformist faction within the MB, ideological moderation took place 
before the establishment of its parties. Th e fact that the founding leaders of 
today’s reformist Islamist parties abandoned the MB umbrella is not purely 
incidential, but indicates that ideological moderation is the result of intra-
organisational disputes rather than the outcome of political participation. 
Th is holds true for al-Wasat, for instance, whose founding members, notably 
al-Madi, were forced to leave the MB in 1996.22 It is also the case with the ECP, 
which was set up by former MB Youth Leaders, al-Qassas and Abd al-Gawad 
in June 2011, or for al-Nahda, which was set up by al-Za’frani and was joined 
shortly aft er by Habib.23 Strong Egypt was established by Abu al-Futuh two 
years aft er his expulsion and a year aft er his unsuccessful candidacy in the 2012 
presidential elections.24 Despite losing against the MB’s candidate, Mohamed 
Morsi, Abu al-Futuh was able to present himself as a signifi cant alternative. 
Moreover, the fact that reformist parties were set up at a time when the MB/
FJP dominated the Islamist spectrum indicates that the concept of sequencing 
is fl awed. Competing against the MB/FJP, these new parties had relatively 
litt le prospect of immediate success; hence the choice to set up reformist 
parties was fi rst and foremost driven by ideological contretemps rather than 
strategic prospects. Th is point comes through in an interview with Al-Qassas 
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of the ECP in November 2011, when he admitt ed his party was relatively 
underrepresented in rural areas and hence did not fi eld candidates in all 
districts.25 Beyond this, as will be set out below, the most important indication 
that sequencing is not a reliable facet of the participation-moderation model is 
the fact that most reformist parties decided to boycott  the 2015 parliamentary 
elections. It demonstrates that ideological moderation can lead to a refusal to 
participate and consequently a rejection of potential political representation 
for a legislative period.
Because of their background, the aforementioned reformist parties retain 
a soft ened version of the ikhwani political frames and even take inspiration 
from the MB’s foundational history. Th is said, they also distance themselves 
from the MB to an extent that cannot be explained away as a strategic choice, 
but involves a more fundamental ideational shift  towards moderation. Indeed, 
overall reformist parties show a propensity towards democratic values that 
sets them apart from the orthodoxy of the MB. Where they diff er, however, 
is the profundity and diff usion of democratic values in their programmes and, 
beyond this, their social and political leanings.
Al-Wasat, previously also al-Nahda, are perhaps slightly more traditionalist 
on social issues and politically more centre-right.26 In its religious interpreta-
tion, al-Wasat is inspired by a religiously reformist current that Baker has 
described as ‘New Islamist’.27 Furthermore, Wickham notes, reformists aquired 
political skills by interacting with other contenders who were in opposition to 
Mubarak’s regime.28 Although al-Wasat underwent fundamental ideological 
change, there are nevertheless areas where its tendentiously more orthodox 
views remain tangible. Th ese are, fi rst and foremost, al-Wasat’s view that 
Shari‘ah is the principle source of legislation, but also the orthodox position 
held by the party that parts of Islamic law are divinely defi ned (however, it is 
not clear which areas are fi xed). Th e fi nal controversial point touches on gender 
equality. Although al-Wasat emphasises women’s equality, the party retains 
conservative views on the role of women in family and society. Considering 
these issues, Wickham therefore voices concerns about al-Wasat’s level of 
ideological moderation.
Strong Egypt, and previously also the ECP, meanwhile, have made a much 
clearer step towards fully accepting liberal democratic values. Although 
El Sherif is critical of the party’s ideological sophistication, it needs to be 
recognised that Stong Egypt no longer regards an Islamic state or the imple-
mentation of Shari‘ah as goals.29 Hence, in the stricter sense, it is no longer 
an Islamist party, but a ‘Muslim democratic party’ with centre-left  leanings. 
To illustate this, Abu al-Futuh stressed that he stands for the protection of 
individual rights and recognises full gender equality and freedom of religion 
as core values.30 Drawing a comparison with parties that draw on Christian 
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values, such as the Christian Democratic Parties in Europe, he argues that 
there is no reason why religious values should not be at the heart of political 
convictions. Similar points were made by al-Qassas who, since the merger of 
the ECP with Strong Egypt, has acted as its Head of Political Communication. 
He added that there needs to be a separation of religion and state, yet on a 
personal level religion does matt er in politics.31
As mentioned above, Strong Egypt and al-Wasat boycott ed the post-coup 
parliamentary elections of 2015. However, their reactions to the coup show 
fundamental diff erences in their political positions. Al-Wasat condemned 
the events of July 2013 and subsequently joined the Anti-Coup Coalition. 
Despite its confl icts with the MB, it regarded Morsi’s presidency as carrying 
democratic legitimacy and argued that the 2013 Constitution refl ected the 
ideas of a civic state based on Islamic principles.32 Strong Egypt, on the other 
hand, had previously expressed support for the mass movement against Morsi’s 
government and, although it objected to the military’s intervention, did not 
give its support to the Anti-Coup Alliance.33 Th is shows that they diff ered on 
the question of Morsi’s legitimacy and the path to transforming Egypt. Still, 
they agreed that the military coup was a backward step that opened the door to 
the renewed authoritarianism under al-Sisi. Th is led them to call for a boycott  
of the 2014 presidential elections and subsequently of the 2015 parliamentary 
elections. Despite leaving the Anti-Coup Alliance in August 2014, al-Wasat’s 
rejection of the regime was expressed in much clearer terms in the run-up 
to the parliamentary elections, openly criticising arbitrary arrests including 
that of the party leader al-Madi, human rights violations, and, more broadly, 
questioning the legitimacy of al-Sisi’s rule.34 Strong Egypt’s critique was more 
cautious, voicing particular concerns about constitutional issues, electoral laws 
and the return of patrimonial politics without att acking the regime directly.35 In 
all, both reformist parties take a clear stance against the return of authoritarian 
politics, a position that is informed by an appreciation of democratic values. 
Th is shows that ideological moderation can lead to the rejection of opportuni-
ties provided by formal participation.
Salafi  parties, meanwhile, reconfi rm that a clear distinction is needed 
between strategic moderation and ideological moderation.36 Th eir participation 
in pre- and post-coup parliamentary elections is rooted in a strategic calculus 
that allows them to voice their ultra-conservative socio-religious views and 
agenda in a public manner. Yet as Drevon convincingly shows, neither al-Nour 
nor the BDP has revised its ideological premises in a substantial manner.37
Th ere are a number of Salafi  parties, but al-Nour has been the most successful 
in recent years. Its main infl uence is in Alexandria and the Delta region, where 
the loose network of al-Da‘wa al-Salafi yya (Salafi  Call) has had some impact.38 
Saudi–Wahhabi principles inform its ideological outlook, as can be seen in the 
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writings of al-Nour leader Yasser Hussein Burhami.39 Yet intra-organisational 
tensions over the direction of the party, particularly on what a Salafi  party 
should stand for, emerged in the course of 2012. Th is led to the departure 
of Abd al-Ghaff our, who went on to establish the electorally less successful 
al-Watan Party, in December of the same year.40 As for al-Nour, it backed 
protests against Morsi in 2013; yet the party was reluctant to support al-Sisi aft er 
the events of July 2013.41 Leaving all strategic options open, al-Nour neither 
supported Morsi’s return to power nor did it support the military intervention. 
Al-Nour deliberately hung back from calling for challenges to the transitional 
government and, subsequently, to al-Sisi’s regime. Th e party thus evaded major 
arrests and, despite a legal challenge to its status, was able to survive.42 In the 
2014 constitutional referendum, al-Nour urged voters to support the new 
legal framework, thus indicating a pragmatic and tactical approach to politics. 
Its strategic calculation became apparent when an-Nour fi elded candidates for 
the 2015 parliamentary elections.43 Gaining eleven seats, all of them through 
independent candidacies in the Delta and Cairo, it became the only Islamist 
party with seats in the House of Representatives. Yet compared to its previous 
results in 2011–12, the results were rather poor and thus did not fi ll the void left  
by the FJP.
Th e Salafi  stance also fi nds representation in the BDP and al-Asala. While 
al-Nour has its roots in the Salafi -Wahhabi trend of the Delta region, the BDP 
is directly linked to the IG which was particularly dominant in Upper Egypt 
and in poorer areas of Cairo with a dominant Sa‘idi population. As a party, the 
BDP was established in 2011 on the initiative of the IG leadership.44 Al-Asala 
is similar to the BDP and, although the party is not directly linked to the IG, it 
drew members from its circles. Both parties show similarities with al-Nour in 
their post-Spring political trajectory. Th e BDP achieved some modest success 
in the 2011–12 parliamentary poll, winning thirteen seats, while al-Asala 
secured three seats.45 In 2013, the BDP and al-Asala joined the Anti-Coup 
Alliance but, because of tactical manoeuvres similar to those of al-Nour, 
avoided major repercussions. Still, the post-coup era left  the BDP and al-Asala 
side-lined. Although both parties withdrew from the Anti-Coup Alliance in 
2015, they failed to secure any seats in the 2015 parliamentary elections.
As an organisation, the IG was known for its militancy. It was involved in a 
number of terrorist activities, including the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat and 
the 1997 Luxor att ack, which claimed eighty-seven lives.46 Subsequently, the 
organisation underwent a ‘deradicalisation’ process.47 Analysing fundamental 
ideological positions, Meijer shows that the IG applied a dual strategy: on 
the one hand it justifi ed the use of militancy, but on the other it undertook to 
build wider social support among ultra-conservative sections of society.48 It is 
the latt er aspect that remained the strategic focus of the IG in its four central 
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books published in 2004, which articulate to their supporters a renunciation of 
violence. Yet Drevon critically remarks that despite the recantation of violence, 
militancy as a political tactic was never formally rejected.49 In fact, jihad, even 
in its violent interpretation, continued to be regarded as a strategic option 
should the context in question call for such action. Although its party, the 
BDP, formally engages in political participation, the IG retains this position 
until today. Hence, there remains a distinct question-mark over the ideological 
moderation of the BDP, with the party so far remaining a clear example of 
moderation only at the strategic level.50
Th e political amivalence of Salafi  parties evidences the strategic calculus that 
binds them to political participation. Th ese parties are far from re-evaluating 
their ideological positions. Although there is an ongoing intra-organisational 
debate in all three Salafi  cases, this does not amount to ideological moderation. 
Given that al-Sisi’s regime appears to tolerate their political participation and, 
in fact, appears to regard Salafi s as an Islamist alternative to the MB that can 
be held in check because their ultra-orthodox ideas do not fi nd widespread 
support, there is litt le incentive for change as there is litt le internal or external 
pressure that could trigger the intra-organisational debates rhat are key to 
ideological reform.
Conclusion
Does the political participation of Islamist parties lead to moderation? Th e 
case of Egypt’s Islamist parties in the post-Spring era seems to challenge the 
‘participation-moderation’ model. It suggests that, by including parties in 
formal political processes, they change not only their political behaviours, 
but eventually also their ideological frames. Looking at post-Spring Egyptian 
cases, we can trace a variety of political trajectories among Islamist parties, but 
none of them actually substantiates the participation-moderation model. As 
we have seen above, the FJP’s development demonstrates that participation 
in formal politics can undermine ideological reform. Meanwhile, the various 
Salafi  parties participate in elections, but there is litt le evidence of ideological 
reform in any of them. Finally, reformist movements have accepted democratic 
values, but this has led to their boycott ing the 2015 parliamentary elections; in 
short, their ideological moderation led to non-participation.
Still, the paradigm, if used critically and with caution, remains a useful 
facsimile, perhaps an ideal-type, by which to assess the trajectories of political 
parties in transition. Egyptian post-Spring developments illustrate that 
numerous Islamist parties have adapted to the new political sett ing and as 
such have shown some level of moderation. As such, strategic moderation is a 
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minimal denominator as it allows Islamist parties, similar to any other legally 
recognised party, access to pursuing their agenda through formal political 
institutions. From this point of view, participation has a direct, positive eff ect, 
although many of the more infl uential parties such as the FJP, al-Nour, the 
BDP and al-Asala have merely participated due to strategic calculations and 
without engaging in substantial ideological reframing.
While participation has a direct impact on strategic moderation, the 
Egyptian cases of Islamist parties suggest that ideological moderation is 
not prompted by political inclusion. When reviewing Islamist parties in the 
post-coup era, there is no case supporting the ‘participation-moderation’ 
thesis, which suggests a direct relationship between political inclusion and 
ideological moderation. For example, the strategic decision of the MB/
FJP to participate in the political system (and eff ectively to dominate it) 
undermined the possibility of ideological moderation; the reason for this 
lies in the fact that there were few incentives for the organisation to change. 
While there is limited concrete evidence that the MB, and its now irrelevant 
FJP, have any intention to turn to violence as a strategic option in response 
to the ban of the MB in 2013, this aspect in itself does not demonstrate 
ideological moderation in terms of a relative process of accepting democratic 
principles and values. Salafi  parties such as al-Nour, the BDP, al-Asala and 
al-Watan continue to participate in post-coup politics, but they also show 
litt le sign of ideological reform. Th eir turn to formal politics is mainly driven 
by a strategic calculus, thereby continuing to consider violent jihad as a 
potential option should a formal institutional path be blocked. Moreover, 
their views on the status of non-Muslims and the role of women in society 
and politics remain fi rmly guided by ultra-orthodox religious precepts. Only 
reformist parties show a considerable degree of ideological moderation, 
although with notable diff erences between them. As such, al-Wasat remains 
more on the orthodox side of the reformist spectrum given its positions 
on Shari‘ah. Not altogether successfully, al-Wasat att empts to bridge the 
gap between traditional Islamic positions and democratic values. Strong 
Egypt, however, clearly demonstrates a high level of ideological moderation, 
supporting positions which present an interpretation of Islam that is fully 
compatible with democratic processes and liberal values. Yet even in the case 
of Strong Egypt, this ideological moderation is not necessarily the result of 
political participation, but rather the outcome of refl ections triggered by a 
dispute with the conservative MB leadership. Th e fact that reformist parties 
boycott ed the 2015 parliamentary elections in protest against the return to an 
authoritarian regime epitomises that ideological moderation is not the result 
of participation; on the contrary, non-participation here is the consequence 
of ideological moderation.
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Reformist parties that did engage in ideological moderation, thus undergoing 
a micro-level transformation that internalised (at least to a considerable extent) 
democratic principles and values, did not reframe their positions as a result of 
participation in the political system. In fact, in the case of the reformist Islamist 
parties, it is apparent that their ideological shift s are the outcome of intra-
organisational debates. In the Egyptian cases, these resulted in the departure 
of reformists from their mother-organisations as ideological diff erences proved 
irreconcilable. We can identify several triggers for intra-organisational tensions, 
both negative and positive factors, which put the given parties under considerable 
pressure. Th ese include (1) levels of repression and exclusion which, as in the 
Tunisian case, encourage parties to foster alliances and thus to negotiate with 
what constituted opponents previously; (2) (relative) political openings which, 
as in the Egyptian cases, provide new opportunities to participate and to absorb 
political skills; and/or (3) tensions caused by generational cleavages. In any case, 
the process of ideological moderation is not triggered by a strategic consideration 
as there is usually a high cost involved, adversely aff ecting a party’s mobilising 
capacity and hence its short-term strategic infl uence. Taken beyond the remit of 
Egypt’s Islamist parties, there is thus certainly reason to substantially reconsider 
elements of the participation-moderation model, albeit without dismissing the 
basic concept completely.
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Chapter 10
Islamist political societies in 
Bahrain: collateral victims of the 
2011 Popular Uprising
Marc Valeri
On 17 July 2016, the High Civil Court of Manama ordered the dissolution 
of the most important Bahraini political society, the Shi‘a Islamist Jamʿiyyat 
al-Wifaq al-Watani al-Islamiyya (Entente – National Accord Islamic Society, or 
in short al-Wifaq), and the liquidation of its funds.1 It took place a few weeks 
aft er the society’s Secretary General, Ali Salman, was sentenced to jail for nine 
years on charges related to ‘promoting forceful change of the regime’2 and the 
stripping of citizenship of Bahrain’s most prominent Shi‘a cleric and al-Wifaq’s 
spiritual leader Isa Qasim. Al-Wifaq’s dissolution represents one of the latest 
developments in a massive crackdown on both secular and Islamist opposition 
that has taken place in the wake of the popular uprising that started in 2011.
Since 2011, the Kingdom of Bahrain has experienced one of the darkest 
periods of its history, marked by a structural division of society probably 
unknown since the 1970s. Drawing on personal interviews and observations 
conducted in Bahrain, this chapter studies the role of both Sunni and Shi‘a 
legal Islamist societies in the 2011 popular mobilisations and, more generally, 
the uprising’s impact on political Islam in Bahrain. Th e chapter argues that 
mainstream pro-regime and opposition legal societies, in particular Islamist 
ones, have been the biggest losers in post-2011 political developments. Th e 
main Shi‘a Islamist force (al-Wifaq), which had proposed a conciliatory 
approach to reform, and which had been transformed by the regime into an 
institutionalised safety valve since 2006, has never been able to break with 
its sectarian image in order to broaden its popular support and embody a 
real cross-sectarian political alternative. It suff ered tremendously from its 
incapacity both to resist the regime’s sustained eff orts at undermining the 
society’s political role aft er 2011 and to become a legitimate intermediary 
between the throne and the more revolutionary Shi‘a movements. On the 
other hand, Sunni Islamist forces, which had maintained unquestioned loyalty 
to the regime in the 2000s, have proved unable to propose a platform immune 
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from the regime’s manipulation since 2011. While the regime, in its strategy 
to portray the popular uprising as a Shi‘a sectarian one, encouraged in 2011 
the development of a loyalist encompassing Sunni Islamist platform, the latt er 
only playing the temporary part assigned by the regime and quickly losing its 
momentum, unable to transform into an autonomous, self-suffi  cient political 
movement.
Th e chapter itself is structured as follows. It fi rst provides some background 
on the legal Sunni and Shi‘a Islamist political societies during the fi rst decade 
of King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa (r. 1999-), which can be considered as the 
Golden Age of political societies in Bahrain, before examining the role they 
played during the 2011 uprising. It then analyses the implications of these 
events on the structure and capacity of political mobilisation of these legal 
Islamist societies. In particular, it will refl ect on the marginalisation of the 
mainstream Sunni Islamists organisations (Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi  
societies) on the one hand, and the dramatic failure of Shi‘a Islamist al-Wifaq’s 
conciliatory approach to reform, on the other hand.
The development of Islamist political societies 
in the 2000s
Hamad bin Isa came to power in 1999 up on the death of his father and Bahraini 
ruler Shaikh Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa (r.1961–99). His accession followed 
on the heels of years of civil unrest widely known in Bahrain as the Intifada, 
which had been triggered by the combination of a deteriorated economic 
situation aft er the fall of oil prices in the 1980s and growing frustration at the 
lack of political opening since the dissolution of the fi rst parliament in 1975.3 
In order to strengthen the legitimacy of the al-Khalifa dynasty, a National 
Action Charter, which was to outline the future structure and principles of 
government, was draft ed and put to a popular referendum on 14 February 
2001. It was approved by 98.4 per cent of voters. A few days before the vote, 
to dissipate the reluctance of numerous opposition personalities to support 
a deliberately ambiguous text on the division of powers and the role of the 
ruler and royal family in politics, Hamad pronounced the abolition of the 1974 
decree on state security measures, the release of all political prisoners and 
detainees and allowed the return of Bahraini opposition activists aft er years in 
forced exile abroad.4
Th is also manifested in the revival of political pluralism in the kingdom. 
Indeed, political societies (jamʿiyyat) were allowed to register under the old 
1989 general law governing civil social and cultural societies (law no.21/1989), 
making Bahrain the fi rst Gulf monarchy to legalise political organisations. 
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In August 2005, a new law on political societies (no.26/2005) was passed. 
According to it, political societies – which have to register with the Ministry of 
Justice5 – must not be linked organisationally or fi nancially to any non-Bahraini 
organisation and are not allowed to build on any ethnic, linguistic, geographic, 
gender-based, class-based or sectarian element. Formerly banned political 
groups, on both pro-regime and opposition sides, quickly mushroomed. 
Political parties per se remain banned but societies, including Sunni and Shi‘a 
Islamist ones, functioned like parties in all but name until 2011.
Of these newly formed societies,6 the largest and best-organised is the Shi‘a 
Islamist al-Wifaq. Established with the ‘aim of gathering all the Shi‘a Islamic 
currents under one banner’,7 al-Wifaq is headed by Ali Salman, a cleric who 
was one of the leaders of the 1990s’ Bahraini Intifada. Its manifesto revolves 
around the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Bahrain, in which the 
cabinet is accountable to an elected unicameral legislature, as well as an end of 
sectarian discrimination. Many former activists of the Islamic Enlightenment 
Society, the legal front in Bahrain of Hizb al-Da‘wa (Da‘wa Party, DP) in the 
1970s,8 either joined the society from the beginning or are closely affi  liated 
to it, such as for instance Isa Qasim, who although not formally a member, is 
generally considered al-Wifaq’s spiritual leader.
Th e other Shi‘a Islamist society founded in 2002 was Jamʿiyyat al-ʿAmal 
al-Islami (Islamic Action Society, IAS), which is an off shoot of the former 
al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li-Tahrir al-Bahrayn (Islamic Front for the Liberation 
of Bahrain, IFLB), founded in exile in 1975. In December 1981 sixty IFLB 
members were accused of plott ing against Bahrain’s ruling family. In the 2000s, 
the IAS, which mainly appealed to the followers of Ayatollah Shirazi in Bahrain, 
was committ ed, like al-Wifaq, to the implementation of constitutional reform.9
Among the pro-regime societies established in the early 2000s, two 
referred to themselves as Islamist. Jamʿiyyat al-Minbar al-Watani al-Islami 
(National Islamic Tribune, or in short, al-Minbar) is regarded as the political 
wing of the Bahraini al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB). 
Active since the creation in 1941 of the fi rst organisation representing its 
ideas in the country (the Students’ Club, renamed the Reform Club in 1948, 
and the Reform Society in 1980), the MB focused until the early 2000s on 
charitable and educational work and expressed its disagreement with the 
positions adopted by Arab nationalists and Shi‘a Islamists during the Intifada 
in the 1990s. Recruiting mainly from among the urban middle class and civil 
servants, it has secured considerable infl uence and decision-making positions 
in a number of public departments, including the education sector.10 Among 
its most prominent fi gures have been members of the ruling family, including 
former Labour Minister Isa bin Mohamed al-Khalifa, who headed the society 
for fi ve decades (1963–2013). Th e other pro-regime Islamist force is al-Asala 
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al-Islamiyya (Islamic Authenticity Society, or in short, al-Asala), which is the 
political wing of the main Salafi  organisation in Bahrain, the Islamic Education 
Society. Th e latt er – whose members are particularly infl uential within the 
Ministry of Justice, Islamic Aff airs and Endowments – registered as a society 
in 1990 and quickly att racted support among poorer and more tribal Sunnis 
from Muharraq and al-Rifa‘ as well as among naturalised Bahrainis. Some 
att empts at political rapprochement between the MB, the Salafi s and other 
smaller Sunni religious personalities were conducted in 2002 and 2003 under 
the initiative of Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood, who had been the founder of a 
small independent charity called al-Jam‘iyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Society). An 
al-Azhar-trained Sunni cleric and University of Bahrain professor of Arabic, 
Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood, had been one of the leaders of the 1992 petition 
presented to then Emir Isa by a coalition of opposition fi gures ranging from 
left ists to Sunni and Shi‘a Islamists and demanding the restoration of the 1973 
National Assembly. However, nothing came out of these att empts to establish 
bridges between the diff erent Sunni Islamist societies.11
Four opposition societies, including the Shi‘a Islamist al-Wifaq and the IAS, 
coalesced into a cross-ideological coalition to boycott  the fi rst parliamentary 
elections in October 2002. Together they published a list of preconditions 
that would have to be met to secure their electoral participation, including 
a revision of the 2002 Constitution in order to give full legislative powers 
to the elected chamber and a redrawing of electoral constituencies on a fair 
demographic basis in order to redress the imbalance favouring Sunni villages. 
Within al-Wifaq, many cadres of the movement favoured electoral participa-
tion.12 Th e society’s hard choice to boycott  the poll was primarily motivated by 
pressure from its electoral base, which was not ready to make compromises on 
the need for constitutional reform. In contrast, the pro-regime Sunni societies 
participated in the 2002 elections, with the political wing of the MB winning 
seven and the Salafi  al-Asala six out of forty elective parliamentary seats.
Like most other opposition societies, al-Wifaq decided to register under 
the new law on political societies in 2005. Within al-Wifaq, this decision led, 
however, to the secession of some cadres. Together with members of secular 
societies, who also opposed their society’s decision to abide by the new 
rules determined by the regime, al-Wifaq’s deputy Secretary General Hassan 
Mushaima‘ and cleric Abd al-Wahab Husayn founded Haraka Haqq – Harakat 
al-Hurriyya wa al-Dimuqratiyya (Right Movement – Movement for Freedoms 
and Democracy, or in short Haqq). Th is unlicensed movement, comprised of 
a dual Shi‘a–Sunni leadership, actively campaigned for the draft ing of a new 
constitution and favoured recourse to civil disobedience.
Th e issue of an electoral boycott  by the opposition resurfaced again prior 
to the 2006 elections. Al-Wifaq’s boycott  of the assembly and its engagement 
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in street activism (mass rallies, petitions for constitutional reform) between 
2002 and 2006 had signifi cantly increased its popularity and support within 
the population. However, none of the demands justifying the 2002 boycott  
had been met four years later. While Haqq, which enjoyed a wide audience 
among the underprivileged Shi‘a youth, called for a boycott  (as they would 
do in 2010 too), both al-Wifaq and IAS thus decided to compete in the 
2006 elections and to forge a cross-ideological electoral pact with the Arab 
nationalist Jamʿiyyat al-‘Amal al-Watani al-Dimuqrati – Wa‘d (National 
Democratic Action Society – Promise, or in short Wa‘d), which was repeated 
in the 2010 elections as well.13
Th e 2006 elections marked the triumph of Islamist electoral politics – both 
opposition and pro-regime – with Islamist political societies conquering a total 
of thirty-two seats in the forty-seat Council of Representatives. Th e MB and the 
Salafi  al-Asala agreed not to present candidates in the same constituencies to 
maximise the Sunni Islamist vote. Th is proved benefi cial, since they won seven 
and eight seats respectively. On the opposition side, all of al-Wifaq’s candidates 
– seventeen in total – were elected. However, the decision to participate in 
the elections also confi rmed the legal opposition societies’ resignation to a 
political game that the regime controlled. While their 2002 boycott  was driven 
by an unwillingness to comply with rules that were established unilaterally by 
the regime, the opposition societies’ participation in the 2006 elections ratifi ed 
their capitulation to the regime’s ‘rules of the game’.
In 2010, a MB-Salafi  deal similar to that of 2006 could not be reached and 
candidates supported by both al-Minbar and the Salafi  al-Asala competed 
against each other in three constituencies. Th is had a direct eff ect on their 
capacity to defend their 2006 success. Only two MB candidates were elected, 
and the Salafi s secured three seats despite competing in eight constituencies. 
On the opposition side, the electoral success of al-Wifaq was confi rmed, with 
all its eighteen candidates elected in the fi rst round.
Islamist societies in 2011: bystanders of the 
popular uprising
At the beginning of February 2011, young Sunni and Shi‘a online activists 
called upon fellow citizens to occupy Manama’s Pearl Roundabout for a ‘day of 
rage’ on 14 February. Th e movement was called ‘February 14 Youth’ to mark 
the tenth anniversary of the National Charter and what its coordinators – who 
in their vast majority had no affi  liation with existing political societies – viewed 
as King Hamad’s ‘new era’ of broken promises. A loose umbrella coalition 
with no formal leadership, the February 14 Youth Coalition, was established 
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to gather all online groups and professional networks who had supported the 
original call to occupy the Pearl Roundabout. Obviously, a variety of views 
and demands were represented within the coalition, of which, however, only a 
very small minority initially supported the overthrow of the monarchy. While 
‘the bulk of the protesters belonged to the majority Shi‘a population, their 
demands were not sectarian or religious’.14 Th e vast majority were calling for the 
ousting of incumbent Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman, the establishment of 
a constitutional monarchy with a parliament holding legislative power and a 
government accountable to it, as well as the release of all political prisoners.15
Whilst Haqq, along with al-Wafa’ movement,16 openly supported the call 
for protests from the beginning, contributed to the radicalisation of parts of 
the Bahraini youth when issuing a joint statement on 7 March 2011 calling for 
a ‘democratic republican system’ and founded a ‘Coalition for the Republic’, 
they were never able to be in control of the movement. Th is observation 
applies even more so to al-Wifaq, which lived through the period reacting 
to the events instead of leading the action. True, the 18 MPs from al-Wifaq 
resigned from the Council of Representatives on 27 February, in reaction to 
the violent clearing of the roundabout ten days earlier. Also, until the military 
intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint force (14 March), 
al-Wifaq, along with the other legal opposition societies, were in almost daily 
contact with the Crown Prince in order to discuss ways of addressing the 
crisis. However, they were never really in a capacity to take leadership over 
the protest movement. Part of the explanation is given by a leading human 
right activist who asserts:
Both al-Wifaq and Wa‘ad were unprepared for the movement and unready 
to know how it was to evolve . . . They had no clear strategy. When they 
were in contact with the Crown Prince to negotiate, the youth in the Pearl 
chanted ‘No dialogue’. . . . The youth was leading the politicians and the 
[opposition] political societies, not the contrary.17
More generally, al-Wifaq’s participation in the 2006 and 2010 elections and 
integration into the political institutions of the state had slowly transformed 
it into a society of professional politicians, living off  politics, and with a 
conciliatory socio-economic and political agenda towards the regime. If 
its undisputed successes in the 2006 and 2010 Council of Representatives 
elections established al-Wifaq as the leading opposition group, its incapacity 
to change everyday life for Shi‘a since then has seriously weakened its political 
credibility in the eyes of ordinary citizens and deprived society of any capacity 
to embody an alternative to Hamad’s regime. Th e opinion that al-Wifaq’s 
strategy during the 2000s to work for change from inside the system proved 
‘its ineffi  ciency and is doomed to failure’18 was shared by many young political 
activists present on the Pearl Roundabout.
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Concomitantly, the regime’s deliberate policy to portray the 2011 uprising as 
a sectarian one – added to the Hamad’s regime’s long-term strategy to emphasise 
the sectarian division of society as a means of de-legitimising any non-sectarian 
opposition – has also had tremendous eff ects on the country’s Sunni Islamist 
societies. Th e regime strongly encouraged the emergence of a loyalist Sunni 
organisation, which was supposed to illustrate, in a mirror-inverted confi gura-
tion, the Shi‘a confessional character of the popular uprisings. On 19 February 
2011, several Sunni political societies, including the MB (al-Minbar), the 
Salafi  al-Asala and several smaller ones, such as the Sunni nationalist Harakat 
al-‘Adala al-Wataniya (National Justice Movement Society) and the Nasserist-
cum-Islamist al-Wasat al-‘Arabi al-Islami (Arab Islamic Centre Society), agreed 
on the necessity to establish an alternative forum to Pearl Roundabout. Th ey 
thus announced the formation of a new movement called Tajammu‘ al-Wahda 
al-Wataniya (National Unity Gathering, NUG) with the aim of establishing a 
vehicle to make the Sunni voice heard and to support ‘reform over revolution’.19 
Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood was elected NUG spokesperson. Th is umbrella 
organisation led two massive rallies at the biggest Bahraini mosque (Al-Fatih 
Mosque) on 21 February and 2 March. In its fi rst rally, the NUG affi  rmed 
‘the legitimacy of the existing regime and considered that the maintenance 
of stability in the country is not negotiable’.20 It also emphasised ‘the unity of 
the Bahraini people who share the same grievances, problems and challenges’ 
and ‘extend[ed] its hand’ to the protesters at the Pearl Roundabout.21 On 22 
February, the NUG leaders were publicly praised by the prime minister and 
received by the king, who ‘hailed the peaceful massive rally paying tribute to 
all loyal citizens for their patriotic stance and allegiance to their leadership and 
country in confronting challenges’.22
While the NUG, whose creation had been encouraged by the government, 
was useful to the latt er in helping present the popular uprising as sectarian, it 
insisted that it had ‘its own demands’, to paraphrase the mott o of the second 
of its rallies (lan mutallib), and claimed to represent those ‘who have not 
had anyone to represent them’,23 that is those Sunnis who do not belong to 
the ruling family. In this narrative, Bahrain is not composed of two, but three 
political groups: ‘the leadership of the country’,24 the Shi‘a, confl ated with 
the Pearl Roundabout protesters, and the Sunnis. Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood 
explained later ‘[w]e consider there to be three forces: the system (royal 
family), the Sunnis and the Shi’ites, and political and constitutional reform 
needs the consent of all of them’.25
Unsurprisingly the NUG’s strongest att acks were directed against al-Wifaq, 
which was labelled as sectarian and accused of wanting to introduce wilayat 
al-faqih in Bahrain. But a number of the NUG demands were, interestingly 
enough, not very diff erent from the ones heard among the legal opposition. 
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Th ey included calls for substantial social and political reform, in particular that 
‘authority should be vested in the people in reality and not only as a façade’ 
and that ‘fundamental and balanced revisions of the Constitution’ should 
be undertaken ‘to ensure people are the sources of authority under the kind 
custodianship of the King’.26 Th e NUG also called for the release of political 
prisoners, the trial of those responsible for the deaths of protesters since the 
beginning of the uprising, the increase of salaries in both public and private 
sectors, solutions to the housing problems, greater independence in the 
judiciary and an end to corruption. Th ree meetings between representatives 
of the seven legal opposition societies (including al-Wifaq) and NUG leaders 
took place at the beginning of March 2011 – two at Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood’s 
Islamic Society offi  ce and one at al-Wifaq’s headquarters. At the end of one of 
these meetings, a general common statement was issued to condemn ‘inter-
communal clashes that had occurred throughout the day in Bahrain, call[ing] 
on the people not to confront their fellow citizens and warn[ing] against the 
dangers of sectarianism’.27
In its second rally on 2 March, meanwhile, the NUG’s initial demands for 
political reform were dropped to give way to the affi  rmation of ‘the continued 
legitimacy of both the existing political regime and the ruling al-Khalifa family 
under the leadership’ of the king, the rejection of the opposition’s calls for the 
resignation of the cabinet, ‘which would bring destruction to Bahrain’, and 
calls to take ‘all necessary measures’ to end demonstrations and to bring to 
trial the leaders of strikes and demonstrations in public services.28 Th is change 
of tone from the fi rst rally on 21 February was precipitated by the regime’s 
increasing pressure on the NUG leadership, but also by the organisation’s 
ambition to establish itself as a reformist conciliatory third force that set itself 
apart from the Pearl Roundabout protests, which the NUG portrayed as revo-
lutionary and uncompromising. Communication between the NUG and the 
legal opposition was fi nally interrupted by the GCC’s military intervention to 
clear the Roundabout on 14 March. In a press conference held that evening, 
the NUG accused al-Wifaq of being ‘responsible for what was occurring in 
Bahrain’ and, in a thinly veiled allusion to the alleged Iranian connection with 
al-Wifaq, asserted that ‘any intervention from outside [the GCC community] 
was unacceptable’.29
A state of emergency was enacted between 15 March and 1 June. During this 
period, the NUG leaders had to decide how to make the movement evolve. Th e 
extreme variety of irreconcilable ideological roots and political interests among 
the components of this pro-regime coalition made agreement on a common 
vision all the more diffi  cult. Th ree options were on the table: (1) carrying on 
as a loose umbrella coalition composed of independent political societies (the 
political wing of the MB, al-Minbar, pushed for this route), (2) turning the 
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NUG into a charitable society with social goals (this was supported by the Salafi  
al-Asala) and (3) transforming the NUG into a registered political society. 
Th e latt er, which was supported by Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood, was opposed 
by al-Minbar and al-Asala, since Bahraini law does not allow simultaneous 
membership in two political societies. Th e leaders of al-Minbar and al-Asala 
were concerned that the registration of the NUG as a political society would 
lead some of their members to resign and join the NUG. Following the king’s 
decision on 31 May to organise a National Dialogue to start on 1 July, the NUG 
felt caught up in a race against time. On 11 June, 69 per cent of the eligible 
members of the NUG voted for its transformation into a political society.30 
It offi  cially registered as a political society on 28 June 2011. Th e subsequent 
election of the new society’s Central Committ ee revealed fi rst serious cracks, 
as no former members of al-Minbar and al-Asala societies were elected to 
leadership positions. As a result, al-Minbar and al-Asala leaders felt they had no 
longer any stake in the NUG project and thus offi  cially withdrew from it. From 
then onwards, the three societies (al-Minbar, al-Asala and the NUG) became de 
facto political competitors. Tensions between the NUG and other pro-regime 
societies increased even further following a Washington Times interview in 
August in which the head of the NUG Abd al-Latif al-Mahmood stated that the 
prime minister ‘should stay in offi  ce until the crisis is over and then step down’.31 
Many Sunnis, especially among al-Minbar and al-Asala, perceived this position 
as a lèse-majesté off ence towards the prime minister, who is extremely popular 
among loyalists for his role in facilitating the military intervention of the GCC 
joint force in March 2011.
In the by-elections organised in September 2011, following the resignation 
from the Council of Representatives of all eighteen MPs from al-Wifaq in 
February, the NUG announced that it would not participate in order to 
preserve ‘national unity’. Th e MB and Salafi  societies did not present candidates 
either – due to their lack of preparation and political anchorage in the involved 
(predominantly Shi‘a) constituencies – but instead supported candidates 
considered to have similar programmes.32 It comes as litt le surprise, meanwhile, 
that the legal opposition boycott ed these by-elections. Th e non-participation 
of all major political societies led to the election of pro-government deputies 
offi  cially labelling themselves as ‘independent’.
The plight of (Sunni and Shi‘a) Islamist societies
As illustrated by the modest electoral results of the MB’s affi  liate al-Minbar 
and the Salafi s throughout the 2000s, these societies, which have always been 
unquestionably loyal to the regime, were more dependent on the regime 
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than the reverse and never enjoyed the popular support that their Egyptian 
or Kuwaiti counterparts did. For the fi rst time in 2011, the hypothesis of 
a movement gathering all Sunni Islamist currents in Bahrain under one 
banner – a kind of ‘Sunni equivalent of al-Wifaq’33 – became realistic. In its 
strategy to portray the Pearl Roundabout popular mobilisation as a Shi‘a 
revolt, the regime undeniably supported and benefi ted from the emergence 
of a Sunni coalition in spring 2011. However, the regime’s tolerance towards 
of an encompassing movement had to do with the very particular political 
circumstances of the Arab uprisings. Once the regime perceived that its 
survival was no longer under threat, the existence of a Sunni Islamist political 
movement – which would be more than just a tool at the ruling family’s 
disposal in times of crisis, but could play a perennial role, potentially pushing 
specifi c Sunni demands or claiming to give the Sunnis an independent voice 
from the regime – was defi nitely not to the latt er’s taste. As a result, by the end 
of 2011, the NUG had lost its usefulness to the regime and its momentum 
was already waning.
In January 2012, a new movement called Sahwat al-Fatih (al-Fatih 
Awakening, or in short al-Fatih), and led by young NUG sympathisers, was 
created. It organised a rally on 21 February to commemorate the anniversary 
of the fi rst NUG gathering at Al-Fatih Mosque in 2011 but did not invite any 
NUG leaders.34 Considered by many observers as ‘a brainchild of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Royal Court’,35 in an att empt to weaken the NUG, 
al-Fatih opposed any dialogue between the regime and al-Wifaq. It described 
the latt er as ‘terrorists’36 and claimed that the priority should be ‘deterring 
vandalism that aims to blackmail the nation for foreign agendas’, accusing in 
particular the United States of using Bahrain for its own regional interests.37 
Al-Fatih faded away in the summer 2012 as quickly as it had emerged a few 
months before, but it had fulfi lled a double political role. Not only did it 
confi rm, and exacerbate in the eyes of many Sunni Islamists, the existential 
crisis of the NUG, which had started materialising in June 2011 following the 
break with al-Minbar and al-Asala, who had been founding members of the 
NUG coalition. But even more so, by illustrating the radicalisation of some 
Sunni groups to the point that they rejected the possibility of a negotiation 
between the regime and the legal opposition, al-Fatih enabled the regime to 
present itself as torn between two uncompromising sectarian components of 
society and exonerate itself from the responsibility of the National Dialogue’s 
failure. Th is said, the regime’s ongoing strategy to locate the Sunni–Shi‘a 
divide at the centre of the political arena ultimately backfi red, paving the 
way for the emergence of a jihadi–Salafi  current. Th is current fi nds its roots 
in a sectarian (virtually exclusively Sunni)38 recruitment policy – and the 
conveyance of anti-Shi‘a propaganda – within the regime’s very security 
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services39 and openly professes sympathy for the Islamic State, encouraging 
young Bahrainis to join the latt er.40
Th e results of the November 2014 elections for the Council of Represen-
tatives illustrated the popular disenchantment with Sunni Islamist political 
societies, perceived as unable to fulfi l the expectations raised in 2011 of being 
a platform to convey particular (Sunni) demands to the regime. Two months 
before the elections, the government announced a redrawing of electoral 
constituency boundaries, intended to ‘hinder the chances of Sunni Islamists 
. . . in favor of tribal independents. Th e districts of several current Islamist MPs 
. . . were even combined to force direct electoral face-off s among sitt ing Sunni 
legislators’.41 Th is constituted a blatant illustration of the reluctance of the 
regime to have a parliament controlled by Islamists (either Shi‘a or Sunni) and 
of its strategy of favouring pragmatic businessmen and tribal leaders ready to 
support the regime’s policies.  In addition to this, following Riyadh’s decision 
to label the MB a ‘terrorist’ organisation in March 2014, the Bahraini regime 
was under increasing pressure from its Saudi and UAE allies to limit Sunni 
Islamists’ infl uence at home, despite the close connection of the regime with 
the Bahraini Salafi  and MB off shoots.
While the MB and the NUG agreed not to present candidates competing 
in the same constituencies, this deal could not be reached with al-Asala. As a 
result, the MB and the Salafi s went head to head in three constituencies (in 
one of them, the NUG even presented a candidate). Together these factors 
explain why Sunni Islamist associations suff ered a terrible setback in favour 
of self-styled ‘independent’ candidates. While the MB’s al-Minbar presented 
seven candidates and won one seat only, the Salafi  al-Asala managed to win 
three seats out of six candidates it had presented.42 Th e results were even more 
disastrous for the NUG, which presented seven candidates, all of whom were 
defeated in the fi rst round of the elections.43
In the meantime among the opposition, al-Wifaq had been struggling to 
balance the pressure from the street and the necessity to keep its privileged 
access to the Crown Prince and the royal family. Many al-Wifaq cadres – 
particularly concerned by the increasing diffi  culty to balance the society’s 
moderate wing, which favours a return to normal (that is the ‘not-so-bad’ 
pre-2011 period) and the more radical wing, which shared many of the 
demands of the February 14 Youth Coalition and regards 2011 as a breaking 
point in Bahrain’s history – already expressed worry about a potential 
implosion of the society. In addition to several unlicensed opposition 
societies – including al-Wafa’ and Haqq, whose leaders had been sentenced to 
life in prison and who called for a boycott  of the elections, as they had done 
since 2002 – fi ve legal opposition associations, including al-Wifaq and the 
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IAS, confi rmed in October 2014 their decision to boycott  the poll. Th is was 
decided despite the strong pressures to participate emanating from Western 
embassies – in particular the UK, which allegedly threatened to stop all 
contacts with al-Wifaq and hold it accountable for the political deadlock – and 
from the regime, which had been threatening to ban the society’s activities 
since July 2014.44 Despite these threats, however, the decision by al-Wifaq to 
boycott  the poll was in the end rather straightforward and accompanied only 
by few dissenting voices from within. As explained by a cadre of the society 
supporting the boycott , ‘participation would have ratifi ed the society’s 
capitulation to the terrible conditions imposed by the regime since 2011 and 
would have been perceived as a treason vis-à-vis the Shi‘a street and the 4,000 
political prisoners remaining in jail’.45
Conclusion
Th e chapter of reform opened in 1999 by King Hamad led to the channelling 
of popular discontent through the legal opposition and a defusing of societal 
tensions for several years. When the Shi‘a Islamist political society al-Wifaq 
decided to participate in the 2006 parliamentary elections, the goal was to 
establish a clear demarcation with the illegal opposition. While the latt er was 
directly challenging the monarchical order (through an overtly republican 
project, for example the unlicensed Shi‘a Islamist al-Wafa’ movement) or 
unwilling to play the game and participate in elections (for example, the cross-
sectarian Haqq), al-Wifaq decided to accept the rules of the game in return 
for representation in parliament and – although limited – some infl uence over 
the policy-making process. However, by 2011, al-Wifaq’s institutionalisation 
and failure to change the system from within had already contributed to an 
increase in the ranks of opposition activists convinced that a more radical 
strategy was necessary to achieve meaningful political reforms. Aft er 2011, 
this class of professional Shi‘a politicians, whose legitimacy was based on 
years in exile, had tremendously suff ered from an incapacity both to resist the 
regime’s eff orts at undermining their political role, and to represent a legitimate 
intermediary between the throne and the Bahraini street. In addition, al-Wifaq 
has been deeply aff ected by its leaders’ experience of harassment and arrests by 
the regime since 2011. Al-Wifaq’s 2014 electoral boycott  and its denunciation 
by foreign embassies – including the UK, which appeared more interested 
in maintaining an authoritarian order conducive to business deals than in 
condemning the suppression of most basic human rights by a non-democratic 
regime – were taken by the Bahraini government as a go-ahead to carry out a 
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widespread crackdown on the legal opposition. With al-Wifaq’s dissolution in 
2016 and its Secretary General Ali Salman in jail since December 2014, there 
is almost nothing left  of the largest political society under Hamad fi ve years 
aft er the popular uprising. In a bitt er mirror image of the political situation 
in the 1990s, many of the society’s cadres who are not in jail are in exile and 
defi nitely not in a capacity, in the short term, to revive Bahraini Shi‘a politics 
from its ashes.
Among the Sunni Islamists, meanwhile, the picture is no less bleak. As 
observed by Justin Gengler, ‘Sunni nationalism is not a phenomenon the 
Bahraini state is eager to see, and even much less become institutionalised 
in the form of organised political societies’.46 True, Sunni Islamists were 
extremely useful to the regime in 2011 and 2012, in presenting a pro-ruling 
family front to stand up against what was abusively denounced as a Shi‘a coup 
att empt. However, as illustrated by the terrible blow suff ered by the three 
main Sunni Islamist societies (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi s, NUG) in the 
2014 elections, they have been unable to propose a sustainable post-2011 
Sunni Islamist platform immune from the regime’s manipulation. Instead, 
the entrenchment of a jihadi–Salafi  current in the country may become the 
not-so-unexpected legacy of the regime’s sectarian strategy that it will have 
to deal with in the years to come.
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Chapter 11
Kuwait’s Islamist proto-parties 
and the Arab uprisings: between 
opposition, pragmatism and 
the pursuit of cross-ideological 
cooperation
Luciano Zaccara, Courtney Freer and 
Hendrik Kraetzschmar
Introduction
Th is chapter is concerned with Kuwait’s so-called Islamist proto-parties,1 and 
their evolution and responses to the Arab uprisings of 2010–11. Despite the 
absence of a political parties’ law, the Kuwaiti government has tolerated the 
presence of proto-parties and their involvement in legislative, municipal and 
associational elections since the country gained independence in 1961. Today, 
numerous such proto-parties operate openly in Kuwaiti politics and represent 
populist-left ist, national-liberal and Islamist ideological currents.2 Comprising 
both Sunni and Shi‘a denominations, some Islamist groupings/proto-parties 
even predate the offi  cial creation of the Kuwaiti state. Since the re-establish-
ment of al-Sabah rule aft er the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation 
in 1991, Islamists, both as members of proto-parties and as independents, 
have been consistently represented in parliament. Th e most active and well-
organised Islamist proto-party has been the mainstream Sunni al-Harakat 
al-Dustouriyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Constitutional Movement/ICM, also 
known by its Arabic acronym Hadas), which functions as the political arm of 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi  al-Kuwait (Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, KMB).3 
Other Islamist proto-parties, such as the Salafi  al-Tajammu‘ al-Islami al-Salafi  
(Salafi  Islamic Gathering, SIG), al-Haraka al-Salafi yya (Salafi  Movement, SM) 
and Hizb al-Ummah (Ummah Party, UP) as well as the Shi‘a-based al-Tahaluf 
al-Watani al-Islami (National Islamic Alliance, NIA) and Tajammu‘ al-Adala wa 
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al-Salam ( Justice and Peace Assembly, JPA), have also tended to be represented 
in recent legislatures. Since the 1990s, many of these Islamist proto-parties 
have alternated between opposing and supporting the government, depending 
on strategic calculus, domestic political circumstance and regional dynamics. 
Since the mid-2000s, however, and especially since 2005–6, the two Sunni 
Islamist proto-parties traditionally known for their close ties to the Kuwaiti 
government – Hadas and the SIG – have become more visibly oppositional 
in their approach to the al-Sabah government and its policies, while the 
Shi‘a-based NIA has become increasingly pro-government in outlook.
Over the past decade, the oppositional stances taken by Hadas, the SIG 
and others – together with mounting (and previously unseen) tribal resistance 
to the implementation of increasingly restrictive government policies, limiting 
political participation of independent societal actors – has contributed to 
an almost permanent deadlock in parliament between government and 
opposition. Indeed, parliament was dissolved an impressive seven times 
between 2005 and 2016 alone, largely due to persistent opposition challenges 
in that body. While Hadas and the various Salafi  proto-parties, combined 
within the ‘Islamic bloc’, held on average ten to twelve seats in the assemblies 
elected between 1992 and 2009, this fi gure reached twenty-two to twenty-fi ve 
aft er the February 2012 election – which had followed on the heels of a series 
of domestic protests in 2011 and the stunning electoral successes of Islamist 
parties elsewhere in the region – providing this assembly with its strongest 
Islamist presence ever. For the Kuwaiti government, these electoral gains 
certainly represented a serious challenge, given that by then a majority of 
Sunni Islamist proto-parties had become fi rmly associated with the broader 
political opposition. Th e subsequent dissolution of parliament at the hands 
of the Constitutional Court four months later led to the reinstatement of the 
largely loyalist assembly that had been elected previously. Since restoration of 
the previous assembly was so controversial, consecutive elections were called 
in December 2012 and again in July 2013 amidst massive street demonstra-
tions inspired by the Arab uprisings elsewhere.
Notably, following the opposition’s success in the February 2012 polls, the 
government unilaterally imposed a new electoral law that granted each citizen 
only one vote (each had previously had four) in a measure that members of 
the opposition assumed was aimed at harming organised proto-parties. As a 
result Hadas, alongside other Islamist and secular portions of the opposition, 
boycott ed the elections of December 2012 and July 2013, and only returned to 
the electoral fold in the November 2016 polls.4
As this chapter demonstrates, during their period outside parliament, the 
principal Sunni Islamist proto-parties, including Hadas and the SIG, resorted 
to a strategy of cooperation with other (secular) political opposition, partaking 
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in non-institutionalised forms of collective action, such as demonstrations and 
protests, in order to eff ect change. Indeed, it was in this environment that Sunni 
Islamists – perhaps having seen the pitfalls of Islamists going it alone elsewhere 
in the region – ramped up their cooperation with other strands of the political 
opposition. As Shadi Hamid observes, such a strategy of forming broad-based 
coalitions has been used elsewhere in the face of an increased government 
crackdown, as it ‘off ers protection against government crackdowns, making 
it harder for regimes to portray Islamists as extremists or terrorists. In one 
sense, working with other, more “liberal” and “respected” political forces gives 
Islamists the political cover they need’.5
Th at Hadas and the main Salafi  proto-parties have come to increasingly work 
with other oppositional forces also refl ects their understanding of regional 
dynamics. Indeed, following the ousting of president Mohamed Morsi in July 
2013 and the worsening crackdown on affi  liates of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun 
(Muslim Brotherhood, MB) in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as the 
regional turmoil resulting from ongoing civil war in Syria, cooperation with 
other proto-parties and focusing on gradual progress towards political reforms 
have become key pillars in the Islamists’ strategic repertoire to avoid falling 
victim to the regime’s red lines and to secure their own political survival. Th is 
is also evident in the decision taken by Kuwait’s major Islamist proto-parties 
to end their electoral boycott  in November 2016, which demonstrates their 
acknowledgement of the limits of a protest movement and their willingness 
to use a more gradualist strategy to eff ect political reform, working through the 
political system rather than trying to expose its fl aws by remaining outside it 
through election boycott s.
The institutional context
Kuwait’s political system, as enshrined in the 1962 constitution, combines 
monarchical rule with representative politics. According to Article 4 of the 
1962 Constitution, the Kuwaiti political system is a ‘hereditary Emirate, the 
succession to which shall be in the descendants of the late Mubarak al-Sabah’.6 
Th e constitution further stipulates the creation of a unicameral legislature7 – 
the 65-seat Majlis al-Ummah (National Assembly)8 – to be elected every four 
years by universal adult suff rage. Until 2005, this suff rage was restricted to male 
Kuwaiti citizens, but has since been broadened to include full suff rage rights 
for female citizens as well.9 Elections to the National Assembly have been held 
since 1963, although rarely at regular intervals, with the assembly having been 
dissolved on numerous occasions by the Amir or the Amir-appointed Consti-
tutional Court. Th ough the constitution requires that new polls be scheduled 
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within two months of the dissolution of parliament, the Amir-mandated 
dissolutions in 1976 and 1986 were exceptions to this rule and led to years of 
governance without parliament (1976–81 and 1986–92).
Unlike elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), elections 
in Kuwait have been formally held on a non-partisan basis, given that in its 
current form the Kuwaiti constitution does not mandate the legislation of 
a political parties’ law. Indeed, although it enshrines some basic democratic 
rights, including those to establish (non-political) associations (Art. 43) and 
freedom of assembly (Art. 44), neither the constitution nor its explanatory 
memorandum stipulates the passage of legislation that would regulate the 
licensing and operations of the country’s proto-parties.10 According to 
Allarakia and others, the government’s unwillingness to legislate on the matt er 
must be regarded as part and parcel of a broader divide-and-rule strategy to 
keep the political landscape fragmented and its constituent proto-parties 
weakly institutionalised and non-threatening to al-Sabah rule.11 Combined 
with the presence of electoral rules based on individual candidacies, a society 
that remains largely circumspect of the idea of ‘political parties’ and one in 
which familiar, denominational and tribal considerations weigh heavily in 
voter choices, this legislative framework in fact produces electoral contests 
that remain dominated by political entrepreneurship and legislatures featuring 
a majority of MPs unaffi  liated to any proto-party.12
Two consequences fl ow from this situation. First, it has prevented the 
emergence of strong and disciplined proto-parties/blocs in parliament, 
and thus of a viable rival centre of power to the Amir and his government. 
Second, it has turned electoral contests into rent-seeking endeavours, whereby 
candidates/MPs seek to extract benefi cial resources from the state for their 
constituents in return for support of the government and its legislative agenda. 
In Kuwait, MPs engaged in such behaviour are known as ‘service’ MPs, and 
their presence in parliamentary politics has been vital to ensure the passage of 
government legislation.13
The spectre of Islamist proto-parties before the 
Arab uprisings
Representing the diverse range of ideological tendencies in the country, 
Kuwaiti politics today features proto-parties with populist-left ist, national-
liberal as well as Sunni and Shi‘a Islamist dispositions. Th e development of 
these political tendencies throughout the twentieth century was aided by the 
arrival of large numbers of Arab migrants, mainly from Egypt and Palestine, 
who came to the Emirate where they were granted substantial freedom to 
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spread these ideologies, especially in the fi rst decades of the existence of the 
Kuwaiti state.14 Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s in particular, Sunni 
Islamist trends – both mainstream and Salafi  – benefi ted from the patronage of 
a government that considered Islamism a bulwark against the more politically 
dangerous left ist and Arab nationalist currents, and indigenous proto-parties/
groupings were founded in Kuwait representing both ideologies. Indeed, 
as expanded upon by Zoltan Pall and others, it is during this period of time 
that the Kuwaiti government commenced courting Sunni Islamist forces, 
including most notably the KMB-affi  liated charitable association Jam‘iyyat 
al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi (Social Reform Association, hereaft er Islah), as well as the 
Salafi  movement, whose entry into formal politics it actively encouraged. 
For one this was done, of course, to ‘counterbalance’ the country’s Arab 
nationalist forces and their growing domestic popularity, yet it also served the 
government to stoke intra-Islamist competition and hence to keep the KMB 
in check.15
Following the decline of Arab nationalist and left ist parties in the MENA 
region, as a consequence of the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war and 
the geopolitical shift s that occurred aft er the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 
1979, Islamist movements, especially the KMB, used their good ties with the 
government to advance their platforms, penetrating Kuwait’s economic and 
political elites.16
As mentioned above, the Islamist political landscape in Kuwait is made up of 
both Sunni and Shi’a proto-parties and groupings, with the former comprising 
the mainstream Islamist KMB/Hadas as well as several Salafi  proto-parties/
associations. Among the collection of Sunni Islamist forces, in fact, the KMB 
and its political wing Hadas, can be considered by far the most prominent in 
terms of popularity and organisational muscle. Th e KMB itself was founded as 
a branch of the Egyptian MB nearly a decade before Kuwaiti independence, 
in 1952, with the establishment of a charitable association, Jam‘iyyat al-Irshad 
al-Islamiyya (Islamic Guidance Society, henceforth Irshad).17 At the time, Irshad 
pledged to espouse Hassan al-Banna’s ideology by spreading Islamic culture 
and countering secular and Western infl uences among the new generations of 
Kuwaitis.18 Th e KMB, as represented by Irshad, was heavily infl uenced by its 
Egyptian counterpart, primarily in its organisational set-up and arrangement 
of networking and da‘wa activities. Th e arrival of large numbers of Egyptian 
teachers and other offi  cials associated with the MB in Kuwait during Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s (r.1956–70) crackdown on the movement aided in spreading 
the Brotherhood’s ideology.19 Certainly, with many of these educated 
immigrants involved in the understaff ed education sector, they were able to 
gain support from the grassroots by spreading their ideas to a new generation 
of Kuwaiti students.
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Following independence, Irshad, which had struggled to gain a Kuwaiti 
following, was rebranded as Jam‘iyyat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi (Social Reform 
Association, hereaft er Islah) and expanded its activities.20 Several members of 
the association ran as candidates in Kuwait’s fi rst parliamentary elections of 
1963, albeit formally as independents. Only one of them was elected, however, 
with other KMB/Islah-affi  liated candidates losing their contests largely due 
to the prevalence of Arab nationalist sentiment within Kuwaiti society.21 In 
the subsequent parliamentary election of 1967 Islah’s sole affi  liated candidate 
was elected,22 but it was only in 1981 that the association resolved to partake 
in elections offi  cially with its own slate of candidates, rather than through the 
support of affi  liated candidacies. Although it had initially been argued that the 
group’s entry into electoral politics would be a deviation from the mission of 
daʿwa and incremental progress towards the ideal Islamic state, as envisaged by 
al-Banna, the KMB/Islah nevertheless resolved to run, winning several seats 
in the 1981 and 1985 parliamentary elections. At the time, the KMB/Islah 
benefi ted from a slowdown in popular support for Arab nationalists, while 
also enjoying representation in cabinet due to the group’s continued cordial 
relationship with the Amir and his government. Aft er the Amir invoked the 
suspension of parliament in 1986, following continued att acks on ministers 
from the largely oppositional legislature, new polls were not called, leading to 
years of rule in the absence of an elected parliament.23
Following the end of the Iran–Iraq war in 1988, which had been cited as one 
reason for the suspension of electoral politics,24 the KMB/Islah joined in the 
establishment of a cross-ideological alliance entitled al-Harakat al-Dustouriyya 
(Constitutional Movement, CM). Founded in 1989 by a collection of former 
parliamentarians, proto-parties and other societal forces, the CM pressed for 
a range of constitutional reforms, including the restoration of parliamentary 
life. However, although formally party to the CM, the KMB/Islah remained 
circumspect about some of the more radical reform demands put forward 
by members of the alliance, and discouraged its members from participating 
in protest rallies and demonstrations. According to scholarly accounts, the 
KMB/Islah did so in order to avoid unsett ling the perks it had obtained over 
the years from its close ties with the authorities, thus sett ing a precedent for the 
association’s approach to government in the decades to come.25 Indeed, as shall 
become apparent below, even when in opposition during the 2000s, the KMB 
and its political affi  liate Hadas chose to practise restraint, espousing a political 
strategy of engagement with, and acceptance of, the established political order, 
rather than one driven by a rejectionist and/or radical reformist agenda.
Amidst the CM’s advocacy for restoring an elected parliament – and 
government att empts to quell precisely these demands by off ering the creation 
of a partially elected (fi ft y elected and twenty-fi ve Amiri appointees) consultative 
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assembly charged with studying ‘the advisability and feasibility of a restoration of 
parliament’26 – the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took place in 1990. Some documents, 
in fact, suggest that erstwhile Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (r.1979–2003) 
overestimated popular discontent within Kuwait to such an extent that he 
thought Kuwaitis would welcome his rule. Instead, under occupation, KMB/
Islah members took a lead in organising civil resistance and supplying assistance 
to citizens, showing their support for the ruling elite, who were exiled during 
the occupation, while also gaining more followers from Kuwaitis who remained 
inside the country.27
Aft er the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, a younger cadre 
from within the KMB pressed ahead with the establishment of an independent 
political wing, Hadas, to organise electoral campaigns once parliament was 
restored.28 Following its creation and during the early post-liberation period, 
Hadas and the KMB more broadly were aff orded relative freedom in pursuing 
their local political agenda, particularly once the KMB had formally cut its 
ties to the international Brotherhood organisation, which had objected to 
American-led eff orts to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.29 Th e KMB’s 
social arm, Islah, meanwhile, remains in operation as a separate association 
and manages grass-roots outreach and the group’s charitable work.
In the early 1990s, Hadas focused its electoral and parliamentary agenda 
predominantly on religious matt ers, presenting itself as a socially conservative 
proto-party that advocated an Islamisation of Kuwaiti politics and society 
through constitutional means. As such, Hadas actively promoted a revision 
to Article 2 of the 1962 Constitution with a view to enshrining Shari‘ah as 
the sole source of all legislation, as well as a conservative social agenda on 
women’s rights, taxation and education. As the 2000s progressed, however, 
Hadas soft ened its approach, moving from an emphasis on religious doctrine 
and societal reform to one focused on political reform.30 Arguably, this 
shift  in priorities was in large measure a consequence of Hadas’ growing 
involvement in parliamentary life and the nitt y-gritt y of everyday politics, as 
well as its interaction with political forces espousing fundamentally diff erent 
conceptions of what Kuwaiti society should look like. As Badr al-Nashi, who 
led Hadas between 2003 and 2009, explained:
I also believe that participating in the legislature has increased ICM’s 
[Hadas] interest in issues of political reform and development. Previously 
we focused more on general issues of morality and societal reform, but 
now we focus on specifi c issues such as educational reform, employment, 
the economy and political issues such as electoral redistricting and 
reforming laws on publications and political parties.31
Alongside Hadas, the Sunni Islamist political landscape comprises a plurality 
of Salafi  groupings/associations and proto-parties. Th e fi rst such grouping to 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   188 05/01/18   6:48 PM
Kuwait’s Islamist proto-parties and Arab uprisings 189
emerge was al-Jamʿiyyat al-Salafi yya (Salafi  Group/Gathering, SG) which 
was established in the mid-1960s as an extension of the broader Saudi-linked 
movement featuring prominent Salafi  fi gures such as Nashmi al-Nashmi, 
Mosaa’d al-Abdul Jader and Khalid al-Khadir. As was the case for other proto-
parties/associations at that time, the arrival of Arab immigrants contributed 
signifi cantly to the emergence of the SG. Although the SG never revealed 
its organisational structure and membership base, it is known to feature a 
Shura Council responsible for the formulation of the group’s policies, and to 
restrict membership to those who regularly att end lectures and camps. Pro-
grammatically, the SG espouses the establishment of an Islamic state through 
legitimate channels, including constitutional methods and without resorting 
to violence.32
In 1981, SG members succeeded in the establishment of a registered 
charitable association – Jamʿiyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Revival of the 
Islamic Heritage Society, RIHS) – thus enabling the Salafi  current to offi  cially 
engage in social activities, collect zakat and tap into state funding.33 As alluded 
to above, the creation of the RIHS was, in fact, sponsored by the ruling family as 
a means to foster a pluralisation of the Islamist political scene and as a counter-
balance to the KMB and its growing infl uence in Kuwaiti politics.34 Although 
denied by the SG leadership at the time, the RIHS is widely considered as 
the group’s ‘offi  cial social front’,35 engaged in charitable work as well as in 
daʿwa. Moreover, considerable internal contention not withstanding, from its 
inception the SG became politically active, expanding its presence in labour 
and student unions,36 where it competed against KMB activists, as well as in 
national politics. Indeed, in 1981 the SG became the fi rst Salafi  grouping in the 
Islamic world to sponsor two candidates for parliamentary elections, both of 
whom succeeded in winning a seat.37
Th e Iraqi occupation and subsequent liberation of Kuwait in 1991 led to 
signifi cant divisions within the SG. While a more ‘activist’ branch of the SG, 
under the leadership of Egyptian-born cleric Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq, 
opposed the presence of American troops on the Arabian Peninsula during the 
liberation of Kuwait and advocated the legitimacy of Salafi  political engagement, 
others, infl uenced by a traditional purist (and largely apolitical/quietist) 
interpretation of Salafi sm, felt compelled to support the ruler’s decision to 
involve American troops, regardless of their own opinions about it. Forming 
a majority within the SG, this branch thus gathered those who believed in the 
necessity of absolute obedience to the incumbent regime, and who sought to 
focus their work in parliament on the advancement of a full Islamisation of 
Kuwaiti law and politics.38 Dominant within the SG, in the early post-liberation 
era adherents of this purist/quietist conception of politics, pushed ahead with 
the creation of a political wing, fi rst under the banner of al-Tajammu‘ al-Islami 
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(Islamic Gathering, IG) and thereaft er under that of al-Tajammu‘ al-Islami 
al-Shaabi (Islamic Popular Gathering, IPG). In 2000, the proto-party yet again 
changed its name and was henceforth known as SIG.39 As Pall suggests, at the 
time the formation of the SIG, as well as that of its predecessors, was driven not 
so much by a desire to ‘implement a coherent political vision or agenda’, but by 
a need to protect da‘wa from ‘external threats’, most notably from forces with 
‘liberal–secular’ leanings, and to prevent a marginalisation of the Salafi  current 
in Kuwaiti politics.40
As mandated by its purist outlook, throughout the 1990s, the IG/IPG 
and its MPs pursued an agenda focused on Islamising society and politics, 
introducing a host of draft  laws ranging from the establishment of a Saudi-style 
Public Authority for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, to 
gender segregation in public schools and the introduction of mandatory zakat 
for all companies working in Kuwait. Whilst most of these law proposals were 
defeated, some, such as the prohibition of co-education in public schools, did 
make it onto the statute books.41
Triggered by internal rift s within the SG/IPG, in 1996 an activist Salafi  
group, the Salafi  Movement (SM), emerged on the Kuwaiti Salafi  scene. 
Led by Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq, the SM united activist Salafi s who 
opposed the ongoing alliance between Kuwait and the United States and were 
outspoken in their demands for political reforms. Indeed, unlike the purist 
IPG/SIG and its focus on Islamic morality, the SM advocated early on a range 
of political reforms that in many ways resembled those expressed by Hadas and 
non-Islamist proto-parties, including calls for increased parliamentary powers, 
electoral reform and the introduction of a political parties’ law. Th ese populist 
demands enabled the SM to att ract many voters from within the country’s tribal 
population who supported political reform but whose conservative religious 
views prevented them from espousing any of the more liberal proto-parties. 
Although the SM never developed a sophisticated institutional structure, it 
nevertheless managed to win representation in all parliaments between 1996 
and 2006.42
Possibly due to internal clashes over the future direction of the SM, one of 
its key fi gures and a prominent Shari‘ah scholar, Hakim al-Mutairi, decided 
in 2005 to leave the proto-party to create the Ummah Party, the fi rst such 
grouping in fact to call itself a proper ‘political party’.43 Since its creation, 
the UP has distinguished itself in its unrelenting and uncompromising ‘call 
for the sovereignty of the people as expressed in the power of the national 
assembly to decide who should form the government’.44 Moreover, although 
very diff erent from traditional quietist Salafi  groups that eschew political 
opposition, the UP does maintain a solid Islamist agenda, advocating the 
eventual establishment of an Islamic State, the implementation of Shari‘ah 
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in all aspects of life, and the elimination of foreign military presence in 
the Gulf.45 Nevertheless, the UP remains most outspoken in its defence of 
Kuwaitis’ right to select, and hold to account, their government, as well as 
the right to form political parties within the framework of a multi-party 
system. In this respect, the UP contrasts with the positions of the purist 
Salafi s, whose political agenda remains far more conservative, and of Hadas, 
whose pragmatism has allowed it to work alongside the government, rather 
than merely challenge it. Th e UP did not participate in the 2006 parliamen-
tary elections due to the proto-party’s belief that the electoral process was 
corrupt, but then participated in the 2008 elections, yet failed to gain any 
seats.46 Following the 2008 elections, the UP boycott ed all subsequent polls 
until those held in November 2016.
As is evident from the above, since the 1990s the Salafi  movement in Kuwaiti 
politics has become increasingly fragmented, being marked by ideological 
divisions between purists and activists and a concomitant splintering into 
several proto-parties with either pro-government or oppositional leanings.47 
Th is state of within-group fragmentation is further reinforced by the prepon-
derance of independent Salafi  candidates and MPs, whose decision calculus to 
stand for elected offi  ce outside any of the extant Salafi  proto-party is testament 
to the latt er’s limited popularity and societal embeddeness.
Nevertheless, despite these internal divisions and fractures, Salafi  MPs 
across the various proto-parties, as well as some of their independent 
counterparts, have at times worked closely together in parliament, joining 
in the various Islamic parliamentary blocs that were created throughout 
the 2000s to push for an Islamic-oriented legislative agenda. A case in point 
concerns the 2003–6 legislative term, during which MPs from the SIG and 
SM, as well as independent Salafi s, joined forces with Hadas in an ‘Islamic 
bloc’, collaborating among others on legislation to reform the country’s 
electoral law (2006), as well as against an extension of voting rights to women 
(2005).
Kuwait’s political landscape, fi nally, also features a Shi‘a Islamist current 
that – like its Salafi  counterpart – remains fragmented into several competing 
proto-parties.48 Some, though not all, of these Shi‘a Islamist proto-parties 
offi  cially follow the teachings and leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
and his successor, Ali Khamenei, in Iran, which is why domestically they have 
been under pressure to reaffi  rm their loyalty to the al-Sabah ruling family, 
and to the Kuwaiti state more generally, by taking pro-government positions 
within the National Assembly.
At present, Kuwait’s Shi‘a Islamists are mainly organised through the NIA 
and JPA, which operate in the Kuwaiti body politic alongside a range of lesser 
Shi‘a Islamist proto-parties.49 Th e NIA, which in its current incarnation was 
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established in 1998, is widely considered the most infl uential Shi’a Islamist 
proto-party in the country, tracing its roots to Hizbullah of Kuwait, which 
fi rst emerged in the aft ermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Following the 
liberation of Kuwait in 1990, numerous Shi’a Islamist groupings, including 
members of Hizbullah of Kuwait,50 had banded together under the banner of 
al-’Itilaf al-Watani al-Islami (Islamic National Coalition, INC) to contest the 
1992 elections.51 By 1998 this coalition all but ceased to exist, however, due 
to numerous defections, and the creation of the NIA by ‘hard-line’ members 
of the INC. Th e NIA is ideologically proximate to Teheran, following the 
teachings of Ali Khamenei and subscribing to the dogma of wilayat al-faqih 
(jurist’s guardianship).52 Since its creation, the NIA has trodden a fi ne line in 
domestic politics, oscillating between pro-Iranian and oppositional stances 
and outspoken support for al-Sabah rule. Following the Mughniyeh mourning 
crisis of 2008, the NIA and its deputies have emerged as fi rm allies of the 
government and its agenda.53
Created in 2004, the JPA constitutes the second most prominent Shi‘a 
Islamist proto-party/grouping active in Kuwaiti politics. Comprising mostly 
followers of the Shirazi school of thought in Shi’a Islam, the JPA presents itself 
as a moderate counterpart to the NIA and holds a clear pro-governmental 
stance, granting the group a reputation of providing a reliable vote for the 
government within parliament.54 Overall, the JPG has enjoyed very low levels 
of representation in the legislatures of 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2013.55
Th us constituted, it is apparent that the fi eld of Islamist proto-parties is vast, 
comprising numerous Shi’a and Sunni Islamist forces. As we have seen, despite 
contention, cooperation among the various Sunni Islamist forces in elections 
and parliament has been widespread. And, as will become apparent in the 
following pages, so has that between Sunni Islamists and secular proto-parties 
and groupings. Cooperation between Sunni and Shi‘a Islamist proto-parties, 
meanwhile, has been more elusive, due not solely to ideological and doctrinal 
diff erences, but, in recent years, primarily to the common alignment of Shi‘a 
proto-parties with government policies, while Sunni proto-parties have 
increasingly adopted an oppositional stance in and outside parliament.
Islamist proto-parties and oppositional politics 
pre-Arab Uprisings
When the popular uprisings swept across the MENA in 2010–11 – with 
millions of people taking to the streets calling for far-reaching socio-political 
change – Islamist proto-parties, including most notably Hadas, the SIG, SM 
and UP, alongside their secular counterparts and other civil society groupings, 
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had already been engaged in a longer-term campaign focused on institutional 
reform and the fi ght against corruption. Gaining traction in the wake of the 
emergence of Harakat Nabiha Khamsa (‘We Want Five’ movement) in 2006,56 
this campaign played out on the streets as well as in the National Assembly, 
where MPs across the ideological divide proved increasingly willing (though 
not always able) to set aside their ideological diff erences and work together 
towards common constitutional reform objectives, holding government 
ministers to account through interpellations.57
Harakat Nabiha Khamsa (also known as the ‘Orange Movement’) was 
itself a bott om-up youth-led movement that brought together reform-minded 
Kuwaitis who had grown frustrated with the poor state of political life in the 
country. Organising a series of demonstrations, the movement demanded 
most notably a reduction of electoral districts from twenty-fi ve to fi ve, hoping 
this change would help diminish the likelihood of gerrymandering and vote 
buying, as well as reducing the importance of family, clan and tribal affi  liations 
in future elections.58 Unseen since the days of the Constitutional Movement 
in 1989, at the time Harakat Nabiha Khamsa not only att racted many Kuwaiti 
citizens to its cause, but managed to solicit the support of a majority bloc of 
twenty-nine MPs in the 2003–6 legislature, comprising deputies from across 
the ideological divide.59 Supporting Harakat Nabiha Khamsa’s electoral reform 
demands, several of its deputies, in fact, joined in the street demonstrations that 
rocked the capital in 2006, including MPs from Hadas, which became a major 
player in the movement, alongside other secular members of the opposition.60 
Other (independent) Salafi  MPs, meanwhile, remained more circumspect of 
the movement’s goals, primarily because many of its tribal supporters feared 
the law could diminish their political clout.61
To spread their message, Harakat Nabiha Khamsa supporters organised 
several demonstrations throughout the spring and summer of 2006, even 
entering parliament to place leafl ets about their cause on the desks of cabinet 
ministers. Ultimately, ‘the intensity of the movement forced the emir’s hand’.62 
Th e government fi rst off ered to reduce the number of districts from twenty-fi ve 
to ten instead of fi ve, as demanded by the movement.63 Voting with their feet, 
this ‘compromise’ proposal led, however, to additional demonstrations outside 
parliament, which ultimately turned violent and, in turn, spurred more street 
protests and louder calls for political reform.64
Following this display of popular outrage, the Amir, Sheikh Sabah al-Sabah, 
called for the dissolution of parliament and new elections. Th e ensuing June 
2006 poll (the fi rst in which women were granted the right to vote) was a 
success for the opposition, which had formed a broad-based electoral alliance 
around the issue of political reform and collectively garnered a majority 
of thirty-fi ve of the fi ft y elective parliamentary seats. Of the main Islamist 
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proto-parties contesting the elections, Hadas won six seats, the SIG and 
NIA each two and the JPA one.65 Following on from this electoral success, 
the opposition was able to push through a law reducing the number of 
electoral districts to fi ve, as had been demanded by Harakat Nabiha Khamsa. 
Th roughout the remainder of this opposition-dominated legislature (2006–8) 
and again during the 2008–9 and 2009–12 legislatures, opposition contention 
with the government remained strong, although levels of cross-ideological 
coordination between Islamist and liberal MPs became increasingly shaky, 
largely due to deep-seated suspicion by liberal MPs of the socio-political 
agenda of their Islamist counterparts. Indeed, whilst the opposition had lost 
its majorities in the 2008 and 2009 legislatures, parliament remained unruly 
with Islamist opposition MPs from Hadas and others continuing in their 
collaborative eff orts at pressuring the government on political reforms and 
in interpellating cabinet members suspected of corruption. In both these 
legislatures, in fact, opposition MPs made signifi cant strides in holding 
government to account by managing to interpellate Nasser Bin Mohamed 
al-Sabah, the prime minister (PM) at the time. Although the PM was not 
removed from offi  ce until 2011, these interpellations nevertheless constituted 
a signifi cant departure from parliamentary practice, as hitherto no PM had 
ever been subjected to any such questioning.66
In the years immediately leading up to the Arab uprisings then, Kuwaiti 
politics had not only experienced growing opposition contention in and 
outside parliament and calls for major political reform, but also the emergence 
of a cross-ideological reform movement, albeit limited and short-lived, that 
in many ways resembled that of the protests that were to sweep the country 
in the 2011–13 period, and in which Islamist proto-parties were to play a 
key role.
Islamist proto-parties and the Arab uprisings
When the popular uprisings swept across the Arab world in 2010–11, Kuwaiti 
politics had thus already experienced a sustained period of heightened 
contention, pitt ing a cross-section of the country’s opposition, including most 
notably the KMB/Hadas and (activist) Salafi  proto-parties, as well as national-
liberal forces, against the government and its supporters in parliament. 
Although very much driven by local circumstance and concerns, however, 
this contention received further impetus in the wake of the Arab uprisings, 
renewing a spirit of cross-ideological opposition cooperation and activism 
that had been on the wane since its heyday of the Harakat Nabiha Khamsa 
protests. As before the Arab uprisings, the key bones of contention for civil 
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society activists, opposition MPs and proto-parties, including those of the 
Islamist current, remained widespread government corruption, which became 
primarily associated with PM Nasser al-Sabah, and political reform. Indeed, 
unlike elsewhere in the region, Kuwait’s opposition and the mass rallies held 
throughout the 2011–13 period, never called for a rupture with the extant 
al-Sabah regime, but merely for a range of political reforms that would see 
Kuwait transform into a constitutional monarchy.67
In April 2011, amidst growing calls for PM Nasser al-Sabah to stand 
down and the submission of several petitions by liberal and Shi‘a MPs to 
question key government ministers, the cabinet resigned.68 Whilst the Amir 
replaced some of its members, the new cabinet remained led by PM Nasser 
al-Sabah, whose position had become increasingly untenable in the eyes of 
the opposition. Low-level protests against the government, mostly by youth 
since March 2011, then escalated in the fall of 2011, aft er it had transpired 
that the PM might have been implicated in the payment of bribes to pro-
government MPs.69 Outraged by the prevalence of rampant corruption and 
perceived government ineffi  ciency, a cross-ideological collection of Kuwaiti 
youth, civil activists and MPs from secular as well as Islamist proto-parties 
(including Hadas), demanded yet again major constitutional reforms, most 
notably that the PM be elected by parliament rather than appointed by the 
Amir. Remarkably, these political reform demands also gained traction 
among some purist pro-government Salafi s, who had initially ‘opposed 
the revolutions [but] revised their stance aft er the brutal crackdowns of 
protestors in Libya and Syria’.70 Continued protests then ultimately led to 
the government’s resignation, including that of PM Nasser al-Sabah, and the 
Amir’s decision to dissolve parliament prematurely in December 2011 and 
schedule fresh elections.71
Beyond the Kuwaiti street, the period of 2011–16 was also marked 
by renewed cross-ideological coordination between proto-parties at the 
electoral and parliamentary levels. When in February 2012 new elections 
were called, opposition candidates and proto-parties across the political 
divide campaigned fi ercely around shared demands for political reform 
and an end to corruption. In the short-lived February 2012 legislature, 
meanwhile, proto-parties and independent MPs belonging to the country’s 
populist liberal and Sunni Islamist currents/proto-parties forged a loose 
opposition bloc – the so-called Kutlat al-Aghlabiyya (‘majority bloc’) – 
against the government and its supporters in parliament, pressing for the very 
same demands.72 Indeed, the February 2012 elections and their outcome are 
noteworthy for two reasons: fi rst, because for the fi rst time since 2006, they 
produced a legislature dominated by opposition MPs, of which deputies 
belonging to the Sunni Islamist current – including representatives/affi  liates 
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of Hadas and the SIG – constituted a clear plurality with twenty-one seats.73 
With Sunni Islamist forces dominant in the new assembly, their infl uence in 
fact became quickly apparent, with Islamist MPs driving the parliamentary 
agenda, calling for the interpellation of cabinet ministers and the tabling of 
numerous laws, the most notorious of which sought to impose the death 
penalty for blasphemy and for insulting the Prophet and his wives.74 Second, 
and related to the former, the February 2012 elections are noteworthy 
because their outcomes are so closely aligned with developments elsewhere 
in the immediate post-uprising era, with Sunni Islamist parties – including 
both moderate and Salafi  currents – making signifi cant gains in a series of 
uniquely free and fair elections across the MENA region.
As is now widely known, the tenure of the February legislature came to an 
abrupt end in June 2012, when the country’s Constitutional Court declared 
it unconstitutional on the grounds that the previous (2009) assembly’s 
dissolution had been illegal, ordering the latt er’s reinstatement.75 Amidst 
popular outrage at the decision, the opposition again forced the Amir’s hand by 
forging a broad-based front entitled al-Jabha al-Wataniya li-Himayat al-Dustour 
(National Front for the Protection of the Constitution),which comprised 
deputies from the ‘majority bloc’ as well as numerous civil society groups and 
which protested against the reinstatement of the 2009 assembly. In November 
2012, the cabinet fi nally resigned, and the Amir called for fresh elections to 
be held in December 2012, this time, however, under the ‘one-person-one 
vote’ electoral system that had been rushed through by government against 
stiff  opposition protestations.76 As a result, and in the spirit of ongoing cross-
ideological cooperation, Hadas, jointly with most of the country’s opposition 
proto-parties/groupings – the UP, the populist Kutlat al-Amal al-Shaabi 
(Popular Action Bloc, PAB), the liberal Kutlat al-‘Amal al-Wataniya (National 
Action Bloc, NAB) and al-Minbar al-Dimuqrati al-Kuwaiti (Democratic 
Forum of Kuwait, DFK) as well as the large tribes of the Awazem, Mutairi and 
Ajman – decided to boycott  any polls held under the new electoral law, which 
they considered unconstitutional.77 Within the Salafi  SIG, meanwhile, the 
Arab uprisings more broadly, and the opposition’s call for an election boycott  
more specifi cally, had led to serious internal turmoil and fragmentation. 
Indeed, while some of its members supported the boycott , others sought to 
reassert their pro-government outlook by putt ing forward candidates for the 
December 2012 poll.78 On the Shi’a Islamist side, lastly, the largest of its proto-
parties – the NIA – decided not to participate in the electoral boycott  called for 
by the opposition, opting instead to put forward candidates in the December 
2012 elections. In line with its pro-government outlook, it is widely assumed 
that the NIA’s decision to forgo the boycott  was driven largely by its desire to 
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reaffi  rm loyalty to the regime in light of the Bahraini uprising and crackdown 
on its Shi’a Islamist forces.79
Following the decision to boycott  elections, Hadas partook in mass 
rallies against the new electoral law and, aft er the December 2012 polls, 
against the newly elected legislature. Working alongside other secular proto-
parties and groupings hereby provided Hadas and activist Salafi  proto-parties 
with the political cover needed to ensure that they would not be targeted 
individually. Th is said, throughout the 2012–13 protest cycle, Hadas and its 
parent organisation, the KMB, never crossed the government’s red lines of 
permissible opposition, by advocating political reforms that fell well short of 
rupture.80 As such the KMB/Hadas appear to have pursued a double-edged 
strategy, partaking in street protests to rack up pressure on the regime, but also 
retaining its position of a pragmatic Islamist force that accepts al-Sabah rule 
and is willing to operate within the confi nes of the existing order.
Th e maintenance of a pragmatic political, rather than religious, agenda in 
the 2012–16 period, focused on matt ers of political reform, also transpires 
from Hadas’ decision to sign up to an opposition document in 2013, spelling 
out wider-ranging constitutional reforms. Adopted by a cross-section of 
liberal-nationalist and Islamist political forces and activists, the document 
called for the establishment of ‘a full parliamentary system, with a stronger 
legislature, independent judiciary and revised criminal code’.81 As Freer noted 
in this regard, the willingness of Hadas, but also of other activist Salafi s, to 
espouse a platform exclusively focused on att aining limited political reforms, 
constituted a signifi cant departure from its long-standing objectives of 
Islamising politics and society and turning Shari’ah into the sole source of all 
legislation.82
Alongside a growing preparedness to collaborate with secular opposition 
forces, this show of pragmatism by Kuwait’s Sunni Islamist proto-parties 
and associations during the early post-uprising period is in all likelihood the 
result of a combination of factors. For one, it is likely to have been shaped 
by the long-standing ties that existed particularly between KMB/Hadas and 
government, and that have infl uenced the proto-party’s acceptance of al-Sabah 
legitimacy and rule. More immediately, moreover, this pragmatism might 
also have been part of a deliberate strategy to ward off  growing domestic 
and regional antagonism towards the broader MB movement. Indeed, whilst 
in late 2012 some pro-government MPs had launched a campaign with the 
slogan ‘loyalty to the homeland, enmity to the Brotherhood’ to discredit those 
protesters linked to the KMB/Hadas, accusing them of looking to replicate the 
MB’s (electoral) successes in Egypt as a model for Kuwait, by 2013 the tide had 
fully turned against the broader MB movement with the ousting of president 
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Mohamed Morsi.83 Whilst strongly critiquing the ousting of Morsi and the 
plight of the MB in Egypt,84 the KMB/Hadas did not, however, radicalise in the 
wake of a clamp-down on the wider MB movement, but instead maintained its 
position of a pragmatic force in Kuwaiti politics that remained pro-monarchy 
in outlook and limited in its domestic reform demands.
Pragmatism again also prevailed in the decision taken by Hadas, and 
other forces within the broader opposition, to end their election boycott  and 
re-enter the arena of institutional politics in the wake of the November 2016 
parliamentary elections. Again, these elections were called for early, with some 
asserting that this was purposefully orchestrated by the regime to prevent the 
opposition from organising an eff ective election campaign. Be this as it may, 
Hadas’ decision to re-enter the electoral fray followed on the heels of a heated 
internal debate on the matt er, with those maintaining that reform could only 
be adequately aff ected through parliament narrowly winning an internal vote 
over those that sought a continuation of the boycott .85
Th e elections themselves, held in November 2016, proved that neither 
Hadas, nor the Sunni Islamist current more broadly, had lost much popular 
appeal, despite years of extra-parliamentary opposition and work. Indeed, 
various Salafi  candidates and those sponsored by Hadas/KMB, won nearly 
half of the twenty-four opposition deputies elected, thus constituting yet again 
a clear plurality of members within the parliamentary opposition.86 According 
to Giorgio Cafi ero, Hadas’ pragmatism in emphasising the need for political 
reform ahead of any Islamisation of society allowed it to widen its appeal, thus 
contributing to its electoral success.87
Th e 2016 elections, lastly, also hone in on yet another reality pertaining 
to the politics of Kuwaiti Sunni Islamist proto-parties in the post-uprisings 
era; namely that despite the aggregate success of Sunni Islamist candidates 
at the polls, the Salafi  political landscape remains fragmented into numerous 
proto-parties and independent candidacies/deputies. Indeed, whereas Hadas 
managed to remain unifi ed throughout the tumultuous post-uprising years – 
from the street demonstration in 2011–13 to its return to the electoral fold 
– for the Salafi  current the uprisings not only brought about ongoing frag-
mentation, but a signifi cant realignment within one of its key proto-parties, 
the SIG. As alluded to above, in 2011–12 the pro-government/purist SIG 
experienced a fundamental internal schism, with the emergence of reform 
advocates who partook in anti-government protests and the 2012 electoral 
boycott  alongside Hadas, national-liberal and populist-left ist proto-parties 
as well as other civil forces. For Pall, the emergence of this reformist trend 
within purist Salafi sm, and its alignment with the country’s opposition, were 
largely fuelled by both domestic (a growth in the oppositional stances taken 
by Salafi s with tribal background) and regional developments (the Syrian 
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civil war and the growth in sectarian politics), and are likely to result in a 
strengthening of activist Salafi  proto-parties/forces at the expense of their 
quietist pro-government counterparts, which have hitherto been dominant 
in the Salafi  political scene.88
Conclusion
Exploring the evolution of Islamist proto-parties in Kuwait, this chapter 
revealed that in the aft ermath of the Arab uprisings their behaviour was guided 
mostly by pragmatism, albeit with diff erent outcomes. As we have seen, within 
the Sunni Islamist political current this pragmatism was manifest in a focus by 
most proto-parties on political reform (and not rupture) as well as a willingness 
to set aside ideological diff erences and work closely with liberal-national and 
populist-left ist forces in driving this reform agenda forward. It was also evident 
to some extent in the downplaying of their traditional social/religious agenda, 
although, of course, its pursuit was never entirely abandoned, as evident in the 
legislative initiatives put forward by some of the Salafi  proto-parties during 
the post-uprising period. Within the principle Shi‘a Islamist constituency, 
meanwhile, pragmatism, as espoused by the NIA, was manifest in the proto-
party’s steadfast show of loyalty to, and support for, the government and its 
policies in light of growing regional sectarian tensions and the crackdown on 
Shi‘a (Islamist) forces and activists in Bahrain.
Reminiscent of the 2005–6 period, cross-ideological cooperation to 
advance political reforms thus once again earmarked the nature of oppositional 
politics in and outside parliament in the years following the Arab uprisings. 
Indeed, it provided not only the opposition with greater muscle to press for 
constitutional reforms, but also political cover for the country’s principle 
Islamist proto-parties in the face of growing region-wide anti-MB sentiment, 
particularly from 2013 onwards.
Whether these collaborative endeavours between Islamist and secular 
opposition will survive in the longue durée and entice the al-Sabah regime to 
accede to the opposition’s long-standing reform demands remains, however, 
far from certain. For one thing, the euphoria of the Arab uprisings has long 
since made way for an authoritarian re-entrenchment in many parts of the 
MENA, with governments no longer showing any appetite for liberalising 
reforms, and with Arab societies growing increasingly weary of the turmoil 
and confl ict the uprisings have brought about. In this climate, the Amir and 
the Kuwaiti government may well feel litt le inclination to succumb to any 
reform pressures at home from civil/political society. More signifi cantly, 
there remain serious question-marks over the sustainability and scope of such 
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cross-ideological cooperation among Kuwaiti proto-parties. With suspicion 
running deep within the liberal-national currents about the ulterior motives 
of Islamist proto-parties, such cooperation remains prone to friction and 
breakdown. Moreover, so long as fundamental diff erences remain between 
the country’s various ideological currents on matt ers of religion and state, 
cooperation is likely to remain shallow, and directed towards procedural 
change, rather than more comprehensively towards a multiplicity of questions 
pertaining to the future identity of the Kuwaiti polity. In fact, so long as Islamist 
proto-parties show litt le willingness in principle to modify their long-term goal 
of Islamising Kuwaiti society and politics, the pragmatism alluded to above 
cannot, and should not be construed as policy moderation.
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Chapter 12
Secular forms of politicised Islam 
in Tunisia: the constitutional 
democratic rally and Nida’ Tunis
Anne Wolf
One of the byproducts of the 2010–11 Arab uprisings and the subsequent 
ascent of Islamist political parties in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco 
was the re-emergence of Western orientalist binaries, especially the pitt ing 
of ‘secularists’ against ‘Islamists’, and a focus on the perceived polarisation 
between the two. Much of the scholarship that has appeared since then has tried 
to bett er understand political Islam and its various manifestations in the Arab 
world.1 Th e ‘secular’, by contrast, has received much less att ention, presumably 
because it is perceived as closer to the Western way of life and, at fi rst sight, its 
meaning might appear to some almost self-explanatory. Th is chapter is part of 
an eff ort to balance this research bias by focusing on two parties in Tunisia that 
are commonly perceived in the West as showcases of ‘secular’ party politics: 
(1) Hizb al-Tajammu‘ al-Dustouri al-Dimuqrati (Constitutional Democratic 
Rally, widely known by its French acronym RCD) party: the quasi-parti 
unique under former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (r.1987–2011), which 
was dissolved by court order shortly aft er his ousting in January 2011 but the 
networks of which have remained active ever since; and (2) Hizb Nida’ Tunis 
(Call for Tunisia), which was founded in 2012 under the premise of regrouping 
various political forces to counter the perceived political dominance of Hizb 
al-Nahda (the Renaissance Party, henceforth simply al-Nahda).
Th e RCD and Nida’ Tunis are central to understanding the characteristics of 
the ‘secular’ and secularity in Tunisia as well as the rise of legal and institutional 
Islamism following the 2010–11 uprisings – a trend that has sometimes been 
framed in opposition to Tunisia’s supposed secular legacy, but that also occurred 
within a variety of so-called ‘secular’ forces. Th is chapter demonstrates that, in 
stark contrast to their secular image, both the RCD and Nida’ Tunis have been 
home to a plurality of religious expressions and varying levels of religiosity/
secularity and that thus there is no dichotomy between the ‘secular’ and the 
‘religious’ in Tunisia. Indeed, among Nida’ Tunis members the place of Islam 
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in the socio-political realm has been a key subject of controversy, alongside 
their relationship to al-Nahda – a tendency that was also highly visible within 
the RCD. Domestic and regional events have shaped internal party struggles 
over the role of Islam. Signifi cantly, these have generational, geographic and 
social class connotations, which this chapter will discuss in more detail. As for 
the RCD and Nida’ Tunis’ confl ictual relationship with al-Nahda, they are only 
secondarily related to issues of national identity and religion. In fact, they are 
primarily a result of elite competition over economic and political resources. 
Indeed, Islam has been key to the political identity of both the RCD and Nida’ 
Tunis; their contentions with al-Nahda have centred on the appropriation 
and ‘correct’ interpretation of religion. To underline this point, this author 
proposes the notion of ‘secular forms of politicised Islam’, which encapsulates 
the organic relationship between the ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ that is a reality 
in Tunisia as in many other countries in the region. It applies to a variety of 
non-Islamist actors commonly perceived as ‘secular’ – and who sometimes 
even identify as such – but who habitually employ religion in their speeches 
and party programmes.
Th e chapter fi rst introduces the conceptual foundations of this research and 
then discusses historic processes of secularisation in Tunisia. It subsequently 
focuses on the role of Islam within the RCD, arguing that its president, Ben 
Ali, embarked on a path of desecularisation to respond to a surge in popular 
religious sentiments – a dynamic that also swayed the inner circles of the ruling 
party. Th e following section, detailing the case of Nida’ Tunis, demonstrates 
that the role of religion remains a contentious topic among its diff erent party 
factions. Th is author argues that the opening up of the political sphere and 
competition with al-Nahda have democratised religious practice and politics – 
a process that has reinforced the importance of Islam even in the most secular 
corners of Nida’ Tunis.2
Secular forms of politicised Islam
For any scholar att empting to apprehend ‘secular’ politics in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) it is fi rst necessary to scrutinise the historic roots of 
‘the secular’, which underlie many misconceptions of the term’s contemporary 
use in relation to the region. Th e birth of ‘the secular’ and ‘secularism’ is 
closely linked to the emergence of modern nation states in the West, where 
they helped to end confl icts between competing religious sects by proposing a 
political system separate from religious denominations. As a process occurring 
alongside vast industrial and technological innovations, secularism became 
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associated with the gradual ‘modernisation’ of society, while religion and myth 
were denounced as the antipode to ‘progress’. However, in reality the place of 
religion in politics and society varies in secular Western countries. As Talal 
Asad noted, in France both the state and citizens are secular; in contrast, the 
British state is linked to the Church but its citizens are mainly non-religious, 
and in the US the state is secular but citizens are mainly religious.3 In light of 
this persistent coexistence of religious and secular realms, he proposes:
The secular . . . is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly 
proceeded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a 
simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes 
the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept that brings together certain 
behaviours, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life . . . in certain 
respects ‘the secular’ obviously overlaps with ‘the religious.4
Key tasks of the present research are to uncover the main characteristics of 
‘the secular’ and ‘secularism’ in the RCD and Nida’ Tunis and how they relate 
to and overlap with ‘the religious’. Th is is facilitated by a number of important 
studies of ‘the secular’ and ‘secularism’. Signifi cantly, Hussein Ali Agrama 
found that, in Egypt, ‘secularism itself increasingly blurs together religion and 
politics’, a trend rooted in ‘deeper indeterminacies at the very foundation of 
secular power’.5 Th is chapter also draws on José Casanova’s pre-eminent study, 
which disentangles three distinct processes of secularisation: (1) the decline 
of religious beliefs, (2) the privatisation of religion and (3) the diff erentiation 
of the secular spheres (state, science, economy) from religious institutions.6 It 
also benefi ts from Michael Willis’ singular research on political parties in the 
Maghreb, which traces the central features of their inner workings and raison 
d’être. Willis highlights the role of the zaïm (a single dominant leader) and the 
nature of a party’s ties to the state’s main powerbrokers as key factors behind its 
political orientation – more so than ideological divisions.7
Willis warns against the fallacy of viewing party politics in the Arab world 
through the lens of Western ideologies. In many ways, the ‘barren ideological 
construct’ of ‘secularists against Islamists’8 refl ects an orientalist att empt to codify 
political dynamics in the region in a manner easily intelligible to Westerners. 
Alternative propositions – for example, viewing Tunisia’s contemporary power 
struggles as contentious politics between democrats and non-democrats9 – have 
received litt le att ention. Th is is presumably in part because many Westerners 
– who tend to equate ‘secular’ with ‘liberal’ – fi nd some secular parties’ lack of 
democratic traditions confusing. In contrast, the ‘secularists against Islamists’ 
paradigm resembles the pitt ing of Western modernisation forces against the 
religious establishment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the 
superiority of the secular oft en implicit. Yet in contrast to the Western secularism 
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that emerged as a tool to end violent confl ict, secularisation and Westernisation 
processes in the Arab world were mainly imposed by colonial powers and a 
Westernised elite. Th erefore, the colours and shapes of the secular in the Arab 
world are oft en distinct from their Western manifestations. For example, while 
in the West secularisation and modernisation are frequently seen as concurrent 
processes (to the extent that the terms are oft en used interchangeably), in the 
MENA a range of socio-political forces have framed religion as compatible 
with modernisation, or even as a prerequisite to it. Th is includes some political 
parties commonly perceived in the West as ‘secular’, and whose activists 
sometimes self-identify as such but habitually use religious terminology in their 
party platforms and during speeches – a dynamic conceptualised as secular 
forms of politicised Islam.
Indeed, in the MENA, political parties oft en avoid the ‘secular’ label since 
it tends to be associated with atheism and moral decay. Instead, many use 
terms such as ‘left ist’, ‘social-democrat’ or ‘Marxist’ to express their political 
leanings.10 Th e French legacy in Tunisia is of such importance that, in author 
interviews, some former members of the RCD alongside Nida’ Tunis activists 
– especially at the elite level – described their ideological inclination as laïque. 
Yet in the vast majority of cases this characterisation did not imply that they 
advocated for a strict separation between religion and the state along the lines 
of France’s laïcité. To bett er understand the particularities of the secular and 
Islamic dimensions within the RCD and Nida’ Tunis, it is instructive to discuss 
briefl y the historical dynamics of secularisation in Tunisia.
The many faces of secularisation
In author interviews, Nida’ Tunis and ex-RCD members typically argued that 
Tunisia’s nineteenth- and twentieth-century reformist movement constituted 
the forerunner of contemporary secular politics. Back then, state offi  cials 
introduced innovations in sectors ranging from the military to education, 
and in socio-political and legal realms. While some occurred under pressure 
from French Protectorate offi  cials, many were instigated independently by 
Tunisians, some of whom are now commemorated in statues, street names and 
textbooks. One of these is Kheireddine Pasha al-Tunisi, who created the Sadiki 
College in 1875, which taught the modern sciences alongside traditional 
subjects such as Qur’anic studies. Other Tunisian reformers included Shaykh 
Mahmood Qabadu, the spiritual guide of Tunisia’s prestigious Bardo military 
school, who in the mid-nineteenth century called for the reintroduction of the 
sciences into education and asked students to translate European textbooks 
featuring modern subjects into Arabic.11 However, his legacy has received litt le 
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commemoration – arguably in part because his ties to the religious establish-
ment run counter to post-independence state discourse, which frames clerics 
as counter-modernisation forces.
Th ough some religious scholars such as Shaykh Qabadu called for 
wide-ranging innovations,12 many – particularly from the Zaytouna establish-
ment, Tunisia’s historic centre of Islamic learning and education – remained 
resistant to the kind of modernisation propagated by the state elites. In some 
cases, this was because of deeply entrenched religious convictions; but many 
clerics, alongside wide sectors of the population, also opposed reforms 
because they associated them with Western meddling in domestic aff airs. In 
the words of scholar Kenneth Perkins, they ‘feared that the door allowing 
European penetration of Tunisia, once opened, could never be closed’.13 Th is 
was particularly the case because as early as the mid-nineteenth century – 
several decades before the French Protectorate was established over Tunisia in 
1881 – European products came to jeopardise local economic structures and 
the many people relying upon them. Th is process was particularly visible in the 
souk and in southern and central Tunisia, where people were both incapable 
of competing with Western traders and cut off  from potentially lucrative deals 
with them. Evidently, nineteenth-century modernisation processes were 
‘multi-dimensional’; whereas for some they meant ‘progress’, for many they 
entailed socio-economic marginalisation.14
Th e nationalist independence movement, organised around Hizb al-Hurr 
ad-Dustouri al-Jadid (New Constitutional Liberal Party, also known as 
Neo-Destour), refl ected the diff erent sensitivities of the Tunisian people. Its 
president, Habib Bourguiba, hailed from the coastal town of Monastir and was 
educated at the prestigious Sadiki College. In contrast, its vice president, Salah 
Ben Youssef, grew up in a small town in the southern province of Djerba and 
was close to the Zaytouna establishment. While some of their socio-political 
susceptibilities varied, accounts that describe Bourguiba and Ben Youssef as 
part of a wider clash between ‘a modernising liberal elite’ and ‘conservative 
forces’15 are caricatured. For example, Hedi Baccouche – a former prime 
minister and close advisor of Bourguiba, who also knew Ben Youssef – stressed 
in front of the author that Bourguiba was very well versed in Islamic studies 
and entertained ties to the Zaytouna establishment.16 Moreover, Bourguiba 
initially promoted conservative stances on issues such as gender policies, 
although he later reversed some of them.17
In the 1940s and early 1950s, frictions mounted between Bourguiba and Ben 
Youssef, who both wanted to lead the struggle for independence. Bourguiba was 
closer to French culture and willing to discuss the option of internal autonomy, 
whereas Ben Youssef immediately demanded full independence and sought 
to strengthen Tunisia’s arabophone heritage. France’s support of Bourguiba’s 
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leadership bolstered his sway, and Ben Youssef was gradually forced to seek 
self-exile. Yet Ben Youssef ’s support base within Tunisia remained substantial, 
particularly in the centre and south, as well as in some Tunis neighbour-
hoods.18 Following independence in 1956, Bourguiba launched wide-ranging 
secularisation reforms, dismantling Zaytouna University and establishing 
a modern education sector. Bourguiba’s reforms were partially driven by his 
desire to modernise Tunisia, yet he also sought to marginalise the constituency 
of Ben Youssef – a process that culminated in Bourguiba personally ordering 
Ben Youssef ’s assassination in August 1961 in Frankfurt, Germany.19
In subsequent years Bourguiba reinforced his secularisation programme, 
which focused on establishing boundaries between the state and religious 
institutions. It also promoted the privatisation of certain aspects of religious 
life, especially Islamic education. Yet religion never disappeared from the public 
sphere. Islam remained the offi  cial state religion and a source of legislation 
next to more secular laws. For example, Tunisia’s renowned Personal Status 
Code promoted Western-style women’s rights, but confi rmed the status of 
the man as the head of the family and enshrined unequal inheritance rights, 
among others. Moreover, in his speeches and policy programmes, Bourguiba 
frequently referred to Islamic precepts and even criticised the Turkish state for 
its laïcité.20 Such secular forms of politicised Islam illustrate that Bourguiba did 
not intend to abolish religion and privatise it altogether. Rather, he envisioned 
that the secular and the religious coexisted and complemented one another.
Bourguiba’s top-down secularisation reforms did not translate into a decline 
in religious beliefs, however. Indeed, Mark Tessler found a rise in personal 
piety in the late 1960s and the early 1970s,21 possibly in part because some 
portions of society felt alienated by his reforms – a tendency that highlights 
the organic relation between the secular and the religious in Tunisia. Th e 
Neo-Destour party – Bourguiba’s quasi-parti unique, renamed in 1964 Hizb 
al-Ishtiraki al-Dustouri (Socialist Destourian Party, also known by its French 
acronym PSD) – accommodated this ambivalence through what Clement 
Henry Moore identifi ed as the ‘elasticity of the party’s principles’. It allowed 
its members to have ‘diverse views’ – provided they did not challenge the 
authority of its uncontested zaïm, of course.22 Th us, in contrast to its secular 
image, the PSD was also home to an ‘Islamo-Destourian’ faction, which sought 
to revive Tunisia’s Islamic heritage from within the state structures.23 It was 
particularly present in Tunisia’s provinces, which remained largely immune 
to the infl uence that Western codes of conduct and dress codes had come to 
yield over the PSD in the capital and the Sahel, the coastal belt to the east. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, some religious portions of society also 
organised outside offi  cial state structures. Th ey founded the secretive al-Jama’a 
al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG), which in 1979 became Harakat al-Itt ijah 
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al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement, also known by its French acronym 
MTI) and focused on issues of morality and socio-economic deprivation. 
MTI activists quickly rose to become Bourguiba’s main political opponents. 
Alongside other forces, they plott ed to overthrow the ageing and increasingly 
senile president in 1987; yet Bourguiba’s Prime Minister Ben Ali, who had 
devised his own coup, forestalled them. On 7 November 1987, Ben Ali 
deposed the president in a bloodless oup d’état, henceforth discontinuing his 
secularisation programme.
Ben Ali’s RCD: desecularisation
Contrary to the common perception that Ben Ali and his RCD – which 
emerged out of a renaming of the PSD – ‘continued the tradition of secular 
politics in Tunisia’,24 Tunisia’s new president in fact embarked upon a process 
of gradual desecularisation. Th e RCD’s zaïm personally launched top-down 
re-Islamisation campaigns, which the party’s countrywide branches were 
central to implementing. During religious holidays, for example, local 
RCD offi  ces were tasked with organising festivities and distributing gift s 
to the poor. On a more institutional level, soon aft er taking power, Ben Ali 
re-elevated the status of the Zaytouna to that of a university, although it 
had lost much of the signifi cance it had enjoyed before independence. Th e 
new president also established a Supreme Islamic Council and a Ministry 
of Religious Aff airs. In 2003, he created a pompous mosque in the wealthy 
Carthage suburb, which he named aft er himself and att ended with his family 
during holidays to pray.
While some interpreted Ben Ali’s desecularisation policies as a way ‘to 
co-opt the popularity of religious sentiments in Tunisia’,25 it is questionable 
as to whether they were solely motivated by a desire to bolster his power. 
Indeed, although most were secular-leaning, some of Ben Ali’s own family 
members were religiously observant, which interviews and documents 
suggest was not a pure masquerade.26 Th is included his son-in-law, Sakher 
al-Materi, a leading fi gure within the RCD27 who sought to spearhead Islamic 
fi nance and launched the religious Radio Zaytouna. Irrespective of the 
intentions behind the regime’s re-Islamisation policies, they became a reality 
for many Tunisians, especially in the years immediately aft er Ben Ali’s ascent 
to power. Th e support Shaykh Abderrahman Khelif – a former Imam of the 
renowned Uqba ibn Nafi  Mosque in Kairouan – expressed for Ben Ali and his 
RCD is a case in point. Under Bourguiba, Shaykh Khelif was dismissed as an 
Imam aft er opposing the shooting of an American fi lm inside the walls of the 
mosque. When Ben Ali took power, however, Shaykh Khelif was keen to join 
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politics and even came to head the RCD electoral list during general elections 
in 1989. He explained:
For almost thirty years, Islam and the men of religion were excluded and 
marginalised. The political change of 7 November rectifi ed this situation. 
It gave back to Islam its natural place in society and the state. The current 
government has a Minister for Religious Aff airs, a Superior Islamic Council 
was established, the Zitouna University is progressively becoming what it 
should never have ceased to be: a place of education and legitimation of 
Islamic faith and culture. . . . All this means that things are now evolving in 
a positive way. My presence on an RCD list means that I take this evolution 
into account and that I support it.28
Shaykh Khelif was not the only cleric to join the RCD. Indeed, many research 
participants affi  rmed that Ben Ali opened up the party to observant Muslims, 
who believed that the new president fought for their rights and the revival 
of Tunisia’s Arabo-Islamic heritage. Other political tendencies also integrated 
into the RCD. ‘Baathists, left ists, nationalists, even Islamists integrated the 
Rally’, explained one former party member, evaluating that this broad set-up 
was one of the main reasons for the RCD’s disintegration in later years.29 Th e 
Islamo-Destourian tendency within the RCD became particularly strong 
within the central and southern provinces, where Bourguiba’s secularisation 
programme had remained limited in sway and big family clans dominated 
political life. One former RCD leader from Gafsa affi  rmed that, in the 
south, ‘some family clans sympathise with religious themes [and] family 
topics’. He suggested that ‘these religious roots . . . refl ect in part the roots 
of Hizb al-Nahda’,30 which emerged out of the renaming of the MTI in 1988 
and constituted the regime’s most fervent opposition. Yet not all observant 
Muslims supported the ‘political position of Hizb al-Nahda’, which was 
particularly popular among the youth, so some of them joined the RCD.31 
When referring to al-Nahda’s ‘political position’, the research participant 
alluded to the primacy its members supposedly bestowed on Islamic law. 
Some activists of al-Nahda’s more scriptualist wing indeed desired the es-
tablishment of some kind of Islamic state at that time, but others favoured 
a more fl exible interpretation of religious texts and early on called for 
multi-party rule, encompassing also left ist forces.32 Th us, while there were 
ideological diff erences between al-Nahda members and the RCD, there were 
also common interfaces. Both the more pragmatic al-Nahda members and 
the RCD’s Islamo-Destourian wing called for an increased role for religion 
without challenging the foundations of the state.
Th e sharp political reservations many RCD activists harboured against 
al-Nahda, including from the Islamo-Destourian wing, must be understood 
in a context in which state offi  cials stoked fears that its followers would 
pursue ‘extremist’ policies if elected. Th ey affi  rmed that al-Nahda constituted 
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a danger to national unity and security, and brutally cracked down on the 
movement. Implicitly, such rhetoric helped to reinforce the RCD’s own 
supposed commitment to a ‘moderate’ Islam. Many observant Muslims who 
decided to join the RCD affi  rmed in front of the author that Ben Ali defended 
the ‘right’ Islam and protected Tunisia from ‘extremists’.33 Many alleged that 
al-Nahda members followed the political goals of the international al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) and were hence unpatriotic. Th ey 
typically denounced al-Nahda’s desire to confl ate religion with politics, 
seemingly oblivious of the RCD’s own politicised forms of Islam – a trend 
that highlights the power of rhetoric in gaining religious legitimacy. Indeed, in 
an att empt to counter the persistent sway of al-Nahda, state authorities were 
particularly careful to monitor and control religious discourses, especially 
in places of worship – traditionally the centre of the Islamists’ recruitment 
eff orts. Among others, offi  cials in the Ministry of Religious Aff airs wrote the 
content of sermons to be held in mosques. Provincial governors, usually with 
close ties to the ruling party, proposed Imams, who were then appointed 
by the Ministry of Interior.34 Clearly, the regime’s politicised expressions of 
Islam evolved around the appropriation and promotion of the ‘right’ Islam, 
alongside the use of physical and symbolic violence against its religious 
contenders.
Th e exact nature of this Islam remained contested, however, including 
within the inner circles of the RCD. Th is was particularly the case from the 
2000s onwards, when ‘new Islamic veils’35 emerged in Tunisia (alongside 
many other countries). Th ese headscarves, which were particularly popular 
among youthful women, did not necessarily signify adherence to the MB or 
one of its regional off shoots, but refl ected wider social, cultural and aesthetic 
sensitivities. Th is included a reinterpretation of ‘the modern’ as compatible 
with religious practice and belief.36 Ben Ali initially interpreted the increasing 
presence of the Islamic veil – previously worn almost exclusively by al-Nahda 
supporters – as a threat to his religious authority, and responded by reinforcing 
anti-hijab laws. Yet such policies were criticised by religious corners of his 
own constituencies – particularly in the centre and south and in popular 
Tunis neighbourhoods, where new veils had become popular among young 
women. In these locations, many grass-roots RCD followers denounced the 
crackdown on hijab wearers as a violation of Ben Ali’s stated commitment 
to promoting Islam. In contrast, the more francophone elite of the RCD – 
mostly in the northern suburbs of Tunis and the Sahel – oft en played a key 
role in enforcing anti-hijab policies, including during sensitive periods such as 
Ramadan.37 Th is illustrates the great extent to which the level of religiosity or 
secularity diff ered among RCD members depending on factors such as social 
class, age and locality. If Tunisia’s contemporary political landscape is oft en 
seen through the lens of ‘Islamists versus secularists’, the RCD itself was a 
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platform in which batt les over the role of Islam in society and politics were 
fought; its activists came in many diff erent colours and shapes, and varying 
levels of religiosity and secularity.
Nida’ Tunis’ brand of Islam
Friction between diff erent RCD constituencies heightened during the 2010–11 
uprisings, which launched a wider restructuring process of the religious 
political scene in Tunisia. Many RCD offi  cials framed their opposition to 
the protests, which culminated in the overthrow of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, 
through a religious lens. During author interviews, some denounced Mohamed 
Tarek Bouazizi, whose self-immolation sparked the countrywide protests, and 
said he should not be celebrated as a martyr because suicide is prohibited 
in Islam – statements many RCD grass-roots activists, who oft en joined 
the protests, fi ercely denounced.38 RCD fi gureheads also sought to bolster 
the regime’s religious and symbolic authority by praising Ben Ali’s religious 
objectives and avant-garde policies; these discourses were spread through the 
regime’s omnipresent media organs, including Le Renouveau, the RCD’s daily 
publication.39 During the unrest, Le Renouveau also called upon Imams to 
‘att end training sessions to improve their performance and the quality of their 
work’ and to ‘adapt the religious discourse to the concerns and expectations of 
Tunisians’.40 By staging a commitment to religious renewal and reforms, RCD 
offi  cials sought to contain internal criticism over Ben Ali’s religious credentials 
at a time when his overall legitimacy was quickly crumbling.
Frictions between rival RCD trends further intensifi ed following Ben Ali’s 
ousting on 14 January 2011. In author interviews, some former party activists 
blamed the RCD’s ‘Islamist elements’ for Ben Ali’s fall and the subsequent 
dissolution of the RCD, in complete denial that a range of non-Islamist 
activists were a central force behind the protest movement. In part, their 
denunciation of the Islamo-Destourian faction as ‘Islamists’ results from a 
restructuring of the political scene that took place aft er the uprisings. Th is 
restructuring saw some RCD individuals alongside prominent family clans 
from the Islamo-Destourian wing (mostly in central and southern Tunisia) 
join al-Nahda, a development some interpreted as evidence that they had 
never been truly loyal to Ben Ali. However, some Islamo-Destourian activists 
also became members of Nida’ Tunis, which absorbed a particularly high 
number of former RCD members. Some of them joined Nida’ Tunis because 
they believed the party was best placed to defend their socio-economic 
interests, or because they did not support al-Nahda’s political platform, even 
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though they were close to its socio-cultural premises. As a consequence of 
such restructuring, the religious divisions between Nida’ Tunis and al-Nahda 
have become blurred in the provinces and at the local level. Sofi en, a former 
RCD youth leader from the Sidi Bouzid governorate in central Tunisia who is 
close to Nida’ Tunis, told the author:
We are witnessing a new generation of parties which are not based on 
ideological diff erences. . . . Instead this new generation of parties is based 
on programmes. Their programmes need to be followed and they have to 
refl ect that we are living in an Arab and Islamic country.41
For Sofi en, the diff erences between Nida’ Tunis and al-Nahda are rooted in 
the concrete policies their leaders pursue but are not ideological, as both 
parties act within the framework of Tunisia’s Arabo-Islamic heritage. So, from 
a religious point of view, Sofi en did not distinguish between the followers of 
al-Nahda and Nida’ Tunis. While this might at fi rst seem counterintuitive, in 
the provinces many common Islamic traditions (such as women covering their 
hair) are practised by al-Nahda and Nida’ Tunis followers alike. By contrast, it 
would be unthinkable for female Nida’ Tunis leaders, who typically hail from 
the capital or the Sahel, to wear the headscarf, a practice strongly associated at 
a national level with al-Nahda women.
Even though the secularism of Nida’ Tunis’ political fi gureheads is more 
pronounced in the capital, its characteristics and particularities have markedly 
evolved in the years since the party’s creation. Nida’ Tunis emerged out of 
a perceived need to regroup a range of non-Islamist actors to counter the 
political dominance of al-Nahda, which emerged as the biggest electoral force 
in the October 2011 Constituent Assembly election. Nida’ Tunis includes 
left ists, labour unionists and women’s rights activists alongside many former 
RCD members. Like previous RCD offi  cials, Nida’ Tunis leaders positioned 
themselves as the ‘moderate’ alternative to al-Nahda, which they denounced 
as ‘extremist’. Th ey stressed al-Nahda’s supposed links to the MB, in contrast 
to Nida’ Tunis’ roots in the eighteenth-century Tunisian reformist movement. 
Such a stance was att ractive to a range of people, particularly aft er the assas-
sination of two political opposition fi gures by religious radicals in 2013, events 
that Nida’ Tunis blamed on the al-Nahda-led Troika government. Th e assas-
sinations evoked a major popular outcry, as well as the withdrawal of dozens of 
lawmakers from the Constituent Assembly.42 Nida’ Tunis activists, capitalising 
on the popular outrage, intensifi ed their anti-al-Nahda rhetoric to bolster 
their political sway. Th ey also stressed their commitment to ‘modern’ values, 
including women’s rights, alleging that al-Nahda was pursuing a ‘retrograde’ 
agenda. However, the fact that Nida’ Tunis offi  cials failed to promote many of 
its female activists to key party posts exposed the gap between its stated values 
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and actual practices.43 Initially, therefore, anti-Islamism remained the strongest 
glue holding the party’s diverse membership together.
However, once the Troika had resigned and a national unity government 
was created, Nida’ Tunis’ leaders revisited their ideological underpinnings 
and increasingly came to stress their own Islamic values and roots. During the 
2014 election campaign, many observers noticed that the only party offi  cials 
who seemingly did not stop talking about Islam hailed from Nida’ Tunis.44 In 
part, this was certainly a strategic considerations, particularly a fear of being 
considered too laïque or even atheist – an appearance that had disfavoured 
their secular counterparts during the 2011 ballots.45 However, it also refl ected 
an internal search for the party’s own religious identity, especially once its 
focus on anti-Islamism became politically unsustainable.
Th ree key dynamics led many Nida’ Tunis leaders gradually to distance 
themselves from the anti-al-Nahda label and to embrace politicised forms 
of Islam. First, al-Nahda leaders’ persistent focus on reconciliation and 
compromise, which rendered many accusations of them being ‘extremists’ 
obsolete; second, the eruption of religious violence under the national unity 
government, which demonstrated that insecurity and political instability 
were not tied to al-Nahda’s rule; and third – and most importantly – Nida’ 
Tunis’ coalition government with al-Nahda, alongside some smaller parties, 
which was created following the October 2014 parliamentary elections out 
of a need to ensure a stable parliamentary majority. Nida’ Tunis’ decision to 
enter into a coalition with al-Nahda led to an outcry among its most secular 
corners. It reinforced frictions among rival leaders within Nida’ Tunis that 
culminated in a major internal party split when Mohsen Marzouk, a left ist 
fi gurehead, left  the party in December 2015.46 Yet some left ists and women’s 
rights activists decided to remain loyal to Nida’ Tunis. In front of the author, 
one left ist lawmaker said: ‘Hizb al-Nahda . . . is a religious party, but it 
changed, it started to change. I am actually not sure if [Hizb al-Nahda] is really 
changing or if it just pretends to’.47 While many left ists and secular women’s 
rights activists remained confused about their coalition with al-Nahda – their 
previous arch-enemy – Nida’ Tunis’ RCD constituency was comparatively 
compromising towards the Islamists. Th is is because, in contrast to the far 
left , al-Nahda leaders sought reconciliation with members of the former 
ruling party and supported their reintegration into politics – a tendency 
that highlights the complexity of Tunisia’s emerging political landscape, 
which cannot be grasped through the ‘Islamist versus secularists’ paradigm. 
Post-uprising political alliances and coalitions are driven by various factors. 
While some of these are ideological and religious, they are usually forged on 
the basis of shared strategic interests, party leaders’ priorities and social and 
regional affi  liations.
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Conclusion
As Nida’ Tunis fi gureheads sought to move beyond their anti-Islamism to 
focus on their own religious underpinnings, they re-established ties with the 
Zaytouna University and stressed their adherence to the Maliki school of Islam, 
historically the most infl uential Islamic jurisprudence in Tunisia. Moreover, 
the secular-leaning media regularly distributes pictures of Nida’ Tunis leaders 
praying and visiting mosques to prop up their religious and symbolic capital. 
Beji Caid Essebsi, the founder of Nida’ Tunis who was elected president in 
2014, even published a book entitled Tunisia: Democracy in the Land of Islam in 
December 2016, which is dedicated to advocating the compatibility of Islam 
and democracy – also a key concern of al-Nahda since the 1990s. In an interview 
with this author, Mohamed Ghariani – the RCD’s last Secretary General, who 
joined Nida’ Tunis aft er the uprisings before integrating a competitor party, 
Mubadara (Initiative) – explained:
Islam is diff erent [from Christianity]. The West managed to separate 
religion from politics. In the Muslim world, this is diffi  cult. I am in favour 
of reforming Islam and I prefer to encourage political currents that accept 
change [and] make eff orts to reform their ideological and religious ideas. 
I consider Hizb al-Nahda in this context.48
Ghariani clearly seeks to portray himself as a conciliatory fi gure between 
al-Nahda and former RCD offi  cials. Whether based on actual convictions or 
strategic considerations, Ghariani’s statement illustrates the extent to which 
a variety of political forces have sought not only political but also religious 
reconciliation aft er the uprisings. As a consequence, the Islamic underpin-
nings of Nida’ Tunis and al-Nahda are progressively converging on not only 
the local but also the national level. Th is has become even more the case 
since al-Nahda’s party congress in May 2016, when its offi  cials abandoned 
the Islamist label to become ‘Muslim democrats’.49 Al-Nahda offi  cials also 
sought to prop up their religious capital by framing their movement as part 
of Tunisia’s early nineteenth and twentieth-century reformist movement 
– just like RCD and Nida’ Tunis leaders. In their competition for religious 
authority and legitimacy, both al-Nahda and Nida’ Tunis leaders are 
increasingly adapting their policies to the religious sensitivities and concerns 
of the people, portraying themselves as centrist and modern religious forces. 
As a result, Nida’ Tunis’ use of religious discourse and religious-inspired 
policy has not merely become more acceptable – it has become a political 
priority. Ultimately, the 2010–11 uprisings not only diversifi ed the political 
and religious landscapes in Tunisia but also democratised religious practice 
and politics.
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Chapter 13
Political parties and secular–Islamist 
polarisation in post-Mubarak Egypt
Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Alam Saleh
Th is chapter is concerned with the polarisation that gripped Egyptian politics 
in the period following the Tahrir uprising of 2011 and the coup d’état of 3 July 
2013 which led to the ousting of the country’s fi rst directly elected post-uprising 
president Mohamed Morsi.1 Whilst this polarisation took on many shapes, 
involving contentious episodes between revolutionaries and felool,2 between 
establishment politicians and advocates of radical structural reform, as well as 
between left ist, nationalist and liberal forces,3 its most talked-about dynamic 
concerned the discursive and physical batt les fought out between the country’s 
so-called ‘secular’ and ‘Islamist’ forces.4 Indeed, the growth in secular–Islamist 
polarisation – particularly with the coming to power of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun 
(Muslim Brotherhood, MB) in 2012 – has become one of the more pertinent 
prisms through which local protagonists and outside observers have sought to 
evaluate this early post-uprising period.5 Unfortunately, for the most part this 
was done by means of a rather uncritical usage of labels such as ‘secular’ and/or 
‘Islamist’, and by treating secularism and Islamism as discrete ideological frames.
Drawing on a range of interviews conducted with party elites,6 this chapter 
casts a critical eye on the secular–Islamist binary in early post-uprising Egyptian 
party politics. With a focus on the country’s secular parties, it scrutinises their 
discourses and policies during the 2011–13 period, juxtaposing the two and 
assessing them within the context of an alleged secular–Islamist polarisation. 
Two inter-related scholarly debates will hereby form the theoretical point of 
departure. Th e fi rst debate concerns the legacy of secular–Islamist rivalries in 
Egyptian (party) politics, dating back to the Sadat presidency (r.1970–81), and 
more recent eff orts at cross-ideological cooperation between representatives 
of left ist, liberal and Islamist political currents. Gaining traction in the early 
2000s, a handful of academics in Egypt and elsewhere in the region have studied 
the rising occurrence of such cross-ideological initiatives, critically unpacking 
the depth and purpose of such collaboration as well as their propensity to 
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overcome decades-old ideological divisions in favour of joint opposition 
activism against authoritarian incumbency. Whilst cautiously optimistic about 
its occurrence, in the Egyptian case much of this work pre-2011 revealed such 
cross-ideological cooperation to be mostly short-termist and tactical in nature, 
involving few att empts at policy accommodation and compromise, let alone 
the development of a common political vision among the collaborating parties. 
Th e academic tenor at the time thus appeared to be broadly sceptical about the 
implications of such collaboration for future ideological accommodation and 
unity of purpose in the eventuality of regime change.7 Regrett ably, since the 
Arab uprisings, this nascent literature has seen litt le further advancement, and 
to date a retrospection of the impact of such cross-ideological collaborative 
endeavours in light of the Egyptian uprising and its aft ermath remains lacking.
Connected to the fi rst is the second academic literature of relevance here 
which revolves around the antipode to cross-ideological cooperation: that of 
ideological polarisation. Following Piero Stanig, polarisation, as it pertains to 
party elites, is here conceptualised as the distance in policy positions from the 
political centre, however defi ned.8 For the analysis at hand, the political centre 
of the pre-2013 party system is identifi ed as the estimated mid-point between 
the two most extreme political parties on a two-dimensional progressive–
conservative socio–cultural and left –right economic scale. As highlighted above, 
numerous commentators and scholars of Egyptian politics have characterised 
the period between the ousting of Mubarak and the July 2013 coup d’état as 
highly polarised, with elite contention revolving primarily around secular and 
Islamist ideological poles. However, this representation of Egyptian politics is 
being increasingly challenged by scholars who question bounded conceptuali-
sations of ideology that (1) fail to recognise the cross-fertilisation between, and 
fl uidity of, ideological currents in Egypt and (2) are evoked and reproduced 
by protagonists on the ground for instrumental power-political purposes.9 As 
Sune Haugbølle notes in this regard, scholars of the Arab world ‘have tended 
to separate Islamist and secular positions too neatly’.10 It follows that what is 
needed is a far more critical engagement with, and deconstruction of, the 
‘secular–Islamist’ binary as well as clarifi cation of what we mean by polarisation 
in the Egyptian context.
Feeding into both the aforementioned debates, in the case of Egypt this 
chapter makes the following assertion: elite polarisation as it takes place 
at the discursive level is not necessarily a sanguine refl ection of the factual 
ideological/policy distances extant between political parties. As will become 
apparent below, in the Egyptian case, elite discourse at the back end of June 
2013 was highly polarised, evoking a bifurcation of the party landscape into a 
secular camp and an Islamist camp marked by near irreconcilable diff erences. 
Th is discourse sits at unease, however, with some of the realities on the ground, 
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which present a party landscape in which diff erences in policy positions – 
particularly with regards to the role of religion in the public realm and on 
the economy – were far less clear-cut than the secular–Islamist binary makes 
one believe, and which saw the emergence of several parties that identifi ed 
themselves as post- or cross-ideological.
When it comes to the study of party politics, evidence from Egypt thus 
suggests that, whilst elite polarisation can be substantive – that is, it can revolve 
around policy distances – it may also be strategic, that is, it can be deployed 
rhetorically by party offi  cials for power-political considerations/gains, and 
that the two do not necessarily go hand in hand. As regards the Egyptian case, 
it is apparent, in fact, that this distinction has been insuffi  ciently drawn in most 
(scholarly) accounts of the elite polarisation that gripped domestic politics 
in the 2011–13 period, thus precipitating an imagery of the Egyptian party 
landscape in the early post-Mubarak era that is incomplete at the least and 
distorted at worst.
The Tahrir spirit, the Morsi presidency and the 
politics of polarisation
When mass demonstrations swept Egyptian autocrat Hosni Mubarak 
(r.1981–2011) from power in early 2011, there were as yet few signs that the 
transitional months following his ousting and the election of a new parliament 
and president in 2011–12 would be characterised by high levels of elite 
polarisation. Indeed, the uprising in Egypt, as elsewhere in the region, was 
marked not only by the hope of millions of citizens that decades of authori-
tarianism would make way for a just and democratic order, but by a unique 
spirit of unity and respect among the diff erent political forces in Egyptian 
politics.11 As we now know, this Tahrir spirit was short-lived – driven as it was 
by a shared desire to see the back of Mubarak – and quickly unravelled into 
growing animosity and confl ict between the various forces vying for power 
in the ‘new’ Egypt, most notably of course between the MB and its affi  liate, 
Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala (Freedom and Justice Party, FJP)12 and the 
secular political opposition, comprising both old and new forces on the party 
political scene. As detrimental as it ultimately proved to be to the prospects for 
democratic change, the fact that Egypt’s revolutionary moment unravelled so 
quickly into acrimony and confl ict following the successful ousting of Mubarak 
should not come as a surprise. Indeed, a close reading of pre-uprising Egyptian 
politics, particularly following the infi tah (open door) policies introduced by 
Sadat,13 reveals a protracted history of hostility and rivalry between secular and 
Islamist opposition groupings/parties. While the regime was intent on keeping 
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the opposition divided, the secular opposition was driven largely by suspicion 
of the MB’s political project. It particularly questioned the Islamists’ claim of 
being committ ed to pluralism and democracy, and feared its superior capacity 
for societal outreach and electoral mobilisation.14 Placing a gun theatrically 
on his desk in an interview with one of the authors in the early 2000s, one 
leading left ist politician asserted that he kept it for the purpose of deterring 
MB members from visiting party premises, thus vividly illustrating the scale 
of hostility and intolerance extant particularly in left ist quarters towards 
the group.15
As it turns out, during the Mubarak era (and beyond) this legacy of mutual 
suspicion and intolerance proved too persuasive to eventually yield to a 
spirit of broad-based opposition collaboration and accommodation, and this 
despite the various cross-ideological initiatives between the left ist, liberal, 
nationalist and Islamist activists that had gained traction from the mid-1990s 
onwards.16 Several factors may account for the failure of such cross-ideological 
cooperation to lay the foundation for fostering inter-elite trust and for bridging 
extant ideological/policy divisions. As Maha Abdelrahman highlighted, fi rst, 
in most instances these collaborative episodes occurred outside the realm of 
formal politics, revolving around informal networks of activists and groupings 
rather than institutionalised parties and party elites, many of whom retained 
deep-seated resentments against one another, particularly among the older 
guards. Added to this can be the short-termist/strategic nature of much of 
this collaboration, which militated against the possibility of longer-term 
consensus building and was oft en premised on the retention of high levels 
of independence and decision-making autonomy among the collaborating 
actors.17 In this Egypt’s experience in cross-ideological cooperation contrasts 
with that of Tunisia, where collaborative endeavours such as the 18 October 
Collectif were set up by ideologically diverse parties and civil society organ-
isations with the explicit aim of reaching consensus on a post-Ben Ali political 
sett lement, which survived in an authoritarian sett ing for fi ve years. Indeed, 
whilst failing to expedite president Ben Ali’s downfall, the Collectif arguably 
played an important (yet certainly not the only) role in sett ing the scene for 
the inter-elite accommodation reached in the 2011–12 constituent assembly, 
thus paving the way for the successful conclusion of the country’s transition 
phase.18 As concerns Egypt, meanwhile, Ellen Lust rightly predicted that the 
short-termist and strategic nature of past cross-ideological cooperation would 
render multi-issue coalitions between secular and Islamist groupings vastly 
more diffi  cult to sustain, particularly once the stakes of removing Mubarak 
from offi  ce were replaced by the need to formulate a new post-Mubarak 
democratic order.19 With litt le trust and social capital developed between 
political elites, and virtually no legacy of cross-ideological accommodation 
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on substantive issues – let alone on a common vision for Egypt20 – to build 
on, the chances for consensus on the country’s future political identity thus 
seemed bleak.
Th at this eventuality became reality is now widely known. Indeed, once the 
dust had sett led on the Tahrir uprising, relations between secular and Islamist 
political parties quickly descended into rivalry and acrimony, with the secular 
opposition decrying among others the ‘power grab’ and exclusionary style of 
governance by the MB and its FJP affi  liate, and the Morsi administration in 
turn charging the secular opposition with subverting a democratically elected 
government, stirring chaos and plott ing the president’s downfall.21 Several 
contentious episodes during the initial Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF)-led transition (February 2011–June 2012) and throughout the 
short-lived Morsi presidency ( June 2012–July 2013) fuelled this polarisation, 
which eventually culminated in mass demonstrations against MB/FJP rule 
and the ousting of Morsi by the armed forces in July 2013. During the SCAF 
period the key bones of contention, resulting in a wave of (at times violent) 
protests and counter-protests, revolved primarily around the question of 
whether parliamentary/presidential elections should precede or follow the 
draft ing of a new constitution and whether SCAF should issue a set of supra-
constitutional principles, guiding the ensuing constitution-draft ing process. 
Whilst the MB and its allies supported the SCAF transition plan of elections 
fi rst and fi ercely opposed the issuing of such a set principles, its rivals from 
the secular opposition took the reverse stance, demanding the constitution 
be draft ed before the scheduling of elections and, once this was voted down 
in the May 2011 constitutional referendum, unsuccessfully lobbied SCAF 
for the adoption of such supra-constitutional principles.22 During the Morsi 
presidency, meanwhile, the bifurcation of the post-uprising political scene 
into proponents and opponents of the MB/FJP garnered further pace, 
particularly in the aft ermath of the president’s constitutional declaration in 
November 201223 and throughout the constitution-draft ing process. Decried 
by his opponents as an illegitimate power grab, the former resulted in the 
formation of Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Watani (National Salvation Front, NSF), 
which comprised a broad collection of left ist, liberal and conservative parties 
as well as prominent public fi gures, and which from then on became the 
lead institutionalised expression of opposition to the Morsi government.24 
Secular–Islamist trenches were further deepened by the alleged unwill-
ingness of President Morsi to form an inclusive administration, as well as 
around contention over the composition, content and draft ing process of 
Egypt’s fi rst democratic constitution. At the time, most representatives of the 
secular opposition critiqued not only the lack of diversity in the 100-member 
Constituent Assembly tasked with draft ing the new constitution, but the 
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Islamist character of the draft  charter and the manner in which it was rushed 
through ratifi cation by Morsi. Consequently, numerous representatives of 
opposition parties, the Coptic Church and other Christian denominations, 
as well as of revolutionary groups and professional syndicates, walked out of 
the Constituent Assembly and called for a rejection of the draft  constitution 
in the ensuing referendum.25
With moderate voices drowned out in an increasingly acrimonious 
showdown between proponents and opponents of Morsi and his government, 
the scene was hence set for the ultimate collapse of the transition to democracy 
and a return to military rule.
Party elites and the polarisation discourse
How then did this polarisation of Egyptian politics play out at the discursive 
level? What were the discursive practices used in the accounts given by 
secular party elites of the political confl ict unfolding between proponents 
and opponents of the MB/FJP and the Morsi government? Honing in on 
the 2012–13 period, several common traits can be detected in the discursive 
practices deployed by secular party elites for the purpose of self-description 
and the ‘labelling’ of the other; that is the MB/FJP and its allies. Th ese included 
the evocation of an ‘us-versus-them’ binary that emphasised the positive 
properties/actions of oneself and derided those of the others, and which was 
clearly aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the Morsi government and the 
country’s Islamist parties more broadly. To this end as well, secular party elites 
also drew on the discursive practices of ‘categorisation’ and ‘distancing’. Cat-
egorisation, as elaborated upon by Mohammed Eissa, refers to the ‘grouping 
of entities into larger categories’,26 which usually carry negative/ideological 
connotations and are deployed for the purpose of creating stereotypes and 
to stigmatise the other.27 Distancing, as coined by the authors, in turn, relates 
to the self-positioning of individual parties on a party political spectrum and 
contains two types of speech acts: those that emphasise (ideological) distance 
over extant policy congruence/convergence as well as conversely those that 
emphasise (ideological) proximity at the expense of policy distance. Both 
types of distancing were evident in the Egyptian case.
As will become apparent below, in the Egyptian case the discourse 
deployed by secular party elites at the back end of the Morsi presidency was 
very much a refl ection of, and shaped/constrained by, the broader societal 
givens in the country as well as the more immediate political context. 
Indeed, both the prevalence of a deep-seated religiosity and conservatism 
in Egyptian society28 as well as the ascendancy to power of the MB/FJP and 
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its governance since 2012 circumscribed the narrative of secular party elites, 
particularly in regards to their self-positioning within the nascent party 
system and their assessment of the culprits of elite polarisation. When it 
comes to an assessment by secular party elites of Egyptian party politics and 
the Morsi presidency, for instance, the tenor was unequivocal: ideological 
polarisation was a reality and was seen as being stoked by the MB/FJP and 
other Islamist parties to discredit the secular opposition in the eyes of a 
largely devout voting population. Th is was apparent, according to these elite 
accounts, in the evocation by Morsi and the MB/FJP of ‘us-versus-them’, 
‘good-versus-evil’ narratives that drew on sharp binaries between ‘believers’ 
and ‘non-believers’, the ‘devout’ and the ‘infi del’, between those who are ‘with’ 
and those who are ‘anti-Shari‘ah’ and/or those who practise Islam as opposed 
to secularists or atheists, who have abandoned their faith.29 For some secular 
party elites, in fact, the use of such rhetorical binaries constituted nothing 
less than an att empt by Morsi and the MB/FJP to present its opponents 
as operating outside the bounds of the Egyptian mainstream and to cloak 
normal politics in a religious mantle for electioneering purposes.30
As a means of retorting to such alleged depictions by the MB/FJP and 
its allies many secular party elites deployed two rhetorical devices. First, 
they reiterated a mantra that, as Marina Ott away and Amr Hamzawy have 
highlighted,31 hawks back to the Mubarak era, arguing that their parties are 
in fact not secular in the sense of being anti-religious, but ‘civil’ parties that 
are neither anti-Islamic nor opposed to the country’s religious heritage and 
identity.32 Illustrative of such counter-exclamations is the introspection of one 
Hizb al-Karama‎ (Dignity Party, henceforth referred to as Karama) offi  cial, 
who stated that secularism was alien to Egypt and that:
the Nasserite party is a national party with leftist leanings. The term left 
is a bit problematic. If by left I mean ‘classes’ and ‘social justice’, then the 
Karama party is a leftist party in that sense. If you mean left as adhering 
to communism, then we are not leftists. We are not a liberal party in the 
Western liberal sense. We are not a secular party in the Western secular 
understanding.33
Following a slightly diff erent line of reasoning, other secular party elites, 
meanwhile, asserted they took no issue with the term secularism per se, and 
were in fact happy to label their party as such, but felt that within the Egyptian 
context the term had acquired such negative connotations that its use 
constituted an electoral liability, particularly in the countryside. Th is is why, so 
went the argument, they would refrain from using the term.34
Second, and concomitant to the latt er, several secular party representatives 
also pointed to their use of religious symbols and slogans in public discourse – 
particularly during election campaigns – for the dual purpose of countering 
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allegations of being anti-religious and as a means of mobilising electoral 
support.35 As one leading Hizb al-Tajammu‘ al-Taqaddumi al-Wahdawi (National 
Progressive Unionist Party, also known as al-Tajammu‘) offi  cial explained when 
asked about his party’s use of religious slogans: ‘we don’t like to use religion, 
except when we have to against our adversaries, especially in the rural areas’.36 
Taking such discursive practices even further, during the 2011–13 period 
al-Sayyed al-Badawi, the leader of the centre-right Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid (New 
Wafd Party, NWP), single-handedly removed the cross from the party’s logo and 
proclaimed in public that the party was not anti-Shari‘ah but in fact Islamic.37 
Whilst many in the party decried al-Badawi’s move at the time as unilateral and 
as contravening the party’s long-standing advocacy of the Coptic minority, it was 
thought that he had done so strategically to take the NWP out of the fi ring line of 
the Islamists and to woo devout voters into the party’s electoral fold.38
Labelling and the evocation of an ‘us-versus-them’ binary, meanwhile, 
were not only restricted to the sacred, but also conjured up by secular party 
elites through the use of derogatory worldly labels aimed at delegitimising 
the Morsi administration and the Islamist current more broadly. Th e most 
common adversarial images evoked hereby included the notions of ‘authori-
tarianism’, ‘violence’, ‘brotherhoodisation’ and ‘transnationalism’. Indeed, 
without fail, secular party elites would depict Morsi and his government as 
exclusionary and authoritarian in character as well as working against the 
national interest, and the Islamist current more broadly as ‘anti-progressive’, 
‘anti-democratic’ and comprised of ‘fanatics’ and/or former ‘terrorists’.39 
Within this imagery comparisons between the MB/FJP and the previous 
NDP regime were drawn, and representatives of the government and the 
broader Islamist current presented as undermining, rather than advancing, 
the goals of the Tahrir uprising.
Beyond the use of such adversarial imagery aimed at placing the MB/FJP 
outside the bounds of the revolutionary mainstream, most of the secular party 
elites interviewed also resorted to rhetorical categorisation and distancing 
in their assessments of the evolving post-uprising party landscape in Egypt. 
Hawking back to orientalist accounts of political Islam,40 it is possible to 
detect a tendency in the narratives of secular party elites to present Egypt’s 
diverse range of Islamist parties as a single undiff erentiated grouping, thus 
reinforcing an imagery of Egyptian politics marked by clear ideological 
binaries. In this narrative Salafi  parties, the FJP, other reformist parties, such 
as Hizb al-Wasat ‎ (Centre Party, CP), and parties widely referred to nowadays 
as ‘Muslim democrat’ – such as for instance Hizb Misr al-Qawmiyya (Strong 
Egypt Party, SEP) and Hizb al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current Party, 
ECP)41 – were all grouped together, with respondents refusing/failing to 
acknowledge the signifi cant diff erences in policy positions/ ideology that 
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exist between this heterodox group of parties.42 Several respondents, in fact, 
derided the SEP and its leader Abdel Mone’m Abu al-Fotouh, as well as 
the ECP, as mere MB ‘split-off s’ or as just one of the ‘faces of the MB’, thus 
negating the ideological distance that had developed between the two and 
the MB, as well as the latt er’s autonomy from the group.43 Representative of 
such rhetorical categorisation are the statements made, for instance, by an 
al-Tajammu‘ offi  cial who purported that ‘Morsi rules in the name of God 
and political Islam and all groups, even those who disagree with him inside 
political Islam, belong to the current that is ruling Egypt’,44 adding that ‘[n]
ow, all liberal parties that are non-religious are the true opposition’.45 When 
comparing Egypt’s Salafi  parties to the MB, meanwhile, leading Hizb al-Islah 
wa al-Tanmiyyah – Misruna (Reform and Development Misruna Party, 
RDMP) and NWP offi  cials also summarily grouped the two together,46 with 
the NWP representative asserting that ‘the main idea that Shari‘ah be applied 
and Islam rule is an idea that unites them all’.47
Although more subtly, the creation of ideological binaries through 
rhetorical categorisation also permeates to some extent the self-positioning 
of secular parties on the nascent post-uprising party scene. Coined as 
distancing above, two trends can hereby be detected: a fi rst, pertaining to 
speech acts that expose a propensity by the respondent to either (1) overstate 
the (ideological) distance between his/her party and those deemed to belong 
to the Islamist camp, or (2) position their party exclusively within the realm 
of fellow secular parties on the economic left –right spectrum, thus drawing 
litt le to no reference to parties classed as Islamist. In this latt er scenario, any 
references to Islamist parties, in fact, were for the most part drawn only upon 
the explicit encouragement by the authors.
Th e second observable trend, in turn, concerns narratives that – oft en 
concomitantly to the fi rst – contain a propensity by the respondent to 
downplay/understate extant (ideological/policy) distances between so-called 
‘liberal’ and ‘left ist’ parties within the secular camp. Examples of both sets of 
rhetorical distancing abound, yet are particularly noteworthy with regards to 
economic policy positions. In conversations with the authors, offi  cials from 
Hizb al-Mo’tammar al-Misri (Egyptian Conference Party, henceforth referred 
to as al-Mo’tammar) and Hizb al-Misriyeen al-Ahrar (Free Egyptians Party, 
FEP), for instance, would exclusively position themselves within the spectrum 
of ‘secular’ parties although, according to expert opinion, on economic policy 
there is considerable programmatic overlap between the two and the Islamist 
FJP.48 Th e same is evident with regards to the self-positioning of party elites 
from Hizb al-Misri al-Dimuqrati al-Ijtmaʿi‎ (Egyptian Social Democratic Party, 
ESDP), who purported the party was closest to Hizb at-Tahaluf al-Shaabi 
al-Ishtiraki (Socialist Popular Alliance Party, SPAP) on economic issues, and 
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who made no reference to economically proximate Islamist parties, such as 
for instance the SEP or ECP.49 Sharing the ESDP’s centrist economic outlook, 
arguably in fact, both of these parties are far more proximate to the ESDP than 
the socialist-oriented SPAP.50
Two tentative conclusions might be drawn from these practices of rhetorical 
distancing. First, it suggests that at the time broader ‘ideological’ trench 
thinking by secular party elites seems to have precluded a more nuanced/
accurate self-positioning of their parties on the full post-uprising party 
spectrum; one that would have mandated a more benign confrontation with 
the programmes of Islamist parties. Second, and following from the above, it 
suggests that rhetorical distancing as a speech act by secular party elites tells 
us more about the nature of polarised politics in Egypt at the time, than about 
actual policy distances between its constituent parties.
Rhetorically, secular party elites thus deployed a range of discursive 
practices aimed at delegitimising Morsi and his government and at drawing out 
(ideological) distances between those in opposition to Morsi/the MB/FJP and 
representatives of the Islamist camp. In so doing, their narratives reinforced an 
imagery of Egyptian politics at the back end of June 2013 as one being shaped 
primarily by secular–Islamist polarisation. However, as will become apparent 
in the following pages, this depiction of Egyptian (party) politics under Morsi 
is diffi  cult to sustain once the investigative spotlight is moved from speech acts 
to policy positions, which reveal a party system that is far less ideologically 
clear-cut than the polarisation narrative makes one believe.
Beyond the secular–Islamist binary
As in life, modern-day politics is never a clear-cut ‘black or white’ aff air, but 
messy, ambiguous and complex one. In Egypt this applies as much to the 
dynamics of the Tahrir uprising and its eventual demise, as to the party political 
scene that emerged following Mubarak’s ousting. Indeed, whilst marked 
by growing rhetorical polarisation between allegedly secular and Islamist 
political elites, closer inspection of this party political scene reveals a level of 
ideological fl uidity and ambiguity that muddies secular–Islamist binaries and 
renders problematic any narratives subscribing to such a depiction of Egyptian 
politics. Several observations inform this latt er characterisation of Egyptian 
party politics in the 2011–13 period, two of which will be expanded upon here. 
Th ey pertain fi rst to secular party positions on the role of religion in public life 
and on economic policy, and second to the emergence of several parties whose 
composition and programmatic self-positioning fall outside simple secular 
and/or Islamist categorisations.51
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Party positions on Shari‘ah52 and its application in public life are one area 
that obfuscates clear secular–Islamist binaries in Egyptian party politics. As 
Michael Hannah astutely observed on the matt er ‘[i]n terms of their approach 
to sharia and the role of religion in public life, even avowedly secular parties 
have bowed to the current realities of Egyptian society and ceded the fi ght 
over the inclusion of Islamic law’.53 Indeed, for many secular party elites the 
question is not one of whether or not Shari‘ah should be applied – and hence 
whether Islamic teachings should remain entirely outside the realm of public 
life as ‘assertive’ forms of secularism would mandate54 – but which teachings 
should apply and who should carry the authority to decide which interpreta-
tions and precepts be adopted and enforced. So for instance, whilst secular 
parties have called for a ban on religious parties,55 and have voiced their 
objections to prescribing Shari‘ah as sole source of legislation, to the adoption 
of hudud in the criminal code and to the involvement of religious authorities 
(e.g. al-Azhar) in matt ers of governance,56 this should not be read as an outright 
rejection of Shari‘ah in all aspects of public life. When it comes to other areas 
of Egyptian law and politics in fact – such as for instance with regards to views 
on Article 2 of the 1971, 2012/13 and 2014 constitutions or on personal 
status matt ers and Islamic sukuk57 – many secular parties appear to postulate 
positions that deviate from the strictures of a clear separation of religion and 
state/politics. As Tarek Masoud and others have highlighted, for example, 
most secular parties have expressed their support for the retention of Article 2 
of 1971 and subsequent constitutions, which prescribes Shari‘ah as a principle 
source of legislation.58 Certainly, in part this support constitutes a refl ection 
of the societal stigma associated with ‘Western’ secularism. For several secular 
party elites, moreover, it is informed by an interpretation of Shari‘ah that is 
minimal in application, with its strictures being considered more as an ethical 
frame of reference guiding politics than as a set of religious prescripts that 
require strict adherence.59 In this, of course, secular parties diff er from some 
of their Islamist counterparts, who regard Article 2 as a mandate to ensure all 
legislation is fully Shari‘ah-compliant.60 Be this as it may, the important point 
here is that, by endorsing Article 2, secular parties have come out in favour of 
a conception of statehood and politics that is bounded by a religious canon, 
minimal as this may be.
Th is is also evident in other areas of primary legislation, such as those 
governing personal status matt ers (marriage, divorce, adoption and inheritance) 
and the economy. As concerns personal status matt ers, for instance, most secular 
party elites take litt le issue with the extant status quo that is governed by legal 
pluralism and religious prescripts.61 Whilst some have challenged the exclusionary 
remit of the current law – which applies exclusively to the three Abrahamic faiths 
and thus leaves in legal limbo members of minority denominations such as 
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the Baha’i – party representatives from the NWP, al-Tajammu‘, al-Mo’tammar, 
Karama, ESDP and Hizb al-Ghad al-Th awra (Revolution’s Tomorrow Party, 
RTP) all expressed litt le opposition in principle to the current status quo and its 
enshrinement in Article 3 of the 2012/13 Constitution.62 As one high-ranking 
Karama executive explained ‘[p]ersonal status law, in my opinion, must remain 
under the purview of Islam and the Qur’an and what is there scripturally. We 
believe that what is specifi ed there should be abided by.’63 Th is point of view also 
resonates within al-Tajammu‘, as is evident in the following remarks made by one 
of its top offi  cials: ‘we can never agree to a Muslim [woman] marrying a Christian 
[man] and all of this nonsense. Th ey can, however, practice their freedom of faith 
and their social life within the parameters of their religion.’64 Whether these 
positions on personal status matt ers are expressions of conviction politics or 
driven instrumentally by electoral calculi is, of course, hard to ascertain and it 
may well be a combination of the two. Of note in the context of this research is 
this, however: by accepting aspects of Shari‘ah as part of the corpus of Egyptian 
law, secular parties advocate not only a blurring of boundaries between religion, 
state and politics, but with it conceptions of citizenship and personal liberties 
that are discriminatory and unequal in nature, mostly with regards to the rights 
of women and minority denominations.65
On economic policy as well, the positions of secular parties are not as 
clear-cut as the polarising rhetoric may make them appear. An illustrative case 
in point concerns the introduction by the Morsi administration of a law on 
Shari‘ah-compliant bonds (Islamic sukuk) in the Spring 2013, with which the 
government sought to shore up its credentials of managing Egypt’s fl edging 
economy, as well as put ‘a more “Islamic” stamp’66 on the country’s fi nance 
sector.67 Reviewing the Shura Council debate of the draft  law, and conversations 
with research respondents on the issue, two points become apparent. First, the 
stiff est opposition to the law did not come – as one might have expected – 
from the handful of secular opposition representatives in the Shura Council, 
but from religious scholars affi  liated to al-Azhar68 and Salafi  lawmakers ‘who 
protested [against the law] both on nit-picking religious grounds and due 
to nationalist fears that sukuk might become a back-door route to selling off  
Egyptian state assets to foreigners’;69 and second, several secular politicians 
viewed the proposed law overall benignly, treating Islamic sukuk as simply 
yet another form of ‘investment choice’,70 and voicing concerns more about 
specifi c details of the law than regarding its Islamic underpinnings.71
In the realm of policy making then, it is apparent that the 2011–13 period 
in Egyptian party politics was never marked by razor-sharp secular–Islamist 
fault lines. What we encounter instead below the veneer of elite polarisation 
is a nascent party landscape that was characterised not only by a lack of 
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programmatic distinctiveness and fl uidity, but also by the absence of parties 
with an unequivocal secularising policy agenda. Th is observation holds true, 
in fact, not only for those parties traditionally classed as secular or secularist 
(such as e.g. the FEP, ESDP, SPAP or al-Tajammu‘), but also for a new brand of 
political parties that emerged in the aft ermath of the Tahrir uprising and whose 
very raison d’être has been premised on the idea of bridging Egypt’s ideological 
divide. Th ese include most prominently some of the country’s nascent ‘youth’ 
parties, such as Hizb al-Adl‎ ( Justice Party, JP) or the ECP, both of which were 
established by revolutionary youth from diverse ideological backgrounds, and 
with the explicit aim of positioning themselves outside the secular–Islamist 
binary. Whilst the JP sought to position itself as a centrist party, advocating a 
‘third way’ between Islamism and liberalism in domestic politics,72 the ECP 
cast itself as a ‘post-ideological’ force which, in the words of one of its rep-
resentatives, during its existence prescribed to a ‘combination of ideologies, 
and not specifi cally to one particular ideology’.73 Although in the end of litt le 
electoral relevance – largely due to a combination of internal disunity, lack of 
programmatic clarity and heightened elite polarisation – the existence of these 
and other such parties is of note as they constitute concrete att empts at inter-
ideological accommodation and programmatic consensus building and as 
such may well have provided a blueprint for broader-based societal agreement 
on a new political sett lement for Egypt.
Conclusion
As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, depicting Egyptian party politics 
in the early post-uprising period through the lens of elite polarisation and/or 
secular–Islamist contention is problematic on two accounts. For one, there is 
a real danger of oversimplifi cation wherever narratives fail to look beyond the 
adversarial rhetoric deployed by secular and Islamist party elites, particularly 
during the Morsi presidency. As we saw, this rhetoric – as ferocious and 
antagonistic as it was – masked in many ways an emergent party landscape 
that on substantive issues was characterised by far greater ideological fl uidity/
fl exibility than insinuated by the polarising prism and one in which compromise 
on substantive issues might well have been possible. Indeed, below the veneer 
of rhetorical polarisation, we encounter secular policy positions that, whilst 
disparate, were oft en far closer to those of their Islamist counterparts than the 
party elites would have one believe. It follows that at the time elite polarisation 
was in all likelihood driven at least as much by power-political calculi as by 
insurmountable policy diff erences.
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Second, such lenses are not only overtly reductionist, but they are also 
misleading, particularly when it comes to the labelling of parties as secular and/
or Islamist. As the authors have sought to demonstrate, the portrayal of Egypt’s 
parties as secular is problematic not only in light of their positions on the role 
of religion in public life, but also because they run counter to the self-depiction 
of party leaders, many of whom object to being labelled as such. A cursory look 
at Egypt’s vicinity, in fact, highlights the broader signifi cance of this fi nding, as 
here as well we encounter parties branded as ‘secular’, while they espouse policy 
positions that cannot be classed as such. Indeed, as Anne Wolf and Mohammed 
Masbah have shown, in Tunisia and Morocco very few, if any, of the extant 
political parties advocate a complete separation of the sacred from worldly 
politics, and rejection of the label ‘secular’ remains widespread.74
Be it in Egypt or elsewhere in the region, it is apparent then that drawing 
parties onto a secular–religious/Islamist policy axis is of highly questionable 
utility and that in so doing we run the risk of downplaying the complexities 
and singularities of regional party systems and the positioning of parties 
therein. Not only this, but as Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has pointed out, in 
Western policy circles such labels are frequently stigmatised/orientalised, with 
‘secularism’ being associated with ‘good’ (democracy and rights) and ‘Islamist’ 
with ‘bad’ (‘irrational, threatening’) politics.75 Th is of course, presents a 
gross misrepresentation of Egyptian/regional (party) politics that ought to 
be avoided and, as far as the authors are concerned, is best accomplished by 
moving away from the use of secular/Islamist labels altogether.
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Chapter 14
The complexity of Tunisian 
Islamism: confl icts and rivalries 
over the role of religion in politics
Francesco Cavatorta
Th e fall of the Ben Ali regime in 2011 quickly, and surprisingly, gave way 
to a process of transition to democracy that, at least from an institutional 
perspective, was a success, particularly when compared to post-uprisings 
developments elsewhere in the region. While there is much criticism of the 
way in which the transition has taken place,1 there is no doubt that signifi cant 
institutional progress has been made. Since 2011 Tunisia has enjoyed two 
rounds of free and fair legislative elections and one round of competitive 
presidential elections, approved a new constitutional text enshrining individual 
freedoms and boasts a very lively and plural civil society. In short, the country 
has successfully transformed into a liberal democracy. Th e opening up of 
the political system immediately showed two rather surprising trends. First, 
it became readily apparent that Islamism was particularly strong. Very few 
expected, for instance, that Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance Party, henceforth 
al-Nahda) would so quickly reorganise, enthuse voters and win the 2011 
elections for the Constituent Assembly. Second, it became apparent that 
al-Nahda was not the only Islamist actor on the political scene and was in fact 
unable to monopolise the Islamist camp because of the challenge from jihadi–
Salafi sm. Following on from this, the majority of works on Tunisian Islamism 
have since focused on al-Nahda and its role in the institutional success of 
the transition, accounting for the party’s strategy, behaviour and ideological 
change during the transitional period.2 A number of scholars then focused on 
the rise of jihadi–Salafi sm, a relative novelty for the country and a potential 
threat to the success of democratisation, in its organisational form of Ansar 
al-Shari‘ah (Defenders of Shari‘ah).3
Th is chapter asserts, meanwhile, that the whole post-revolutionary camp 
in Tunisia should not be reduced to al-Nahda and Ansar al-Shari‘ah because 
the collapse of the regime and the political developments that occurred during 
the transition allowed a number of Islamist actors to enjoy the opportunities 
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that the new political system off ered. Th us, one ought to take into account the 
divisions within al-Nahda, the presence of diff erent strands of Salafi sm, the 
violent splinters emerging from the failure of Ansar al-Shari‘ah as a social project, 
and the work of unaffi  liated civil society groups promoting an autonomous 
practice of Islamism.
Explaining the plurality of post-revolutionary Islamism in Tunisia, this 
chapter suggests that its diff erent manifestations are not simply the product of 
the confl icts within the Islamist camp that came to a head with the transition 
to democracy, but also the outcome of long-standing diff erences about the role 
Islam should play in politics and society. Th e roots of such diff erences can be 
traced back in the history of Tunisia.
Al-Nahda: From Islamist party to the party of 
Muslim democrats?
Before the transition to democracy in 2011–12 there was an academic and 
policy-making consensus that the only Islamist movement of any note who 
could have an impact on Tunisian politics was al-Nahda. Since the 1970s the 
movement/party had occupied a prominent role in Tunisian politics, albeit 
from a position of illegality. Notably, its leader Rachid Ghannouchi was also 
believed to be the only Islamist personality of note given his role in the party and 
his standing as a respected Muslim intellectual. Th us, soon aft er the departure of 
president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (r.1987–2011) and the return of Ghannouchi 
from exile to Tunisia to participate in the construction of a new political system, 
the focus of observers and the public was almost entirely on al-Nahda, its leader 
and the choices he would make. By 2016, it is fair to acknowledge that one 
of the most signifi cant changes that the Tunisian transition brought about is 
the transformation of the Islamist party al-Nahda into a pillar of new liberal 
democratic system. Whereas large sectors of Tunisian society, and many within 
the international community, believed at the outset of the transition process 
that the party would use democratic mechanisms instrumentally to impose 
its vision of society on the whole of the country,4 the party strived instead to 
become a consensual political player and sought to compromise with other 
parties to avoiding being excluded from the game of democratic politics. Th us, 
it accepted the need to play what Boubekeur termed ‘bargained competition’5 
despite its relative strength compared to other parties, and become an integral 
part of the newly emergent political system. Th is entailed signifi cant political 
and ideological compromises that departed from the original ideology of the 
movement. As Kasper Ly Nett erstrøm maintains, ‘the new constitution is in 
stark contradiction with Ennahda’s original Islamist ideology’.6
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For some this departure is the product of the natural evolution of a 
movement that was never as radical and ideologically infl exible as others in 
the region.7 For others it is the product of ideological discussions taking place 
over time within a changing political environment both in Tunisia and in the 
wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where the rise of extremely 
violent groups was perceived by al-Nahda as the hijacking of what Islamism 
should stand for.8 Others still tended to dismiss the role of ideological 
rethinking as post-facto justifi cation of a strategic decision taken because of 
organisational necessities, namely to preserve the movement from returning 
to the days when it was banned and repressed.9 Irrespective of the reasons that 
led the compromise, and the benefi ts it had for the success of the Tunisian 
transition, the party is now fully integrated and a reliable member of the 
current political system. Furthermore, at the tenth congress of the party in 
May 2016, the leadership put forth, and pushed through, a motion that the 
party would become autonomous from its parent movement. In the words of 
Ghannouchi, al-Nahda ‘can fi nally be a political party focusing on its political 
agenda and economic vision rather than a social movement fi ghting against 
repression and dictatorship’.10 Th e rationale for this decision is that there is 
no longer the need for political Islamism in Tunisia given that no one now 
needs to defend and protect religion because the state refrains from imposing 
a secular vision on society. In fact the ideological neutrality of the state ensures 
that the faithful can follow their religious principles and there is therefore 
no need for a party that would stand between them and the state to protect 
their right to practise religion as they wish in daily life. It follows that the party 
can abandon the label ‘Islamist’ and become the party of Muslim democrats 
according to Ghannouchi.11 Th us, the separation between da‘wa (proselytis-
ing) and politics is now both complete and offi  cial. Th e party can now focus on 
what matt ers to citizens – the economy or foreign aff airs for example – while 
the social movement can continue its social activism, promoting specifi c 
religious practices in society. Th e overarching objective is to promote an 
Islamist ‘sub-culture’ that is offi  cially disconnected from political institutional 
representation, but instrumental to electoral success.
In fairness, it should be noted that the change in direction the party 
formalised in 2016 was already evident in earlier years. It follows that the loss 
of ‘revolutionary spirit’ and radicalism, with the abandonment of references to 
anything Islamist including Shari‘ah, possibly contributed to the lack of appeal 
of the party among young people. Th e youth had only known the repression 
of the later Ben Ali years and had formed their views on Islamism through the 
internet and TV channels, given the impossibility for al-Nahda to participate 
in public life in any form during the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.12 Fabio Merone 
explains convincingly that the political project of al-Nahda aft er the transition 
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was to make sure that the social constituency it largely represented – a 
conservative and pett y bourgeois middle class with very litt le interest in revo-
lutionary and ideological politics – could fi nally be integrated into the political 
system and share, in some ways, the spoils and benefi ts of being included in the 
state and in the running of the country from which it had been excluded since 
independence.13 Th is objective is what made the compromise with the nation-
alist-secular sectors of society possible, and the democratic game could then 
regulate this compromise to mutual satisfaction by excluding the proponents 
of radical political, social and economic change.
In any case, this momentous change is far from representing the complete 
transformation, or the end, of Islamism in Tunisia. In fact, the multiple voices 
of Islamism that emerged forcefully aft er the transition to democracy retain 
their signifi cance, suggesting that the decision the party leadership took is 
widely contested both internally and in the broader Islamist camp. Th is puts to 
rest the notion that Islamist challenges to the current structures of power are 
no longer an issue given the conversion of al-Nahda to democratic politics and 
the pre-eminence of individual rights. If anything, the evolution of al-Nahda 
and its decision to separate the movement and the party has exposed further 
its internal fault lines and motivated its external Islamist challengers.
Since its inception, al-Nahda has functioned according to the principle of 
democratic centralism that other highly ideological political parties across the 
globe have adopted. Th is principle simply means that the leadership and the 
members can have heated internal discussions about ideological direction and 
strategy, but once a decision is made to follow a certain path all will conform 
despite their initial opposition. Th us, dissent is managed internally and a united 
front is presented to the outside world. Th e presence of a charismatic leader, 
as in the case of Ghannouchi for al-Nahda, allows for democratic centralism 
to operate even more effi  ciently because the leader is able to hold together the 
diff erent factions. However, democratic centralism does not ensure against 
splits when diff erent positions and opposing beliefs cannot be reconciled. 
As Rory McCarthy highlights, diff erent trends within the party have learned 
diff erent lessons from their personal engagement within al-Nahda.14 Leaders 
in exile have seemed more interested in reconciliation and gett ing into offi  ce 
once the transition began, while those who remained in Tunisia during the 
dictatorship shunned party politics because of repression and began to 
think about civil activism as the realm in which Islamist messages could be 
propagated. In addition, al-Nahda is also divided between an older generation 
of leaders who experienced all phases of the movement from its inception and 
a younger generation whose ideological references and personal experiences 
are diff erent. In the party therefore there is at times an uneasy coexistence, for 
instance, between what one might call genuine Muslim democrats like Abdel 
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Fatt ah Mourou and members close to Salafi  thinking. Splits have aff ected the 
party in the past and as Susan Waltz noted even in 1986:
[s]ince 1981, MTI leadership has seized every available opportunity to 
affi  rm democracy as the framework within which they would work to 
advance their goals, but there is apparent within the MTI today an openly 
anti-democratic wing, impatient with the homage to democracy paid by 
its leadership.15
Th e MTI16 eventually split, with a minority going on to found a more militant 
group and the rest transforming the group into al-Nahda.
Th us, while the tenth congress formalised the distinction between movement 
and party, this decision did not have the support of the whole membership. 
Th is might not be problematic per se, given that the principle of democratic 
centralism remains strong, but indicates that there is no consensus over the 
supposed end of Islamism and the turn to Muslim democracy because for many 
ordinary members this represents a considerable, and potentially unacceptable, 
departure from the original objectives of their engagement. In fact, there is 
very litt le to nothing, they would contend, that is Islamist in either the political 
system or the party al-Nahda. It is for this reason, as Nett erstrøm observes17 
that party members had to be convinced by the leadership of the necessity 
of compromise and ultimate change. While this eff ort to convince militants 
was broadly successful, it has also encountered failures. Giving up on the core 
principles of Islamism, and in particular references to Shari‘ah in legislation and 
the constitution, has been particularly diffi  cult for many members, and this 
might explain in part the poorer electoral results in the 2014 legislative elections 
compared to the ones held in 2011. Ultimately though, as Ghannouchi states, 
over ‘80 per cent of the delegates at the Congress voted in favour of the formal 
shift ’,18 implicitly approving the radical change in the party’s direction. In short, 
al-Nahda is far from its origins when, as Lewis B. Ware notes citing the review 
Peuples Méditerranéens, the movement strived for:
[t]he resurrection of the Tunisian Islamic personality; the renewal of Islamic 
thought in the light of fundamental religious principles; the recovery for 
the people of the right to self-determination; the reconstruction of Islamic 
life on a humane basis and a redistribution of wealth according to Islamic 
practices; and lastly, the making of a contribution to the resurrection of a 
civilisational and political Islamic entity on the Maghreb, Arab and global 
levels so as to save people from injustice and international hegemony.19
Th e majority of members and followers have accepted the new direction, but 
a minority does not, making the strategic evolution of al-Nahda problematic 
because it liberates a political space that other political movements can occupy 
in the name of reviving Islamism. Th us, the party’s decision has signifi cant 
repercussions on the broader fi eld of Tunisian Islamism.
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Salafi  parties
When it comes to rival Islamist political parties, al-Nahda did not suff er 
greatly electorally from their activism and participation. However, it is 
important to briefl y discuss their role, strategies and political positions 
to highlight the multi-faceted nature of Islamism as a whole. Th e political 
parties competing for the Islamist vote with al-Nahda in the new Tunisia are 
all part of what can be called the Salafi  galaxy. As will be detailed later in the 
chapter, the greatest threat to al-Nahda within the Islamist camp following 
the revolution came from the jihadi–Salafi  movement Ansar al-Shari‘ah, 
but Salafi sm is a complex phenomenon and its ‘political’ trend established 
a number of parties that have att empted to off er a more radical and purer 
vision of Islamism than al-Nahda.
Th e political tendency of Salafi sm, when it comes to the relationship 
between politics and faith, is ideologically close to the thinking of al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) in the early days. ‘Politicos’ 
recognise that Salafi sm should not organise itself into parties or movements, 
because this would simply encourage divisions in the community of the 
faithful. However, they argue that creating political parties and competing in 
elections, where possible, is a necessity in modern nation states, if ‘religion’ is 
not to be defeated and relegated to the private sphere by liberals and Muslim 
Brothers who have accepted both democracy and liberalism. Politicos in 
Tunisia follow the same line of thinking, and aft er coming back from exile or 
being freed from prison they set up political parties to defend Salafi  positions 
and ideas, namely the necessity to instal an Islamic state ruled through 
Shari‘ah. In this respect, they challenge the notion of liberal democracy and 
argue that its procedural mechanisms and processes are only permissible 
insofar as they do not generate decisions that go against God’s laws. In short, 
democratic sovereignty cannot belong to the people when it allows them 
to pass legislation that goes against God’s will. Saving the inunctions of 
Islam thus permits politicos to argue in favour of creating political parties. 
As mentioned, in Tunisian elections they have so far performed very 
poorly and do not enjoy much support in society because their ideological 
positions are considered to be extremely regressive, conservative and out 
of tune with Tunisian modernity. Among the demands of one of the Salafi  
parties, Jabhat al-Islah (Reform Front), for instance are the abolition of 
the egalitarian personal status legislation and the creation of a hisba-style 
police force to crack down on anti-Islamic behaviour. Th ese stances pit them 
against al-Nahda, which is accused of abandoning its earlier commitment to 
precisely these kinds of policies of Islamisation.20 Th e turn of Ghannouchi’s 
party to Muslim democracy and the relegation of Islamism to social activism 
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outside of political institutions have led to internal grumblings, and the 
Salafi  parties might be able to reap electoral benefi ts from the disenchant-
ment of al-Nahda members and constituents. It follows that the Islamist 
electoral off er in Tunisia is still present, although Salafi  parties also have a 
diffi  cult time att racting young members in part because their open rejection 
of the use of political violence to achieve regime change is not att ractive to 
radicalised young people.
Another political party that was legalised in the aft ermath of the 
revolution is the pan-Islamic movement Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party). 
While its national chapters in the Arab world operate underground, the 
Tunisian chapter manages to operate in stops and starts – despite att empts 
at banning it for good – to promote its core objectives, namely the return of 
the Caliphate and the implementation of Shari‘ah. Th is vision diff ers from 
the one that other Salafi  parties propose, insofar as Hizb al-Tahrir struggles 
for the creation of a politically united ummah, taking in all Muslim lands. 
In Tunisia, it naturally opposes al-Nahda, not only because it accuses the 
party of having abandoned Islamism, but also because al-Nahda accepts 
the nation-state as the supreme political entity within which politics is 
conducted. For Ghannouchi the modern nation-state is here to stay and 
is not a temporary and contingent entity, while for Hizb al-Tahrir the 
goal of Islamists should be to go beyond the nation-state and re-establish 
the Caliphate as the sole political authority. Th e party has a very limited 
following in Tunisia and has recently been at loggerheads with the security 
services and the presidency, which are seeking a judicial order to ban the 
party because its extremism constitutes a threat to the state.21 It should be 
highlighted that Hizb al-Tahrir also opposes al-Nahda’s acceptance of market 
economics. Th e party published the following statement regarding the 
country’s socio-economic situation:
[t]he failure in solving the problems of the people from the side of the 
consecutive governments does not come from the weakness in material 
potential and capabilities as they have portrayed it to us. Rather, its cause 
is the capitalist system perched over our chests. It represents the basis of 
the disease, the source of distress and house of corruption and those who 
cause corruption. In addition to being in opposition to the pure Shari‘ah 
of Allah which by itself is enough to bring the anger of Allah upon us.22
In short, political alternatives to al-Nahda exist within institutional politics. 
Although they are quite weak at the moment because of their limited appeal 
to the wider electorate and the pressure they are under from state security 
despite their legal status, the abandonment of Islamism on the part of al-Nahda 
might provide them with the opportunity to att ract militants and voters feeling 
betrayed by Ghannouchi’s choices.
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Jihadi–Salafi sm: Ansar al-Shari‘ah and its 
challenge to al-Nahda
Outside of party politics, there exist in Tunisia other forms of Islamism that 
challenge the prominent role of al-Nahda in its social movement form. While 
jihadi–Salafi sm is no longer as central to political debates in Tunisia as it 
was in the immediate post-revolutionary period, it is a phenomenon worth 
reassessing and exploring because it provides the opportunity to discuss the 
legacy it has left  and to understand its potential future impact.
Th e emergence of Salafi sm as a powerful social and political force in 
Tunisia was not necessarily a surprise for observers of the country, given 
that the trend had been present since independence. While it remained the 
preserve of a very small minority, Salafi sm or Salafi  tendencies existed from 
the start within the Islamist movement from which al-Nahda saw the light of 
day. As mentioned above, in the late 1980s some members of the MTI left  the 
movement to found a more militant group, which, through armed struggle, had 
the objective of overthrowing the regime. Th e sudden opening of the political 
system in 2010–11 allowed this trend to re-emerge and occupy the public 
space. Post-uprising Salafi sm in Tunisia took on overtly jihadi undertones, 
employing the symbols and language of international jihad. Th e objective 
was to push through muscular bott om-up social activism for the creation of 
a genuine Islamic state ruled by a strict interpretation of Shari‘ah.23 Crucially, 
Tunisian jihadi–Salafi sts by and large did not subscribe to the widespread use 
of violence to instal an Islamic state. Rhetorically, the main organisational 
representative of the movement – Ansar al-Shari‘ah – argued that its activism 
would not target the nascent democratic structures because the revolution 
had conferred legitimacy on the new political order. In the post-revolutionary 
context violence was to be avoided because there were alternatives to armed 
struggle to spread the message of Islam and the movement took advantage 
of the liberal nature of the political system to organise and recruit. As long 
as the state respected the organisation’s right to operate, there would be no 
call for jihad against the democratically elected government. However, Ansar 
al-Shari‘ah militants were involved in a number of high-profi le violent acts,24 
leading the major political parties to discuss the idea of banning it to save the 
transition. Ansar al-Shari‘ah therefore operated in plain sight from 2011 until 
August 2013, but it was then banned and labelled a terrorist organisation. 
What matt ers most though in the rise of jihadi–Salafi sm is how it mobilised 
many ordinary young citizens through a radical, uncompromising and literal 
interpretation of what Islam required of them and of the authorities. Th is 
type of mobilisation stood in sharp contrast to the appeasing and moderate 
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discourse employed by al-Nahda and the small Salafi  parties that were happy 
to compete in the new democratic system. Th e continuation of the revolution 
through street politics in opposition to the system being built excited 
many young people for whom the revolution had not yet fi nished. While 
Ghannouchi and the al-Nahda leadership were busy fi nding a compromise 
that would allow their party to become a central player in the transition, 
and therefore avoid a return to the political margins of society, other forms 
of Islamist engagement took hold where the centrist, appeasing and pro-
democracy discourse of al-Nahda found no echo. Th e 2011 electoral victory 
allowed al-Nahda’s leadership to negotiate and compromise from a position of 
relative strength, but, at the same time, this detracted att ention from the fact 
that almost 50 per cent of Tunisians did not go to the polls and that many of 
them, and in particular the youth, were fi nding discussions about the creation 
of a liberal democratic system a betrayal of the revolutionary struggle.25 As it 
became apparent with the rise of jihadi–Salafi sm, many of these young people 
subscribed to a political project that was, in their eyes, genuinely revolution-
ary, clear in its objectives and in tune with what many of them had ‘learned’ 
through satellite television and the internet during the 2000s.
Th ere was therefore a signifi cant disconnect in political discourse and 
strategy between al-Nahda and Ansar al-Shari‘ah. Th e young jihadi–Salafi s 
had contempt for the eff orts of the al-Nahda leadership to be part of a political 
system that they saw as a continuation of past social and economic practices 
with a democratic veneer. Th ey also had very litt le knowledge of, and respect 
for, al-Nahda leaders because the party had been cut off  from Tunisia and in 
particular from Tunisian youth for a long time. Ansar al-Shari‘ah’s ideological 
references, its strategies and recruitment pool were entirely diff erent from 
those of al-Nahda. In terms of ideological references for its political project 
al-Nahda was, and still is, linked to the modernist reformism of the MB, but 
with a much greater focus on religious reformists from the Maghreb.
Th us, Ghannouchi and the leadership have incorporated the work of Malek 
Bennabi on the compatibility between democracy and Islam, and the work of 
Mohamed Ben Achour on Tunisian Islam’s singularity and openness.26 Th ese 
ideological references are in sharp contrast with the ones espoused by the Ansar 
al-Shari‘ah leadership. Forged in foreign jihads and in complete disaccord with 
the institutional strategies of the MB, the Ansar al-Shari‘ah leadership relied 
on scholars like Qutb to argue against liberalism, al-Maqdisi to argue against 
democracy and for the necessity of da‘wa as jihad, and al-Qaeda-linked intel-
lectuals like Abdullah Azzam. In terms of strategies, al-Nahda looked for the 
validation of its role as a pillar of the new Tunisia and compromised all of its 
radical stances in the name of acceptance in the system.27 Ansar al-Shari‘ah for 
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its part promoted revolutionary change from below and employed aggressive 
da‘wa to gain traction in society and held the political system, parties and the 
leadership of the country in contempt because they represented the opposite 
of revolutionary zeal and were the spokespeople of a generation and a social 
class Ansar al-Shari‘ah held responsible for the poor state of Tunisia.28 In terms 
of recruitment, Ansar al-Shari‘ah had its strongholds in disenfranchised areas 
of urban centres where there are very few social services, few job prospects and 
a higher incidence of criminality. Most members of the group were young, with 
litt le to no prior engagement in politics or social activism before the revolution, 
but who had individually come across Salafi  literature during the later years of 
the Ben Ali regime.29 For its part al-Nahda has an older membership and is 
popular with a conservative middle class marginalised under both Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali.30
Although initially al-Nahda saw the emerging Salafi sts and the young 
people swelling their ranks as potential allies and voters in their quest for 
affi  rmation in the new political system, the party’s leadership was never 
comfortable with their presence and actions because they fundamentally 
undermined the party’s project to create a political system where it would 
not face once again the repression of the state. Th e Salafi sts’ actions and 
discourse att racted not only social opprobrium, which al-Nahda wanted to 
avoid in order to prevent the discrediting of Islamism tout court, but also 
created a tense climate that, according to the leadership, would inevitably 
invite repression as it had occurred in the past. Ghannouchi and the 
leadership of al-Nahda feared that such repression would target all Islamists 
and by the summer of 2013 the party, in government at the time, decided 
that it would outlaw the largest Salafi st organisation and side decisively in 
defence of the nascent democratic system.
As mentioned above, the ideological, political and strategic confl ict 
between al-Nahda and Ansar al-Shari‘ah over the best course to ensure 
the realisation of the Islamic state is not a novelty in the Tunisian Islamist 
landscape and fi nds echoes in the split within the MTI in the late 1980s. 
What is, however, novel in the contemporary struggle between the two 
is that much like al-Nahda, the jihadi–Salafi st movement had its internal 
divisions, which came to a head when the movement was banned in the 
summer of 2013. Many within Ansar al-Shari‘ah believed that the Tunisian 
experience of jihadi–Salafi sm was an entirely new one because mobilisation 
along jihadi–Salafi  lines had never occurred in a pluralist political and social 
context before. Jihadi–Salafi sm had always been forged in opposition to au-
thoritarian leaders or in international armed struggles through the category of 
anti-imperialism, such as the war in Iraq against US occupation. Tunisia was 
a diff erent experience, insofar as for over two years since the 2011 revolution 
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an avowedly jihadi–Salafi  movement was allowed to carry out its activities, 
propagate its beliefs, hold its annual congress and be present in both the media 
and the public space without much hindrance from the state or the police 
authorities. Th is horrifi ed a considerable number of ordinary Tunisians, but 
the freedom of expression and the freedom to organise had also a profound 
infl uence on the Ansar al-Shari‘ah leadership and members because they had 
the opportunity to ‘practise’ what a number of jihadi–Salafi  sheikhs, and Abu 
Mohamed al-Maqdisi in particular, had theorised. Like other jihadi–Salafi sts, 
al-Maqdisi had been disturbed by the sectarian violence perpetuated by the 
jihadi movement in Iraq and had argued that, when given the possibility, 
jihad should be equated to da‘wa. In short, if jihadi–Salafi st ideas about how 
to organise society politically and behave individually were free to circulate, 
members of the movement should be engaged in da‘wa as their jihad.31 Th is 
meant that violence was not a necessary part of jihadi–Salafi sm but a fall-back 
instrument of struggle for when the ideas of the movement could not be 
propagated and discussed.
Life after Ansar al-Shari‘ah
Despite its political and analytical signifi cance, it should be noted that 
jihadi–Salafi sm did not occupy the whole Salafi  scene in Tunisia. In line with 
Quintan Wiktorowicz’s categorisation of Salafi  movements32 – the jihadis, 
the politicos and the quietists – all these tendencies also emerged in Tunisia 
following the uprising. Th is is not to argue that such tendencies did not 
exist under authoritarianism, but they became visible and important socio-
political actors only aft er the revolution. Th e quietist tendency of Salafi sm, 
meanwhile, has always been the dominant one across the MENA, but it 
seemed on the back foot in Tunisia aft er the revolution, when engagement 
in politics and social activism through the creation of political parties and 
associations was seen as indispensable in defending and promoting the faith. 
Th is rush towards the politicisation of Salafi sm did not characterise only 
Tunisia, but could be seen in Egypt and Yemen very clearly, as well as in 
Jordan and Morocco.33 Th e challenges of the Arab uprisings had a profound 
impact on Salafi  sheikhs and scholars who had quite suddenly to contend 
with the rise of ‘people power’ and had to devise strategies to respond to it. 
Engagement rather than withdrawal towards doctrinal studies seemed to be 
the way forward for Salafi sm. Th is, however, changed quite rapidly because 
political space, except in Tunisia, closed down as rapidly as it had opened 
up and the descent into civil confl ict in many countries demonstrated that 
fi tna was indeed a real and considerable danger. Quietist Salafi sm therefore, 
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with its emphasis on doctrinal studies and disengagement from parties and 
associations perceived to be divisive, has made a comeback. Tunisia has not 
been immune to it, and the political disappointment with the transition as 
well as the choice of violence of many within Ansar al-Shari‘ah has made 
quietist Salafi sm again appealing because one can live one’s religiosity 
undisturbed from the state in today’s Tunisia. It is for this reason that 
quietist sheikhs are occupied with building places of doctrinal religious 
learning, such as the Shari‘ah University in Tunis. Th rough these activities 
they connect with a tradition of individual civil engagement that traces back 
to the later Ben Ali years when quietist Salafi sm was tolerated, and even 
encouraged, as an antidote to radicalism. Th is is because quietist Salafi sm 
does not challenge political rule and focuses instead on personal religious 
growth away from politics. Th is tradition of civil society activism is linked to 
the growth of Qur’anic schools for example, a phenomenon that had begun 
under Ben Ali and is now more widespread as religious Tunisians seek a ‘safe’ 
space to practise and live their faith free from the interference of politics and 
the violence of ideological confl icts.34 Salafi  quietist tendencies have become 
more relevant in the aft ermath of the banning of Ansar al-Shari‘ah because 
many of its militants decided to abandon their revolutionary engagement 
and fall back on the traditional positions of Salafi sm, namely refraining from 
challenging political authority.
Other former Ansar al-Shari‘ah militants, meanwhile, have chosen the path 
of political violence and moved on to join pre-existing terrorist groups outside 
the country, or set up new ones. Many of these former members were already 
much more committ ed to the idea of armed struggle against the local infi dels 
as the only and just way to impose an Islamic state. For them, Ansar al-Shari‘ah 
was a sort of cover they could employ to begin organising embryonic armed 
groups that, when ready, would genuinely take up the fi ght against the taghout 
(tyrant) regime because democracy and liberalism were just as bad as the 
previous authoritarian Ben Ali regime. Th ese jihadi–Salafi s took the role of 
violence very seriously and, as mentioned, were involved in political assassi-
nations and other violent episodes that plagued the Tunisian transition from 
2011 until the summer of 2013.35 Once Ansar al-Shari‘ah was disbanded, they 
went on to commit terrorist atrocities inside Tunisia or joined international 
jihadi networks in Iraq, Syria and Libya.36
Th e divisions within the Salafi  movement are an important part of the 
complex story of Tunisian Islamism because they suggest again how the 
surrounding environment is in constant tension with ideological beliefs and 
while at times the environment shapes how groups and individuals react, at 
other times fi xed ideological positions shape the surrounding environment.
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Conclusion
As Luisa Gandolfo convincingly states, ‘the use of the collective “Islamists” 
fails to acknowledge the ideological nuances among the groups’37 and 
the analysis of the so-called Islamist camp in Tunisia confi rms it. Despite 
being a small and homogeneous country, all forms of Islamism are present 
post-2011 in the country, illustrating the necessity to understand their 
complexity. It would, however, be erroneous to believe that the complexity 
of Tunisian Islamism is the product of the uprising and the transition to 
democracy that followed. While both events have had an impact on the re-
structuring of the Islamist camp and have set off  new avenues for ideological 
debate and strategic decision making, many of the fault lines we see today 
are the product of long-standing divisions that have periodically resurfaced 
in Tunisian history. Th e abandonment of the Islamist label on the part of 
al-Nahda is a momentous shift  for the movement and its leadership and 
for parties that have chosen to play the democratic institutional game 
elsewhere in the region, but this does not suggest the end of Islamist politics 
in Tunisia and elsewhere. Th e Islamist off er is varied, and channelling faith 
into politics remains important for ordinary citizens. How they will do so 
will determine not only the real success of the Tunisian transition, but also 
the future direction of the region.
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Chapter 15
The reconfi guration of the Egyptian 
Islamist social movement family 
after two political transitions
Jérôme Drevon
Th e 2011 Arab uprisings have helped to refi ne existing understandings of 
Islamist groups’ evolution.1 New opportunities to participate in free and fair 
political processes have presented a unique chance to re-examine previously 
covered issues ranging from their decision and strategy-making processes2 to 
the study of their constituencies.3 Moreover, the electoral successes of a few 
Islamist groups affi  liated with al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, 
MB) and their subsequent endorsement of governmental responsibilities have 
generated important empirical and theoretical discussions of their pragmatism4 
and inspired noticeable calls for innovative methodological approaches 
including cross-country5 and micro-level studies.6
Although new studies have substantially enriched existing analyses of 
Islamist groups and movements, post-2011 research has frequently exposed two 
biases: (1) the study of political opportunities as electoral processes only and 
(2) a primary focus on Islamist groups’ elites and factions. Th e prevailing study 
of Islamist groups’ decision and strategy-making in consideration of their inter-
pretations of new electoral means to reach political power and mobilise their 
constituencies has generated very detailed case studies that oft en overlook non-
electoral political opportunities and remain centred on these groups’ leaders 
and prominent factions. However, the Arab uprisings have also generated 
non-parliamentary political opportunities and facilitated the emergence of 
new repertoires of protest for Islamist and non-Islamist movements alike, 
whose consequences have not been fully analysed. Furthermore, whilst 
Islamist elites’ positions and factional divergences need to be fully deciphered, 
Islamist movements cannot be solely understood through the positions of their 
leaders without comprehending how they are simultaneously infl uenced and 
constrained by the reactions of their members and their broader milieu.
Th is chapter accordingly develops a relational approach to the reconfi gu-
ration of the Egyptian Islamist Social Movement Family (SMF hereaft er), 
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which is defi ned as a ‘nationally based, historical confi guration of movements 
that – though they have diff erent specifi c goals, immediate fi elds of struggle 
and strategic preferences – share a common worldview, have organisa-
tional overlaps, and occasionally ally for joint campaigns’,7 aft er 2011 and 
the 2013 July military coup. Th is relational approach focuses on intra and 
inter-movement interactions and their consequences, with the premise that 
Islamist groups’ ideological and behavioural evolution should be analysed 
conjointly. Th ese groups indeed share common ideational and organisa-
tional resources and overlapping constituencies, which suggests that their 
respective choices and associated outcomes infl uence their decisions over 
time. However, existing research has primarily examined the impact of these 
groups’ interactions with non-Islamist actors8 and paradoxically overlooked 
cross-Islamist interactions.9
Th is chapter argues that the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2013 
military coup have destabilised the Egyptian Islamist SMF in contrasting 
ways. Th e liberalisation of the political process aft er 2011 stimulated the 
institutionalisation of loosely organised movements, challenged the organ-
isational cohesion of established Islamist groups, and empowered Islamist 
constituencies through the development of new repertoires of contention. 
Th e subsequent removal of President Mohamed Morsi (r.2011–13) from the 
MB marginalised established Islamist groups, challenged their organisational 
control over their constituencies and impeded the development of political 
alternatives to armed violence.
A relational approach to the Egyptian Islamist 
Social Movement Family
Academic research on Islamist movements has long investigated the impact 
of repression and political participation on their ideological and behavioural 
evolution. Th is corpus posits that Islamist movements accommodate political 
liberalisation with political participation, while exclusionary and reactive 
repression can spark their militarisation.10 Th e decisions of MB-affi  liated 
movements to participate in electoral processes in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen 
have accordingly been rationalised by the necessity to protect their preaching 
activities and sustain the Islamisation of society by providing legal cover 
and non-Islamist allies in civil society.11 Th e prevailing consensus on the 
consequences of political participation underlined in the so-called ‘inclusion-
moderation’ thesis additionally states that electoral participation can moderate 
these groups’ ideological leanings, although ideological moderation is less 
applicable with regards to several issues associated with Islamic law.12
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Th e 2011 Arab uprisings have generated new studies examining Islamist 
groups’ performance in power, their electoral constituencies and their 
comparative political choices across cases. However, two important biases still 
characterise the study of Islamist politics aft er the Arab uprisings. Th e fi rst bias 
pertains to these studies’ understandings of post-2011 political opportuni-
ties. Generally defi ned in social movement studies as the ‘features of regimes 
and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action 
and [. . .] changes in those features’,13 political opportunities include political 
participation, although they are not limited to parliamentary access to state 
institutions. Yet most post-Arab uprising studies have extensively analysed 
Islamist groups’ political and governmental participation without thoroughly 
covering the development of new repertoires of contention,14 including street 
demonstrations and organised forms of activism, and their consequences. But 
new repertoires of contention can infl uence Islamist groups’ internal cohesion 
and decisions beyond the electoral calculus.
Th e second noticeable bias of post-2011 studies is elitism. Although there are 
exceptions,15 research on Islamist politics has oft en relied extensively on Islamist 
elites and prominent factions and their disputes to explain Islamist groups’ political 
decisions aft er 2011. For example, the Egyptian MB’s internal factionalism and 
contest for power between the daʿwa faction, the pragmatic conservatives and 
the reformist youths have provided critical information on the group’s decision-
making processes and diverging preferences following the January uprising.16 
While the elite and factional perspectives are essential, focusing exclusively on 
them tends to isolate these groups from their members and constituencies and 
overlooks additional internal and external dynamics. Th ese analyses are therefore 
less convincing in explaining the impact of new repertoires of contention on 
Islamist groups’ positions and the infl uence of these groups’ constituencies on 
their leaders. Analysing only Islamist elites generates top-down explanations that 
can only be partial from a social movement perspective.
Several pre- and post-2011 uprising studies have indeed already suggested 
that Islamist groups’ internal and external relational patt erns yield considerable 
infl uence on their leaders and members. For instance, the Egyptian MB’s par-
ticipation in professional and student syndicates has shaped their members’ 
political views on non-Islamist actors and generated important moderating 
cognitive processes,17 while cooperation between the MB and non-Islamist 
political parties has generated limited ideological changes in Jordan.18 More 
importantly, a rich political ethnography of the Moroccan Islamist SMF sub-
stantiates that, in contrast to prevailing assumptions, Islamist sympathisers 
do not follow their leaders blindly but make informed choices based on their 
interests, identities and preferences.19 By focusing on the dynamic ideational 
market constituted by the Islamist SMF, this author contends that Islamist 
movements have to be responsive to the expectations of their followers if they 
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want to maintain their popularity. Moreover, considering that Islamist groups 
share valuable resources and constituencies, their respective decisions are 
naturally infl uenced by each other’s choices and their associated outcomes. 
Islamist groups therefore cannot be studied individually without considering 
general patt erns of interactions with their milieu and broader SMF.
Th e present chapter similarly adopts a relational understanding of the 
Islamist SMF aft er the 2011 uprising and the July 2013 military coup. 
Relational approaches are rooted in broader theoretical academic debates 
in relational sociology and social movement studies.20 In contrast with ‘sub-
stantialist’ studies dedicated to single actors,21 relational approaches contend 
that social movements cannot be studied in a vacuum but should be analysed 
relationally with their environments. An actor’s ideational and behavioural 
evolution is indeed shaped by relational patt erns of interactions with inter-
dependent allies, contenders and milieu. For example, inter-organisational ties 
regulate social movement organisations’ strategic actions and choices and can 
stimulate the adoption of similar forms of contention.22
Relational approaches to social movement studies examine social movements 
from a multi-level perspective, explaining how diff erent types of political opportu-
nities at the macro-level are constructed, interpreted and mediated by meso-level 
organisational dynamics and micro-level developments. While drawing on the 
theoretical tools and concepts of social movement theory, relational approaches 
investigate more specifi cally the constraints and opportunities inherent in a social 
movement’s internal and external relational patt erns of interactions, arguing 
that the structure of diff erent types of relationships determines the diff usion of 
information, resources and repertoires that cannot necessarily be understood by 
focusing on a single social movement actor.
Th e decision to examine the Egyptian Islamist SMF instead of a single 
Islamist actor is justifi ed by this chapter’s relational approach. Focusing on the 
broader Islamist SMF in Egypt facilitates the study of the impact of various 
types of political opportunities on patt erns of interaction inside and across 
Islamist actors as well as with non-Islamist actors. Th is perspective therefore 
keeps its distance from elite-centred analyses in order to examine how Islamist 
groups have been divergently aff ected internally and externally by post-2011 
environmental developments.
The multi-dimensional impact of the 2011 uprising
In January 2011, unprecedented demonstrations destabilised the Egyptian 
authoritarian regime and sparked the downfall of its president Hosni Mubarak 
(r.1981–2011).23 Th ese demonstrations paved the way for an opening of 
political opportunities that objectively altered Egypt’s political confi guration 
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as well as social actors’ subjective understanding of available modes of 
mobilisation. New constitutional provisions temporarily broadened political 
participation and bolstered freedom of assembly and demonstration between 
January 2011 and June 2013.
Th e main observable impact of the January uprising is the unparalleled 
development of the institutional and organisational components of the 
Islamist SMF. Before 2011, the Islamist SMF was forcibly disjointed by 
Egypt’s political system. Th e assassination of president Anwar al-Sadat 
(r.1970–81) by armed Salafi s in 1981 catalysed the separate development of 
the MB, the Salafi s and the proponents of violence by imposing the choice of 
confi ned approaches to political action, which were associated with specifi c 
mobilisation and socialisation processes that limited internal interactions 
inside the Islamist SMF.24 Th e MB endorsed political participation in 
professional and student syndicates and presented candidates in the legislative 
elections.25 Mainstream Salafi s favoured informal modes of mobilisation and 
distanced themselves from the proponents of armed violence in order avoid 
state repression. Finally, unaffi  liated and ‘new’ Islamists and personalities 
engaged the public sphere independently.26
Aft er 2011, pre-2011 dividing lines quickly eroded. Non MB-affi  liated 
movements joined the political process, including many Salafi s27 and ex-jihadis.28 
Independent Salafi  preachers and institutions formed the new Majlis Shura 
al-ʿUlama (Council of the Scholars),29 while al-Azhar scholars defended its 
independence,30 and a plurality of formal and informal groups emerged from 
the middle class salafi yocosta (the Salafi s of Costa Coff ee) to the more radical 
Ansar al-Shari‘ah (Supporters of Islamic Law), al-Haraka al-Islamiyya li Tatbiq 
sharʿ Allah (Islamic Movement for the Application of Islamic Law), and Tulab 
al-Shari‘ah (Students of Islamic Law). An unprecedented Islamist organisational 
diversity materialised in only a few months.
Organisational pluralism unfolded in parallel with the growth of new 
repertoires of contention. Broadly defi ned as ‘the ways that people act 
together in pursuit of shared interests’,31 post-2011 repertoires of contention 
ranged from electoral participation, public street protests, sit-ins and 
assemblies to an array of private activities. While single repertoires used 
to be associated primarily with specifi c actors before 2011, most Islamists 
subsequently diversifi ed their approaches to political action. For example, 
political protests used to be circumscribed to an educated minority or workers 
affi  liated with trade unions before 2011, with the exception of several wider 
protest movements organised on foreign policy issues (the war in Iraq and 
Palestine).32 In turn, Islamists scarcely socialised publicly with one another 
before the uprising. Th e post-2011 political confi guration was therefore 
an unprecedented opportunity for the Islamist trend to att end public 
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demonstrations organised in defence of wide issues ranging from Egypt’s 
Islamic identity and Islamic law to the Syrian jihad and bearded army and 
police offi  cers. Th e new public sphere facilitated the intermingling of internal 
components of the Islamist SMF and further blurred pre-2011 dividing lines. 
Th e new competitive Islamist market presented more opportunities and 
choices than ever before to Islamist constituencies, which virtually aff ected all 
Islamist actors. Islamist groups’ organisational challenges diff ered. Th e MB’s 
strong organisational cohesion and hierarchical norms, rationalised in an 
authoritarian environment by the necessity to survive state repression, were 
contested by the younger generation’s demanding a bigger share of responsi-
bility and say in the group’s decision-making processes.33 Unusual disputes 
regarding the group’s political positions on the post-2011 sett ing sparked the 
departure of leading MB members, including the prominent reformist Abdel 
Mone’m Abu al-Fotouh, and the creation of new splinter political parties 
such as Misr al-Qawmiyya (Strong Egypt Party, SEP) and al-Tayyar al-Misri 
(Egyptian Current Party, ECP) which recruited younger MB members and 
leading reformists. According to the author’s extensive fi eld research, Muslim 
Brothers with more conservative outlooks conversely participated in Islamist 
public protests and became closer to Salafi -leaning Islamists on the ground and 
eff ectively distanced themselves from younger reformist MB members. Th e 
MB was therefore torn on both sides of the spectrum by political liberalisa-
tion. Th ese new dividing lines, which partially refl ected social and geographic 
internal divisions, mean that the group’s confl icting political positions cannot 
be analysed solely as an elite intra-MB confl ict.
Th e Salafi s initially att empted to follow an opposite direction towards 
greater organisational cohesion. Since the loose organisational structures and 
mobilising processes characterising pre-2011 Salafi sm proved unsuited to 
party politics, several Salafi  political parties were created in order to capitalise 
on political liberalisation and promote their agenda. Th e most successful party, 
Hizb al-Nour (Party of Light, PL), used the pre-existing mobilising structures 
of the Alexandria-based al-Daʿwa al-Salafi yya (Salafi  Call), while Cairo-based 
Hizb al-Fadila (Virtue Party, VP) and Hizb al-Asala (Authenticity Party, AP) 
faced vigorous organisational challenges informed by the absence of similar 
pre-existing structures and pre-2011 divisions.34 Th e PL, the most organised 
Salafi  political party, faced a notable predicament: its religious leanings became 
increasingly popular in society but political realism imposed a postponement 
of unadulterated religious demands in the political sphere. Moreover, the 
absence of established and legitimate organisational structures akin to those 
of the MB and the internal competitiveness of the Islamist SMF signifi ed that 
the group’s voters could not necessarily be considered secure and loyal in the 
long run.
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   263 05/01/18   6:48 PM
264 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
Th e Salafi  loose cannon Hazem Abu Ismail is a manifestation of the di-
versifi cation of the Islamist SMF and its competitive ideational market. 
A television religious preacher who was supported by the MB in the 2005 
legislative elections, Abu Ismail exploited the expansion of the Salafi  revolu-
tionary milieu to position himself as its leading fi gure.35 Revolutionary Salafi sm, 
which combines a Salafi  heritage with revolutionary repertoires, mobilised 
unaffi  liated youths on the margins of Salafi  party politics and Salafi  jihadism 
around the idea that Islamic law should be implemented immediately.36 As 
an emerging social movement, revolutionary Salafi sm aggregated young 
Egyptians who were socialised individually, in small groups or institutions, 
with diff erent Salafi  tendencies before 2011. Aft er the uprising, they united 
and converged around a shared Islamic revolutionary platform according 
to fi eld research. Revolutionary Salafi sm epitomises the hybridisation of 
repertoires of contention associated primarily with secular movements in the 
2000s, including street protests, and a Salafi  outlook. At the same time, loose 
modes of organisation and mobilisation implied that no structured group 
managed to claim a monopoly on this milieu, and that populism prevailed. 
Abu Ismail’s popularity among Salafi  revolutionaries is easily explained by his 
fi rm political positions and astute public performance, which reinforced his 
popularity from Salafi –jihadi sympathisers to MB members.
Islamist competition inside the post-2011 newly diversifi ed SMF generated 
two contradictory outcomes for Islamist political parties, contextualised by the 
expectations of a demanding Islamist constituency versus the requirements of 
political realism. On the one hand, the development of a competitive ideational 
market – noticeably marked by rising Salafi  forces – reinforced assertively 
religious references and demands, from a description of the constitutional 
referendum in March 2011 as an early Islamic expedition37 to subsequent calls 
for the Islamisation of the constitution. Street support of the Islamist SMF and 
public calls for the immediate application of Islamic law pressured Islamist 
parties to endorse wider religious claims, and the MB – which had soft ened 
its position on the application of Islamic law in Egypt before 2011 – felt 
particularly pressured to accept these new religious constitutional demands. 
Th is development does not necessarily refl ect a long-entrenched ideological 
commitment, as is sometimes claimed.38 Political support for religious law 
and Egypt’s religious identity39 is a direct outcome of outbidding processes 
aff ecting the newly competitive Islamist SMF. On the other hand, party politics 
imposed some level of pragmatism. For example, many Salafi  political parties, 
including the PL and the political party formed by the ex-jihadis of al-Jama’a 
al-Islamiyya, Hizb al-Bina’ wa al-Tanmiyya (Building and Development Party, 
BDP) refused to endorse the zealous candidature of Hazem Abu Ismail in the 
2012 presidential elections and recognised that political realism should prevail 
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considering the circumstances, according to personal interviews. Senior 
members of PL leadership further upheld the primacy of politics when they 
split and created a new political party, Hizb al-Watan (Homeland Party, HP), in 
response to the Salafi  Call’s religious sheikhs’ control over the party’s political 
strategy.40 Th e contradictions and tensions between religious dogmatism, 
stemming from their constituencies’ pressure in support of Islamic law, and 
political realism, informed by the requirements of party politics, thus became 
apparent within the Islamist SMF before the July 2013 military coup.
Finally, the diversifi cation of the Islamist SMF fi nally informed ideational 
developments on domestic and international issues from a social movement 
perspective. At a domestic level, the Islamist SMF broadly endorsed the 
political process despite pre-2011 contentions over Islam and its incompat-
ibility with democracy.41 Th e development of a credible political alternative 
to preaching and violence legitimised political participation in the eyes of 
most Salafi s who had formerly considered party politics akin to apostasy. 
Extensive fi eld research also suggests that a majority of young Salafi –jihadis 
supported the candidature of Hazem Abu Ismail, to the dismay of some 
jihadi–Salafi  scholars, such as Abu Mohamed al-Maqdisi, who rebutt ed Abu 
Ismail’s candidacy on his online mouthpiece Minbar Tawheed wa al-Jihad. Th e 
legitimisation of political participation is hence not solely a choice imposed 
by Islamist elites on their followers. Indeed, the reverse may well be the case, 
with Islamist elites being pressured to accept political participation by their 
constituencies on the ground.
While the Egyptian Islamist SMF broadly rejected the resort to armed 
violence aft er the uprising, a simultaneous legitimisation of violence in 
another Muslim country crystallised. Th e repression of the Syrian uprising 
by the regime gradually justifi ed the use of violence against Syrian armed 
forces in the public sphere. In Cairo, Syrian-led demonstrations were backed 
by Egyptian Salafi  of all persuasions, whose legitimisation of armed violence 
became consensual within the Islamist SMF. Pre-2011 opposition to armed 
violence in Muslim countries dissipated in Syria, long before President Morsi 
and Salafi  political parties’ participation in a massive conference in support of 
the Syrian jihad in June 2013. As in the legitimisation of party politics, support 
for armed violence in Syria was not necessarily elite-led.
Competition inside a plural ideational market, the development of new 
repertoires of contention, and the contradictions and tensions between 
political idealism and realism, have considerably altered the making of the 
Egyptian Islamist SMF aft er 2011. Beyond stereotypical portrayal as blind 
followers of their political leaders and religious sheikhs, Islamist constituen-
cies challenged Islamist actors and used post-2011 political opportunities to 
contest the latt er’s monopoly over the ideological making and repertoires of 
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contention endorsed by the Islamist SMF. Th is development was nonetheless 
interrupted by the July 2013 military coup, which suddenly ended Egypt’s 
democratic experiment.
The repercussions of the 2013 military coup
Opposition to President Morsi escalated in Spring 2013 and climaxed on 
30 June, when mass protests organised throughout the country demanded 
his resignation. On 3 July, an army-led coalition suspended the Egyptian 
constitution and removed Morsi from power. In the next few months, thousands 
of Egyptians were killed during the violent dismantlement of the sit-ins 
organised by opponents to the military coup in the Rabaa and Nahda squares 
and tens of thousands were arrested and detained in atrocious conditions.42 Th e 
military authorities terminated Egypt’s democratic experiment and restored a 
militarised and brutal version of Hosni Mubarak’s regime.
Th e post-2013 political confi guration was formerly unknown to the 
Egyptian Islamist SMF. Previous authoritarian regimes – with the possible 
exception of Nasser’s brutal repression of the MB in the 1950s and 1960s 
– always manifested some level of tolerance for some of the activities of the 
Islamist SMF,43 even when they were repressing specifi c Islamist groups and 
their members. Egypt’s new autocrat Abdel Fatt ah al-Sisi conversely decided 
to  asphyxiate the Islamist SMF with an unparallelled level of repression that 
aff ected the entire Islamist spectrum and its constituencies. Although the 
regime offi  cially claimed that it was only fi ghting terrorism, every Islamist 
actor was aff ected in specifi c ways.
Th e main target was the MB. Along with the classifi cation of the group as a 
terrorist organisation, the MB’s fi rst- and second-tier leaders were arrested or 
had to quickly depart the country. Th e Brotherhood was virtually decimated 
on the ground as a structured group and the hierarchical norms that previously 
characterised its organisational structures vanished. In the absence of the 
organisational cohesion and consensual deliberation that previously typifi ed 
the MB’s approach to political action, younger MB members have become 
increasingly active in the streets of the country and have gradually pushed for 
a confrontational approach to the military authorities that the MB’s old guard 
has been both reluctant to endorse and unable to prevent.44
Smaller Salafi  political parties and institutions have att empted to eschew 
state repression by endorsing a lower profi le that substantially contrasts with 
their pre-2013 public pre-eminence. Many mainstream Salafi  preachers 
associated with the Majlis Shura al-ʿUlama, who had become vocal aft er 2011, 
left  the country. Moreover, although most Salafi  political parties supportive of 
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the MB had joined al-Tahaluf al-Watani li-Daʿm al-Shari‘ah (National Alliance 
in Support of Legitimacy) in favour of the reinstatement of President Morsi, 
they never crossed the new regime’s red lines by att acking the president or the 
army, nor did they obtain any noticeable political concession from it. Th e main 
backlash to Egyptian Salafi sm, meanwhile, stems from the regime’s exploitation 
of religion in the public sphere and associated insistence that religious extremism, 
more than political repression, caused the wave of violence witnessed aft er 
2013. Th e regime has accordingly called for a religious revolution and promoted 
an unprecedented ban of traditionalist Islamic scholarship associated with 
Salafi sm, control over Egypt’s mosque networks, and a monopolisation of the 
Friday sermons against independent Salafi  preachers.
Against this post-2013 political backdrop, the main Salafi  political party, the 
PL, has faced a unique predicament. Whilst the party, in contrast to all major 
Salafi  actors, was used by the military when it supported the coup, regime-led 
charges against Salafi sm inevitably aff ected its subsequent political orientation. 
Th e PL has consequently muted its pre-2013 religious constitutional demands 
and strived to defend its existence as a non-religious party with an Islamic 
frame of reference only in order to thwart public calls for the application of 
a general ban on religious political parties. Th e PL’s inconsistent political 
positions, combined with the public backlash against political Islam on the 
one hand and a feeling of betrayal by Islamist constituencies on the other, 
contextualise its post-2013 unique electoral losses. Whereas Alexandria-based 
Salafi s managed mostly to eschew repression aft er 1981, when they distanced 
themselves from the proponents of violence,45 the post-2013 backslash against 
the Islamist SMF prevented a similar development owing to the new regime’s 
strategy of delegitimising Islamist political actors in toto.
Th e most challenging developments, however, have occurred on the 
ground, among Islamist constituencies. In contrast to pre-2013 developments, 
political repression (rather than a competitive Islamist SMF) has reinforced 
the marginalisation of organised Islamist groups in the streets of the country. 
Unprecedented waves of arrests, combined with a unique degree of repression 
and isolation of Islamist political parties, have hindered the development of a 
political alternative in the Islamist SMF. Th e younger generation sympathetic 
to the latt er has therefore taken the lead by engaging in street protests around 
the country’s universities and in specifi c neighbourhoods. Moreover, the spiral 
of violence has fuelled the legitimisation of armed confl ict in the absence of 
a political solution. According to many personal testimonies,46 violence has 
been paradoxically perceived as less risky than non-violent forms of resistance, 
considering that the high personal risks taken during public marches contrast 
with the lower chances of being caught while participating in clandestine 
armed actions.
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Although small skirmishes occurred only on an irregular basis before July 
2013, armed att acks against various types of targets have signifi cantly escalated 
since. Violence covers an array of repertoires ranging from the use of hand 
grenades in hit-and-run att acks against the security forces to more sophisti-
cated selective assassinations and car bomb att acks. Th is diversity suggests the 
existence of various groups and networks with access to diverging logistics and 
military expertise.
Th e most notable of such armed att acks have taken place on the Sinai 
Peninsula and are att ributed to the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis group (Partisans of 
the Holy Place/Jerusalem), later renamed Wilayyat Saina’ (Sinai Province, 
WS hereaft er). Th e WS formally emerged aft er the 2011 uprising, although 
its origins can be traced back to the early 2000s. Th e group’s inception is 
rooted in the peculiar socio-political conditions of the region and its 
antagonistic relations with the Egyptian state.47 Armed militancy in the Sinai 
Peninsula emerged in response to economic and political marginalisation 
combined with harsh state repression. Th e growing use of violence by the 
WS aft er 2013 was primarily the result of the state’s iron fi st approach aft er 
the removal of Morsi.
Two additional patt erns characterise the violence perpetuated from within 
the Islamist SMF in mainland Egypt aft er 2013. Th e fi rst patt ern is defi ned by 
the absence of military expertise and its targets (the security forces, broadly 
defi ned). Th ese att acks are characterised primarily by the use of light weaponry 
against army checkpoints, police stations and members of the security forces. 
Limited logistics and military experience suggest that the perpetrators of these 
att acks are not formally affi  liated with violent networks or groups. Indeed, 
these att acks are probably conducted by local groups of friends and acquain-
tances, considering the risks involved. Some of the low-level att acks have been 
self-att ributed to al-ʿIqab al-Th awri (Revolutionary Punishment), although 
this designation appears to be a generic name used by unaffi  liated or loosely 
connected individuals.
Th e second patt ern refers to professional and selective armed att acks 
committ ed against prominent targets. High-ranking individuals affi  liated with 
the security forces, the Ministry of Interior and the judiciary have been executed 
by unknown networks and groups. Th ese att acks reveal a higher degree of 
professional expertise that signifi cantly contrasts with those perpetrated by 
previously unaffi  liated individuals. Th ey range from the assassination of General 
Mohamed Said in January 2014 and Egypt’s state prosecutor Hisham Barakat in 
June 2015, to failed att empts against the Minister of Interior.
Th e proliferation of low-level armed contention, combined with the 
marginalisation of virtually all organised Islamist groups, constitute two com-
plementary facets of post-2013 Egypt. Such complementary developments 
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are, in fact, commonly traced in social movement studies. Indeed, scholars of 
contentious politics have long asserted that armed violence tends to emerge 
on the periphery of mainstream social movements at the end of cycles of 
protest, when the ‘prevailing behaviour of the movement families [are] more 
confrontational and the political culture polarised’.48 Moreover, the inability 
of mainstream Islamist groups such as the MB to provide a credible political 
alternative and infl uence their members and sympathisers on the ground has 
fuelled the narrative that violence is the sole response to state repression. 
Th e Egyptian regime has triggered a self-fulfi lling prophecy: designating 
established Islamist groups as terrorist entities has eff ectively marginalised 
them, radicalised their members and obstructed the development of 
non-violent political alternatives.
Conclusion
Charting the evolution of the Egyptian Islamist SMF since 2011 constitutes 
an important contribution to current understandings of Islamist politics aft er 
the Arab uprisings. While most studies in the fi eld have chosen to revisit the 
‘inclusion-moderation’ thesis or investigate Islamist groups’ electoral constitu-
encies, this chapter has sought to show that is equally important to examine 
the Islamist SMF more generally as well as the emergence of new repertoires 
of contention among its supporters. Th is focus substantiates that, beyond the 
calculus of Islamist elites, new relational patt erns of interactions inside the 
Islamist SMF altered its organisational making and shaped new ideational 
developments that cannot be solely comprehended by a top-down logic. Far 
from being blind followers of theirs groups and sheikhs, Islamist supporters 
contested established hierarchies and ideas and developed new forms of 
political activism. In turn, established and newly created Islamist groups had 
to adapt to the expectations of their sympathisers and be answerable to their 
demands. Unfortunately, the July 2013 military coup abruptly terminated this 
new experiment.
Th e military coup and its repercussions on the Islamist SMF, meanwhile, 
constitute a textbook case study of social movement radicalisation. A brutal 
authoritarian regime crushes a broad social movement, dismantles its 
organisational structures, prevents the development of a non-violent political 
opposition, and eventually bolsters the proponents of armed violence. Th e 
articulation of a radical theology of violence cannot be studied as the manifes-
tation of a violent Islamist essence. In Egypt, in fact, it was largely a response 
to an unprecedented wave of repression obstructing any non-violent political 
alternative.
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If/once the al-Sisi regime realises that the mainstream Islamist opposition 
has to be reintegrated into domestic politics, the main challenge of the Islamist 
SMF and organised Islamist groups will be the presentation of a viable 
alternative and the integration of its younger constituencies, who are not likely 
to submit to their leaders unconditionally and accept not being fully part of 
these groups’ decision-making processes.
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Chapter 16
Iraq’s Shi‘a Islamists after the 
uprisings: the impact of intra-
sectarian tensions and relations 
with Iran
Ibrahim al-Marashi
While Iraq cannot be considered as one of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ states 
per se, it is nevertheless apparent that the 2011 uprisings have had a signifi cant 
impact on Iraq’s predominant Shi‘a Islamist political parties: Hizb al- Da‘wa 
al-Islamiyya (Da‘wa Party, DP), al-Majlis al-A’ala li-Th awra al-Islamiyya fi  al-‘Iraq 
(Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI) and al-Tayyar 
al-Sadri (Sadrist Movement). Th e collapse of the state in neighbouring Syria 
and its descent into civil war in the wake of the uprisings created the context 
for the emergence of al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi  al-ʿIraq wa al-Sham (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) in 2014, which in turn prompted these Iraqi Shi‘a 
Islamist parties to rally their constituencies in defence of the nation. However, 
the emergence of a common foe in the shape of ISIS neither resulted in the 
creation of a unifi ed political front among these parties nor consensus over 
their respective relationships with Tehran. Indeed, despite the emergence of a 
pan-Shi‘a identity across the region aft er the 2011 uprisings, and the common 
threat posed by the rise of ISIS, confl icts persist among the Shi‘a Islamist 
parties/elites in Iraq and Iran, where the pursuit of narrow self-interest and 
political survival continues to trump intra-sectarian solidarity and cooperation.
Th is chapter focuses on three dominant Iraqi Shi‘a Islamist political 
parties, the DP, the SCIRI and the Sadrist Movement. All three of the parties 
can be classed as Shi‘a Islamist, as all have articulated a future vision of Iraq 
that refl ects the Shi‘a majority status and demographic weight in the country 
and advocated a defi ning role for Islam in the constitution to ensure Iraq’s 
Islamic identity and character. Yet despite similar Islamist agendas and a 
shared sectarian affi  liation, the interest-driven aims of Shi‘a politicians in the 
post-2003 electoral environment have lead to ongoing fragmentation rather 
than unity. In fact, this chapter posits that, since the Iranian Revolution of 
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1979, ongoing rivalries among Iraq’s Shi‘a Islamist parties demonstrate that 
they have primarily sought dominance within the national sett ing against rival 
domestic Shi‘a groups, and autonomy in their position vis-à-vis Tehran, all 
the while enjoying the fi nancial and military largesse of the Islamic Republic. 
Dispelling the widely inferred ‘Shi‘a crescent’ narrative with regards to Iraqi 
politics, it reveals that the context of the Arab uprisings has precipitated 
further fragmentation and confl ict among the three Shi‘a Islamist parties, as 
manifest (1) during the 2011–12 wave of anti-government protests, (2) the 
contested 2014 formation of a third al-Maliki government in the shadow of 
the ISIS threat and (3) the resurgence of service delivery and anti-corruption 
protests from 2015 onwards.
Contesting notions of the ‘Shi‘a Crescent’
In the aft ermath of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Jordan’s King Abdullah 
II alluded to the spectre of a ‘Shi‘a Crescent’ spreading from a resurgent Iran, 
a newly assertive Shi‘a Iraq, to Allawi Shi‘a-controlled Syria, and fi nally to a 
Hizbullah-dominated Lebanon.1 Sectarianism as a concept has gained renewed 
prominence following the Arab uprisings as the causative dynamic behind 
confl icts in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, framed as part of a ‘sectarian 
Cold War’. Such analytical frames are oft en embedded in an assumption that 
sectarian confl ict can be att ributed to tensions raging since time immemorial 
as an irreconcilable Sunni–Shi‘a confl ict, explained away by the ‘ancient ethnic 
hatred’ trope. When metaphors such as the ‘Shi‘a Crescent’ or ‘sectarian cold 
war’ are invoked, they tend to describe sects as social units that are historically 
continuous and primordial, rather than as a reaction, and mobilisation strategy, 
to unique political crises in certain states. Representative of academic work 
that evokes this sectarian bipolarity is, for instance, Geneive Abdo’s Th e New 
Sectarianism and Khalil F. Osman’s Sectarianism in Iraq, both of which posit 
that ‘primordial sectarian affi  liations’ lie at the heart of the confl ict in Iraq.2
Countering this line of analysis, a literature has emerged that questions 
the notion of sectarianism itself, and problematises extant tensions between 
the Arab Shi‘a and Iran, as well as intra-Shi‘a confl icts within national sett ing 
such as Iraq. So for instance, Vali Nasr’s work, Th e Shi‘a Revival, examines the 
ramifi cations of a Shi‘a-led government in Iraq on regional dynamics.3 Despite 
the suggestion in the title, Nasr does not argue that a ‘Shi‘a International’ exists 
between Iran and its Shi‘a Arab allies. Rather he acknowledges the diff erences 
that exist among the region’s Shi‘a communities. He argues that the regional 
Arab Sunni status quo was upset by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, 
and demonstrates how certain states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, perceive 
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this change as a seismic shift  that upset the balance of power in favour of Iran. F. 
Gregory Gause, in his piece ‘Beyond sectarianism’, argues as well that sectarian 
rationales alone are insuffi  cient to explain the post-2011 regional crisis in the 
Middle East, and focuses instead on an Iranian–Saudi proxy confl ict based 
on rational balance-of-power calculations.4 Finally, these readings of regional 
politics also resonate with Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke’s work, 
Th e Arab Shi‘a, which examines the intellectual origins of the pan-Shi‘a 
construct. Th e authors argue that the Shi‘a in both the Arab world and Iran 
since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 tend to be portrayed within Western and 
Middle Eastern policy circles and the mainstream media as a homogeneous, 
monolithic sect, ignoring diff erences within this community in each country, 
such as for instance the distinction between religious and secular Shi‘a, the 
disparity between well-educated, middle-class Shi‘a and the poorer segments 
of this community, urban versus rural divides, and most oft en ignored, the 
national diff erences between Shi‘ism in Iraq, Kuwait and Lebanon, or the 
widely theologically divergent Shi‘a sects in Syria and Yemen.5
Prominent scholars devoted to the study of Shi‘ism, meanwhile, also tend 
to argue against Shi‘a homogeneity within the broader region as well within 
Iraq. Yitzhak Nakash’s Th e Shi‘is of Iraq, for instance, provides a history of this 
community until 1958, highlighting the cultural distinctions that emerged 
between them and their co-religionists in Iran.6 Faleh A. Jabar also provides 
a history of the Iraqi Shi‘a until the 2003 war, demonstrating divisions along 
political, religious and social lines, challenging the oft -perceived homogeneity 
of this community.7
Taking this more critical reading of sectarianism and Shi‘a politics in 
the Middle East as a point of departure, this chapter examines Iraqi politics 
since the Arab uprisings of 2011, highlighting the pluralisation of, and 
ongoing fragmentation among, Shi‘a Islamist parties and the concomitant 
growth in intra-Shi‘a Islamist competition and contention within Iraq and 
bilaterally with Iran, a neighbour that enjoys a paramount infl uence over 
internal Iraqi aff airs.
The emergence of Iraq’s Shi‘a Islamist parties
Of the three Shi‘a Islamist parties under scrutiny here, the DP emerged fi rst in 
the 1960s to mobilise the Iraqi Shi‘is, providing a religious alternative at the 
time to secular parties, such as al-Hizb al-Shiyuʿi al-ʿIraqi (Iraqi Communist 
Party, ICP) and Hizb al-Baath al-ʿArabi al-Ishtiraki fi  al-ʿIraq (Arab Socialist 
Baath Party of Iraq, or simply Baath party), both of which had begun to make 
inroads into this community. Following the Baathist coup d’état of 1968 and 
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the ascendancy to power of Saddam Hussein in 1979, the DP was banned, 
allegedly for being complicit in a failed assassination att empt against Tariq 
‘Aziz, then Iraqi deputy prime minister.8 From then onwards the party operated 
clandestinely, while most of its leadership sought refuge in Iran, Syria and 
the UK.
Th roughout the 1980s, whilst underground and in exile, the DP retained 
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, at the time the Iranian 
regime actively encouraged the DP to join an Iraqi Shiʿa umbrella organisation, 
SCIRI, which had been forged in 1982 under the leadership of exiled Iraqi 
cleric Mohamed Baqir al-Hakim. Sponsored by Iran, SCIRI served as a means 
for the Iranian leadership to unite and control Iraqi Shiʿa factions, as well as a 
government in exile that would assume control of Iraq aft er Saddam Hussein’s 
expected demise during Iran’s early military successes in the Iran–Iraq war 
(1980–8). Having initially joined SCIRI, the DP later withdrew, however, due 
to its apprehensions about Iranian control over the organisation, and its refusal 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of the wilayat al-faqih (rule of the theological 
jurist), a post held by Ayatollah Khomeini and which fused Shiʿa religious 
authority with the highest executive political authority in Iran.9 Th e DP’s 
att empts to distance itself from SCIRI and Iran represents an open manifesta-
tion of tensions between an Iraqi Shiʿa group resisting Iranian infl uence, even 
at a point where the party was weak and outlawed and its leadership exiled.
Alongside the DP and SCIRI, within Baathist Iraq itself, the following three 
grand ayatollahs emerged as spiritual leaders of the country’s Shiʿa community: 
Abul-Qassim al-Khoe’i, his successor Ali al-Sistani, and Mohamed Sadiq 
al-Sadr. Al-Sadr, who had a wide following among the inhabitants in the east 
Baghdad district known as Saddam City, was killed in February 1999, allegedly 
at the hands of Iraq’s security forces for his incendiary sermons. His surviving 
son, Muqtada went into hiding and would later emerge as a pivotal force in 
Iraqi Shiʿa politics.10 All three clerics remained separate from the exiled Shiʿa 
Islamist parties in order to survive in Baathist Iraq. Both al-Sadr and his son 
leveraged this distance to present themselves as leaders free of foreign (that is 
Iranian) control and steadfast in guiding Iraq’s Shiʿa during Baathist rule.
Muqtada al-Sadr re-emerged from hiding aft er the 2003 regime change, 
founding the Sadrist Movement, a political organisation that sought to 
represent the marginalised lower and less-integrated social classes among the 
Shiʿa community. As such al-Sadr created a movement that fused sect and 
socio-economic status, and sought to cultivate its image as an indigenous Iraqi 
nationalist and anti-American one, transcending the sectarian divide, and one 
that developed from within the nation, as opposed to the exiled Shiʿa parties. 
While al-Sadr was still too young to elevate himself to his father’s status as a 
learned religious scholar, he proved himself as a shrewd political tactician, 
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elevating himself from relative obscurity in 2003 to developing a cult of 
personality and Shiʿa sub-culture that has emerged as a fi xture in Iraq’s politics 
ever since.11
Whilst the DP, SCIRI and the Sadrist Movement can all be classed as 
‘Islamist’ parties for the reasons highlighted above, it is important to note that 
none of them ever sought the establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic system 
of government. Al-Sadr, for instance, had called for the establishment of an 
Islamic republic in Iraq shortly aft er the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, yet he 
made implicit that he disagreed with the Iranian notion of wilayat al-faqih, and 
did not wish its implementation in Iraq.12 Since the 1980s, the DP, as well, had 
expressed its reservations about the notion of clerical authority as exercised 
within the Islamic Republic.13 Even SCIRI, which has depended on Iranian 
support since its creation, did not advocate the establishment of an Iranian-style 
Islamic Republic in Iraq post-2003, when the party shift ed its allegiance from 
Ayatollah Khamenei to Ayatollah al-Sistani in 2007, as a means of cultivating 
an Iraqi nationalist image.14 What is more, given that from 2003 onwards the 
USA had become the paramount authority in Iraq, and given its commitment 
to creating a successful democracy that would serve as a beacon for the rest of 
the region, the three parties and the leadership in Tehran realised that it would 
have been impossible to create an Iranian-style state even if they had wanted 
to, and that Iraq’s other ethno-sectarian and secular communities would have 
been opposed to it. Rather, the electoral process set up under American aegis 
would be suffi  cient for these Shiʿa Islamist parties to assume power, given the 
Shiʿa demographic majority in Iraq.
Th e introduction of electoral politics aft er the fall of Saddam Hussein in 
2003 thus spurred the DP, SCIRI, the Sadrist Movement and other smaller 
Shiʿa (Islamist) parties to enter into a complex game of alignment and rivalry 
in the new political system based on power-political considerations. Iraq’s fi rst 
post-2003 plural elections took place in January 2005 for the 275-member 
Council of Representatives, tasked with draft ing a new constitution as well 
as the formation of a transitional government. Th is and subsequent elections 
featured a proportional electoral system based on party lists rather than 
individual candidacies.
In the 2005 elections the DP, SCIRI and candidates loyal to al-Sadr formed an 
electoral alliance, al-I’tilaf al-‘Iraqi al-Muwahhad (United Iraqi Alliance, UIA), 
under whose umbrella they managed to secure a plurality of the votes and seats 
in parliament.15 At the level of governance, meanwhile, Iraqi politics started to 
mimic Lebanon’s consociational system, in which administrative posts were 
allocated not on merit or qualifi cation but primarily on the basis of a politician’s 
ethno-sectarian background. Th is was done so as to give the appearance of a 
balanced and inclusive government that represented the nation’s diversity. Th e 
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allocation of executive posts benefi ted the former exiled Shiʿa Islamists, as 
the political consensus among the dominant parties, both Shiʿa Islamist and 
Kurdish, was that since the UIA had secured a plurality of the votes, it should 
determine who was to form the transitional government. Ibrahim al-Ja’fari of 
the DP was thus duly chosen as prime minister (r.2005–6), an arrangement 
deemed acceptable to both the US and Iran. Although al-Ja’fari was a Shiʿa 
Islamist, the DP itself remained suffi  ciently distant from Iran at the time to 
allay US concerns, whilst Iran was able to leverage SCIRI, a key party in the 
transitional government, to advance its goals. Th e principle party representing 
the country’s Kurdish community, meanwhile, Yekîtiya Nishtimane ya 
Kurdistanê (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK), was awarded the presidency, 
whilst the position of speaker of parliament went to a representative of the 
Sunni community. Other key posts in the transitional government, meanwhile, 
were allocated to Shiʿa Islamists, including the posts of vice president and 
Ministry of Interior, which went to representatives of SCIRI, as well as the 
ministries of Health and Transport, which went to politicians loyal to Muqtada 
al-Sadr. Since then, this consociational arrangement has evolved as a political 
norm in Iraq, and this despite the fact that the new Iraqi constitution, ratifi ed 
in 2005, does not explicitly stipulate that the prime minister must be Shiʿa, the 
president Kurdish, and the speaker of parliament an Arab Sunni. Indeed, in 
subsequent elections, Shiʿa Islamists would seek to leverage the benefi ts of the 
consociational arrangement that governed the distribution of executive posts, 
allowing these parties the opportunity to expand their patronage network, 
for example, by off ering supporters local development projects or jobs in the 
ministries or in the security forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior.
Following the ratifi cation of the new Iraqi constitution and a second 
UIA electoral victory in the December 2005 parliamentary elections, Nouri 
al-Maliki, a DP member, was chosen as the country’s fi rst post-transition 
prime minister. During his fi rst term in offi  ce from 2006 to 2010, al-Maliki was 
widely accused of seeking to centralise power in his own hands, and installing 
an authoritarian system of government in a country increasingly divided by 
sectarian factionalism and civil war. It is in this period also that tensions broke 
out between members and parties/groupings of the governing UIA coalition, 
ultimately leading to its break up. In August 2007 a skirmish broke out 
between members of SCIRI and the Sadrist militia, the Mahdi Army, during 
the pilgrimage in Karbala, leading to a two-day street batt le. Al-Maliki faulted 
the Mahdi Army for starting the incident and ordered government forces to 
crack down on the militia, a force that had challenged his centralising drive.16 
Th e fi nal break between al-Maliki and the Sadrists then occurred when the 
PM sought to break the power of the Mahdi Army, ordering the military to 
att ack them in Basra and Baghdad in 2008, with fi ghting ending aft er Iranian 
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mediation.17 Al-Maliki thus proved to Iraqis that he would combat his fellow 
Shiʿa and forgo an alliance with them to restore domestic security, enhancing 
his nationalist credentials.
Taking advantage of this momentum, al-Maliki sought re-election as PM 
in the ensuing parliamentary election of 2010 by putt ing together an entirely 
new electoral alliance, Dawlat al-Qanun (State of Law). Although his ticket 
included DP members, the new name was designed to appeal to a more 
nationalist strand among the Shiʿa, as well as Sunnis and secularists. SCIRI, 
meanwhile, had also rebranded itself as al-Majlis al-A’ala al-Islami al-‘Iraqi 
(Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or ISCI), indicating that it sought to distance 
itself from its origins in Iran during Khomeini’s project to export the Islamic 
revolution, and also to adopt a more nationalist-sounding name.
Al-Maliki sought to rebrand himself and his alliance as Iraqi nationalist, fi rst 
to rival the secularly oriented al-Haraka al-Wataniya al-Iraqiyya (Iraqi National 
Movement, also known as al-Iraqiyya), an electoral alliance led by Iyad Allawi, 
a Shiʿa and former Baathist with close ties to Saudi Arabia, and second to 
distance himself from ISCI and the Sadrist Movement, which were already 
alienated by his policies during his fi rst term in offi  ce. Iran in turn encouraged 
ISCI to make amends with the Sadrists and form a new combined electoral list 
entitled al-I’tilaf al-Watani al-‘Iraqi (Iraqi National Alliance, INA).
Th e breakup of the UIA and the fragmentation of the Shiʿa Islamist 
political current into two principle parties/alliances in the 2010 elections 
made it possible for Allawi’s al-Iraqiyya to secure a plurality of ninety-one seats 
in the new parliament, whilst al-Maliki’s State of Law alliance came second 
with eighty-nine seats, and the INA third with seventy seats (thirty-nine to the 
Sadrists, and seventeen to ISCI).18 As the Iraqi constitution stipulated that the 
largest parliamentary party/bloc should be charged with the formation of a 
government, the odds were initially stacked in favour of Allawi and his secular 
al-Iraqiyya alliance. However, to prevent this scenario from materialising, and 
thus for Allawi – who was deemed close to Saudi Arabia – to become PM, Iran 
encouraged the two rival Shiʿa Islamist parties to reconcile their diff erences, 
realign as a majority bloc in parliament and hence form the next government. 
Th e INA and State of Law subsequently forged a majority bloc in parliament, 
even though ISCI and the Sadrists did not want to see al-Maliki renewed as PM. 
Precipitating a new crisis between the two parties, the ISCI and the Sadrists 
were in fact adamant in their rejection of al-Maliki, whilst al-Maliki himself 
showed no sign that he intended to make way for an alternative candidate. Iran 
fi nally summoned the two parties/alliances to Tehran for negotiations. Th e 
Sadrists, under Iranian urging, broke ranks and agreed to support al-Maliki’s 
second term in offi  ce, essentially leaving the rest of the Shiʿa alliance with litt le 
choice but to allow al-Maliki to remain.19 At the time Iran was thus able to 
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prevent a Saudi-linked candidate from assuming the prime ministership, yet 
this fragile Iraqi Shiʿa Islamist alliance broke down soon aft er, as shall become 
apparent below.
In sum, plural politics in post-2003 Iraq initially witnessed a short period 
of Shiʿa Islamist cooperation in the form of the UIA, but this electoral alliance 
soon broke down aft er the formation of Iraq’s fi rst government in 2006. 
Despite Iran’s eff orts at fostering Shiʿa unity, diff erences between the leaders 
of each party resulted not only in tensions within the alliance between the 
major three parties, but also in armed confrontation. A shared Shiʿa Islamist 
identity was thus not suffi  cient to get the parties to cooperate aft er 2006, 
particularly in the lead up to the 2010 elections, ultimately costing all three 
parties an electoral defeat. Following the 2010 elections, the only instance 
when these same-sect parties united was to prevent Allawi’s bloc from forming 
a new government but, as we saw, this cooperation was also short-lived. By 
the time the Arab uprisings broke out in 2011, Iraq’s three principle Shiʿa 
Islamist parties were thus bitt erly divided, not least on how to respond to the 
ensuing regional instability.
Iraqi Shiʿa plurality following the 2011 uprisings
Extant tensions between the ruling coalition of ISCI, the Sadrist Trend and 
al-Maliki’s State of Law prior to 2011 were further compounded by the 
onset of the Arab uprisings of 2011–12. Inspired by the popular uprisings 
in neighbouring states, Iraqis themselves took to the street in 2011, not for a 
change of regime, but to demand improved public services and governance. 
Th e government’s failure to do meet this requirement led to the emergence of 
a renewed protest movement in 2015, a movement that the Sadrists sought to 
embrace as a tool in its rivalry with al-Maliki’s State of Law and ISCI. In the 
meanwhile, security concerns had grown for Iraqi Shi‘a due to the emergence 
of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq), which later 
became the al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi  al-ʿIraq wa al-Sham (ISIS). Both pursued 
an aggressive anti-Shi‘a politics and the seizure of Mosul in 2014 by al-Dawla 
al-Islamiyya’s (Islamic State, IS) precipitated a crisis in leadership among Iraq’s 
Shi‘a Islamist parties.
To demonstrate the eff ect of the uprisings on the Shi‘a Islamists, the 
following pages examine three contentious episodes that emerged following 
2011, highlighting ongoing tensions between Iraq’s three main Shi‘a parties: (1) 
the Shi‘a parties’ response to the Arab uprisings, (2) the elections of 2014 and 
the resignation of PM al-Maliki, and (3) the Sadrists and the anti-government 
protests beginning in 2015.
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   281 05/01/18   6:48 PM
282 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
Pan-Shi‘ism as a response to the Arab uprisings
Taking inspiration from the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Iraqis took 
to the streets in February 2011 in what was deemed as ‘Iraq’s Day of Rage’. 
Protests erupted in the capital Baghdad and the cities of Falluja and Ramadi, 
in the Anbar governorate, Mosul in the Nineveh governorate, and Hawija, 
near Kirkuk, with demonstrators demanding reliable public services and an 
end to rampant corruption, nepotism and unemployment.20 At the time, PM 
al-Maliki ordered security forces to suppress the protests without addressing 
their root causes, thus leaving societal tensions simmering. In January 2013 
protests broke out once more in the same cities, launched by disenfranchised 
Iraqi Arab Sunnis in response to al-Maliki’s crackdown of prominent politicians 
from their community.
Al-Maliki blamed the Arab Sunni demonstrations of 2013 on Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, who had been the chief backers of the rebellion in Syria. 
In terms of linkages between Iraq and Syria following the uprisings, Iraqi 
Arab Sunni protesters had been emboldened by what they perceived as an 
Arab Sunni uprising against the Alawite Shi‘a government in Syria. One Iraqi 
protester, for instance, expressed sentiments that internalised the notion of a 
‘Shi‘a Crescent’, asserting:
[b]oth our governments are very close to Tehran, and both of us oppose 
Iranian plans in the region. Iran wants to turn Baghdad and Damascus 
into its provinces and form a Shi‘a axis stretching from Tehran to the 
Mediterranean Sea.21
Protesters invoked the pejorative term ‘Safavid’ to describe al-Maliki’s 
government, a reference to the Turco-Persian dynasty that converted Iran to 
Shi‘ism wholesale in the 1500s and later contested the Ott oman Empire for 
control over Iraq, while others carried posters of then Turkish PM Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been an early supporter of the Arab Spring protests 
in Egypt, Libya and Syria.22 Al-Maliki sought to take advantage of these 
developments and rally Iraq’s Shi‘a population by stoking the fear that disen-
franchised Iraqi Arab Sunnis had sought out support from the former Iraqi 
Baathists and ISIS based in Syria, as well as receiving aid from Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar. While al-Maliki sought to cultivate a nationalist image prior 
to the 2010 elections, by 2013 he used sectarian fears to rally his constituents 
and mobilise against his rivals.
One of the eff ects of the uprisings was that al-Maliki and other Shi‘a Islamist 
parties could invoke an emergent pan-Shi‘a imaginary as a response. What 
is striking about this is the fact that prior to the Syrian and Yemeni confl icts 
aft er 2011, Iraqi Twelver Shi‘as rarely thought of Syrian Alawites or Yemeni 
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Zaydis as fellow Shi‘a.23 Indeed, in the Iraqi Twelver Shi‘a imagination, Bashar 
al-Assad’s government and the Alawites of Syria became ‘Shi‘a’ by sheer virtue 
of buying into the narrative that Damascus was under att ack from anti-Shi‘a 
Salafi s.24 Th ey disregarded the near past, when from 2004 onwards al-Assad 
had allowed foreign Salafi  jihadists (precursors of ISIS) to cross from Syria 
into Iraq, thus enabling most of the sectarian killing against their community 
during the Iraqi civil war.25 Along with this trend, the Saudi air campaign in 
Yemen against the Zaydi Houthi movement created an Iraqi Shi‘a solidarity 
with the Houthi community.26
However, while the Syrian civil war and the confl ict in Yemen allowed for 
a rekindling of pan-sectarian identities, this identity was not embraced by all 
Iraqi Shi‘a, or Sunnis for that matt er, who saw through the veneer of such op-
portunistic discourses and expressions of solidarity. Indeed, if anything, this 
resurgent pan-Shi‘ism represents an illustrative case of what Marina Calculli 
calls the ‘securitisation of identities’; that is, a transnational social process 
utilised by political elites to mobilise constituencies that serve as a proxy 
for direct military confrontation.27 Th is process reconciles discursively the 
dissonance between Shi‘a actors that invoke a pan-Shi‘a imaginary, whether 
it is Iran or Iraq’s Shi‘a Islamists, even if they pursue policies that undermine 
sectarian unity. In this regard Iran and Iraq’s Shi‘a Islamist parties securitised 
a Shi‘a identity in the aft ermath of the uprisings in order to bolster their own 
domestic as well as transnational legitimacy. Th ey did so, however, while it was 
clear that pan-Shi‘ism was not their principle driver for domestic/regional 
policy choices, which remained dictated by real political concerns and power-
political rivalries.
In the Iraqi context, in fact, pan-Shi‘a imaginaries are evoked primarily 
by Shi‘a Islamist parties to enhance their mobilisation potential, while these 
parties pursue policy choices that oft en fl y in the face of Shi‘a unity in Iraq and/
or across the region. For example, given his pre-existing tensions with al-Maliki, 
al-Sadr expressed solidarity with the Arab Sunni protests, highlighting ongoing 
fi ssures among the Shi‘a Islamist political parties. He even appropriated 
the language of the Arab Spring, labelling the Anbar protests as ‘Iraq’s Arab 
Spring’.28
For Iraqi Sunnis to believe al-Sadr was an Iraqi nationalist who put nation 
before sect would have amounted to nothing less than a miracle, of course, 
given that some within his militia had been implicated in some of the worst 
sectarian killings that took place between 2006 to 2008. Al-Sadr’s embrace of 
the Sunni protesters then served as his att empt to distance himself from the 
sectarian blood lett ing of the past, as well as from the entrenched Iraqi political 
elite. Th is tactic in 2013 would ultimately foreshadow al-Sadr’s embrace of the 
politics of protest in 2015–16, another episode of intra-Shi‘a confl ict.
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On 23 April 2013 clashes between security forces and protesters in the 
town of Hawija broke out, leading to fi ft y deaths. Further armed clashes 
followed between the Iraqi security forces and Arab Sunni protesters. Aft er the 
Hawija incident ISIS’s bombing campaign reached a level unprecedented since 
the height of sectarian confl ict between 2006 and 2008, with terror att acks 
being carried out against religious centres, security forces’ headquarters and 
checkpoints, crowded markets, and politicians, aff ecting both Shi‘a and Sunni 
districts. At the time, al-Maliki blamed Iraq’s Arab Sunnis for enabling ISIS 
to conduct these att acks. Th e worsening security situation, however, did not 
aff ect al-Maliki’s political prospects, and perhaps in fact strengthened his base, 
as he invoked the new pan-Shi‘i narrative in the run-up to the 2014 elections.
The elections of 2014 and the resignation of al-Maliki
Despite heightened sectarian confl ict and fears, when the 2014 parliamentary 
elections were called there were no cohesive ethnic or sectarian coalitions 
to speak of. ISCI and Sadrists’ rivalry with al-Maliki continued, and both 
parties failed to join the PM’s State of Law alliance. ISCI ran in the elections 
under al-Muwatin (Citizen) alliance and the Sadrists ran separately as part of 
Kutlat al-Ahrar ‎ (Liberal Bloc) alliance. Indeed, not only had the grand Shi‘a 
Islamist coalition (UIA) broken down by 2010, but Iraq had since witnessed 
further pluralisation of the Shi‘a political fi eld with the emergence of several 
smaller Shi‘a Islamist parties. Most notably, these included Hizb al-Islah 
(Reform Party), formed aft er Ibrahim al-Ja’afari split from the DP, Hizb 
al-Fadila (Virtue Party), a rival to the Sadrists, and the Munadhamat al-Badr 
(Badr Organisation), which had split off  from ISCI, and allied with its rival, 
al-Maliki’s State of Law alliance.
As mentioned above, divisions among the core Shi‘a Islamist parties can 
be traced back to disagreements over the re-election of al-Maliki as PM for a 
second term in 2010. In the lead-up to the 2014 parliamentary elections, Shi‘a 
parties thus simply sought to maximise the number of votes/seats for their 
respective electoral lists, upon which they would then argue that its politicians 
be awarded the most important cabinet positions and ministries based on their 
popularity. Th e formation of coalitions would be negotiated aft er the elections, 
rather than before. Th us, by 2014 a shared Shi‘a identity thus no longer provided 
suffi  cient glue to unite Shi‘a Islamist parties at the political and electoral levels, 
instead fostering fi erce competition for votes and political posts among its 
constituent parties. It is for these reasons, and because of the consociational 
arrangement that had governed Iraqi politics since 2005, that the formation of 
broad electoral alliances lost traction with Shi‘a Islamist parties.
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In the 2014 elections themselves al-Maliki’s State of Law alliance won 
the most seats, ninety-two, while the Sadrist Movement and the ISCI came 
in second and third, winning thirty-four and twenty-nine seats respectively. 
Th eoretically, the three Shi‘a parties thus were in a position to form a coalition 
government with the help of a number of the smaller Shi‘a parties. Th is scenario, 
however, did not materialise, with al-Maliki’s persona becoming yet again a 
key bone of contention between the key Shi‘a Islamist parties. Whilst al-Maliki 
argued that winning most seats had granted him a national mandate to run for 
a third time as PM, the Sadrists and ISCI were adamantly opposed. Another 
post-election stalemate akin to 2010 thus emerged, centred on the personality 
of al-Maliki, leaving Iraq without the necessary leadership to coordinate a 
national response to the ISIS incursion into Iraq and its seizure of the country’s 
second largest city of Mosul as well as several urban centres along the Tigris 
and Euphrates in the summer of 2014. Th is incursion, and particularly the fall 
of Mosul under al-Maliki’s watch, gave ISCI and the Sadrist Movement further 
impetus to deny the PM a third term, blaming his policies for alienating Arab 
Sunnis, who, they asserted, either actively abett ed or passively supported, the 
ISIS invasion. Th e two Shi‘a Islamist parties, and even some members from 
within the DP itself, thus joined Kurdish and Arab Sunni politicians calling 
for al-Maliki’s resignation. Ayatollah al-Sistani also called for al-Maliki to step 
down (albeit subtly, in a Friday sermon), and so did the Iranian government.29 
Pressure for his resignation also came from the Obama administration in the 
US, which made military aid contingent on fi nding a less divisive candidate to 
head a new government.
Consequently, the Iraqi Shi‘a political parties, in addition to Iran, dropped 
support for al-Maliki as PM, rallying instead behind Haidar al-Abadi, who 
appeared a less divisive and polarising fi gure within the DP. In response, 
al-Maliki mobilised the elite special forces, the Golden Division, a unit he had 
established as his own ‘praetorian guard’, and for a few days rumours of a coup 
abounded, in response to what had been essentially an Iraqi Shi‘a and Iranian 
vote of no confi dence. In the end, al-Maliki did not resort to force in order 
to secure a third term in offi  ce but rather relinquished power, calculating that 
Iraq’s political structure could allow for his eventual political comeback.30
Once al-Abadi had become prime minister in 2014, with the support of 
disparate Shi‘a political parties, a new government was formed in which the 
Shi‘a Islamists once again reaped the benefi ts of key ministerial posts. Th e 
actual allocation process is opaque as it is negotiated beyond public scrutiny, 
and it is diffi  cult to ascertain why, despite securing more votes than ISCI, the 
latt er secured the all-important Oil Ministry, as well as that of Transportation, 
while the Sadrists secured the ‘lesser’ ministries of Housing, and Industry.31 
In terms of other executive posts, the Sadrist Baha al-‘Araji was made one of 
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three deputy prime ministers, a largely ceremonial post. Th us, al-Sadr had litt le 
stake in the new government in terms of powerful ministerial portfolios, which 
would explain his later embrace of the 2015 protesters’ demands to dissolve 
the cabinet and replace it with a technocratic one.
The Sadrists and the anti-government protests
Finally, Inter-Shi‘a divisions are apparent in the wake of the service delivery 
protests that swept Iraq in 2015–16. Indeed, whilst the Sadrist Movement and 
ISCI had jointly opposed al-Maliki’s third term in offi  ce in 2014, they would break 
over the issue of government accountability and corruption during the protests.
In August 2015 sustained mass protests erupted in Baghdad’s Tahrir 
Square, Basra in the South, and the predominantly Shi‘a heartland towns 
of Najaf, Karbala and Hilla. Protesters demanded an end to corruption and 
improved public services, particularly in the delivery of electricity, and the 
sectarian quotas that hindered effi  cient governance.32 Although the demon-
strations began as a popular uprising, al-Sadr took the lead in galvanising the 
protest movement against the al-Abadi government. He had earlier embraced 
the politics of street protest in 2013, seeking to appear as a grass-roots Shi‘a 
and Iraqi nationalist leader who stood above the fray of partisan Shi‘a politics. 
In February 2016, he continued to cultivate this image, as he convened a rally 
in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, mobilising crowds to pressure the PM to follow 
through with anti-corruption reforms.33 To increase the pressure, he then 
called on protesters to stage a sit-in outside of the Green Zone, the location of 
Iraq’s key state institutions and where most of Iraq’s politicians reside.
Al-Sadr pressured the PM to accede to his demand for the creation of a 
technocratic non-partisan cabinet that would tackle government corruption 
and improve public services. Apparently giving in to this pressure, in April 2016 
al-Abadi presented a list of technocrat candidates to form a new Iraqi cabinet, 
including new ministers for electricity, fi nance, oil and water where corruption 
in these ministries aff ected daily public services. None of the candidates on 
this list came from the major political parties, but were nominated for their 
technical expertise. However, a technocratic cabinet would have entailed the 
resignation of career politicians, many of whom were Shi‘a politicians. For 
example, the ISCI party member, Adil Abd al-Mahdi who was Minister of 
Oil, was to be replaced by a Kurdish technocrat. In response to this measure, 
Ammar al-Hakim, the ISCI leader, responded ‘if we have a totally technocratic 
cabinet, then PM al-Abadi must be a non-partisan technocrat or PM al-Abadi 
must go’.34 ISCI rebuked its co-religionist by demanding that the PM should 
resign given his connections to the DP. Th e resistance al-Abadi faced from 
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career politicians was symptomatic of the entrenchment of a new post-2003 
political elite, including Shi‘a Islamists, who had benefi ted from the new 
political system. Politicians from the Sadrist Movement, meanwhile, held 
thirty-four seats in parliament, but al-Sadr ordered his MPs to boycott  any 
future sessions until his call for a technocratic cabinet was heeded.
Th e deadlock benefi ted al-Sadr’s political standing and granted him a 
political victory, despite the Iraqi parliament’s failure to approve a technocratic 
cabinet. Al-Sadr clearly challenged the power of the al-Abadi government, 
which at its helm comprised the two Shi‘a political parties, the DP and the 
ISCI, precipitating an intra-Shi‘a confl ict among his rivals.35 From a power 
calculus perspective, the Sadrist strategy during the 2015–16 protests had 
a more cynical motive for pressuring al-Abadi to introduce a technocratic 
cabinet. In order to respond to protesters’ demands in August 2015, al-Abadi 
had already dissolved the three positions of deputy prime minister, thus 
depriving the Sadrist Movement of its one post in the cabinet, albeit a weak 
and largely ceremonial one.36 It appears that al-Sadr was willing to relinquish 
his party’s hold on the remaining ministries of Housing, and Industry, given 
that his Shi‘a rivals in government would lose far more powerful posts in the 
event of the establishment of a technocratic government.
What is more, al-Sadr’s strategy had been to assert himself as an Iraqi Shi‘a 
nationalist, independent of Iranian infl uence (despite engaging with Iran in the 
past, such as aft er the contested 2010 elections). Indeed, the protests off ered 
al-Sadr a means to undermine Iran’s objective to unite the various Iraqi Shi‘a 
parties, with the caveat that they formed a united front to augment Iran’s infl uence 
in Iraq. Th is anti-Iranian sentiment was demonstrated by the protesters who 
chanted against the Islamic Republic’s infl uence in Iraq and Tehran’s support 
of the ‘corrupt’ Shi‘a incumbent elite, particularly the DP and ISCI politicians. 
Ahmad Abd al-Hussein, a leader of the protests working alongside the Sadrists, 
used Facebook to articulate this sentiment, stating that ‘Iran’s insistence on 
embracing corrupt thugs and thieves, desperately defending them, assisting 
them during crises and covering up for their disastrous corruption and failure 
will drive Iraqis to hate Iran, if it continues to sponsor these thugs’.37
Th e consociational arrangement of dividing executive posts among the 
country’s diverse ethno-religious communities was meant to ensure that 
the majority Iraqi Shi‘a would never again be ruled by an oppressive Sunni 
minority. In the event, however, al-Sadr, himself a Shi‘a, challenged this system, 
demonstrating that analysing Iraq’s politics as a simple confl ict between Shi‘a 
versus Sunni is reductive at best. Iran’s policy aft er 2014 of fostering Shi‘a unity 
in Iraq deprived al-Sadr of asserting his own presence on the Iraqi political 
landscape, and thus he embraced a protest movement that has proved to stoke 
intra-Shi‘a confl ict in the government.
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   287 05/01/18   6:48 PM
288 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
Conclusion
Aft er the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a pluralisation of Shi‘a domestic 
Islamist actors took place in the new Iraqi body politic, resulting in intra-Shi‘a 
Islamist competition within Iraq and bilaterally with Iran, a neighbour that enjoys 
a paramount infl uence over internal Iraqi aff airs. Th is chapter examined why 
same-sect political parties aligned with, or rivalled, each other in this environment, 
focusing in particular on the rationale behind the behavior of diff erent Shi‘a 
Islamist parties in key moments of post-2011 Iraqi politics: the immediate street 
protests in 2011 and then 2013, the crisis surrounding al-Maliki’s premiership in 
2014, and the anti-government protests of 2015–16. Problematising the evolution 
of identity politics in the country, it sought to show how sectarianism is used by 
Iraqi Shi‘a political actors to craft  political and societal discourses and practices. 
As such, the chapter illustrated that, despite widespread assumptions and fears in 
both the region and internationally of a cohesive Shi‘a regional bloc emerging in 
the region aft er 2003 and 2014, shared sectarian affi  liation did not serve as a basis 
to unify Iraqi Shi‘a Islamist political parties and elites. In fact, as we saw, even the 
ISIS invasion of Northern Iraq in 2014 failed to produce a ‘rally around-the-fl ag’ 
eff ect among Iraq’s Shi‘a Islamist political actors.
Arguably, since the 2011 Arab uprisings a greater pan-Shi‘a narrative has 
developed around the notion of ‘a securitisation of Shi‘a identity’. Th is Iraqi 
Shi’a narrative should not be reduced, however, to an essentialist reading of 
an alliance based on reasserting Shi‘a dominance in the region, but rather as a 
means for Iraqi Shi‘a political parties to legitimise power within their national 
sett ing. By virtue of a shared identity, Iraqi Shi‘a can form connections with Iran, 
and vice versa, but this relationship is shift ing, informed by political bargaining 
and competition among themselves and with Tehran. Indeed, before and aft er 
the Arab uprisings, Iraqi Shi‘a Islamist elites have contested power and formed 
shift ing alliances, due to infl uences ranging from domestic opportunity 
structures to the role of opportunities posed by external actors, such as Iran. 
Based on this past precedent, and with tensions likely to continue unabated in 
Iraq in the near future between the Shi‘a Islamist parties, ISIS remnants and 
other Arab Sunni and Kurdish parties, confl ict and policy divisions are likely 
to prevail over the sense of Shi‘a unity in the foreseeable future.
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Chapter 17
The impact of Islamist trajectories 
on the international relations of 
the post-2011 Middle East
Katerina Dalacoura
Th is chapter interprets the ‘international relations of the Middle East’ as the 
complex web of linkages that criss-cross the region and embed it in world 
politics. Th ey include the foreign policies of states, but also of non-state actors, 
and the foreign policies of regional states but also of major outside powers 
involved in the region, mainly the United States and Russia. Th e international 
relations of the Middle East are not, however, only about actors’ decisions and 
their implementation: they also encompass shift ing relations, connections, 
alliances and balances of power. Th ese shift ing connections and balances 
are determined by material, political and military factors but also by ideas, 
ideologies, and abstract values such as ‘recognition’ and ‘legitimacy’.1
Th is chapter, however, does not deal with the international relations of 
the Middle East in their totality but only to the extent they have been shaped 
by the diff erent trajectories (or trends) that can be observed within Islamist 
movements and ideologies in the region since the uprisings of 2011. It must, 
therefore, at its outset identify and outline these trajectories. Th is is no easy 
task, given that ‘Islam’ is woven into the fabric of Middle Eastern politics in a 
variety of ways: even secular movements and political actors make reference 
to it as a set of cultural idioms or as a marker of identity. Th is is not unique to 
the Muslim-majority societies of the Middle East, but what is particular is that 
the region contains quite a number of movements, peaceful and violent, with 
an explicitly Islamist agenda. It is these movements, not the role of ‘Islam’ in 
general, that this chapter investigates.
Specifi cally, the chapter will focus on those Islamist movements that rose 
to prominence or changed signifi cantly as a result of the 2011 uprisings and, at 
the same time, had an impact on the international relations of the region. Th e 
author will hence not be concentrating, for example, on the Kuwaiti or Algerian 
Islamist movements, which are important in themselves but were not changed 
signifi cantly by the uprisings, or on the Moroccan Islamists or the Egyptian 
Salafi s whose political fortunes were shaped by the 2011 uprisings but who 
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did not impact the international relations of the region directly. Moreover, 
this author defi nes governments such as Iran, Saudi Arabia or Egypt under 
President Mohamed Morsi (r.2012–13) as Islamist actors but examine their 
foreign policies only insofar as they pursue Islamist objectives, not in general.
Th is chapter argues that there have been three major strands within Islamism 
in the Middle East since 2011 and that each was aff ected signifi cantly by the 
uprisings of that year (this is what the word ‘trajectories’ in the title refers to). Th e 
fi rst is constituted by the historically pre-existing, more ‘established’ Islamism, 
pursuing a ‘third-worldist’ or anti-imperialist agenda, associated with Iran 
and Hizbullah, which in the 2000s had defi ned itself as ‘the resistance’ against 
Israel and the West. Th is Islamist strand experienced a change in its fortunes 
and regional standing following the 2011 revolt against Bashar al-Assad and 
the decision by Hizbullah and Iran to take his regime’s side in the Syrian civil 
war that followed. Th e second strand includes (but is not exclusively confi ned 
to) the moderate al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) and 
al-Nahda (Renaissance) movements in Egypt and Tunisia, which rose to 
political power through elections following the overthrow of the Mubarak and 
Ben Ali regimes and then lost power through a military coup or loss of public 
support. Th ese moderate movements shaped the international relations of the 
region either directly, by changing Egypt’s and Tunisia’s foreign policies, or 
indirectly, by contributing to a shift  in regional balances of power. Th e third 
trend comprises radical Islamist movements such as al-Dawla al-Islamiyya 
(Islamic State, IS) and al-Qaeda, and others, which emerged, or re-emerged, 
as a result of the Syrian civil war and continuing internal division in Iraq, the 
security vacuum in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, and, even more seriously, in 
Libya aft er the fall of the al-Qaddafi  regime following the 2011 uprising. Th e 
chapter covers each of these in turn in its three sections, outlines its impact 
and concludes by assessing their collective eff ect on the region and its future. 
Th e author notes that the regional confl icts that have erupted as a result of the 
2011 uprisings have connections with, and in some cases have been fed by, 
pre-existing ones, such as the internal confl ict in Iraq, the Israeli–Palestinian 
confl ict, the Kurdish confl ict and many others. Th is chapter touches on these 
only insofar as they are relevant to its argument.
The de-legitimation of ‘third-worldist’ Islamism and 
the growth of sectarianism
During the 2000s, one of the two core confrontations that characterised the 
international relations of the Middle East was between a ‘pro-Western’ camp, 
comprising Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and a loose coalition of state 
and non-state actors, led by Iran and joined by Hizbullah, Hamas and others. 
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Despite the presence of secular actors, such as the Baathist Syrian regime, the 
camp was partly associated with and, indeed, driven by, an Islamist ideology 
of a third-worldist, anti-imperialist kind symbolised above all by Hizbullah. 
Th e group presented itself as the heart of the resistance against Israel and the 
West in the Middle East. It had emerged in 2000 as the sole (Arab) entity that 
had ‘defeated’ Israel, in that it had forced the Israeli government to withdraw 
most of its armed forces from Southern Lebanon aft er a lengthy confl ict. 
Th e anti-Western camp’s agenda was popular in the Arab world and beyond, 
particularly aft er the brief Lebanon war of 2006 which confi rmed, in the 
eyes of some, Hizbullah’s ability to withstand the might of Israel. Hizbullah 
had been closely associated with Iran since its inception. Iran also supported 
Hamas, particularly aft er it took over control of Gaza in 2007.2 In the years 
aft er the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the government in Baghdad also aligned 
itself loosely with Tehran. Confrontations between Hamas and Israel, in 
particular in December 2008–January 2009, in which Hamas was supported 
by Iran and Hizbullah, confi rmed Hamas’ centrality, symbolic and military, to 
the anti-Western camp. Th e ‘nuclear issue’ – the charge, or suspicion, by the 
West and the international community more generally that Iran was on track 
to build nuclear weapons – was part and parcel of this struggle between Iran 
and the West.3
Th is situation changed signifi cantly with the eruption of the Syrian crisis 
following the popular rebellion against the al-Assad regime in 2011. Th e 
people’s insurrection turned into a civil war in Syria, pitt ing the regime against 
an array of forces, from moderate to extremist, mostly Sunni Islamist: from the 
Syrian al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and the Syrian Free Army to Jabhat al-Nusra, an 
affi  liate of al-Qaeda, and IS, an indirect product of al-Qaeda in Iraq which had 
been defeated there aft er 2006.4 Iran and Hizbullah were sucked into the Syrian 
crisis by their decision to support the al-Assad regime militarily. Hizbullah in 
particular became increasingly involved in a conventional confl ict, gaining 
considerable experience in this type of warfare.5 Th is has strengthened the 
movement in material terms, but has severely diminished its standing and 
damaged the legitimacy it had previously enjoyed in the Arab world. From the 
hero of the Arab world against Israel it has come to be seen, at least by some, as 
an ally of the butchers of Damascus.6 Hizbullah’s loss of the moral high ground 
as proud resistance to the universal Israeli enemy was underlined by the fact 
that Israel looked unfavourably on the loss of control by al-Assad, thereby 
belonging in some way to the same ‘side’ as Hizbullah.
Th e main consequence of this development has been the gradual identifi ca-
tion of Hizbullah and Iran with a sectarian (Shi‘a) as opposed to an Islamist 
third-worldist and anti-imperialist agenda. Iran’s and Hizbullah’s support 
of the al-Assad regime has come to be seen as support for their fellow Shi‘a 
(specifi cally Alawites, the Shi‘a off shoot from which many of the al-Assad 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   293 05/01/18   6:48 PM
294 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
regime personnel are drawn), against Syria’s Sunnis. Th e changing fortunes 
of Hamas are evidence of this ‘sectarianisation’. Th e Hamas leadership, and 
in particular Khaled Mashal, had been sheltered by the al-Assad regime in 
Damascus for years, but following the start of the crisis in Syria in 2011 left  
for Egypt and then Qatar. Th e reasons for this decision were complex, but a 
key element was that, partly as a result of their MB antecedents, Hamas found 
themselves unable to side with al-Assad in an increasingly sectarian-tinged 
confrontation. Hamas’ decision strained its relationship with Iran, which only 
started to partially mend in 2014.7
Th e implications of the change in this Islamist strand from a third-worldist, 
anti-imperialist agenda towards a more sectarian one have been profound 
for the international relations of the Middle East. Th e Syrian civil war has 
triggered a regional clash between the supporters of al-Assad (Iran, Hizbullah) 
and his opponents (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) which has, in turn, acquired a 
sectarian colouring.8 Th e Barack Obama (r.2009–17) administration’s att empt 
to extricate the United States from the Middle East,9 and the growing asser-
tiveness of Saudi Arabia at a regional level, contributed to the transformation 
of the confrontation between ‘pro-Western’ and ‘third-wordlist’ camps into a 
‘Sunni–Shi‘a’ one led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively. Th e confrontation 
is the latest incarnation of a historical enmity between the two countries that 
goes back to the establishment of the Islamic Republic following the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 and the twin ideological and geopolitical challenge it 
posed to Saudi–Wahhabi Islam and the Saudi monarchy. In the Middle East 
environment defi ned by the 2011 rebellions, the renewed Saudi–Iranian 
antagonism has tangible and pernicious implications in many parts of the 
region. One example is Yemen, where the Saudi–Iranian clash, with its 
Sunni–Shi‘a hue, has been super-imposed on and exacerbated a complex set 
of internal confl icts that erupted into violence following the domestic changes 
in 2011–12.10 Bahrain is another example where a Shi‘a uprising against the 
Sunni regime provoked a Saudi intervention in 2011, partly because of the 
conviction that it was instigated by Iran.11
Since the rise of IS in 2014, a further shift  may be occurring in regional 
balances, with potential implications for the ‘third-worldist’ camp. IS has 
increasingly drawn the United States and the West into the Syrian civil war 
but it is also a threat to the al-Assad regime and, by implication, to Iran and 
Hizbullah, as well as Russia, which supports their side (through direct military 
intervention since September 2015).12 Th is may lead to a convergence 
between the al-Assad regime and parts of the opposition as they focus on a 
common enemy. Th e Iran nuclear deal of 2015 between Tehran and the fi ve 
permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany did not 
tackle the Syria crisis but may play an enabling role, should other conditions 
permit an agreement in Syria in future.13 Such an agreement can potentially 
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att enuate the confl ict between Iran, Hizbullah and the West and between Iran 
and Turkey14 – though not necessarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which 
has deep ideological and geopolitical roots and has now acquired a strong 
sectarian dimension – with signifi cant regional implications, including for the 
position of Israel.
The rise and fall of moderate Islam
Th e 2011 uprisings led to rapid and dramatic changes in the fortunes of 
moderate Islamist movements in the Middle East. Th e overthrow of presidents 
Hosni Mubarak (r.1981–2011) and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (r.1987–2011) in 
Egypt and Tunisia respectively was the result of a popular uprising (in the case 
of Egypt also backed by the military) with inchoate demands. However, in both 
cases, mainly because of their superior organisation and their implicit promise 
of social justice, the Islamist MB and al-Nahda were able to benefi t from the 
electoral contests that followed the fall of the regimes.15 In 2011–12, the MB 
affi  liate Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala (Freedom and Justice Party, FJP) won a 
plurality of seats in both houses of the Egyptian parliament, and in June 2012 
Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, became president of Egypt. 
Similarly, in Tunisia, al-Nahda, by then transformed into a registered political 
party, became the largest participant in a coalition government in 2012–13 that 
included secular and left ist parties. Neither in Egypt nor in Tunisia, however, 
did this rise of the moderate Islamist groups to power end well for them.16 
Morsi was overthrown by a military coup in July 2013, but this was on the 
back of a tremendous turnaround in popular opinion against the Brotherhood, 
which mismanaged power and showed itself incompetent and unable to 
work with others (though, to be fair, others were also unwilling to work with 
them). Al-Nahda, meanwhile, was able to form coalition governments in 
Tunisia, but its popularity suff ered anyway because of its own mistakes and 
the diffi  cult situation that it faced in political, economic and security terms. 
Th e result was the loss of its plurality in the parliamentary elections of October 
2014. In other sett ings, such as Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait, the situation of 
moderate Islamist movements also changed as a result of the 2011 uprisings 
but in less direct and clear-cut ways.17 In places where ‘hot’ wars broke out, in 
Syria and Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood and other moderate groups became 
marginalised as extremists gained ground.
Th e fl uctuating fortunes of moderate Islamist movements shaped the 
international relations of the Middle East directly through the changes that 
the MB and al-Nahda eff ected in Egyptian and Tunisian foreign policies. Th e 
overthrow of Mubarak unsett led regional and Western actors, with Saudi 
Arabia in particular accusing the United States of ‘abandoning’ Mubarak. It also 
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caused uncertainty in Israel, which feared the implications of the regime’s fall 
for Gaza. Th e military-controlled transitional regime that replaced Mubarak 
did not signal a major change of direction in foreign policy but this did occur, 
to an extent, with Morsi’s arrival in the presidency. Although they did not have 
full control of the reins of power or foreign policy, the MB steered Egypt to a 
closer relationship with Qatar and Turkey. Th eir presence in government also 
further alienated Saudi Arabia, because of the latt er’s historical and ideological 
antipathy towards the Brotherhood. Th e arrival of the Brotherhood in the seat 
of Egyptian power also boosted Hamas in neighbouring Gaza which, as we 
saw, had been weakened by the crisis of its relations with the Iran camp. Th is 
caused further alarm in Israel and has had implications for the situation in 
Sinai, to be discussed below.18 Finally, Brotherhood control had implications 
for Egypt’s relationship with the United States, which scrambled to establish a 
modus vivendi with the Morsi administration.19
Th e changes Tunisia experienced in its foreign policy and positioning in 
the Middle East had some parallels with Egypt, though Tunisia is a smaller 
actor with a diff erent and distinct foreign policy history. Th e participation 
of al-Nahda as the major partner in the coalition government that replaced 
Ben Ali led to partial changes in Tunisia’s external relations and position. Th e 
presence of the centrist (in Islamist terms) al-Nahda in government did not 
aff ect Tunisia’s Western orientation and it continued being supported by the 
West and international fi nancial institutions. However, regional relations saw 
some modifi cation. While Nahda was in the ascendant, Qatar supported and 
began investing in the country, while Saudi Arabia kept its distance, again 
because of its historical and ideological antipathy towards the dominant 
party.20 Turkey also became a key supporter of Tunisia, because of the close 
relations and affi  nity between the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ( Justice and 
Development Party, also known by its Turkish acronym AKP) and al-Nahda. 
When the government changed in Tunisia and al-Nahda lost its principal role, 
fi rst in February 2013 with the resignation of the Hamadi Jebali government 
and then in October 2014 with the electoral victory of the secularist Hizb 
Nida’ Tunis (Call of Tunisia), a recalibration of Tunisia’s regional relations 
took place, with Qatar and Turkey receding in prominence.21
Th e changing fortunes of moderate Islamist movements also had a broader 
impact on the international relations of the region. Th e rise of the MB in Egypt – 
and, secondarily, of al-Nahda in Tunisia – alarmed Saudi Arabia, which saw the 
political model they represented as antagonistic to its own. It thus redoubled 
its eff orts to combat the Muslim Brotherhood, not just in those two countries 
but also across the region; taking dramatic action in June 2017 against Qatar 
because of its support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi success in doing 
so entailed greater legitimacy in the region for its model of government or 
Islamism as opposed to a ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ model, which entailed a more 
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politicised role for Islam. However, it also contained a danger for Saudi Arabia, 
in that it opened a second front in its regional policy, alongside the one with 
Iran. Th e military coup against Morsi in July 2013 caused a rift  between the 
new president Abdel Fatt ah al-Sisi and Turkey, and tension between Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia. Relations between the latt er two had improved by 2015 
(though they deteriorated again during the Qatar crisis, as Turkey supported it 
against Saudi Arabia), but the coldness between Egypt and Turkey was more 
long-standing, with diplomatic relations severed following the expulsion of 
the Turkish ambassador from Cairo in November 2013.22
Th e fall of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the decline of the political 
fortunes of al-Nahda in Tunisia also aff ected the regional standing of Qatar 
and Turkey, which had staked their regional policy to a considerable extent 
on the ascendance of the two movements. Th e blow was particularly hard for 
Turkey, whose appeal and popularity in the Middle East had soared in the 
period immediately aft er the 2011 Arab uprisings. Finally, as already suggested, 
Hamas had been boosted by the support of the Morsi government but, 
conversely, it suff ered as a result of its overthrow.23 Th e Gaza blockade, which 
had been eased between 2012 and 2013, was tightened again with the arrival of 
the al-Sisi government in July 2013 as it reverted to closer collaboration with 
Israel. Th e changing standing of Hamas as a result of domestic developments 
in Egypt aff ected its relationship with Iran, as we saw in the previous section.
The growth of Islamist extremism
Th e third way in which the 2011 uprisings shaped Islamism in the Middle 
East region was in strengthening extremist movements. Like the electoral 
successes of moderate Islamist groups in Egypt and Tunisia, this was not 
a direct product of popular demands or preferences. On the contrary, the 
millions who mobilised to overthrow repressive regimes in the region did not 
call for an Islamic system or show support for extremist Islamist ideas, and 
it would be fair to say that the rebellions indicated a marginalisation of such 
ideas. Rather than the product of popular choice, the upsurge in extremism 
in the post-2011 Middle East was the result of the vacuum of power that was 
created by the breakdown of state institutions, as popular uprisings in some 
cases caused insurrection and civil war. Th is development had two epicentres 
(which eventually became inter-connected) in the Fertile Crescent and North 
Africa. Th e impact of this upsurge in extremism was felt far and wide in the 
region and beyond, with Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, Europe and even the United States, suff ering att acks directed or 
inspired by al-Qaeda and IS. It also had some, albeit indirect, implications for 
the situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban insurgency is continuing.24
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Th e eruption of violence in Syria in 2011 stoked the coals of confl ict in 
Iraq, which had hardly died down aft er the bloody decade that followed the 
US invasion of 2003. During that time, chaos and bloodshed had enabled the 
birth of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a ‘franchise’ of al-Qaeda, which had employed vicious 
violent tactics in support of the Sunnis of Iraq. Th e group was crushed in the 
period aft er 2006, as we saw, but elements of it re-emerged a few years later, in 
the form of IS, as a result of the sectarian policies of the al-Maliki government 
and Iraqi Shi‘a majoritarianism in general. IS found some support among the 
disillusioned Sunni minority and former Baathists populated its ranks.25 It 
gained control of the city of Mosul in June 2014 and other signifi cant parts 
of Iraq. From there it spread to Syria where it secured territory centred on the 
city of Raqqa. Th e deepening of the civil war in Syria led to the sidelining of 
moderates such as the Syrian MB and the proliferation of extremist groups, 
alongside IS, the most signifi cant of which was Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s 
‘franchise’ in Syria from 2012 until it cut ties with it in 2016).26 All of them, 
including their opponents – led by the al-Assad regime – purveyed an extreme 
brutality but the IS ‘brand’ was particularly dependent on a twisted and vicious 
image that contributed to its appeal abroad and ‘pull’ of jihadists from Europe, 
the Middle East, Central and Southern Asia and the Caucasus.27
Th e upsurge in Islamist extremism in the Fertile Crescent caused it to spill 
over into North Africa, where it was fed by the breakdown of authority. In 
the Sinai Peninsula, a combination of local Bedouin discontent and Islamist 
infi ltration from outside had caused violence and instability since the early 
2000s, and even earlier. When the Egyptian government’s control over Sinai 
diminished aft er the overthrow of Mubarak, the pre-existing situation was 
exacerbated, leading to the emergence of the radical Islamist group Ansar Bayt 
al-Maqdis group (Partisans of the Holy Place/Jerusalem). It pledged allegiance 
to IS in 2014 and continued to wreak havoc against the Egyptian army and 
security forces, even extending its activities to Cairo.28
Competition between IS and al-Qaeda in North Africa fuelled violence 
and pushed them to ever greater extremes. ‘Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’ had had 
a presence in Algeria since the 2000s29 and the arrival of IS caused friction. 
Al-Qaeda has links with the militant al-Shabaab group in Somalia, with the 
latt er pledging allegiance to it in 2012. IS expanded into Libya, taking advantage 
of the chaos there to take over the city of Sirte in the East.30 Th e overthrow 
of the al-Qaddafi  regime in October 2011 had caused the breakdown of state 
institutions (already atrophic because they had been deliberately undermined 
for decades by the regime). Th e result was the collapse of authority, the spread 
of militias and weapon proliferation within Libya and beyond. Th e chaos in 
Libya aff ected the whole of North Africa and the Sahel, already destabilised 
by the confl ict in Mali (in which al-Qaeda is involved) and the rise of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram joined IS in 2015 but then broke away and 
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rivalry between them ensued.31 Algeria, which had not experienced an uprising 
in 2011 or any signifi cant change as a result, suff ered terrorist att acks against 
the In Amenas gas plant in January 2013. Th e consequences for Tunisia were 
even more serious. Its internal Islamist terrorism problem, which had predated 
2011, was aggravated as some Tunisians who had pledged allegiance to IS and 
insurgents from Libya in the south carried out att acks on its territory against 
tourists and Tunisian citizens.32
Th e upsurge in Islamist extremism has reconfi gured the international 
relations of the Middle East in multiple ways, many of which are diffi  cult to make 
out because the situation is still unfolding.33 Jordan and Lebanon have received 
multiple waves of refugees, with implications for their resources, stability and 
security. Turkey has been drawn into the Syrian crisis on its doorstep, both 
unwillingly and as a result of its foreign policy objectives and choices. Th e 
number of refugees it has received is the largest in the region but constitutes a 
much smaller proportion of its population compared to Jordan and Lebanon. 
Turkey’s involvement grew because of its active pursuit of the overthrow of the 
al-Assad regime, from as early as 2011–12. As the crisis unfolded, its reasons for 
intervening became more urgent: the emergence of a Kurdish enclave in Syria 
where a signifi cant organised armed group, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel‎ (People’s 
Protection Units, also known by its Kurdish acronym YPG), with close links to 
the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Worker’s Party, widely known by 
its Kurdish acronym PKK), became the dominant force and alarmed Ankara.34 
Th e emergence of IS in Iraq and Syria worried Turkey, but its primary focus and 
enemy remained the YPG.35 In August 2016, following the failed coup att empt 
against it in July 2015, the AKP government was able to overcome the military’s 
objections and intervene in Syria militarily in a more direct way.
IS’s strategy is to provoke retaliation from its enemies by carrying out 
extreme att acks against them, to create a sense of crisis and mobilise support 
in its favour.36 It did this in Turkey, Jordan, and, further afi eld, in Egypt, France, 
Belgium, Russia and the United States. Th e result has been a concentration of 
eff ort against IS in its stronghold in Iraq and Syria that has reduced its territory 
and weakened it militarily. IS, and other extremist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, 
is not everyone’s primary enemy, however. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are primarily 
concerned to defeat al-Assad, not IS.37 Th e same applies to Turkey, but it may 
currently be changing, as the threat from IS is growing. Turkey’s intervention 
in Northern Syria in late 2016 att empted to also deal with this conundrum. 
Similarly, on the opposing side, Iran, Hizbullah and Russia are concerned with 
al-Assad’s survival, not the elimination of IS. Th is does not bode well for the 
containment of extremism in the Fertile Crescent and beyond. As pointed out 
by the International Crisis Group, enmity between Middle Eastern states is 
so profound at present that ‘regional powers worry less about extremists than 
about their rivals, or even quietly indulge these groups as proxies’.38
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In North Africa, we can observe a similar patt ern of various regional and 
global actors being drawn into local confl icts because of the rise of Islamist 
extremism. Th e situation in Sinai is causing concern in Israel. In February 2015, 
21 Egyptian Copts were kidnapped and beheaded by IS in Libya. In March 
2016 Tunisia suff ered an att ack from IS along its southern border with Libya. 
Both of these att acks caused retaliation, particularly from Egypt. Western 
powers, and particularly the United States, have been increasingly concerned 
with the turmoil and fragmentation of authority in Libya, which have allowed 
IS to gain a foothold. NATO intervention enabled the fall of al-Qaddafi  but 
Western powers withdrew aft er the event. Th ey have returned in support of the 
internationally recognised government of Libya, hounding IS from its basis in 
Sirte with a bombing campaign in the course of 2016 and ensuring that only 
some elements of it remained in place in Libya in 2017.
Conclusion
Th e 2011 uprisings, and the confl icts they gave rise to, have had a signifi cant 
impact on Islamist movements and ideologies in the Middle East which, in turn, 
have transformed the international relations of the region. Th e foreign policies of 
state and non-state actors have been altered, the standing and identities of these 
actors have been infl uenced and region-wide alliances and balances of power 
have been changed. Th e Middle East continues to be embedded fi rmly within 
global economic structures and to be the focus of the att ention of global powers 
and interests in political and security terms: what happens there reverberates far 
beyond its boundaries. As a result, outside powers have been sucked back into 
the Middle East and are becoming increasingly involved in its confl icts once 
again. Th is, in turn, has impacted on regional policies and balances.
Th is chapter has argued that there are three major ‘Islamist’ trends or strands 
in the Middle East whose trajectories have been changed by the 2011 uprisings 
and the confl icts that derived from them, with signifi cant implications for the 
international relations of the region. Th e fi rst consists of a more ‘established’ 
revolutionary, ‘third-worldist’ and anti-imperialist Islamism, sponsored by Iran 
and centred on Hizbullah. Th e focus of this constellation of Islamist actors has 
shift ed, in eff ect, from Israel to Syria. Th is has meant that the rivalry between the 
Iran-centred and Western-centred camps that has defi ned the region since the 
2000s, if not before, has taken a diff erent form. Th e main confrontation is now 
between an Iran-led and a Saudi-led camp, with the result that the ideological 
dimension of the confrontation has been att enuated and the sectarian one 
(with all the things that it obscures and skews) has been strengthened. Th e 
emergence of extremism in the shape of IS in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and the 
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nuclear deal with Iran sponsored by the Obama administration in 2015, could 
have lead to the toning down of the rivalry between the West, specifi cally the 
United States, and Iran (though this now seems to have dissipated with the 
arrival of Trump in the White House). Th e extent to which this will have an 
impact on the Iran–Saudi relationship more broadly is not clear, however, 
given the profound and multi-faceted antagonism between them.
Th e second important strand in the Middle East region whose trajectory has 
been aff ected by the 2011 uprisings and subsequent confl icts is moderate Islam. 
Th e political fortunes of the MB in Egypt and al-Nahda in Tunisia appeared to 
improve following the uprisings but then declined equally dramatically. Th e 
rise and fall of moderate Islam changed Egyptian and (less so) Tunisian foreign 
policies. It aff ected the region-wide confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
directly, through the changing position of Hamas, and also in many indirect 
ways. It refashioned relationships and balances within the ‘anti-Iran’ camp, so to 
speak, creating tension between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. Turkish and 
Qatari support for the MB in Egypt and Saudi support for the Sisi regime that 
overthrew it caused bad blood between these powers, which also fi nd themselves 
supporting diff erent groups in the anti-al-Assad coalition in Syria.
Finally, the rise of extremism in the form of a continuing al-Qaeda insurgency 
and the new phenomenon of IS has heightened chaos and instability in the 
region by hardening confl ict and increasing the cost of compromise. Th e rise 
of extremism has changed relations and identities and reinforced sectarianism 
in the region as a whole. It has also led to rebalancing, though in the current 
situation of turmoil future patt erns are diffi  cult to discern. Defeating Islamist 
extremism is not necessarily the priority for all the parties intervening in Syria 
and Libya but they may in the end achieve its defeat or containment. IS, aft er all, 
has no powerful allies or sponsors and its strategy of provoking over-reaction 
seems to have become self-defeating. Th e rise of extremism has drawn the West, 
and specifi cally the United States, back into the region and Russian support of 
al-Assad has placed the two powers on opposing sides in the Syrian civil war. 
Th is may change if the United States and Russia perceive a convergence of 
interests in Syria but the course of their relationship – and its potential impact 
on the Middle East – are particularly diffi  cult to predict under the Donald 
Trump administration, whose policies in Syria have not yet crystalised.
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Chapter 18
Islamism in Yemen: from Ansar 
Allah to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula
Vincent Durac
On 21 September 2014, fi ghters belonging to the Houthi movement, also 
known as Ansar Allah, entered the Yemeni capital Sana’a, sett ing off  a chain of 
events that led to the overthrow of the internationally recognised government 
of Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, civil war and ultimately military intervention 
in Yemen by an alliance of states led by Saudi Arabia with the objective of 
defeating the Houthis and restoring the political status quo ante. Th e war in 
Yemen has been read variously in terms of a sectarian civil war in which the 
Houthis – a Zaydi Shi‘a movement – is engaged in confl ict with representa-
tives of the majority Sunni Muslim population of the country, or, alternatively, 
as another front in the regional confl ict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
According to this latt er reading, the Houthis function as Iranian proxies while 
the Saudi-led intervention is designed to restore the power of its local allies 
in Yemen and limit, if not eliminate, the infl uence of Iran in the country. Th is 
chapter will argue that, notwithstanding the signifi cance of religio-political 
cleavages in Yemeni political life or that of the direct entry of regional actors 
into Yemeni aff airs, the confl ict fl ows inexorably not from inherent sectarian 
tensions at either the national or regional levels; rather, it fl ows from the dys-
functionality of the post-2011 transitional process, with roots further back in 
the quasi-authoritarian regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which dominated the 
politics of Yemen from 1990 to 2011.
Th e chapter will fi rst explore the origins of the Houthi movement, its rise 
to prominence and its ideological underpinnings. It will then examine the 
complex relationship between the Houthis and other political actors in Yemen, 
especially other ‘Islamic’ actors such as al-Tajammu‘ al-Yamani lil-Islah (Yemeni 
Congress for Reform Party, henceforth referred to as al-Islah), Salafi  elements 
and the radical Islamists of Tanzim al-Qaeda fi  Jazirat al-‘Arab (Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, AQAP). Finally, the chapter will locate the ongoing confl ict 
in Yemen in the context of what is oft en represented as a broader regional 
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tension between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam with a view to exploring the extent to 
which it constitutes an expression of specifi cally Yemeni grievances rather than 
another aspect of a regional sectarian confl ict.
The Houthi movement: Origins, ideology and objective
Th e Houthi movement has its origins in Saada governorate in northwest 
Yemen. Saada is the heartland of Zaydi Islam whose adherents comprise 
some 35–40 per cent of the overall population of the country, most of the 
rest following the Shafi ‘i school of Sunni Islam. Zaydism diff ers in signifi cant 
ways from the Twelver Shi‘ism practised in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Zaydism 
emerged in the eighth century AD among early Muslims who believed 
that Ali was the rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad in the spiritual 
and temporal leadership of the Muslim community. Th e Zaydis emerged 
from disagreement among Shi‘a communities as to which descendant of 
Ali should be considered Imam. Unlike the majority, Zaydis consider Zayd 
bin Ali, a grandson of Ali’s son Hussein, to be the fi ft h Imam and became 
known as ‘Fivers’ or Zaydis as a result. Th us, for Zaydis, the spiritual leader of 
the Muslims must be a sayyid or Hashemite1 – a descendant of the Prophet 
through the line of Ali and Fatima – and that leader – the Imam – should also 
be the leader of the state. Zaydism took root in Mesopotamia and Central Asia 
in AD 740 but gradually moved south, where it reached Yemen.2 Zaydism 
diff ers in signifi cant ways from Sunni Islam on the question of leadership of 
the community. However, in other respects Zaydi practices are closer to those 
of Sunnis than they are to the Twelver Shi‘ism practised by the majority of 
Shi‘as worldwide. Zaydis represent themselves as a fi ft h school of thought 
within Islamic jurisprudence rather than as branch of Shi‘ism. Historically, 
Zaydis have not sought to propagate their beliefs, nor does Zaydi doctrine 
embrace the wilayat-al-faqih (the rule of the jurisconsult), as promoted by 
Ayatollah Khomeini and which lies at the heart of political system in Iran. 
Unlike Iranian Twelver Shi‘ism, Zaydism has moved away from the notion of 
rule by an Imam, and contemporary Zaydis are not subordinate to a clerical 
hierarchy.3 As Christopher Boucek notes, Zaydism is frequently viewed as a 
Sunni school of Shi‘ism and Shafi ‘ism as a Shi‘a school of Sunnism.4
Th e Houthi movement emerged from a broader Zaydi revivalist trend 
in Saada in response to a number of factors. Religious considerations 
constituted an important driver of that revival. However, a range of broader 
socio-economic and political factors was also signifi cant. Th ese included the 
widespread perception of the marginalisation of the region by the central 
government in Sana’a; the increasing rapprochement of the regime with 
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Sunni elements and the concomitant increase in the promotion of Sunni and 
Salafi  Islam in the governorate; and changes in the character of Zaydi society 
in Saada.
Saada has long been remote from control and penetration by the 
government in Sana’a. During the civil war that followed the overthrow of 
the imamate in 1962, it became a refuge for supporters of the imamate who 
resisted anti-imamate revolutionary forces. Saada only joined the Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR) following a treaty of reconciliation in 1970.5 Saada is among 
Yemen’s poorest regions and receives litt le by way of government services. Th e 
post-1962 period also witnessed important changes in Zaydi society in Saada, 
which had traditionally been divided between those who claimed descent 
from the Prophet Muhammad through Ali and the rest of the community. 
Th e former were known by the honorifi c title of sayyid and were a privileged 
and educated class. However, post-1962 regimes, although nominally Zaydi, 
condemned their social aloofness and promoted a mainstream Sunnism that 
narrowed the gap between Zaydis and Shafi ‘is further, such that many Zaydis 
no longer defi ned themselves specifi cally as Shi‘a. Th e consequent ‘crisis 
within Zaydism’ was exacerbated by regime promotion of Salafi  ideology in 
the northern highlands and in Saada itself, which provoked a Zaydi backlash. 
Th is process saw the introduction of so-called ‘scientifi c institutes’; that is, 
religious schools that propagated the Wahhabi version of Islam adhered to in 
neighbouring Saudi Arabia.
Th e growing ideological challenge confronting Zaydism in Saada prompted 
the development of a Zaydi revivalist movement. Elite Zaydis took advantage 
of the political pluralism of the newly unifi ed Yemen to establish Hizb al-Haqq 
(Truth Party, henceforth referred to as al-Haqq) as an expression of Zaydi 
interests in response to Wahhabi encroachment. One of these was Badr 
al-Din al-Houthi, a prominent Zaydi scholar. While al-Haqq was established 
as a counter to increasing Wahhabi infl uence, it also constituted an att empt 
to obtain political recognition and largesse from the regime. But, as an elite 
party, disinclined towards mass political participation, it held litt le appeal for 
an increasingly activist younger generation of Northern Zaydis.6
When prominent Zaydi scholars linked to al-Haqq declared that the ruler, 
or Imam, no longer needed to be a Hashemite, Badr al-Din al-Houthi and 
other Saada-based scholars split from it. His son, Hussein al-Houthi, together 
with others, created a network of associations, sports clubs and summer 
camps that came to be known as Muntada al-Shabab al-Mu’min (Believing 
Youth). Believing Youth was rooted in the assertion of the material, political 
and spiritual needs of Saada. Until the late 1990s, both al-Haqq and Believing 
Youth received some support from the regime in Sana’a in its att empts to coun-
terbalance the increased infl uence of Wahhabism and al-Islah, particularly 
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during the legislative elections of 1997, by which time al-Islah had joined the 
political opposition.7
By the 2000s, Believing Youth had begun to lose momentum. Ultimately, 
events at the global level, and responses to them in Saada, led to outright 
confl ict between the regime and the movement. In the aft ermath of the att acks 
of 11 September 2001, the Yemeni president Saleh (r.1990–2012) entered into 
greater levels of cooperation with the United States, becoming an ally in the 
so-called ‘war on terror’. However, closer ties with the US provoked criticism 
within Yemen both from Salafi  elements and from Zaydi revivalists. On 17 
January 2002, Hussein al-Houthi gave a talk in Marran, his home village in 
Saada, in which he called on his compatriots to fi ght against an American 
hegemony that weighed more heavily every day on the Arab and Muslim world 
and to repeat at meetings aft er Friday prayers the slogan: ‘Allahu akbar, al-mawt 
li Amrika, al-mawt li-Isra’il, al-la’na’ala-l-yahud, al-nasr li-l-Islam’ (‘God is great, 
death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, glory to Islam’). In 
January 2003, as Saleh passed through Saada on his way to Mecca, the slogan 
was repeated in his presence and relations between al-Houthi and the regime 
deteriorated further. Aft er the failure of att empts to reconcile the two sides, 
as well as continuing demonstrations including one in the Grand Mosque 
in Sana’a, the government sought to secure al-Houthi’s arrest. Th is led to the 
outbreak of open hostilities between the two sides.8 Between 2004 and 2010, 
the two sides engaged in violent confl ict on six separate occasions. Despite 
the subsequent characterisation of the confl ict between the Houthis and the 
regime as sectarian in nature, each outbreak of fi ghting stemmed from diff erent 
causes. Th e sixth and fi nal round of confl ict broke out in 2009. By November 
2009, the confl ict had assumed a regional dimension as Saudi Arabia directly 
entered the fi ghting to establish a demilitarised zone on the Yemeni side to 
defend against future att acks on Saudi soil. Direct Saudi involvement refl ected 
the broader support off ered by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
to the Yemeni regime while a number of Sunni Arab states lobbied the US to 
encourage its support for the military action.9 A February 2010 truce brought 
the sixth round to an end without any conclusive resolution of the underlying 
confl ict between the Houthis and the regime.
The Sunni Islamist spectrum in Yemen
Th e Sunni Islamist movement in Yemen has its origins in the 1940s when 
Yemenis from both North and South were fi rst exposed to the ideology of 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) in Cairo and Beirut. A 
Muslim Brotherhood movement was established in North Yemen in the 1960s 
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but it had litt le input into formal political life.10 By the 1980s a Brotherhood-
infl uenced ‘Islamic Front’ had developed considerable infl uence within the 
ruling al-Mo‘tamar al-Shaabi al-‘Aam (General People’s Congress, GPC) in 
the YAR. However, in the broader context of the weakness of representative 
institutions within the country, this functioned neither as a party nor as a 
broad-based social movement.11 Th e creation of a multi-party political system 
in the new Republic of Yemen, which emerged from the unifi cation of the YAR 
and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1990, prompted 
debate within Islamist circles regarding the appropriateness of organising and 
competing in a party system. While many rejected the notion, the Muslim 
Brotherhood trend, already active in such political institutions as existed in the 
pre-unifi cation North, joined with Salafi s prepared to engage in party building 
and with signifi cant tribal fi gures, such as Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, to create 
al-Islah.12 Following the fi rst multi-party elections in the new republic, al-Islah 
entered into coalition with Saleh’s GPC. However, the electoral success of 
the GPC in elections held in 1997 meant that the GPC was no longer reliant 
on al-Islah for support and assumed an increasingly authoritarian character. 
Th is led some in al-Islah, particularly, its Muslim Brotherhood component, 
to begin to move towards a more democratic orientation. Saleh’s success in 
the fi rst presidential elections in 1999, with more than 96 per cent of the 
vote, and followed by the adoption of a series of constitutional amendments 
that increased his powers, hastened al-Islah’s move into outright opposition. 
In 2002, the party joined a cross-ideological alliance called Ahzab al-Liqa’ 
al-Mushtarak ( Joint Meeting Parties, henceforth JMP) with the shared aim of 
challenging an increasingly authoritarian regime.13
In contrast to the activism of those involved in al-Islah, the Salafi  trend in 
Yemen has historically been characterised by its quietism. Indeed, Laurent 
Bonnefoy suggests that the denunciation of political participation has 
marked the rhetoric of Yemeni Salafi s more than in other national contexts. 
Membership of political parties was seen as a kind of corruption leading to 
hizbiyya (factionalism). Th us, Yemeni Salafi s also criticised democracy, 
elections and any kind of organisation that implied any kind of loyalty other 
than to God. However, despite apparently implacable opposition to political 
involvement, an association called al-Hikma (Wisdom) was created in 1992 by 
former students at the Dar al-Hadith Study Centre in Dammaj, which, initially 
confi ned to benevolent activities, was gradually drawn into political activities.14 
Nonetheless, prior to the 2011 uprising, no Salafi  leader expressly supported 
the establishment of a political party.
Yemen’s jihadist groups, meanwhile, also reject multi-party politics and 
democracy but have adopted very diff erent means towards the achievement 
of their objectives from those of the Salafi s. Jihadism in Yemen has its origins 
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in the return of fi ghters from the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad in the early 1990s. 
During this period, the so-called Afghan Arabs shared hostility towards the 
socialists of the former PDRY with the Saleh regime and acted as regime 
proxies during the short-lived civil war of 1994. A precursor to al-Qaeda, the 
Aden-Abyan army was established in the late 1990s and was linked to an att ack 
in 2000 on the US warship, USS Cole, which was docked off  Aden harbour. In 
June 2009, AQAP was formed from a merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches 
of al-Qaeda and was considered by the US as the most dangerous branch of 
al-Qaeda. Its infl uence within Yemen was, nonetheless, limited at this point.15
Yemeni Islamism, the uprising and the 
transitional process
Th e political situation in Yemen was transformed utt erly with the outbreak 
of countrywide protests against the Saleh regime in early 2011. Th e protests 
were led by young people, while established political actors initially adopted 
a cautious approach. Th e JMP response to the protests was designed to signal 
its position as ‘loyal opposition’, with reformist rather than revolutionary 
objectives.16 However, by 20 February, the JMP announced an end to dialogue 
with the ruling GPC as it continued to att ack protesters. On the same day, the 
Houthi movement announced that it would cooperate with the protesters in 
the organisation of protests in a number of governorates. Increasing regime 
violence in the face of an expanding protest movement led to signifi cant 
defections from its support base. Following a massacre in Sana’a of demon-
strators leaving Friday prayers on 18 March 2011, a number of members of 
parliament in Saleh’s GPC resigned, as did approximately half of the country’s 
ambassadors. Th e most signifi cant defection was that of General Ali Mohsen, 
who had played a prominent role in the wars in Saada. His defection to the 
protest movement was a refl ection of his opposition to the widely anticipated 
succession to the presidency of Ahmad Saleh, Ali Abdullah’s son, who was 
being groomed for the role. Although widely mistrusted, his defection provided 
the protesters with protection from regime forces. Th e embatt led regime was 
further weakened with the withdrawal of support by the al-Ahmar family.17
Th e instability in the country and the threat of outright civil war prompted 
the intervention of external actors, in the form of the GCC, with Saudi Arabia 
taking the lead. Th e GCC initiated talks in Riyadh between the various factions 
in order to end the crisis. Th ese negotiations led to what became known as 
the GCC Initiative, which Saleh eventually signed in November 2011 having 
initially signalled his willingness to agree to the deal as early as April. Th e GCC 
Initiative contained a number of controversial proposals. Th e GPC and the 
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JMP were signatories to the deal, which provided not for the replacement 
of Saleh’s ruling party in government but for power-sharing between the 
two. Saleh was to step down as president in favour of his deputy, Abd Rabbo 
Mansour Hadi, but retain his position as head of the GPC.
However, the GCC Initiative excluded the youth protesters who had 
initiated the uprising from any share of power, as well as the Houthis and 
southern separatists. Controversially, the deal provided for a grant of immunity 
for Saleh and his family from prosecution for ‘politically motivated’ crimes 
other than terrorist off ences. Th e fi rst phase of the transition process ended 
with the success of Hadi in presidential elections that took place in February 
2012 in which, in accordance with the terms of the GCC deal, he was the only 
candidate.
Th e transitional arrangements envisaged by the GCC Initiative were seen 
very diff erently by the youth protesters and by Islamist actors. Th e concession 
of immunity to Saleh and his associates led protesters to target the JMP for 
its complicity in the deal. Members of the Houthi movement, who had 
cooperated with other elements in the protest movement, including al-Islah, 
began to bring weapons to protest meetings as those collaborative relation-
ships began to disintegrate.18
However, the key terms of the deal greatly increased al-Islah’s power. As 
the largest and best-organised member of the JMP alliance, now sharing 
government with the GPC, al-Islah was in a position to shape the opposition 
half of the transitional government. Th e GCC deal also guaranteed al-Islah 
a signifi cant role in the second phase of the transitional process, which was 
dominated by a National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Th e GCC Initiative 
envisaged that the NDC would address a series of intractable problems facing 
the country by bringing together a diverse set of participants, and would do so 
within a six-month period. Th ese included the draft ing of a new constitution, 
the Southern issue,19 the situation in Saada, promoting progress towards a 
democratic system, and sustainable economic development. To minimise 
some of the complexities of the negotiation process, president Hadi appointed 
a sixteen-member technical preparatory committ ee with representatives across 
the political spectrum, including the youth and civil society movements that 
had emerged during the uprising. Th is committ ee draft ed a twenty-point plan 
of confi dence-building measures to be implemented before the NDC began 
its work. Its work was undermined, however, when Hadi, with the support of 
the JMP, launched the NDC without implementing the plan. Youth and civil 
society representatives on the preparatory committ ee resigned and removed 
their representation from the NDC. Th e main factions of the Southern 
Movement also withdrew from the NDC, to be replaced by representatives of 
other southern factions with litt le support on the ground.20
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Th e dramatic shift  in the political landscape also prompted signifi cant 
developments within Yemen’s Salafi  movement. For many quietist Salafi s 
the region-wide uprisings brought chaos and benefi ted the enemies of Islam. 
However, some prominent leaders began to rethink their loyalty to Saleh as 
the ‘Imam of the Muslims’, as protests accelerated a pre-existing trend towards 
politicisation. Many Salafi  activists participated in the uprising through 
small-scale informal organisations. Th is led to the establishment of Rabitat 
al-Nahda wa al-Taghyir (League of Revival and Change, LRC) to guide these 
associations at the national level. Th is was followed in turn by the formation of 
Itt ihad Rashad (Rashad Union) in March 2012. Th e Rashad Union distanced 
itself from al-Islah’s ‘lack of orthodoxy’ and emphasised its origins as one of 
the rare new parties that were not linked to long-established political actors 
in the country.21 It was allowed to join the NDC as a new party with fi ve seats 
and exercised a rightward infl uence in committ ee sessions by working with 
al-Islah.22
On 21 January 2014, the fi nal NDC document, with almost 1,800 recom-
mendations, was accepted in a plenary session with further agreement that 
Hadi would remain in offi  ce until a new president was elected. However, the 
negotiations were bedevilled by profound disagreement over the Southern 
issue and proposals for a federal structure for the country. In September 2013, 
Hadi appointed another committ ee to explore this question. Aft er months of 
negotiation, there was agreement that Yemen should become a federal state with 
greater local autonomy and control devolved to the regions. But, consensus on 
how much power should be devolved, or how many regions would constitute 
the new federal Yemen, was harder to secure. Th e Southern representatives 
sought a division into just two regions – North and South – which suggested 
a return to the pre-unifi cation situation. Others preferred a division into four, 
fi ve or six regions. Following the conclusion of the NDC, Hadi announced 
that there would be a six-region federal structure – four regions in the North 
and two in the South – in spite of the fact that such a proposal had already 
been proposed and rejected. Hadi’s plan was similarly rejected by Southern 
representatives but also by the Houthis who believed that the plan deprived 
Saada of resources and access to the sea.
Th roughout this period, while Houthi political representatives took part 
in the transitional process, their fi ghters continued to expand their territorial 
control. Having secured control of Saada during the course of the 2011 
uprising, they moved south. Th e short-lived alliance with their old adversaries, 
al-Islah, Ali Mohsen and the al-Ahmar family, began to fray. Clashes within the 
NDC between the Houthis and al-Islah were parallelled by the outbreak of 
armed confl ict between militias allied to each group. By January 2014, batt les 
raged across the north of the country from the border with Saudi Arabia to the 
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gates of Sana’a.23 As the economy entered rapid decline, Hadi introduced a cut 
in fuel subsidies in order to secure fi nancial aid from the IMF and the World 
Bank. Th e protests that ensued gave the Houthis the excuse to enter and take 
control of the capital Sana’a.24
Th e Houthi seizure of Sana’a was made possible in part by a stunning 
shift  in political dynamics. In its initial phases, former president Saleh and 
his supporters accepted the transitional process, on the assumption that his 
continued leadership of the GPC would allow him to maintain infl uence in 
public life. However, as Hadi gradually moved with international support to 
exclude Saleh and his family from positions of infl uence, this position changed. 
By 2014, an utt erly unexpected reconfi guration of forces had developed as 
Saleh and the Houthis entered into an alliance of convenience based on their 
newly shared opponents: Hadi, al-Islah and Ali Mohsen. Th e Houthi expansion 
was greatly aided by the cooperation, or at least non-resistance, of forces loyal 
to former president Saleh.
Following the seizure of the capital, Yemen’s main political parties signed 
a Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) that could have put 
the transition back on track. It mandated the formation of a new inclusive 
government, the withdrawal of Houthi fi ghters from the territories they 
had gained and a review of the issue of state structure. However, neither the 
government nor the Houthis honoured their commitments. Instead, the latt er 
set up a shadow government to oversee ministries and, ostensibly, to fi ght 
corruption. When Hadi tried to push through a federalism scheme to which 
they were opposed and which was in clear violation of the PNPA, they arrested 
a presidential advisor and surrounded the presidential palace. Hadi and his 
government resigned in January 2015. In a further provocation, the Houthis 
appointed a ‘revolutionary council’ by ‘constitutional announcement’ in 
February and marched south towards Aden to which Hadi had fl ed and where 
he had retracted his resignation and re-established his government.25 At this 
point the confl ict was internationalized, as Saudi Arabia, with the support of 
nine other states, launched an air att ack on Houthi military positions with the 
stated objective of restoring the Hadi government and reversing the Houthi 
advance.26
Th e ensuing political instability provided an opening for radical Islamists. 
While the outbreak of the uprising in 2011 had taken AQAP by surprise, it 
took advantage of the breakdown of regime control to entrench itself in the 
southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa and declared several towns to 
be ‘Islamic emirates’. It also ‘rebranded’ itself Ansar al-Shari‘ah (Partisans of 
Islamic Law) in an att empt to dilute the negative connotations of the global 
al-Qaeda brand.27 By March 2015, al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, IS) had 
emerged on the scene with four coordinated suicide att acks on mosques in 
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Sana’a frequented by Houthis. Both AQAP and IS have benefi ted from state 
collapse and the opportunity to present themselves as bett er alternatives to the 
state in providing services, from Houthi expansionism and the preoccupation 
of regional states with the threat of Iran, and from a war economy, which has 
allowed AQAP, in particular, to increase its resources through bank raids, the 
control of seaports and smuggling.28
Confl ict in Yemen: Sectarian war or 
regional rivalry by proxy?
Th e ongoing confl ict in Yemen is complex and multi-dimensional in its 
origins and character. However, it is frequently seen in simplistic terms. At the 
domestic level, the confl ict is represented as a batt le between the Zaydi Shi‘ism 
of the Houthis and their Sunni Muslim adversaries. Sectarianism also informs 
the rationalisation of the war as a front in a broader regional rivalry between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. In this version of events, the Saudi intervention is 
designed to prevent its most populous neighbour from falling into the hands 
of a Hizbullah-type movement sponsored by Iran.
Th e charge of sectarianism has been frequently voiced by Yemeni regimes, 
both before and aft er the uprising. In particular, the suggestion is made that 
the Houthis, despite protestations to the contrary, reject the republican status 
quo and seek to restore the imamate. For the Hadi government, Saudi Arabia 
and its GCC allies, the Houthis constitute a radicalised Zaydi movement with 
a political leadership tied to, and directed by, Iran. Fear of Iranian infl uence 
is deepened by statements made by some Iranian politicians in praise of the 
Houthis. However, the suggestion that the confl ict in Yemen is primarily 
sectarian in nature and that it constitutes another ‘front’ in a broader regional 
(and also fundamentally sectarian) struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran is 
simplistic and belies both history and current realities.
As has been seen, the Houthi movement emerged as a vehicle of Zaydi 
revivalism in Saada, but also as a response to its marginalisation by the central 
state and its economic underdevelopment by successive regimes in Sana’a. 
Furthermore, the argument that the confl ict is, in essence, Shi‘a versus Sunni 
Islam overstates the diff erences between them, while ignoring the profound 
diff erences between Zaydism and the Twelver Shi‘ism of Iran, for whom the 
Houthis are purported proxies. Th e ‘sectarian’ argument overlooks the fact 
that the Saleh regime has sought, at various points and for political gain, to 
co-opt the Houthis as well as to crush them, as, at various points, he sought 
to manipulate Sunni Islamism, in the form of al-Islah and the AQAP, in order 
to secure party and personal advantage. Th is instrumental approach is evident 
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in the extremely unlikely alliance that developed during the transitional phase 
between the Houthis and their former adversaries in the GPC. But profound 
diff erences persist between the two sides. Many of Saleh’s supporters identify 
themselves as members of a centrist, non-religious party, and remain extremely 
wary of what they regard as religious radicals who have opened the door to 
sectarianism in Yemen and unnecessarily provoked confl ict by their rash 
actions. Many Houthi, in turn, fi nd it impossible to trust Saleh or his supporters 
and hold him responsible for the killing of their founder, Hussein al-Houthi.29
Th e argument that the confl ict has an underlying sectarian character at the 
domestic level is also undermined by analysis of the complexity of the forces 
arrayed against the Houthi–Saleh ‘alliance’. Th is constitutes an essentially 
incoherent mix of Sunni Islamists, including the AQAP and IS, a diverse mix 
of Southern separatists, as well as what is left  of the internationally recognised 
government. Th e Islamists include al-Islah, a party that has participated in the 
political system since 1990 and that has cooperated in opposition with secular 
and Zaydi parties in the JMP since 2002. Furthermore, al-Islah cooperated with 
the Houthis in 2011 during the course of the uprising. Th e anti-Houthi forces 
also include the violent Islamists of the AQAP and IS. Southern separatists are 
internally divided along several fault lines – on whether to push for immediate 
independence along regional lines – and there are important divides between 
fi ghters from diff erent governorates of the South, and along religious lines 
between Islamists and non-Islamists in the Southern movement.30
Equally simplistic is the argument that Yemen’s war is litt le more than a proxy 
for a broader Saudi–Iran contest. Th e Saudi interest in Yemen is consistent over 
the decades. However, Saudi policy has been anything but consistent, while 
Iranian involvement in Yemen is greatly overstated and largely opportunistic 
in nature. Saudi policy towards Yemen has traditionally been directed more by 
the desire to contain Yemen’s chaos than as ‘a theatre for regional competition’.31 
Indeed, while Saudi Arabia has a long-standing set of strategic interests in 
Yemen, it has pursued a variety of strategies in its assertion of those interests. 
During the civil war that followed the overthrow of the Zaydi imamate in 1962, 
the Saudis supported anti-revolutionary Zaydi forces against Arab nationalist 
republicans backed by their then regional rival, Nasserist Egypt. During the 
1980s, the Saudis became a direct patron of the Yemeni government as well 
as military and tribal leaders, paying them a monthly stipend for most of the 
fi rst thirty years of Saleh’s rule. However, when Saleh backed Saddam Hussein 
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, ties with Saleh were cut and an 
estimated one million Yemeni migrants deported from Saudi Arabia.32 Four 
years later, and in part response to this, Saudi Arabia supported southern se-
cessionists in the short-lived civil war of 1994; a decision that had litt le to do 
with sectarian or religious motivation and everything to do with teaching a 
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former ally a lesson. Th e instrumental character of its policy towards Yemen 
is refl ected in the fact that, in spite of its subsequent intervention to address 
Houthi expansionism, it was suspected that the Saudi regime was happy to 
see the Houthis and al-Islah weaken each other during the early days of the 
current confl ict.33 Th is is not least because of lingering Saudi hostility towards 
the broader Muslim Brotherhood movement, of which al-Islah is an off shoot.
Th e Saudi-led intervention undoubtedly refl ects concern about deepening 
Iranian involvement on its southern border. However, it is also related to 
domestic power calculations. Th e military intervention followed the death of 
King Abdullah in January 2015, the accession of Salman to the Saudi throne, 
and his appointment of his son, Mohamed ibn Salman, to the positions of 
Crown Prince and Minister of Defence. Th us the war’s outcome is linked also 
to the fortunes of the ruling family at a time of transition in Saudi Arabia itself.
Iranian involvement in Yemen is less signifi cant and even less driven by 
sectarian motivations. As with the Saudis, historically Iran has pursued an 
instrumental foreign policy in Yemen tied not to religion but to perceptions 
of where regime interests lay. Prior to the 1979 revolution, the Shah’s regime 
cooperated with Riyadh in backing the imamate in the north of Yemen. 
Aft er 1979, the YAR maintained close relations with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
and supported it during the Iran–Iraq war. However, subsequently relations 
between Saleh and Tehran became more cordial – in 1986 he met with the then 
Iranian Foreign Minister to express support for Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear 
programme.34 Relations began to sour as Saleh accused Iran of providing the 
Houthis with support. Nonetheless, Saleh never supplied defi nitive proof 
of this and cables revealed by WikiLeaks suggest that the US embassy was 
unconvinced of the merit of the claims.35 Aft er 2011, and again aft er 2014, it 
was widely suspected that the Iranians had increased the level of support to the 
Houthis. However, the evidence is anecdotal and unclear.36
Conclusion
While the confl ict in Yemen undoubtedly has sectarian overtones and has 
indeed drawn in regional actors, it is primarily a refl ection of the failures of the 
transitional process that followed the 2011 uprising. Almost from the outset, 
there was a failure to address the political, economic and regional grievances 
that underpinned the uprising. Th e intervention of external actors in early 2011 
and the GCC Initiative that followed resulted in an agreement that guaranteed 
the survival of political elites but failed to establish an inclusive government. 
Neither was a transitional justice system put in place, nor were any of those 
accused of human rights violations brought to justice.37 Th e GCC Initiative 
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paid lip service to the demands of protesters – for example, Saleh was forced to 
leave the presidential offi  ce – but the structures of his regime were maintained 
and the position of many of those closest to him were protected through 
immunity from prosecution. As president, Hadi, who was elected in what 
was a plebiscite rather than a competitive electoral process, lacked legitimacy 
and compounded this through mismanagement of key issues, especially the 
question of the federal structure of the country. Th roughout the transitional 
period, levels of violence and instability increased, as did socio-economic 
distress. Th e NDC process was fl awed from the outset. It was intended to 
promote a national conversation about its future political organisation. 
However, from the beginning marginalised groups and civil society represen-
tatives complained that the process did not translate into more transparent 
or accountable government.38 Stacey Philbrick Yadav has argued that at every 
stage in the NDC planning process, inclusivity was scutt led in favour of the 
embedded interests of established partisan, military and tribal fi gures, while 
more Yemenis died during this phase of the transitional process that during the 
2011 uprising.39 Th e willingness of the Southern Movement and of the Houthis 
to participate was overestimated and the failure to agree on the future structure 
of the country undermined much of its potential achievement. By 2014, the 
Houthis struck a chord with segments of society extending beyond its own 
members simply because it stood up to a regime that was seen as incompetent 
and corrupt.40 Th e expansion of the Houthis was in part due to its ability to 
capitalise on popular disenchantment with the condition of Yemeni society in 
the transitional period. While narrow sectarian diff erence informs the confl ict 
at both domestic and regional levels, it is bett er understood, therefore, as an 
expression of the failure of the transitional process in Yemen aft er 2011.
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Chapter 19
Sectarianism and civil confl ict 
in Syria: reconfi gurations of a 
reluctant issue
Laura Ruiz de Elvira and Souhaïl Belhadj
As most journalists and researchers have observed,1 the Syrian uprising, 
which initially relied on a unifi ed (cross-confessional, cross-ethnic and cross-
provincial) popular base, has now become an ‘overtly sectarian confl ict’.2 Th e 
initial revolutionary slogan, wahed wahed wahed, al-shaab suri wahed (‘one, 
one, one, the Syrian people are one’), highlights how the early opposition to 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime organised and framed its protest action. However, this 
‘magical moment’ of unity did not last long. Th e Baathist regime, which purports 
to be multi-confessional and multi-ethnic, favoured from 2011 a sectarian radi-
calisation of the confl ict.3 Moreover, the growing military support provided to 
the Syrian regime by its Shi‘a allies, namely Iran and the Lebanese Hizbullah, 
arguably exacerbated the confrontation between the country’s Sunni majority 
– a community that represents more than 75 per cent of the Syrian population 
– and the Shi‘a minority to which the Syrian president belongs.4 Th ese elements 
partly explain why radical Sunni Islamist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (Nusra 
Front), later call ed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Victory in the Levant), 
and al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, IS) have gradually become stronger 
and more infl uential than the Free Syrian Army (FSA, the military wing of 
the Nati onal Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces)5 and 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi  Suriyya (the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, SMB), a 
political movement that also controls some factions of the FSA. Th e uprising in 
Syria has hence not only led to the pluralisation of domestic Islamist actors and 
to the growth of intra-Islamist competition and confl ict – as can be observed 
in other countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – but also to 
the resurgence of a Sunni–Shi‘a sectarian discourse and confl ict, turning Syria 
into one of its epicentres in the region. In theory, this polarisation of the Syrian 
confl ict along sectarian lines could have entailed both a rapid decline of the 
regime – due to its increasing reliance on its community of reference (Alawite/
Shi‘a) – and the partition of Syria into several ‘statelets’ following the ethnic 
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and religious distribution of the country’s population. Yet the former has not 
collapsed and the country has not yet completely imploded to become a mosaic 
of independent communities and territories.
Against this background, this chapter aims to tackle the very complex issue 
of sectarianism – understood here as the politicisation of ‘collective identities’ 
in Syria based on ethnic, religious, clan, tribal and/or family affi  liations – and 
to explore how this phenomenon and the current confl ict are shaping and 
reconfi guring one another.6 To do so, it is necessary to look back at history. 
Th e fi rst section of the chapter therefore reviews the evolution of sectarianism 
in the country from the Ott oman period onwards. Th is is followed by an 
analysis of the reconfi gurations of the sectarian issue since the beginning of 
the Syrian uprising in March 2011. Th e third section, fi nally, highlights the 
limits of the sectarian prism in understanding both Syria’s current confl ict and 
contemporary political identity.
Diachronic in approach, this chapter reveals that sectarianism has always 
been part of Syrian politics, particularly during the Baathist era. Indeed, since 
1963 the Baathist regime has supervised and managed society in an authoritar-
ian manner through sectarianism. Examples of such sectarian politics include 
the co-optation of certain minorities within the Baath party, the government 
and the state controlled-press, the selection of mostly Alawites and Sunnis 
for key positions in the intelligence services, the armed forces and the Baath 
national security offi  ce (with an over-representation of the Alawites if their 
demographic weight is taken into account), as well as the preferential treatment 
of Christian organisations within the country’s civil society.7 Moreover, it can 
be argued that the Baathist regime managed to remain in power over the past 
four decades partly thanks to its strategy of developing and advocating the idea 
of a unifi ed national Syrian society/identity, while at the same time preserving 
and manipulating its denominational and ethnic cleavages. Th is said, unlike 
in Lebanon, sectarianism was never institutionalised in the country, and the 
Syrian national identity is not inherently a denominational-sectarian one. 
Likewise, it can be argued that although sectarianism matt ers strongly today 
– insofar as it plays a role in the Syrian confl ict and in the political and social 
dynamics that have led to it – it is not the only key prism through which one 
can understand the evolution of the war taking place in the country. Indeed, 
even though sectarianism has represented an important factor of radicalisa-
tion and fragmentation since 2011, the Syrian national identity and the 
nation-state still remain the main point of reference for most actors involved in 
the confl ict. Th is means that national and sectarian identities are paradoxically 
not mutually exclusive in the Syrian context, where eff orts to build a national 
state and a national community have always gone hand in hand with the use of 
sectarianism to achieve or/and stay in power.
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Nevertheless, most, though not all, analysis on Syria conceptualises the 
Syrian state and society in sectarian terms, with ethno-religious identities 
being treated as surpassing all other socio-economic/political cleavages and, 
hence, as a principle driver shaping national politics.8 Th is chapter aims to 
provide a diff erent entry point into Syrian politics, integrating the question 
of sectarianism into a wider refl ection on the relationship between social 
structures, political mobilisation and national identity. In so doing, the authors 
seek to move beyond the idea that sectarianism is principally and solely a tool 
in the hands of political elites, authoritarian leaders and armed groups to 
annihilate their enemies, highlighting instead that sectarianism has historically 
never been the only, let alone the most effi  cient, tool for political mobilisation 
in Syria. While sectarianism has been, and remains, a signifi cant component in 
Syrian politics and society, it is not the founding principle of the construction 
of the Syrian state or of Syrian national identity. However, in times of crisis 
the infl uence of sectarianism naturally increases, since the structure of the 
state and the regime cannot be totally disconnected from the cleavages and 
divisions that structure Syrian society.
Sectarianism in Syria before 2011
Th roughout the modern history of Syria, all ruling parties – be they the 
Ott omans (1516–1920), the French (1920–46) or the post-independence 
governments (1946–63) and the Syrian Hizb al-Baath al-‘Arabi al-Ishtiraki 
(Arab Socialist Baath Party of Syria or simply the Syrian Baath Party, SBP – 1963 
to present) – have imposed their rule over the country on the basis of existing 
ethno-religious divides between communities. Th is sectarian management of 
Syrian society contributed to the exacerbation of existing societal confl icts that 
had their origin in regional, family, confessional and corporatist antagonisms.9 
However, before 2011 and despite the existence of these various ethno-religious 
communities, sectarianism had never been turned into an explicit principle of 
government. Indeed, a national consensus that transcends sectarianism and 
other social divides seems to have been progressively built up since the Ott oman 
era. Of particular relevance in enhancing the latt er was the institution-building 
process that started during the French mandate, and had at its core the notion of 
establishing national institutions and a national sense of belonging.
Th e Ott oman Empire (1299–1923) imposed and religiously legitimised 
the millet system in order to rule over heterogeneous territories covering 
the Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham), with populations ‘belonging to diff erent 
faiths’.10 Th is system was based on the offi  cial recognition of religious 
communities as well as of their rights, and was characterised by diff erent 
regulations for each in matt ers such as taxation, legal personal status and 
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legal collective representation.11 Th e Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish 
communities hence had wide-ranging freedom to order their communal 
aff airs under the authority of their religious hierarchies.12 Th e sectarian 
potential of this millet system – understood in terms of confl ict and political 
mobilisation – remained limited until the mid-nineteenth century.13 Yet 
religious tensions across the Bilad al-Sham, mainly between Muslims and 
Christians (e.g. Aleppo in 1850, Nablus in 1856, Zahleh in 1860 between 
Druzes and Maronites) were present during the era of Ott oman moderni-
sation (Tanzimat, 1839–76), resulting in the reform of the millet. Th ese 
tensions eventually culminated in the massacre of thousands of Christians in 
Damascus in 1860. Scholars assume that, while seeking to establish legal and 
social equality between all Ott oman affi  liates14 – that is between Muslims 
and non-Muslims – the Tanzimat were detrimental to Muslims and their 
privileges, and consequently created resentment and a perception of social 
downgrading, triggering animosity against other communities (notably 
the Christians, who were perceived as a group with societal privileges). 
Hence, instead of leading to the establishment of an ‘Ott oman affi  liation’ 
(citizenship) beyond traditional collective affi  liations (ethnicity, religion, 
tribes, clans, families) as envisioned by the rulers of the Empire, the reform 
of the millet system led to sectarian polarisation. Th e implementation of the 
Tanzimat was also aff ected by international politics and the growing infl uence 
of France and Great Britain over the Ott oman Empire. Both these European 
powers, in fact, responded to growing sectarian polarisation by protecting 
the privileges and the separate status of non-Muslims.15
When in 1920 the French imposed their mandate over the territory that 
roughly constitutes present-day Syria and Lebanon, they ruled it with a 
sectarian understanding of the old millet, and back-paddled on the Tanzimat 
reforms. In other words, the French concentrated their eff orts on dividing 
‘Syria’s communities religiously’,16 while extending the old millet system. Two 
statelets were thus established in 1922, one in the coastal region, where the 
Alawite community was historically anchored, and a second in the southern 
region, historically populated by the Druze. Th e Alawites and the Druze, 
as Muslim communities of Syria, had never been separately recognised as 
millets, but because of their geographical concentration in certain areas, the 
French reorganisation of the territory reinforced their autonomy through both 
geographical and legal means. Hence their capacity to make political claims 
was strengthened. Th e Alawites, for instance, obtained from the French a low 
taxation regime and fi nancial support; and certain local leaders supported 
the idea of an Alawite nation and sought to convert their autonomy into real 
independence.17 In addition, two districts were established in the al-Jazira 
region (the northeast of Syria) and in Alexandrett a (the northwest), inhabited 
mostly by Kurds and Turkmen respectively.
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A clear discontinuity between the Ott oman period and the French mandate 
can hence be noted. Th e latt er tried to transform extant religious communities 
(millet) into autonomous minorities within the framework of a ‘the secular 
state-form of the nation-state’,18 a state that was theoretically governed by Syrian 
elites, but eff ectively ruled by the French. Th is contradictory state-building 
project failed in the end because the various communities never spoke with 
one voice. Th ey were themselves structured according to internal divisions, 
be they based on their urban or rural origins (Alawites and Christians), their 
religious denominations (Christians), their tribal affi  liations (Alawites), their 
clan structure (Druze), or their political beliefs.19 Consequently, there was 
never suffi  cient support for either the establishment of territorial/adminis-
trative autonomy for Syria’s minorities under French control and within the 
borders of a unifi ed territorial state, or for territorial separatism (infi saliyya). 
Although the separatist project was able to mobilise many Alawites and Druze 
in the 1920s, it never succeeded to galvanise a political majority within the 
two communities. Th us, thanks to the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence 
signed in 1936, the Druze and Alawite ‘states’ were incorporated into the 
new-born Syrian Republic. Th is was preceded by mass mobilisations among 
both communities in support of Syrian unity.20
According to the Syrian nationalist leaders at the time, the main political 
challenge of this mandatory period was precisely to form a ‘national majority’, 
that is to fi nd in each ethno-religious minority a majority in favour of the 
‘unity project’. In concrete terms, this project was carried out through modern 
institutions such as political parties/groupings (the National Bloc for instance, 
a coalition of parties hostile to the French presence in Syria created in 1928), 
various youth organisations (e.g. the Nationalist Youth or the boy scouts), 
professional organisations (the Higher Council of Trade Unions) and, to a 
lesser extent, through the paramilitary wing of youth organisations and the 
Syrian army.21 Th us, despite French eff orts to implement a policy based on 
‘the creation of distinct and separate mandatory regimes’22 within the same 
country (extending the old millet system to Alawite and Druze communities 
and assigning territories to those new millets), new types of political 
associations emerged throughout the 1930s and 1940s in towns and villages 
across Syria. Cutt ing across ethno-religious lines and infused by a nationalist 
Syrian ideology, these associations ultimately paved the way for the unifi cation 
of Syria and the att ainment of full independence in 1946.
Once independence was obtained, a nominally republican democratic 
regime was established. Democratic rules based on parliamentarism were 
applied during short intervals between several phases of dictatorship. In fact, at 
that time Syria went through a period of political instability (seven coup d’états 
took place between 1949 and 1970) mainly nurtured by elite factionalism 
grounded in long-standing social antagonisms. Th e unitary impetus that had 
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been created by the nationalist movement during the French mandate – an 
impetus that was in itself relatively inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-class – 
hence lost part of its vigour. Indeed, elite factionalism infl uenced Syrian 
politics since the fi rst years of independence, most notably within and between 
the newly established government, the armed forces and the emerging left ist 
political parties, that is Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Suri (Syrian Communist Party), 
the Baathists and later the Nasserites. Th is factionalism was certainly partly 
structured by sectarian-based interests, as revealed by the over-representation 
of Christians and Alawites in Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima‘i (Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party, SSNP), the strong Sunni character of the Nasserite movement 
and the att empted coup d’état in 1966 by a group of Druze offi  cers, led by the 
Druze Colonel Salim Hatum. However, the factionalist groups that politically 
superseded others were not built on religious or ethnic homogeneity. Hafez 
al-Assad, for instance, an Alawite army offi  cer and Baath member, forged in-
terpersonal relations and formed political alliances – so-called cliques – with 
political activists, members of the parliament and army offi  cers belonging to 
diff erent ethno-religious groups. Al-Assad particularly leant on Sunni Baathist 
fellows such as Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Mustafa Tlass, who also were army 
offi  cers, in order to eliminate a rival clique within the party and eventually lead 
the military coup that brought him to power in 1970.
Th e feasibility and occurrence of such mixed ethnic and religious cliques 
in post-independence Syrian politics is most probably a result of the fact that 
since the end of the Ott oman Empire, and even more so during the French 
mandate, marginalised minorities such as the Alawite, Druze and Ismaili, as 
well as the poor Sunni peasantry, gradually ceased to operate as enclosed, 
inward-looking social groups, and many of its members became increasingly 
active in politics. Driven mainly by ideological considerations, but also as a 
potential path to social mobility and access to power, members of these ethno-
religious minorities thus progressively came to dominate key political parties 
(such as the Baath) as well as the armed forces, which not only facilitated the 
formation of mixed ethnic and religious cliques, but eventually also their rise to 
the highest offi  ces in the country.
When the SBP took power in 1963, its leadership promised to build a state 
in which ethnic and religious marginalised minorities (mainly Alawite, Druze 
and Ismaili, since the Christian minority was more socially integrated than the 
others) would not only be protected but also integrated into the structures of 
power. Th is integration was to be achieved through the intermediation of the 
SBP itself. One of the SBP’s functions was indeed to select, via internal elections, 
leadership cadres – that is the leading members of branches and sub-branches 
of the party, the army, national trade unions and professional federations, and 
youth, student and cultural organisations under the Baath umbrella – from 
among Syria’s diff erent religious and ethnic communities. As representatives 
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of the ruling SBP, many cadres from these minority communities eventually 
emerged in top leadership positions (including the country’s presidency, 
government ministries, parliament) at the helm of public enterprises, as well 
as heads of governorate and local administrations.23
Although the SBP had asserted that the selection of top party, government 
and other leadership roles would be based exclusively on political experience 
and expertise, it is evident that religion, family background and region of 
origin (Hauran, for instance, was a Baathist bastion) played a signifi cant role 
in this process. So, for instance, even though the Alawite minority has never 
held a majority within the decision-making bodies of the SBP (the Central 
Committ ee and the Regional Command, which supervise the activities of 
state institutions), it was, and still remains, overrepresented in comparison 
to its demographic weight and compared to the Christian minority (which 
had a similar demographic weight in the 1960s). Th is is largely due to the fact 
that from early on, the SBP was dominated by Alawite and Sunni military and 
intelligence offi  cers who, aft er they had won factional struggles within the 
Baath and the army in the 1960s, had purged Nasserist, Druze and Ismaili 
offi  cers from the forces. Th ese Alawite and Sunni offi  cers remain today at the 
top of the state institutions and still operate within the same logic, a logic that 
has gradually established a complex confessional power balance based on the 
cross-sectarian alliance between Alawite and Sunni offi  cers.24
Th is elite-level power-sharing arrangement between the country’s Sunni 
majority and the Alawites, which is the biggest minority in Syria, has not only 
encouraged the security elite to work together and maintain its cohesion, 
but ultimately also contributed to relative regime stability between the 
1970s and 2000s. Indeed, the Baath regime has demonstrated an ability to 
remain in power and consolidate its position, as shown by the orchestrated 
political succession from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar in 2000. Another 
example of this ability dates back to the political crisis and sectarian violence 
that resulted from the confl ict between the regime and the Sunni Islamist 
opposition (1979–82). Th e sectarian dimension of this confrontation was 
more signifi cant than the two previous contentious episodes in 1964 and 
1973, when the SMB, the main Islamist opposition force, challenged the 
authority of the Baathist regime. Beyond contesting the political hegemony 
of the Baath party, the Muslim Brothers intended to break ‘the tyranny of 
a minority in power’, arguing that most of the key positions in the state 
apparatus, particularly within the intelligence services, had fallen to the 
Alawite community. Th ree years of violent clashes culminated in the Hama 
massacre (1982),25 when the regime crushed the Islamist insurgents and 
the inhabitants of the city using air strikes, mortar fi re and numerous other 
abuses. Alawite military offi  cers and soldiers were heavily involved in the 
massacre as members of the army special forces and intelligence commandos. 
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Furthermore, 400 Sunni offi  cers were suspended from the army during 
the crisis aft er being accused of being sympathisers of the SMB. Th is said, 
however, from the beginning numerous senior Sunni army offi  cers were 
actively involved in the fi ght against the Islamist opposition and the surge 
in Hama. Such loyalty to the regime was also evident among senior Sunni 
state offi  cials, rendering it problematic to interpret the confl ict as a polarised 
sectarian struggle.
When Bashar al-Assad rose to power in 2000, he sought to reinforce extant 
collaborative ties between the most infl uential Sunni and Alawite members of 
the security and political elite.26 Meanwhile, in order to gain broader popular 
support and enlarge his legitimacy beyond the security apparatus, the new 
president sought to forge a new national consensus based on political and 
economic liberalisation. Th is led, in the short term, to the co-optation of Syria’s 
business elite,27 Sunni religious leaders28 and representatives of the associa-
tional sector, such as the leaders of Christian and Sunni charitable associations, 
into the regime’s orbit.29 By 2011 this support was not suffi  ciently broad, 
however, to protect the regime from the largest and most violent contestation 
it has faced since 1963.
In sum, like the Ott omans and the French rulers, the SBP – which has 
always legitimised itself both as a Syrian nationalist and a pan-Arab force – 
failed to establish a political system characterised by democratic power-sharing 
arrangements between the various national ethno-religious communities. 
Instead, over the past fi ft y years, the Baath has predominantly imposed its 
political hegemony on society by means of sectarian-driven divide-and-rule 
and co-optation strategies. Indeed, while not formally institutionalised 
through a confessional system as in neighbouring Lebanon, Syria’s ethno-reli-
gious identities have nonetheless been signifi cant, because they were relevant 
to elites’ access to state institutions, representing therefore a resource for social 
mobility. Consequently, in Baathist Syria, sectarianism can be considered as a 
signifi cant, yet not unique or decisive, element through which social structures, 
social mobility and political mobilisation relate.30
Sectarianism and the civil confl ict in Syria
As noted in the introduction, when the Syrian uprising erupted in March 
2011, in the context of the so-called Arab Spring, mobilisation against 
al-Assad’s regime was initially organised along cross-confessional, cross-
ethnic, cross-provincial and cross-class lines. Indeed, popular protests took 
place across the country, including in old rural Baathist strongholds such as 
Deraa,31 also called the ‘Cradle of the Revolution’, coastal rich loyal cities 
such as Latt akia, inner medium-size urban localities like Deir ez-Zor and 
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Homs, and urban peripheries such as Douma and Daraya in the Damascus 
governorate. Likewise, although most of the protesters were Sunni Arab, 
demonstrations were also organised in Kurdish, Christian and Ismaili 
(mainly in the town of Salamiye) areas and neighbourhoods. Expressions 
of solidarity were also extended by the dissenters across the country to all 
regions targeted by the army and the security forces because of their activism. 
Th is was manifest, for instance, in the numerous songs and slogans chanted 
during rallies organised in 2011 and 2012, 32 such as for instance ‘I am with 
Syria’, ‘Homs in solidarity with Deraa’ or ‘From Qameshli to Hawran, the 
Syrian people won’t be humiliated’. According to several testimonies, even 
some Palestinians born in Syria (re)discovered their Syrian identity in the 
midst of the turmoil.33 For several months, the will of playing an active role 
in the struggle for a free and all-encompassing Syria thus became the main 
driving force for, and the frame of reference of, the protesters. ‘Dignity’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘social justice’ were the catchwords of this unprecedented 
popular mobilisation against the al-Assad regime.
Openly challenged by large segments of Syrian society for the fi rst time since 
the Hama massacre, the al-Assad regime, meanwhile, responded to this popular 
uprising by portraying the protests as a foreign conspiracy and as fi tna (civil 
confl ict) orchestrated by unknown armed saboteurs, Islamists and terrorists 
that the army should exterminate. Posters warning of sectarian strife were hung 
up in the streets, while state media aired staged footage of arms being found in 
Deraa’s main mosque and warned that a sit-in in the city of Homs on 18 April 
2011 was an att empt to erect a mini-caliphate.34 At the same time, rumours 
about Sunni protesters threatening Alawites started spreading throughout the 
country to the point that many elderly women within the Alawite community 
became afraid of leaving their houses, neighbourhoods or villages.35 Th e slogan 
‘Christians to Beirut, Alawites to the grave’, which according to unconfi rmed 
reports was launched by peaceful demonstrators,36 was the most eloquent of 
these expressions. In addition, al-Assad presented a narrative that depicted 
his so-called ‘secular’ Baathist regime as the sole guarantor of national unity 
and multi-sectarian harmony. Th is narrative was, moreover, reinforced by 
symbolic decisions taken ad hoc, such as the appointment for the fi rst time 
in the Baathist era of a Christian military offi  cer, General Dawoud Rajha, as 
Minister of Defence.37
As in the pre-2011 era, sectarianism and the stoking of denominational 
fears and antagonisms, particularly among the country’s minorities, thus 
became a way to ensure loyalty towards the regime and, therefore, an eff ective 
political tool of governance. Th is instrumentalisation of infra-state ethno-
religious identities had two objectives.38 On the one hand, it was meant to 
consolidate the regime’s national, regional and international support base since 
it presented itself, from the very beginning, as engaged in a fi ght against Sunni 
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terrorism. For instance, aft er a suicide car bomb exploded in June 2012 next 
to the Sayyida Zeinab Shi‘a shrine in the suburbs of Damascus, and by surfi ng 
on its regional Shi‘a allies rhetoric on the need for protection of the Shi‘a holy 
places, the regime was able to att ract thousands of Shi‘a militiamen from Iran, 
Iraq and Lebanon into its fi ghting forces.39 For Hizbullah’s militants, fi ghting 
in Syria thus became a ‘sacred defence’ (difa‘a mouqaddas), the ‘defence of the 
holy places’ (difa‘a al-maqamat).
On the other hand, this strategy was meant to weaken the opposition 
and its capacity for mass mobilisation, by fragmenting it and dissuading the 
country’s minorities from participating in anti-regime protests. By strength-
ening identity politics, the regime succeeded in undermining the opposition’s 
claim to legitimacy, since the protesters were no longer able to pretend to be 
the expression of a unifi ed national movement. Al-Assad and his high-ranking 
intelligence offi  cers thus intentionally fanned the fl ames of sectarian radicali-
sation of the confl ict; a confl ict they thought they could more easily win than 
a cross-confessional one. Arguably, the Christians were not going to support 
the opposition if they perceived it as mainly Sunni and highly infl uenced 
by the SMB. Th e same logic applied to the Druze community, which was 
furthermore divided and did not feel strong enough to protect parts of the 
country other than Soueida, its region of origin. As for the Alawites, they 
would certainly not reject al-Assad and his regime if they believed that their 
survival as a minority, and their privileged access to power, was at stake should 
the Baath regime fall.
At the end of the day, the ambivalence between the promotion of a secular 
Syria, as offi  cially endorsed by the Baath since its foundation in the 1940s, and 
the regime’s de facto sectarian policies, together with the selective brutality 
of the regime’s armed henchmen – known as the shabiha,40 who are mainly, 
but not exclusively, members of the Alawite minority – helped reinforce 
sectarian dynamics within the diff erent groups of the opposition. Moreover, 
the increasing military and economic support provided to the Syrian regime 
by its Shi‘a allies – mainly Iran and the Lebanese Hizbullah, but also Iraqi and 
Afghan militias – arguably further exacerbated the confrontation between the 
country’s Sunni majority and its Shi‘a minority, of which the Syrian president 
is a member.
As Zakaria Taha notes, in such a context of political crisis, and in the 
midst of a destabilised Near Middle East, Syrian oppositional movements 
organising along ‘primordial affi  liations’41 – that is, religious, ethnic, tribal or 
regional-based cleavages – started to appear from the end of 2011 onwards.42 
Th e Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê (Kurdish National Council), 
the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat ‎ (Democratic Union Party, also known by its 
Kurdish acronym, PYD), the Turkman Bloc and the Syrian Tribal Council are 
just few such examples. At the military level, the above-mentioned elements 
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also partly explain why Jihadist Sunni Islamist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra 
and IS, gradually gained strength and became more infl uential than the more 
heterogeneous FSA, which is nowadays almost insignifi cant beyond the Idlib 
and Hawran regions. Indeed, from 2012 onwards foreign fi ghters started 
pouring into the country and joining these two jihadi groups, while sectarian 
killings and creeping fundamentalism within the ranks of the armed opposition 
multiplied. Th e loss of faith in the West (that is, the US and EU) due to the 
absence of a meaningful intervention, as well as increasing fi nancial support 
from the Arab Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are likely to have 
also contributed to these dynamics of radicalisation within the opposition; 
dynamics that were rooted at the local level in pre-existing sectarian tensions 
and that started to arise in some regions over the summer of 2011. Th e initial 
moment of national opposition unity thus gradually eroded.
Against this backdrop, hatred, resentment and sectarian prejudices and 
beliefs have inevitably developed among both pro-regime and anti-regime 
supporters. As explained by a former staff  member of a Syrian humanitarian 
association based in Gaziantep (Turkey) and today employed by an interna-
tional NGO, sectarianism constitutes nowadays one of the biggest problems 
in Syria. ‘People hate Alawites’, he says. To demonstrate this, he recalls the 
mistrust of his colleagues and subordinates when, in early 2016, he decided to 
hire a young Alawite woman who happened to be the best applicant for the job 
that his organisation had off ered.43 Th is testimony, despite its episodical nature, 
mirrors a diff used opinion, and suggests that sectarian-motivated resentment 
against the ‘Alawite dictator’ runs deep among many Syrians. Th ese feelings 
extend today to the whole Alawite community, and have become frequent 
even among well-educated people.
Such feelings of resentment and hatred oft en go hand in hand with a sense 
of being victims of injustice, exclusion and sectarian discrimination. Th is was 
evident among the members of a medium-size humanitarian organisation that 
works remotely from Gaziantep (Turkey), in Damascus’ besieged areas. During 
a biographical interview conducted in 2014, one of the workers, a forty-year-old 
Sunni woman, recalled being discriminated against before 2011 ‘only because 
I wore a scarf ’, whereas Alawites would be ‘respected’.44 Th e same perception 
was also discernible in her twenty-year-old Sunni colleague’s words, with whom 
another interview of the same type was conducted the same day:
Today there are more and more hate against [sic], I mean everybody 
against everybody. Alawites against Sunnis, Sunnis against Alawites . . . 
Christians being afraid also . . . Well, for me, the people who suff ered the 
most were Muslims, so Muslims are hurt. You know, like inside inside of 
us, we think like ‘why?,’ ‘why isn’t anyone supporting us, just because 
we’re Muslims?’ So . . . for me as a Muslim, when I see someone who is for 
instance Shi‘a, Alawite or Christian . . . I feel like, I don’t know, like ‘why did 
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you not support me?’ Or ‘why is it okay for me to be killed?’ . . . if a Christian 
dies everyone will be ‘Oh, Christians die!’ . . . While hundreds and hundreds 
of Muslims are being killed every day[.]45
However, mistrust and resentment against the ‘other’ are never unidirectional, 
as the story of Mohamed – whom the authors met and talked to informally in 
2014 – illustrates. Before 2011, Mohamed, a volunteer in a Syrian humanitarian 
association in Tripoli (Lebanon), was a civil servant and a member of the 
SBP. Despite living a comfortable life, when the protests started in Homs he 
decided to go and see the demonstrations for himself. He recalls how one day 
he saw a young Syrian climbing twelve metres high to destroy a portrait of 
Bashar al-Assad during a demonstration. Th is defi ant action struck a chord of 
admiration, and he started seeing the protests as something new, bringing some 
hope for change. He decided to get involved in the relief sector in Homs, daring 
for the fi rst time to raise his voice, while still working as a civil servant. He was 
then denounced by his Alawite neighbours, allegedly ‘only because’ he is Sunni, 
and he was imprisoned for four months. Aft er being released, he was jailed a 
second time and then set free again. When he learned that he was sought again 
by the security services, he decided to leave Syria with his family and headed to 
Tripoli, where he has lived since 2014. When asked if he will ever return to his 
village once the war is over, Mohamed responds that he could not stand living 
side by side with those who denounced him; that is his Alawite neighbours.46
As these three fi eldwork anecdotes suggest, sectarian resentment currently 
runs deep among Syrians, both those inside Syria and those living in Syrian 
refugee communities abroad. Indeed, while many of the inhabitants and 
armed fi ghters coming from the rebel regions identify their oppressors and 
persecutors as being mostly Alawite and/or Shi‘a, most Alawites, in turn, ‘recall 
centuries of discrimination and persecution at the hands of distant rulers and 
urban elites, oft en drawn from the surrounding Sunni majority’.47 As for the 
Christian and Druze communities, they are sometimes accused of siding with 
the regime, a positioning that results mainly from their fear of political Islam. 
In sum, in the new confi guration emerging from the war, all communities tend 
to perceive and portray themselves as (old and/or new) victims of sectarian 
discrimination, thereby nourishing a vicious circle in which revenge and hatred 
are hard to fi ght against.
Beyond sectarianism
Six years into the civil war, the growing polarisation of the Syrian confl ict and 
society along sectarian lines could arguably have precipitated the body collapse of 
al-Assad’s regime, due to its increasingly narrow (military and fi nancial) reliance 
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on its own community. Likewise, as some observers asserted in 2013, this 
polarisation could have also led to an institutionalised partition of the country 
into several statelets, partly modifying the ethnic and religious distribution of 
Syria’s population (a Kurdish northeast, an Alawite Damascus–Homs–Latt akia 
axis under al-Assad’s control, a Sunni Arab northwest). However, as of 2017 this 
scenario had not yet materialised and the Syrian nation still exists and remains 
the main point of reference for most actors involved in the confl ict.48 At the 
political and military levels, indeed, only the jihadist groups, characterised by 
a strong presence of foreign fi ghters, and some Kurdish elements, openly call 
into question the Syrian national borders and the integrity of the nation-state. 
As for the majority of the population and civil society, it is possible to observe 
a rising feeling and display of patriotism since 2011, as the frequent use of fl ags 
and evocation of national heroic fi gures demonstrate. In the post-2011 Syrian 
context nationalism and sectarian identity are hence still not exclusive.
Th is raises two important questions: Why do the ideas of the Syrian 
homeland (al-watan) and Syrian national identity still survive? And how can 
one explain this resilience? According to the authors, this can be interpreted as 
a sign that, although sectarianism matt ers and plays a radicalising role, it is not 
the only lens through which one should understand the evolution of the war 
taking place in the country. Some elements can be highlighted here. First, as in 
the past, it is impossible to clearly identify unifi ed claims emerging from the 
diff erent Syrian ethno-religious communities. Th is suggests that the politicised 
confessional polarisation (that is, sectarianism) remains constrained by the 
internal divisions that exist within each community which, instead of being 
homogeneous societal groups, are strongly composite. In fact, as shown in the 
fi rst section of this chapter, the history of Syria since the nineteenth century 
is one of gradual social and political stratifi cation of the ethnic and religious 
minorities within the process of nation-state building. Th is stratifi cation has 
been accompanied by an increasing complexity of the social structures within 
these communities, which in turn favours the heterogeneity and diff erentia-
tion within them. Th is also applies to the religious majority in Syria, the Sunni 
community, and exposes a high degree of internal heterogeneity. Arguably this 
heterogeneity is visible not only through the various class, local, tribal and civic 
identities that cross-cut sectarianism in the country and compete with it,49 but 
also through the geographical distribution of the Syrian communities across 
the national territory.50 Th is diversity partly explains the opposed stands taken 
by the Sunni population vis-à-vis the uprising, and is particularly discernible 
in the current Sunni armed opposition groups (FSA, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, 
Ahrar al-Sham and many others). Th ese latt er defend diff erent interests and 
competing visions of society, within which the place assigned to the minorities 
varies from one case to another. Th ese visions may range from positions close 
to secularism (asking for the separation of religion from state), Islamism 
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(promoting the construction of both an Islamic state and an Islamic society) 
and jihadi–Salifi sm (rejecting democracy, marginalising other Muslim sects 
and, in the case of the Islamic State, exterminating non-Muslim minorities).51
Th is means that the factional dynamics that fragment the military opposition 
and have partly prevented it from capitalising on its military gains against the 
Syrian regime, are not fuelled by a sectarian confl ict of an ethno-religious nature 
as was the case in mid-nineteenth century Syria. Indeed, armed opposition 
groups are relatively homogeneous in their ethnic and religious composition 
since they are mostly composed of Sunnis. It is rather the contradictory interests 
of the regional and international actors supporting the opposition (Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the US), their changing strategies (see, for instance, the 
ambiguous role played by Turkey) and the complexity of the multiple alliances 
(for example the US/Russia/Iran axis) that nourish the above-mentioned 
factional dynamics within these groups. Likewise, within the Sunni-dominated 
institutions created by the political opposition, such as the National Coalition 
for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, signifi cant fractures exist 
based on diff erent divides (exiled versus internal opposition, historical versus 
new forces, secular versus religious groups, left ist versus conservative, in favour 
of or against militarisation),52 which are not related to sectarianism.
Finally, interviews and other empirical material53 suggest that it is the 
‘Syrian homeland’ (watan) more than the state (dawla) or the ‘Syrian Arab 
Republic’ that the Syrians, beyond their community affi  liations, identify most 
with. In this context, the identity of individuals in Syria may still be (strongly) 
linked to the sense of belonging to an ethno-religious community, yet not 
exclusively so. Contrary to what the legitimisation narratives produced by the 
leaders of the regime during past decades may say, a feeling of national identity, 
which can neither be simply reduced to a blend of ethno-religious affi  liations 
nor to the Syrian Baathist state, still exists. Th is feeling can admitt edly translate 
into diff erent visions of the legitimate political order that should prevail 
in the country, and also lead to competing conceptualisations of what the 
Syrian nation is and what it should look like, but does not result in alternative 
national projects (except in the jihadist and Kurdish cases). As Th omas Pierret 
observes, the idea of the Syrian nation has therefore not only not disappeared 
but may even have been reinforced during the war.54
Th e work done since 2011 by many Syrian civil society associations and 
networks, both inside and outside the country, has been fundamental in 
promoting the idea of an all-encompassing, non-sectarian Syria, thereby 
preserving what they consider to be the ‘Syrian identity’. As a 35-year-old 
interviewee noted during one focus group:
We aim to build “national” associations that promote a certain idea of the 
future Syria. In this sense, we have diversifi ed our activities that originally 
aimed at providing humanitarian assistance and now also include 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   335 05/01/18   6:48 PM
336 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
the rehabilitation of schools, the training of young adults, etc. Thus, by 
meeting the multiple needs of various social and religious groups, we 
develop and deepen our relations with ‘all’ the Syrian society.55
Symptomatically, when asked why they are involved in such organisations and 
activities, young Syrian activists who work today in exile oft en refer to a duty 
towards their country. Th e expressions ‘giving back to my country’, ‘building up 
the country’, ‘national duty’ or ‘service’ to the country are frequently evoked.56
Conclusion
‘Th e [1975–90 civil] war in Lebanon is now over. Sectarianism is not’, writes 
Ussama Makdissi about the country of the cedars.57 Th e war in Syria is not 
over yet but, as in Lebanon, sectarianism is an exacerbating factor of social 
confl icts, especially since the nineteenth century when it gradually started to 
amalgamate with political culture. However, unlike in Lebanon, sectarianism 
in Syria is not institutionalised and hence, it does not serve as a founding 
principle of the political system: power-sharing arrangements and ethno-
religious pluralism are indeed not linked to a political pact between the 
diff erent communities.
Th at said, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, sectarianism has always 
been politically present in Syria through informal and tacit mechanisms in all 
institutions (local administration, government, parliament, the presidency 
of the Republic, security apparatus, the directorate of the SBP, etc.). Extant 
scholarly research has suffi  ciently documented that during both Hafez and 
Bashar al-Assad’s rule there has been a permanent contradiction between a 
discourse based on multi-confessionalism (or confessional neutrality) on the 
one hand, and sectarian practices on the other. Th is had the eff ect of creating a 
balance of power dominated by an elite formed by Alawites and Sunnis. Yet as 
today’s civil war demonstrates, this balance has always been extremely delicate 
and has created tensions resulting in contradictory outcomes.
Despite this, as this chapter discussed, sectarianism cannot, and should 
not, be considered the main driving force of social and political confl ict in 
the country. Even if the sectarianisation of the Syrian uprising reveals the 
limitations and the failure of the Baathist national project, the confl ict has also 
exposed the resilience of both the Syrian nation and national identity. Looking 
back at Syrian history and its major crises, it becomes clear that the country 
is not fundamentally a denominational or sectarian one and that, despite 
continuous fragmentation dynamics, national identity has always prevailed. 
Th is results from the fact that, as an ‘imagined community’58 the Syrian national 
construction59 is to some extent a success.60
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Chapter 20
Out of the ashes: the rise of 
an anti-sectarian discourse in 
post-2011 Iraq
Chérine Chams El-Dine
Following the popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world in 2010–11, 
most of the studies exploring these momentous expressions of people’s power 
have focused on Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and to a lesser extent, Syria and 
Bahrain. Iraq, meanwhile, has seemed to fall outside the limelight of scholarly 
interest even though throughout 2011 here too demonstrations erupted in 
numerous provinces and cities over multiple issues, including corruption, 
insecurity, poor services and political reform. At the time, the Iraqi government 
under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (r.2006–14) deployed heavy-handed 
tactics to squash the protests. Galvanised from outside institutional politics by 
a cross-section of ordinary citizens and youth, neither Shi‘a nor Sunni Islamist 
parties and movements took part in the popular protests of 2011. Indeed, they 
considered the protests as targeting them and opposing their rule, thus, they 
rather tried to thwart the popular movement. Receiving neither coverage in the 
local media nor support from any foreign state, both popular mobilisation and 
repression at the time went relatively unnoticed. Meanwhile, another major 
cycle of protest erupted at the end of July 2015, with demonstrators denouncing 
the sectarian and corrupt nature of the current political system.
Many scholars have argued that sectarianism took an increasingly ominous 
role in the wake of the Arab uprisings, especially in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states, where nervous Sunni rulers (particularly in Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia) felt threatened and tried to consolidate their power in the 
face of popular protests led by Shi‘a and other groups long prevented from 
fully participating in political/public life.1 In Iraq, the post-2011 situation, 
meanwhile, presented itself diff erently, insofar as here it had been Shi‘a Islamist 
parties that had tightened their grip on power since the fall of Saddam Hussein 
in 2003, with PM al-Maliki’s rule becoming increasingly authoritarian since 
the departure of the American armed forces in 2011.
Th is chapter argues that the 2011 Iraqi protests gave birth to a larger 
anti-sectarian protest movement that, culminating in 2015–16, called for 
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political reforms and bett er living conditions, and questioned the legitimacy 
of the incumbent Shi‘a Islamist parties that tried to stifl e the movement using 
intimidation, repression and the spreading of false rumours. As will become 
apparent below, in fact, this movement challenged the very foundations of 
the post-2003 political order in Iraq, which revolved around institutionalised 
sectarian and other communal identities used by the so-called ‘political en-
trepreneurs’ to create constituencies and rally popular support, instead of 
bridging the divide between the country’s Shi‘a and Sunni communities.2 To 
this day, this order is marked by the empowerment of political actors (mostly 
exiled politicians under the former Baathist regime) whose obsession with 
sect-centric politics corresponded with American interests in – and conception 
of – a new Iraq. As Haddad asserted, this obsession of the Iraqi opposition in 
exile – which came to power aft er the fall of Saddam Hussein (r.1979–2003) 
– with ethno-sectarian identities shaped, or at least reinforced, American 
views on Iraq.3 Th us, the post-2003 nation-building process consolidated 
subnational identities, and created a power structure reproducing sectarianism 
and bringing about a totally dysfunctional and corrupt administrative order.
Drawing on a range of primary sources,4 the chapter provides fi rst an overview 
of the 2011 uprising in Iraq and its demise, before focusing on the emergence of 
new contentious actors and their anti-sectarian discourse through an analysis of 
the slogans and banners of the 2015–16 protest movement – the largest popular 
movement hitherto challenging the post-2003 political order in Iraq.
2011, the forgotten uprising
Concomitant to the onset of popular protests across the Arab world, Iraqi mass 
demonstrations erupted in February 2011, culminating on 25 February in the 
so-called ‘Iraqi day of rage’, when demonstrations att racting thousands of Iraqis 
were held in around sixty towns and cities across sixteen out of eighteen Iraqi 
provinces to denounce corruption, price hikes and unemployment.5 Slogans 
used by protesters such as ‘enough silence’, ‘enough patience’ and ‘down to a 
democracy that transforms bad to worse’ clearly expressed widespread dissat-
isfaction with governmental impotence and an incapacity of state institutions 
to improve the daily life of Iraqi citizens in a relatively rich country. Th e 
explicitly national character of the protest movement that took place in Shi‘a 
and Sunni provinces – and also included the Iraqi Kurdish provinces of Irbil 
and Sulaymaniyah – was set against a sectarian discourse that had dominated 
Iraqi politics since 2003.
Like many of the other uprisings that shook the Arab world in 2011, the Iraqi 
protest movement was youth-led and fashioned by ordinary people, marked by 
the absence of established political parties (either Shi‘a or Sunni) and largely 
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peaceful. Moreover, this movement, like its Arab uprising counterparts, was 
leaderless and non-hierarchical in character, developing around networked 
forms of organisation that relied heavily on non-traditional means of 
mobilisation.6 Th ese means included, for instance, a number of Facebook 
groups/pages that mobilised for, and supported, the 2011 protests, such as the 
‘the Great Iraqi Revolution’, ‘the Iraqi Revolution of 25 February’, ‘Support the 
Iraqi Youth Uprising’, and ‘the Free Iraqis’ Revolution’ pages. Typically these 
Facebook pages would post news, communiqués (issued by the organising 
movements), photos and videos of protests taking place all over Iraq, as well as 
of demonstrations held in other countries in solidarity with the Iraqi people.7
One of the most important fi gures of the 2011 protest movement is the Iraqi 
journalist ‘Uday al-Zaidi, the leader of al-Haraka al-Sha‘biyya li-Inqaz al-‘Iraq 
(Popular Movement to Save Iraq),8 which is a popular, youth-led organisation. 
‘Uday and his brothers Durgham9 and Muntadhir (famed for throwing a shoe 
at President George W. Bush in December 2008) founded this movement and 
were among the main instigators of the protests all over Iraq. Other movements 
and coalitions emerged as well and organised/coordinated the demonstrations 
and sit-ins in various provinces, such as for instance Harakat Tahrir al-Janub 
(Movement to Liberate the South), al-Jabha al- Sha‘biyya li-Inqaz Karkuk 
(Popular Front to Save Kirkuk), al-Rabitt a al-Watt aniya li-Shuyukh ‘Asha’ir 
al-Janub wal-Furat al-Awsat (National Organisation of Tribal Leaders of the South 
and the Central Euphrates), I’tilaf al-Khamis wal-‘Ishrin min Shabat (25 February 
Coalition) and al-Th awra al-‘Iraqiyya al-Kubra (Great Iraqi Revolution).10 
Importantly, all of these movements were cross-sectarian in composition and 
representative of diff erent groups in the Iraqi society – including tribal leaders 
and students – from all over Iraq, as clearly implied by these movements’ names. 
Meanwhile, other civil society activists affi  liated with established labour unions, 
women’s groups, such as for example Munadhamat Huriyyat al-Mar’a fi  al-‘Iraq 
(Organisation of Women’s Freedom in Iraq), and members of al-Hizb al-Shiyuʿi 
al-ʿIraqi (Iraqi Communist Party, ICP) got involved too.11 Th e rallies’ locations 
and times were transmitt ed via Facebook or writt en on paper currency and 
circulated for those without access to social media networks.
Protests typically took place aft er Friday prayers and were themed around 
particular issues, such as for instance the ‘Friday of the Imprisoned’ (18 March 
2011), demanding the release of thousands of Iraqi political prisoners, the ‘Friday 
of Salvation’ (9 April 2011), calling for an unconditional departure of the United 
States occupying forces,12 or the ‘Friday of Retribution’ (7 June 2011), asking for 
the resignation of the al-Maliki government13 and the formation of a transitional 
government of technocrats.14 Other demands voiced by the protest movement 
ranged from calls for the abolition of a sect-based quota system in formal politics, 
an end to Iranian interference in Iraqi aff airs, to demands for the improvement 
of basic services and for the creation of more public sector jobs. At the time, 
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observers criticised the heterogeneous nature of the protesters’ demands as too 
disparate to actually achieve anything, making the whole movement prone to 
fracturing and fragmentation.15
Some analysts, meanwhile, maintained that the 2011 demonstrations in 
Iraq remained narrowly circumscribed due to the consociational nature of 
political power that entailed popular mobilisation within sub-state groups and 
prevented other parts of the population from joining in, leaving the political 
regime essentially untouched.16 While partially true, this reading overlooks the 
range of tactics used by the al-Maliki government and its Shi‘a allies to squash 
the protests. Security forces violently dispersed protesters, and government-
backed armed thugs infi ltrated the demonstrations, injuring and sexually 
molesting peaceful protesters.17 Several demonstrators were shot dead during 
violent clashes with security forces that used live ammunition. Journalists 
covering the protests were threatened, att acked, their equipment confi scated/
destroyed, and some of them were detained. TV stations’ offi  ces were raided 
by security forces to prevent further broadcasting of the demonstrations.18 
As part of the government anti-protest campaign, media outlets – which are 
generally controlled by political parties belonging to the ruling coalition – 
were instructed not to cover the protests in order to stifl e the movement. Th e 
United States, meanwhile, seemingly permitt ed the use of violence by the Iraqi 
security forces and turned a blind eye to protesters’ demands. According to 
some observers, American helicopters fl ew over and monitored the protests, 
which was considered a sign of support for the Iraqi government’s repressive 
measures.19 Th us, keeping Iraq’s stability following the withdrawal of the United 
States armed forces from Iraq20 seemed to have been a priority for the American 
administration at the expense of the protesters’ reformist demands/aspirations.
Warnings against demonstrations were issued by the al-Maliki government 
through meetings with sheikhs and notables, in which they threatened to kill 
and arrest anyone participating in the protests. Government vehicles with 
loudspeakers also drove through Baghdad’s main streets, calling residents to 
refrain from participating in the protests. In a blatant eff ort to delegitimise 
the protest organisers and its participants, al-Maliki accused them of being 
remnants of the erstwhile Hizb al-Baath al-ʿArabi al-Ishtiraki fi  al-ʿIraq (Arab 
Socialist Baath Party of Iraq), or the Baath regime. To justify these allegations, 
elements close to the government infi ltrated the protests, distributed 
photographs of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and raised slogans 
glorifying the Baath party – as witnessed by local journalists.21
Meanwhile, some government-friendly Shi‘a clerics and political forces 
warned against the exploitation of demonstrations by those described as 
‘Saddamists’, ‘Baathists’ and ‘extremists’, and told their followers to stay away. 
While Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani – Iraq’s most pre-eminent marja‘ (religious 
source of emulation) – affi  rmed Iraqis’ right to peaceful protest, he expressed 
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his concerns regarding the possible manipulation of the protests by groups 
he described as ‘enemies of the Iraqi people’. According to him this could 
turn the demonstrations from a peaceful process of dissent into a confron-
tation with the Iraqi authorities and a chaotic situation.22 As for Muqtada 
al-Sadr, leader of al-Tayyar al-Sadri (Sadrist Movement), he called for the 
postponement of the protests in order to give the government a period 
of grace to improve its performance and public services.23 Th us, neither 
al-Sistani nor al-Sadr backed the protesters demands or endeavours. On the 
contrary, al-Sistani’s statement and al-Sadr’s call for a grace period saved 
the al-Maliki government and indirectly led to the demise of the protest 
movement by the summer of 2011.
In their analysis of the eff ect of repression on protest movements’ strategies 
and fate, Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi and Olivier Fillieule concluded that it largely 
depends on the degree of cohesion and organisational structure of the groups, 
the amount of public sympathy with, and interest in, their cause, and the interna-
tional support they enjoy. In this context they noted that when confronted with 
harsh repression, or unfavourable conditions, protest movements may disappear 
but are likely to transform themselves into ‘abeyance structures’ which constitute 
potential reservoirs for future popular mobilisation.24 Th us, whilst the regime’s 
severe crackdown on the demonstrations, its anti-protests propaganda backed by 
Shi‘a clerics, scorching summertime temperatures and the lack of media coverage 
and foreign support caused the protest movement to fade away by the end of the 
summer 2011, abeyance or latent structures remained in place.25
Although the wave of nation-wide anti-government demonstrations had 
died down by mid-2011 – and did not develop the same intensity and scale of the 
uprisings taking place elsewhere in the region – they had seriously questioned 
the sectarian nature of Iraqi politics and paved the way for subsequent protests. 
Indeed, despite the period of time separating the two waves of popular 
protests, some similarities exist between the 2011 and subsequent 2015–16 
Iraqi protest movements, especially regarding their national/non-sectarian 
character and tools of mobilisation. Th ese similarities coincide, however, with 
noticeable diff erences in the composition of those forces participating in the 
2015–16 protests as well as the evolving structure and longevity of the protest 
movement, as shall be discussed in the following section.
The 2015–16 uprising: a movement in progress
Th e second major wave of popular protests rocking Iraqi politics post-2011 
commenced on 16 July 2015 in the southern oil-rich province of Basra, when 
people spontaneously took to the streets to denounce poor public services, 
especially power outages during extreme summer heat largely exceeding 50°C. 
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Th e demonstrators burned tyres to disrupt traffi  c on the main roads, stormed 
and burned the headquarters of al-Majlis al-A‘la al-Islami al-‘Iraqi (Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq or ISCI), one of the governing Shi‘a Islamist political 
parties, and of the Basra city council, offi  ce of governor Majid al-Nasrawi. 
Confrontations between protesters and security forces led to the death of one 
demonstrator and two others were injured.26
Th e protest movement then spread to other Iraqi provinces – aside from 
the Kurdish provinces and the territories under the control of the so-called 
al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, IS) – and reached Baghdad’s Tahrir Square 
on 31 July 2015, when civil society activists called for a popular mobilisation 
through social media networks. As in 2011, the latt er off ered Iraqis, especially 
the youth, a relatively uncensored space to present their views, thus quickly 
emerging as a prime channel to challenge the status quo and organise dissent. 
Besides rallying against poor public services, this time the protests also turned 
into an expression of popular anger against rampant corruption and abuse of 
power by top offi  cials that cost Iraq dearly in its war against IS.27 Despite the 
specifi city of each province, four key demands thus united the protesters in 
2015–16: (1) improving public services, (2) fi ghting corruption and holding 
corrupted offi  cials to account, (3) reforming the judiciary and the security 
sector, and (4) reforming the political system with a view to abolishing the 
sectarian quota system, also locally known as mahassah.28
Th e protests themselves gained momentum during the fi rst week of August 
2015 when Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani backed protesters’ demands and urged 
newly installed PM Haider al-Abadi – in charge since September 2014 – to 
‘rebel against corruption and sectarianism’, to ‘take bold measures in order 
to fi ght corruption, and to sack incompetent offi  cials regardless of their 
party affi  liation or sectarian/ethnic background’.29 Traditionally inclined to 
preserve political stability, the marja‘ thus adopted a fundamentally diff erent 
stance towards the protest movement compared to 2011, pushing al-Abadi to 
implement drastic reforms that could satisfy popular demands. Moreover, on 
20 August 2015, in a writt en statement from his offi  ce in response to questions 
from the Agence France-Presse, al-Sistani warned that Iraq could be ‘dragged 
to partition’ if reforms were not properly carried out by the government.30 Th e 
reason for al-Sistani’s intervention this time around is likely to have resided in 
his fears that a political vacuum would then be fi lled by more radical political 
forces and Shi‘a pro-Iranian militias involved in the fi ght against IS.
Th e following pages will present a profi le of the key actors involved in the 
2015–16 protests – to explain the demographic and evolving composition of 
the protest movement – and provide an analysis of the protests’ emblematic 
slogans. Th e latt er analysis will shed the light on the rise of an anti-sectarian 
discourse during the 2015–16 protests that challenged and rejected the 
sect-centric rhetoric and policies of the incumbent political elites.
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Anatomy of the protest movement: new actors and 
potential divisions
Although widely considered sha‘biyya (popular) – given that the bulk of the 
protesters were non-partisan Iraqi citizens who simply rejected the corrupt 
ethno-sectarian political system and the ruling (Shi‘a) elites dominating the 
political scene since 2003 – several formal and informal groupings took part 
in the 2015–16 protests. Spearheading the protests was the so-called al-Tayyar 
al-Madani31 (Civil Current), whose core was composed of independent 
secular civil society activists, academics, intellectuals, media professionals and 
artists. Th e ICP and some of its allies within al-Tahaluf al-Madani al-Dimuqrati 
(Civil Democratic Alliance), a secular electoral coalition formed before the 
2014 Iraqi parliamentary elections that included Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati 
(National Democratic Party), Hizb al-Ummah (Nation Party) and Hizb 
al-Shaab (People’s Party), and meanwhile constituted the largest partisan/
established political forces present in the protests. Some ICP members, in fact, 
were deemed to have been among the driving forces behind the protests,32 
playing an active role in the coordination of protest slogans and demands 
across Iraqi provinces.33 Th us the protests were largely cross-sectarian in 
composition, involving Iraqis from every walk of life: ordinary citizens, intel-
lectuals, civil society activists, and a few established secular political forces 
with a non-sectarian membership base.
As in 2011, most Sunni and Shi‘a Islamist parties and movements refrained 
from participating in the popular mobilisation of 2015–16, except for the Shi‘a 
Sadrist Movement, which joined en masse the protests in February 2016 and 
‘Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), an armed scission of the Sadrist 
Movement, which briefl y took part in the protests. Indeed, unlike in much of 
the rest of the Arab world, where Islamist movements took part in anti-regime 
protests in 2011, Iraq’s principal Islamist parties belonged to the governing 
coalition and were thus not active partners in the protest movement. On the 
contrary, having then been at the receiving end of the protesters’ fury, they were 
largely anti-protest and sought to undermine them. As one prominent ICP 
fi gure asserted, Shi‘a Islamist parties and movements ‘considered the protests as 
targeting and opposing them, thus, many of them have tried to stop or thwart 
the movement’.34 Th us, Shi‘a political forces launched a propaganda campaign 
to counter the protests and render them less credible, claiming for instance that 
the uprising was merely ‘an external plot to undermine the political process and 
secularise Iraq’.35 Th ey moreover accused the activists of being mulhidin (atheists) 
and Baathists,36 thus seeking to delegitimise their movement and demands in the 
eyes of the wider populace. By late August 2015, activists and journalists were 
att acked in the provinces of Basra, Najaf and Babil. According to these activists 
it was Islamist parties belonging to the Shi‘a ruling bloc – namely al-Maliki’s 
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wing of the ruling Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (Da‘wa Party, DP)37 and ‘Ammar 
al-Hakim’s ISCI – which had sent their henchmen within the security services, or 
their militias, to intimidate activists and to scare off  and discourage protesters.38 
However, these allegations are entirely based on the activists’ testimonies and 
accounts of these incidents, and nothing has been proven to date to verify these 
claims. Another instance, meanwhile, occurred in Basra when unidentifi ed 
armed men stormed a sit-in tent, injured two protesters and distributed leafl ets 
threatening demonstrators.39 Similarly, men in civilian clothes – claiming to be 
intelligence offi  cers – abducted and beat demonstrators on numerous occasions 
following August 2015. On 18 September, for instance, three activists on their 
way out of a demonstration in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square were grabbed and 
carried off  (blindfolded) in a pick-up. Th ey were beaten, interrogated separately 
and released aft er signing a pledge not to demonstrate again. Th e activists were 
threatened with abduction, torture and death if they spoke to the media.40
It is evident from the above then that the ruling Shi‘a political forces sought 
to resist demands for change at all costs, resorting to violent repression in an 
att empt to quell the mass protests. Given Muqtada al-Sadr’s participation in 
the protests from February 2016 onwards, it is also clear, moreover, that the 
Shi‘a political elites were divided on the issue.41 Whilst al-Maliki’s wing of the 
ruling DP and the ISCI opposed the protest movement and considered it a 
threat on their hold on power, the Sadrist Movement and its allies supported it, 
with al-Sadr calling his followers to join the popular demonstrations.42
By proclaiming himself ra‘yi al-islah, or godfather of the reform and the anti-
corruption movement, al-Sadr called for massive protests in support of al-Abadi’s 
endeavour to nominate a ‘technocratic’ government from February 2016 
onwards. Al-Sadr’s initiatives/calls for mobilisation were usually coordinated 
with al-Tayyar al-Madani, or in support of al-Tayyar’s initial calls for demon-
strations. However, the Sadrist Movement and al-Sadr himself had gradually 
appeared to be the key drivers of the protest movement, largely owing to the 
large number of the movement’s followers and its strong organisational structure.
It is interesting to note in this context, that al-Sadr himself had made a 
considerable eff ort to change his reputation as a radical, rebel and fi rebrand aft er 
his return from exile in Iran in 2011. In doing so, he tried to forge a new image 
as tha’ir dhida al-zulm wa al-fasad (rebel against injustice and corruption) for 
himself. Th us, in a public gesture underpinning his anti-corruption credentials 
he referred two former cabinet ministers belonging to the al-Ahrar bloc43 (his 
own political bloc in parliament) at the end of February 2016 to the Integrity 
Commission, which is in charge of investigating corruption cases.44 As part of 
this transformation, al-Sadr fi nally also sought to cast himself in his discourse 
as a nationalist and populist public fi gure who objected to Iraq’s growing 
sectarian politics, although of course his own popularity remained very much 
linked to the spiritual legacies of his father and uncle, two prominent Shi‘a 
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clerics.45 Th us, his main audience and followers remain to be found among 
the Shi‘a community who not only revere him for the religious heritage 
he represents, but also for his capacity to voice and channel their political 
discontent and to transform it into political power on the ground. By backing 
the protest movement of 2015–16, and by trying to distance himself from the 
leaders of other Shi‘a Islamist political parties, al-Sadr undoubtedly pursued 
his own political agenda. Indeed by throwing his weight behind the anti-
government protests, he seems willing to forfeit his political bloc’s presence 
in the current government in exchange for maintaining his role as a leader of 
the anti-corruption and reform movement. In other words, rather than seeking 
imminent political gains, al-Sadr appears to have focused on bolstering his 
personal status as a national/unifying politician and his movement’s position 
in Iraqi politics. Accordingly he has positioned himself as a key actor to be 
reckoned with in future political arrangements/alliances in order to eff ectively 
compete in the 2018 parliamentary elections.
On 18 March 2016, al-Sadr called his followers to stage a sit-in at the gates of 
Baghdad’s Green Zone, which houses Iraqi government institutions and foreign 
embassies. Th en, following weeks of political turmoil and in an unprecedented 
show of force, al-Sadr spearheaded and launched the protesters’ breach of the 
Green Zone on 30 April. On the one hand, this was a tactical move by al-Sadr 
to put pressure on Iraqi lawmakers to approve al-Abadi’s allegedly technocratic 
government. On the other hand, it constituted a clever ploy to demonstrate his 
ability to gather and control crowds who respond to his calls, and to hold the 
Green Zone – the country’s centre of power – at his mercy.46
As mentioned above, the other Shi‘a Islamist force participating in the 
2015–16 protest movement, besides the Sadrist Movement, was ‘Asa‘ib Ahl 
al-Haq (League of the Righteous). Th e League is a pro-Iranian armed scission 
of the Sadrist Movement – involved in the Iraqi forces’ fi ght against IS – that 
aims for the establishment of a Shi‘a Islamic government in Iraq and Shari‘ah 
(Islamic law) throughout the country. For the most part, members of ‘Asa‘ib 
Ahl al-Haq partook sporadically in the popular mobilisation in order to 
strengthen the League’s political position as one of the main Shi‘a militias. 
Generally known as being critical of the al-Abadi government, it called for 
the replacement of the current parliamentary system with a presidential one, 
which could give pro-Iranian political forces and militias a bett er chance to 
control the Iraqi political system.47 Its demands did not have much echo within 
the broader protest movement, however, and its participation in the protests 
gradually waned.
Overall the participation of the Sadrist Movement, and more broadly of 
Islamist forces, in the 2015–16 protests proved to be rather problematic. Th is is 
evident in the debate among secular civil society activists at the time – the initial 
instigators of the demonstrations – on the identity of the protest movement. 
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While some activists highlighted the secular character of the protests and 
considered any partnership with Islamists (including Sadrists) a potential threat to 
the movement, other important fi gures within al-Tayyar al-Madani believed that 
identity had no place in this debate and emphasised instead the national character 
of the protesters’ demands. Th is second group of activists aimed at enlarging the 
uprising’s popular base by consolidating their alliance with pro-reform Islamist 
forces. Th is they sought to achieve, fi rst by capitalising on al-Sistani’s support of 
the protests in order to rally modest Shi‘a who were generally weary about the 
uprising’s overall secular slogans. Th ey moreover multiplied visits and meetings 
with al-Sistani’s representatives in Najaf and, from November 2015 onwards, also 
with Muqtada al-Sadr himself. At the time, some members of al-Tayyar al-Madani 
believed that an alliance with the Sadrist Movement was conceivable and 
benefi cial to the protesters’ cause, given the latt er’s popular base among the Shi‘a 
population and its leader’s pro-reform and anti-corruption stances.48 Moreover, 
it was felt that al-Sadr’s militias would be able to help protect the demonstra-
tors, who – as demonstrated above – were constantly being att acked by thugs/
militiamen of those Islamist parties in power.49 Th is approach, was however, not 
uniformly shared within al-Tayyar al-Madani, with some of its secular activists 
refusing any coordination with Islamist political forces.50
Apart from two big rallies calling for a reform of the electoral process to 
avoid facilitating the return of the same ‘corrupt’ political elites to power, by 
February and March 2017 the protest momentum conspicuously slowed 
down. Th is could be at least partially explained by the popular fatigue aft er 
almost two years of protests, as well as by the (military) mobilisation against 
IS, which was widely seen by Iraqis across the board as a priority and as an 
urgent national security concern.
In sum, the involvement of the Sadrists in the 2015–16 protests certainly 
enlarged its popular base and thus its capacity to exert pressure on the 
Shi‘a Islamist forces in power. At the same time, however, it also divided 
the movement’s secular constituents, particularly al-Tayyar al-Madani, and 
changed at least the image, if not the identity, of the protests. As the Sadrists 
were much more visible, they stole the limelight from the initial instigators 
of the protest movement, though surprisingly – as shall become apparent 
below – its cross-sectarian essence and discourse remained alive.
The uprising through its slogans: The rise of an 
anti-sectarian discourse
Like the 2011 protests in Iraq and across other Arab states, the 2015–16 
protest movement relied heavily on social media networks to organise rallies 
and circulate slogans, news items and videos. In fact, Iraqis have never been 
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so creative in criticising their political leaders or denouncing their poor living 
conditions. As part of the protests, they designed cartoons, created sarcastic 
slogans and produced videos that were circulated on social media to express 
their understanding of the political situation outside the bounds of sectarian/
communally based identities.
Two emblematic slogans have marked the protests and emphasised the 
protesters’ fi ght against corruption and sectarianism. Th ese were: ‘bism al-din 
baguna al-haramiyya’ (in the name of religion we were robbed by the looters) and 
‘hashd51 dhida al-irhab wa hashd dhida al-fasad’ (a popular mobilisation against 
terrorism and another one against corruption). Th rough these and other slogans 
protesters sought to reject not only high-level corruption, but also the instrumen-
talisation of religion prevalent since 2003 to control power and wealth.
By far some of the most poignant anti-sectarian slogans were produced in 
the mostly Shi‘a provinces of Basra, Najaf and Karbala, where slogans circulated 
such as ‘ma‘an li mukafahat tujjar al-din wa mukafahat al-suraq wa tujjar al-dam 
wa kul man irtada al-‘imama al-bayda’ wal sawda’ min ajl al-sulta wal mal’ (let us 
come together in order to fi ght the merchants of religion and blood, to fi ght the 
looters and all those wearing a white or black turban52 in order to control power 
and wealth), or ‘al-mutajirun bism ‘Ali aswa’ min man harabuh’ (those trading 
in the name of Ali are worse than those who fought against him). By referring to 
Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Shi‘a-revered Imam, the latt er slogan specifi cally targeted 
those Islamist parties in power that used Shi‘a sectarian identity/ideology to 
rally communal support and accumulate wealth. Other slogans, meanwhile, 
expressed the demonstrators’ anger with Shi‘a Islamist offi  cials and their 
sectarian politics, such as ‘555 bidaya li ‘Iraq jadid yahkumuhu al-ta’ifi yun’ (the 
electoral list 55553 inaugurated the rule of sectarian politicians in a new Iraq), 
or ‘ma nrid wahid multahi, nrid wahid yastahi’ (we do not want a bearded/
Islamist offi  cial, we want one who has shame). In the same vein, a cartoon 
that circulated in the streets of Basra represented the incumbent parties as an 
enormous octopus, with each of its tentacles embodying one of Iraq’s major 
problems such as corruption, clientelism, crime and unemployment. Judging 
by this and other cartoons/banners, the protesters thus clearly drew strong 
links between corruption, sectarianism and the rise of IS, which (by their 
banners) appear to have been considered as two sides of the same coin. Many 
demonstrators, meanwhile, called for a dawla madaniyya (a secular state) and 
a reform of the political system to put an end to the post-2003 ethno-sectarian 
quota system, thus directly questioning the legitimacy of the current ruling 
Shi‘a elites. Moreover, the slogan ‘Tehran barra barra, Karbala’ tibqa hurra’ 
(Tehran out, out, Karbala will become free), chanted in the streets of Karbala, 
revealed the national, and to an extent even nationalistic, essence of the 
movement. Sectarian or ethnic slogans have been remarkably absent during 
the protests and only Iraqi fl ags have been raised. Besides the movement’s 
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nationalist fervour, this anti-Iranian sentiment could also be associated with 
Iran’s earlier support for some Shi‘a political leaders, a fact that linked Iran and 
these leaders in the popular imagination/mind. Th e activists have also sought 
to defy anti-reform forces, who had bet on the rapid decline of the movement, 
with slogans proving its resilience such as ‘juma‘a wara juma‘a, al-fasid nitt ala‘uh’ 
(Friday54 aft er Friday, the corrupt will be kicked out).
Another symbolic slogan refl ecting one of the main characteristics of 
the protests is ‘la qiyada kulluna mutadhahirun’ (no leadership – we are all 
protesters). Th is slogan clearly underlines both the strength and weakness 
of the movement and raises the issue of its own survival. Th e fact that it was 
leaderless and not monopolised by any of the well-established political forces 
clearly constituted a major incentive for Iraqis from all walks of life regardless 
of their political affi  liation to take part in the protests, thus making them a 
proper moment of popular dissent. In each province tansiqiyyat (organisa-
tional committ ees) were formed to harmonise slogans and ensure the peaceful 
character of the protests. During the initial months of the protest cycle, the 
organisation of demonstrations across the country remained horizontal, 
without any centralised coordination between provinces. With time passing, 
however, some of the most involved activists became aware that the lack of a 
centralised leadership – in order to coordinate the protests’ slogans and demands 
and to negotiate on behalf of the protesters with the Iraqi government – had 
weakened their capacity of action and their ability to impose needed reforms. 
Aft er the end of 2015, coordination meetings between tansiqiyyat did then 
take place more frequently within each province and across provinces. Th us a 
few steps were taken towards the ‘transformation of the uprising into a more 
homogeneous organisational and political structure, while preserving its 
diversity’.55 If ultimately successful, this is the only strategy that could sustain 
the protest movement, make its demands more vocal and strengthen its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the regime.
Th us, through banners and slogans chanted in the streets or circulated on 
social media, Iraqis expressed their anger during the protests of 2015–16. 
As evidenced in their demands and slogans, these protests formed a unique 
moment in recent Iraqi history: a moment that rejected not only corruption 
and bad governance, but also the sectarian logic that had come to defi ne 
post-2003 domestic politics.
Conclusion
In all Arab Spring uprisings the calls for a change of leadership were largely of 
a secular not of a religious inspiration/aspiration. Th us, despite the participa-
tion of some Islamist political forces in the uprisings, religious agendas and 
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slogans were noticeably absent.56 On this basis, the Iraqi protest movement 
that was forged concomitantly to the Arab uprisings in 2011, and then again 
in 2015–16, is perfectly in line with the logic and essence of this Arab wave 
of popular mobilisations. Indeed, the 2015–16 protest movement created a 
positive dynamic with the rise of an anti-sectarian discourse and of new actors 
who mobilised for almost two years and formulated their demands largely 
outside the bounds of the sectarian or communally based identity politics and 
rhetoric that have been at the heart of the Shi‘a Islamist ruling establishment 
ever since it took power in 2003–4.
So far the protest movement has been considered a reformist and not a 
revolutionary one. Its main fi gures believe that a change within the regime and 
not the change of regime is needed. Th e Iraqi protests are thus an example 
of what Asef Bayat57 called ‘Arab refo-lutions’, a term he used to describe the 
2011 Arab uprisings. According to Bayat, these revolutionary movements 
‘enjoy enormous social power, but lack administrative authorities; they garner 
remarkable hegemony but do not actually rule’, and they ‘want to push for 
reforms in, and through the institutions of the incumbent states’.58
To date, the Iraqi protest movement faces two main challenges, namely (1) 
ensuring the unity and cohesion of al-Tayyar al-Madani, whose parameters, 
alliances, and strategies are ill-defi ned, making it prone to internal division, 
and (2) transforming this popular momentum into a coordinated central 
decision-making structure that could represent voices of dissent, sustain 
pressure and produce change. Otherwise it will fade away like all ‘refo-lutions’ 
that carry the perils of ‘counter-revolutionary restoration’,59 especially in the 
Iraqi context where non-sectarian voices have very limited opportunities to 
survive and rally support.
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Chapter 21
Conclusion: new directions in the 
study of Islamist politics
Jillian Schwedler
Th e Arab uprisings were undoubtedly a seminal development for Middle East 
politics. Few states were left  untouched, even if only seven experienced revolution-
ary levels of mobilisation. Besides these challenges to authoritarian regimes across 
the region, Islamist groups behaved in ways that were sometimes surprising and 
unprecedented given the established literature on Islamist political participation. 
Much of that work, as discussed in greater detail below, focused on the experiences 
and strategies of particular Islamist movements as the uprisings unfolded.
But the uprisings were fascinating in part because the most established 
Islamist political parties in the region, long fi xtures in oppositional politics, 
were among the latecomers to many of the populist opposition movements 
that characterised the early uprisings. At the same time, other Islamist groups 
that had long eschewed active engagement in national politics were quick to 
jump into the fray. Th e patt erns of interactions between Islamist and secular 
and left ist groups were maintained in some instances but took new forms 
(of both cooperation and isolation) in others.
Several years aft er the uprisings began in late 2010, it is now possible to 
discern some new patt erns of Islamist politics in the region. As with all revolu-
tionary moments, it takes a bit of dust sett ling to determine what has changed 
and what continuities remain. To be sure, the confl icts are continuing in many 
countries, with the outcome of even ‘sett led’ cases like Tunisia and Egypt 
uncertain in the medium, let alone the long term. Th is collection explores 
these ruptures and continuities, bringing forth detailed studies of individual 
cases with solidly comparative insights. In this concluding chapter, I fi rst 
outline some contours in scholarly studies of Islamist politics before and aft er 
the uprisings. Th en I examine the individual chapters of this volume in order to 
highlight the originality of their contributions, both theoretical and empirical, 
and how they contribute to the innovation in the study of Islamist politics. 
I cluster them diff erently to the way they are organised in the volume in order 
to bring additional insights and innovations to the fore.
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Categories and concepts
For much of the 2000s, scholarly analyses of Islamist groups have been 
organised around a common set of concepts and hypotheses, oft en relating 
to the processes of moderation and radicalisation. Following the events of 
11 September 2001 and the global spread of militant extremism by groups like 
al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Islamic State, IS), one set 
of scholars tracked their att ention on the rise of jihadi groups and the use of 
political violence, while another followed the activities and evolution of groups 
that eschewed violence and sought to work within existing political systems, 
regardless of regime eff orts to control and limit their infl uence. Th is divide 
led to a fl ourishing of two nearly distinct sets of literature, one focusing on 
moderate Islamist movements and another on extremist Islamists (especially 
jihadism and terrorism). While this common-sense distinction may be 
useful for gaining analytic traction on certain questions, the near ubiquity of 
the moderate–radical divide in the literature ultimately limited the insights 
produced by even the best scholars.
Scholars have never entirely agreed on precise defi nitions for core concepts 
such as moderate and radical, but the most common themes and debates 
of the literature were nevertheless largely built around this binary. Even 
critiques of one or another of those literatures oft en did litt le more than 
add new categories, while preserving the focus on clustering various groups 
and off ering adjectives that classifi ed them in various ways. Th is approach 
fairly consistently located Islamist groups as the object of study, with groups 
categorised based on their beliefs and practices with regard to participation 
in the existing political system. Some of the chapters in this volume follow 
this model. Th us, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, MB) 
groups were largely clustered together as one type of group characterised as 
moderate, pragmatic or integrationist. Th ese movements all broadly followed 
the teachings of founder Hassan al-Banna, even as they varied signifi cantly 
in the ways in which they engaged the regime and other political actors in 
their local sett ings. Th ey were therefore also set against another cluster, Salafi  
groups, who were characterised as inspired by the teachings of other founding 
thinkers, and as engaging – or not engaging – with regimes and other political 
actors in strikingly diff erent patt erns. Th e focal point of analysis, therefore, 
was most oft en a classic comparative analysis seeking to explain variations in 
trajectory and behaviour between diff erent groups or clusters of groups. While 
there were some notable exceptions,1 many of the books and articles of the 
past two decades were studies of individual groups or of small-n comparisons 
of two or three Islamist movements or parties.
What got left  out of many of these analyses were the diverse ways in which 
Islam or political Islam was a part of the broader fi eld of politics in ways that 
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did not map easily onto distinct groups or movements. Th at is, the question 
of Islamist politics is about not only Islamist groups and their individual 
(if divergent) trajectories, but also about many ways that people discuss and feel 
the role of Islam in their lives, in the political realm as well as elsewhere, public 
and private. Th e values and ideas that people understand to be connected with 
Islam fi nd traction in a wide range of realms that we would recognise as political: 
social relations, economic structures and practices, and informal interactions 
saturated in power relations even as they stand outside of the formal sphere of 
politics. I am not referring here to personal piety, although many scholars have 
elegantly made the case that even this realm is highly political.2 Rather, I am 
thinking about the ways in which people connect ideas and values that they 
associate with their religious beliefs to a range of practices and processes that 
scholars easily recognise as the realm of the political.
Although the term is a bit awkward, we can imagine this sphere as one 
of ‘Islamistness’, which invokes degrees of association or att achment across 
multiple fi elds rather than a binary distinction between what is and is not 
Islamist.3 Th e fact that the concept is awkward is part of the reason that it can 
actually be intellectually productive, in that it continuously reminds us that as 
a category it does not work unproblematically even as it does aim to capture 
aspects of Islamist politics that are lost or neglected in movement-centred 
studies. Th inking about the dynamics and degree of Islamistness can help us to 
evaluate the importance of particular ideas or debates to policies, affi  liations, 
aff ect, identity and alliances, without treating those debates as relevant only to 
those labelled Islamist.
Th e objective should be to move beyond the ways in which our conventional 
categories of actors fail to capture the complex and changing role of ideas and 
beliefs in shaping the region’s politics. We can think about the Islamistness 
of particular spheres or discourses, waxing and waning over time, unevenly 
saturated in diff erent social spheres or fi elds of politics. We would move away 
from att ention to the ‘ideological’ commitments of diff erent groups, as if those 
ideas were fi xed and stood outside of time. We might also strive to recognise 
more directly in our work the ways in which diff ering degrees of commitment to 
Islamistness shape political practices and alliances, and identify the moments 
when those commitments are subsumed by other political logics. Th e point is 
not whether an individual or group is or is not an Islamist, is or is not a member 
of a particular group, and so on. Islamistness might be about the combination 
of a number of diff erent logics, which are mobilised and utilised to structure 
our understandings of the worlds around us.4 It is not an either/or proposition, 
but a complex of ideas and practices that help to make sense of the world.
To move beyond the focus on groups, we also might de-centre movements 
rather than abandoning the study of them, so they are not necessarily the 
object of our analyses. Instead of a study of the evolution of the MB in Egypt, 
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for example, one might explore a sphere of activity and then see when, where, 
and how various Islamist actors (att ached to groups or not) emerge into our 
analyses. In my current work on protests in Jordan, instead of studying the 
protests that the Jabhat al-’Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Front, IAF) organises 
or in which it participates, I locate protests themselves as the object of study, 
ethnographically examining particular locales of protest activities. In many 
of these, the IAF and other Islamists emerge as participants in that sphere of 
activity. Th e protests around the Kaluti mosque in West Amman, for example, 
oft en include large numbers of IAF, MB, and unaffi  liated Islamist participants 
and are thus frequently characterised as ‘predominantly Islamist’ in character. 
But as confrontations with general police (Amn al-Amm, the Public Security 
Directorate) or the gendarmerie riot police (darak) approach, virtually all 
Islamists have exited the scene, leaving only a small number of left ists and 
secular activists, who stay on to push the envelope with the security agencies. 
Viewing those protesters as ‘predominantly Islamist’ may be an accurate 
descriptor for the moment when the crowds are largest, but not at the (more 
crucial) moment of confrontation with security forces. Even though I have 
studied Jordan’s mainstream Islamist movements for more than twenty years, 
this dynamic did not become fully evident to me until I began to study the 
protests writ large; as a result, I gained unexpected insights about the Islamist 
movement that I had not recognised while I was studying the movement per 
se. By focusing on broader realms of politics, rather than groups themselves, 
we can more accurately recognise the degrees of Islamistness across multiple 
social, political and economic spheres of activity and practice.
Another example might be to examine disaster relief activities. Rather than 
asking what Islamists are doing in the aft ermath of disasters when state actors 
seem incapable of mounting a rapid response, one might study a particular 
location or site in need of relief, and then discern the extent to which the 
various responses need to be understood in terms of degrees of Islamistness. 
To make this more concrete, rather than asking whether Islamists were or were 
not early responders, we might notice that medical professionals who identify 
as Islamist organise relief eff orts, but that the initiatives did not emerge 
from the formal groups or parties themselves. Or, perhaps, the presence of 
individuals with so-called Islamist affi  liations may have no immediate bearing 
under work being undertaken. Th is sort of approach also helps to untangle 
apparently empirical issues as to who is and is not an Islamist. As Carrie 
Wickham noted in her early study of the Egyptian MB,5 the question of 
membership is not easily ascertained: Of the many people who occasionally 
att end MB events, and even of those who share substantial portions of the 
movement’s positions, many are not ‘members’ of the organisation. But 
then how are we to think of those grey zones? An att ention to the ‘edges’ of 
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movements is another way to bring forth the insights that can be gained from 
a focus on Islamistness rather than on the evolution of groups themselves. It 
is not that we should not study groups or movements, but that a shift  in focus 
can advance our theories and knowledge of Islamist politics by bringing new 
practices and degrees of Islamistness to light.
Th e contributions to this volume do not, of course, adopt the awkward 
concept of ‘Islamistness’ that I am suggesting here. Nor am I advocating that 
they should do so. But the spirit of this awkward concept is prominently 
represented in this excellent set of contributions. Each of the authors aims 
to think through the implications of the Arab uprisings and their eff ects on 
various spheres of activity readily identifi able as one of Islamist politics. But 
each is also doing precisely the work that takes us out of, and beyond, the focus 
on individual group or party life-cycles and genealogies. Th e theoretical and 
empirical work here is rich, indeed.
New insights on mainstream Islamist parties
Scholars should not entirely abandon the study of individual Islamist groups, 
particularly as many continue to be central to contentious politics in the post-
uprising Middle East. Branches of the MB, for example, are still functioning 
legally in some countries while outlawed and subject to severe repression in 
others. In all cases, they continue to be consequential political actors, even 
if it is because regimes in places like Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are 
att empting to crush them. Careful and close study of these movements and 
their trajectories still fi nd a central place in the analyses of Islamist politics, and 
careful studies with rich empirical detail will always be welcome additions to 
the literature. Th is collection contains several such noteworthy contributions.
In Chapter 5, for example, Angela Joya explores the economic policy of the 
MB in Egypt from 2011 until the July 2013 coup ousted it from power. She 
argues that the group failed in part because it did not off er a radically progressive 
economic vision, certainly not one that diff ered signifi cantly enough from 
the status quo commitment to neo-liberal economic projects that fl ourished 
during the Mubarak era. Besides failing to present their own vision, other 
non-Islamist groups also proved unwilling to work with them, in large part due 
to the MB’s unwillingness to reach out to other groups. In Joya’s narrower focus 
on economic policy, she brings forth new insights concerning one particular 
realm of power relations – that of economic policy – that has received far too 
litt le att ention in the broader literature on the uprisings in general and on 
the period during which the MB held some governing authority in Egypt in 
particular. Because so much of the explanation for the uprisings across the 
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region concerns structural economic conditions, the extent to which the MB 
reproduced many of the policies of the Mubarak era contributes signifi cantly 
to our understanding of what has and has not changed. While many analyses 
emphasise the Morsi period as one of a temporary disruption between an 
earlier authoritarian and the later one, Joya’s analysis draws att ention two 
surprising continuities between Mubarak and Brotherhood rule.
In Chapter 7, Truls Hallberg Tønnessen also turns his att ention away from 
a linear study of a single movement – in this case the Islamic State – to a realm 
of practical policy making and practice. When the IS came to control territory 
in Syria and Iraq, for example, precisely how did it work to realise control not 
only over those territories? What techniques of quotidian governance did they 
employ, and how much did those diff er from earlier practices of governance? 
Tønnessen provides a fi ne-grained analysis of the micro-processes of incipient 
governance, beginning with the early days of al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid wa al-Jihad 
group (founded in 2004), and continuing to the Islamic State’s capture and 
control of broader swaths of territory. Th is fascinating discussion of diff ering 
narratives among groups – particularly concerning who founded what when, 
and who was responsible for fi lling the vacuum of the missing state (in Iraq) – 
contributes to the growing literature on rebel governance. Tønnessen’s careful 
empirical details, like those in the rest of this volume, also contribute signifi -
cantly to our overall knowledge of the practices of these movements.
In Chapter 8, Mohammed Masbah examines Morocco’s Hizb al-’Adala wa 
al-Tanmiyya (Party of Justice and Development, PJD) aft er the uprisings, and 
its unique history (in Morocco) of sustained electoral success and endurance 
at the helm of government. He asks why this Islamist political party was the 
only one in that region to ascend to power post-uprisings, and remain in 
power. Drawing on, but ultimately moving beyond, the inclusion-moderation 
hypothesis, Masbah builds a framework of analysis that identifi es three 
factors explaining the rise of an Islamist party to power and, perhaps most 
crucially, why the Moroccan regime has not (as of this writing) allowed it to 
happen. His answer, which focuses on Morocco’s unique political context in 
the post-uprising period, particularly the weakness of other political parties, 
reminds us that the pragmatism of an Islamist group will always be contingent 
on the domestic political context, perhaps even more than on any group’s 
stated ideological commitments. Th e Moroccan case is oft en treated as one 
in which an existing regime successfully manoeuvred to defl ate growing 
populist opposition. But Masbah’s analysis brings forth quite profound 
political changes in both the political scene and in the Islamist movement. 
While the narrative goes that the existing regime has successfully defl ated 
possible threats to its rule, transformations within the Islamist party explain 
why it does not challenge monarchical rule per se.
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A broader sphere for Islamist politics
Just as many Islamist parties remain prominent actors in the region, both 
in power and in opposition, they do not exist in isolation of a diverse range 
of other political forces. A number of contributors to this volume have 
examined Islamist movements in careful detail, while also seeking to locate 
their studies of individual movements within a broader sphere of Islamist 
political engagement. Th e focus becomes less the evolution and characteristics 
of a particular movement than the engagements of various groups and trends 
within a broader political arena.
In Chapter 9, for example, Barbara Zollner engages with the inclusion-
moderation hypothesis to assess changes in Egyptian Islamist parties aft er the 
uprisings. But she moves beyond many other analyses of Egyptian Islamists 
by att ending to the wide range of Islamist-oriented parties that emerged 
post-2011, even if most failed to make a signifi cant mark on the political 
scene, or even survive. Th ese diverse groups are seldom even mentioned in 
many studies of Egypt’s Islamist trends, presumably because they ‘failed’ to 
make a mark on the political scene. But Zollner reminds us that the spear of 
Islamist politics, even those seeking to engage directly with the regime, is not 
limited to the larger and seemingly more successful parties, such as those built 
on the foundations of the MB. Rather, across the region we have for more 
than a decade seen multiple smaller and alternative Islamist groups emerge 
to try to compete in the public political realm. Some of these have received 
a moderate amount of att ention, such as Hizb al-Wasat (Centre Party/CP, or 
simply al-Wasat) in Egypt,6 but most have been treated merely as a footnote 
and not integrated, as Zollner has done here, into a substantive understanding 
of the full realm of Islamist politics. Only by broadening our purview, as this 
chapter illustrates, can we seek to gain new traction on important questions 
such as that of sequencing, which became central to the inclusion-moderation 
hypothesis and the question of the ideological versus strategic or pragmatic 
moderation.7
Marc Valeri takes a similar approach in Chapter 10, urging us to examine 
Islamist politics through a lens that captures a broader range of activities and 
organisations. In his study of Bahrain – a case that has received litt le systematic 
att ention – he argues that both pro-regime and opposition mainstream 
political societies, particularly those that are Islamist in orientation, were 
the biggest losers of post-uprising politics. Mainstream political societies 
were marginalised, even as they worked tirelessly to demonstrate their 
commitment to an open pluralist system, and to reiterate that they did not 
want to monopolise power. Th e Shi‘a Islamist Jamʿiyyat al-Wifaq al-Watani 
al-Islamiyya (Entente – National Accord Islamic Society, or in short al-Wifaq), 
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for example, went out of its way to demonstrate that it embraced a conciliatory 
approach to political reform and not a desire to overthrow the regime. But 
this conciliatory approach proved also to be a failure. Valeri illustrates that 
when regimes do not see anything to gain by broadening the realm of political 
participation, they are more than willing and able to simply shut everything 
down. Bahrain survived its massive cross-sectarian uprising only with outside 
assistance, but it has repressed all manner of domestic opposition on its own 
subsequently. Th e numerous and diverse political societies examined by Valeri 
have been almost entirely neglected in the scholarly literature, so this chapter 
is an important corrective empirically, while also building an approach that 
locates Islamist actors in a wider sphere of Islamist political opposition.
In Chapter 14, Francesco Cavatorta examines post-uprising Tunisia through 
a lens that complicates conventional portrayals of the fi eld of Islamist politics 
there as being divided between the mainstream Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance 
Party, henceforth al-Nahda), on the one hand, and Salafi sts on the other. 
Al-Nahda is like most political parties in that it has several distinct trends 
internally, some of which have had connections with Ben Ali’s regime. Salafi sts 
in Tunisia likewise do not make up a unifi ed or homogeneous fi eld. Beyond 
those divisions, numerous unaffi  liated groups in civil society also advocate for 
various Islamist practices, refl ecting a wide range of perspectives concerning the 
appropriate role of Islam in the political sphere. Like others who adopt such 
an approach, the analytic framework seeks to understand the complexities of a 
broader fi eld of Islamist politics rather than the evolution of a single group.
In Chapter 15, Jérôme Drevon rightfully notes that studies of Islamist 
movements oft en emphasise the strategies and actions of elite actors, and 
particularly their participation in elections. Instead, his study of the broader 
political fi eld of Islamist groups includes formal political parties but also a 
wider range of groups and movements that invoke Islam to varying degrees and 
in diverse ways. Th is relational approach aims to reveal how these movements 
evolved since the uprisings, but it does not focus on a single group so much 
as bringing to light how interactions across and within various Islamist 
groups shaped their ideational commitments, as well as their repertoire of 
political actions. Drevon insists that a single party’s evolution cannot be fully 
understood in isolation of other movements within the political fi eld. He 
emphasises the shift ing repertoires of contention that shape the debates and 
interactions among these diverse groups, concluding that the post-uprising 
period broadened repertoires of contention and encouraged the constituents 
of various Islamist groups to challenge the existing hierarchies and monopoli-
sation of the elites to develop new forms of activism and political engagement.
In Chapter 16, Ibrahim al-Marashi examines multiple Shi‘a Islamist parties 
in Iraq and the competition and tensions between them. Although Iraqi 
politics is the focal point, al-Marashi moves beyond a nation-centric frame 
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to examine the impact of Shi‘a politics elsewhere on the various movements 
in Iraq. In particular, he identifi es how Iraqi groups have struggled to balance 
their reliance on Iran for support with their desire for autonomy, all the while 
competing domestically for dominance. Th e US-led invasion of 2003 also 
aff ected the contours of Islamist politics inside Iraq, escalating intra- Shi‘a 
competition as the stakes of the political game increased with the introduction 
of the confessional electoral system. Th e emergence of IS in Iraq did not result 
in intra-sectarian cooperation, as one might imagine, because the individual 
parties continued their ‘pursuit of narrow self-interests and political survival’.
Finally, in Chapter 19, Laura Ruiz de Elvira and Souhaïl Belhadj also 
decentre Islamist movements in their study of the dynamics of the confl ict in 
Syria. Th e regime has advanced a ‘sectarian radicalisation of the confl ict’, they 
argue, particularly given its increasing reliance on Shi‘a allies including Iran 
and Hizbollah. Such reliance created a ripe fi eld for Sunni extremist groups to 
gain a foothold in opposition to a seemingly sectarian regime. As a result, the 
Syrian confl ict evolved from its original cross-sectarian and peaceful dynamic 
into a bloody protracted war, increasingly shaped by the politicisation of 
sectarian identities, exaserbated by the intervention of outside actors with 
political agendas that do not resonate with those who participated in the early 
months of Syria’s uprisings.
De-centering Islamist movements
As suggested above, the scholarly literature on Islamist politics has advanced to 
the point that the range and scope of the studies of individual Islamist groups 
and political parties are substantive enough to enable us to make new forms of 
comparative analysis fruitful. Th e literatures on social movements and political 
parties, as noted above, prioritise certain kinds of questions. Th ese questions 
include, but are not limited to, how particular groups or parties form, the char-
acteristics of their leadership and constituencies, how they seek to gain new 
members, their activities, goals, and ideologies, and – most crucially – how 
have they evolved over time. Th ese are great and important questions, and I 
am not advocating that we should abandon them entirely. We still have much 
to learn about Islamist parties themselves, particularly if we turn our att ention 
away from elites and electoral competition and examine micro practices and 
internal dynamics. Not all studies of Islamist politics conform to the ‘life-cycle’ 
model central to social movement studies and studies of political parties, of 
course, but a very large proportion of them do.8
Among the most exciting innovations in this volume are analyses that adopt 
what might be called a relational approach, rather than a movement-centric 
approach emphasising the evolution of a single group. Th e focal point of the 
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analysis is the changing political context and its eff ects on movement strategies 
and trajectories, but always with multiple actors engaging with other actors in 
specifi c locales within the broader political realm.
In Chapter 2, for example, Mariz Tadros asks whether Mohamed Morsi 
faced an impossible mission in 2012–13. In addition to leading a new political 
party into the highest offi  ces of governance, among his greatest challenges was 
the need to unify his own party. Scholars have long noted that the Egyptian 
MB, like all branches of the organisation, has diverse trends internal to it – a 
feature common to virtually every political or social organisation globally. But 
the challenges for Morsi were compounded with the MB’s success in the par-
liamentary and presidential elections of 2011–12. Tadros’ relational approach 
explores Morsi’s challenges in uniting a party in which he was not previously 
among the dominant leaders. But he was also challenged by the need to 
determine what kinds of relations the party would establish with various other 
groups in the opposition, including more conservative Islamist parties. Morsi 
thus needed to lead internal party debates aimed at reconciling MB doctrine 
with democratic inclusivity, a tall challenge. As the party took power, it lacked 
internal consensus on the scope of what core concepts such as musharaka 
should entail in practice. Disagreements on such practical and strategic matt ers 
such as bureaucratic function (staffi  ng cabinet posts and managing ministerial 
portfolios) were played out along with contending visions within the party 
around concepts such as sovereignty, the nature of the social contract, and the 
political community. Tadros locates Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala (Freedom 
and Justice Party, FJP) as the centre of her analysis, but rather than presenting 
a study of a party-as-actor moving from opposition into power, she brings 
forth a broader fi eld of actors, internal and external to the party, and their 
contending visions and expectations about what holding power could and 
should mean – including the need to keep Morsi in check. Signifi cantly, these 
contentious debates also entailed the need to contend with the Salafi  political 
groups, which brought diff erent claims into the public sphere about the 
appropriate role of Islam. Th e boycott  of the constitution-draft ing process by 
non-Islamists cemented the widespread perception of Islamist homogeneity, 
even as those internal tensions escalated. But the July 2013 coup nearly erased 
these complex tensions and interactions, removing the possibility of a post-
Islamist moment as a subsequent crackdown served to unify the MB as an 
opposition under att ack.
In Chapter 6, Wanda Krause and Melissa Finn also utilise a relational 
approach that broadens the arena of att ention from distinct Islamist groups to 
other actors. Th eir study focuses on women activists in Qatar aft er the uprisings 
who utilise Islam as a referent but who do not fi t into the conventional analytic 
categories of either Islamist or non-Islamist. Indeed, Krause and Finn contest 
the idea that these activists’ grounding in Islam necessarily makes them 
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Islamist at all. Even more, these women’s political activism is not oriented 
in a manner that suggests that their ultimate aspiration is to challenge or 
appropriate the state. Th ey enact instead a form of political agency that at its 
core rejects the notion that repressive regimes reduce them to subjects who are 
either disciplined or repressed. Of course, repression exists, but the resilient 
authoritarian arguments so common in portions of the literature before and 
aft er the uprisings fail to address the many ways in which these women (and 
other actors) are routinely and ‘irreverently refusing state control mechanisms’.9 
While aspects of these women’s activism might be argued to support the status 
quo (by pursuing actions that fi t the regime’s own agenda, even if the regime 
is not doing the actual work), others clearly subvert state priorities, advancing 
their own agendas. Th is relational approach brings into focus a messier arena 
of political actors and debates about Islam, some of which would be classifi ed 
as independent Islamists or not as Islamist at all, while others are affi  liated 
with the Qatari MB. Even as these women activists are marginalised (as 
female subjects), they actively mobilise the citizen-subjectivities in ways the 
regime does not appreciate. Th ey are non-movements, in Bayat’s sense, and 
refuse to be aspirational in the ways that the regime – and other Islamists – 
would prefer. Most signifi cantly, they are adamant in their refusal to accept the 
existing economic and political power structures. While they do not employ 
the categories of rights and citizenship, their actions nonetheless relate to the 
capacities of an empowered citizenry within society, including for women and 
other marginalised sectors.
Similarly in Chapter 11, Luciano Zaccara, Courtney Freer and Hendrik 
Kraetzschmar turn their att ention to a broader fi eld of ‘proto-parties’ in 
Kuwait: a wide range of organisations that function as parties in the absence of 
a law that legalises political parties. Th ese proto-parties are diverse, including 
Shi‘a and Sunni denominations, Salafi  groups and groups with left ist, liberal 
and nationalist orientations. Th ese groups explored other means of eff ecting 
political change, notably through cooperation across ideological lines in 
elections and parliament as well as in pressing claims through protests and dem-
onstrations. Th ey follow these practices from the decades before the uprisings 
to aft erward, with the uprisings creating momentum in the cooperation that 
had already been established in previous decades. Th e post-uprising context 
did lead to some internal divisions within certain groups, as their membership 
struggled with whether to boycott  elections or reassert a pro-regime stance. 
But pragmatism overwhelmingly prevailed, as a coalition of groups across the 
ideological spectrum ultimately re-engaged with the parliamentary system and 
ended their boycott .
In Chapter 18, Vincent Durac examines the rise of the nominally Shi‘a 
Houthi movement in post-uprising Yemen. He argues that while sectarianism 
has taken root in the country in unprecedented ways, the ‘Islamist’ dimension 
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of the current civil war cannot be reduced to sectarian tensions or even to 
the Saudi–Iranian tensions that are tainting the confl ict. Th e war in Yemen 
resulted from long-standing political rivalries and, in particular, the practices 
of the political regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh dating back decades. While 
Durac does not deny the importance of religio-political rivalries, he decentres 
the ‘Islamist’ dimension of the war – notably the supposed Sunni–Shi‘a 
rivalry embodied in the Saudi–Iranian struggle for power in the region. Th e 
war is not a religious confl ict, he argues, but a conventional political struggle 
between rival centres of power both inside and outside Yemen. At the same 
time, however, those politics have unquestionably elevated sectarian tensions 
in Yemen, which are certain to resonate well beyond the end of the confl ict – 
which is sadly not in sight.
Beyond ‘Islamist’ as a category
Finally, several of the contributions to this volume move beyond the focal point 
of movements and groups entirely. Th ey explore the complex ways in which 
ideas and practices work to constitute each other in political arenas in which 
a range of Islamist ideas make up only a portion of the ideas in circulation. It 
is not only the case that the binary between the Islamist and non-Islamist is 
complicated, but that there is complexity and fl uidity about what even counts 
as an Islamist idea or practice.
In Chapter 3, for example, Paola Rivett i and Adam Saleh leverage the insight 
that Iran’s legal system is built on multiple secular and religious epistemolo-
gies to explore how ideas shape politics and vice versa. Th ey note that while 
a wide range of actors advance political visions and arguments that adopt a 
‘rights’ discourse in calling for expanded political participation, their interven-
tions move from strikingly diff erent epistemological foundations. Th e result 
is that conservative and progressive forces alike view political participation as 
a right, but not for the same reasons. Rivett i and Saleh anchor their insights 
in a careful examination of the articulation of political demands in Iran over 
time. Th e ‘legal hybridity’ that has emerged in the Islamic Republic has many 
roots in the constitutional period of the early twentieth century. During the 
intervening decades, the diverse languages of politics have allowed for the 
emergence of a perhaps surprisingly strong discourse on the right to political 
participation. Oppositional and pro-regime forces have used this common 
historical background to advocate for an inclusive political environment, 
even if the particularities of those visions might diff er. Th e analysis thus off ers 
a kind of genealogy of the emergence of a rights discourse in Iran, and one 
that could not appropriately be understood as one in tension between Islamist 
and secular epistemologies. Contentious debates therefore move across these 
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diff erent epistemologies, just as they cross conventional boundaries inside and 
outside of the regime. Th at is, the ideological or ideational foundations of rights 
discourse in Iran today are in fact quite hybrid, rather than homogeneous. 
Analytically distinct categories of ‘theocratic’ and ‘secular’ foundations have 
failed to capture the complexity of those articulations of rights about political 
participation.
In Chapter 4, Nazlı Çağın Bilgili and Hendrik Kraetzschmar also 
complicate categories of what even counts as Islamist. Th ey build on the 
notion of an Islamist left  to bring forth complex strains of Islamist thought 
and practice that have unsett led notions of Islamist thinking as either 
moderate and pragmatic or conservative and radical. Th at is, like Rivett i and 
Saleh, they bring into our view a range of debates that are obscured when 
we think in terms of the Islamist and non-Islamist. For example, neo-liberal 
economic policies have been incorporated into the political thinking of many 
Islamist movements despite criticisms from both other Islamist voices and 
left ist voices, perhaps bett er characterised as more secular. Discourses about 
economics here draw again from multiple epistemological foundations that 
may appear incongruent but in practice fi nd enough overlap to be mutually 
supporting. Th e challenges to those economic ideas, however, likewise move 
from diff erent epistemological foundations, even as the emergent critique 
sett les on notions of justice and equality. Like the debate about the right 
of political participation in Iran, both the defence of neo-liberal economic 
policies and challenges to those policies draw on understandings of Islamist 
thought as they do on more secularly anchored debates about individual 
rights. Critiques of the repression of the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul should 
not be understood merely as coming from opposition or anti-regime voices. 
Rather, many criticisms also came from alternative Islamist voices, ones that 
emphasise problems with the regime’s neo-liberal policies, the neglected 
Islamic teachings about justice, equality and social rights – especially critiques 
emanating from the ‘Islamist left ’.
In Chapter 12, Anne Wolf also extends her analysis of post-uprising politics 
in Tunisia by bringing two supposedly ‘secular’ parties into the discussion of 
the characteristics of the broader political fi eld of contestation. While many 
studies describe that fi eld as one populated by politics parties that can be readily 
identifi ed as either secular or Islamist, Wolf demonstrates that two parties 
frequently classifi ed as secular – Hizb al-Tajammu‘ al-Dustouri al-Dimuqrati 
(Constitutional Democracy Rally, also known by its French acronym RCD) 
and Hizb Nidà Tunis (Call for Tunisia) – have become ‘home to a plurality 
of religious expressions and varying levels of religiosity/secularity’.10 Tensions 
about various parties have less to do with questions of religion or identity than 
they do with the conventional dynamics of elite political competition. Ben Ali 
himself played a role in ‘de-secularlisation’ during his rule, both as a political 
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strategy of defl ating opposition and because some members of his family were 
devout and called for a role for religion in politics. Political groups evolved 
over the years in response to changing political circumstances and as the stakes 
of the fi eld of competition allowed for greater possibilities of engaging and 
obtaining political power.
In Chapter 13, Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Alam Saleh also examine 
the shift ing dynamics of political groups across the ideological spectrum, 
focusing on post-Mubarak Egypt and the rise of polarisation. Secular rivalries 
date to the Sadat era, with shift ing alliances and tensions over the decades 
between Islamists and groups with other political orientations. Unlike in 
Kuwait, Egypt’s political fi eld has been one in which cooperation between 
Islamists and left ists has been only fl eeting, with longer-term dynamics bett er 
characterised as tense. But Kraetzschmar and Saleh direct our att ention away 
from formal rhetoric, illustrating that discursive tensions are not necessarily 
congruent with the substantive reality of political positions and platforms. 
Th at is, in a fi eld of political competition in which multiple parties are 
competing, secular and religious parties alike have incentives to portray 
the other as positioned at the extreme other end of the political spectrum. 
Th is ‘us-versus-them’ strategy sees groups exaggerate ideological distance 
or congruence for strategic purposes. Even more signifi cantly, many secular 
or civil parties make use of religious symbolism and slogans in their public 
discourse. Rhetorical categorisation becomes a political strategy to portray 
the ‘other’ as outside of the norm. Th e post-uprising political fi eld was, at least 
in 2012–13, in fact characterised by ‘far greater ideological fl uidity/fl exibility’ 
than the rhetoric of a wide range of political actors across the ideological 
spectrum would lead one to recognise. Th e analytic framework here provides 
a clear means of understanding exaggerated polarisation even as actual policy 
positions are in greater proximity.
Chérine Chams El-Dine focuses her att ention on the emergence of an anti-
sectarian discourse in Iraq since the uprisings. In Chapter 20, she argues that this 
new discourse explicitly critiqued the incumbent Shi‘a Islamist political parties, 
which actively sought ‘to stifl e the movement using intimidation, repression 
and the spreading of false rumors’.11 Contra conventional wisdom, Iraq did have 
an uprising in 2011, but it did not escalate due to lack of international support, 
repression by the regime and scorching summer temperatures. But it set the 
stage for another wave of protests, which materialised in 2015–16. El-Dine 
does not merely document these oft en-ignored protests, but she illustrates the 
changed repertoire of the protesters – utilising cartoons, videos and creative 
slogans – and in particular the eff ort to forge anti-sectarianism. Some of the 
slogans emphasised the exploitation of religious symbols and rhetoric by the 
regime, and others invoked corruption and economic exploitation.
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In Chapter 17, Katerina Dalacoura turns our att ention to the international 
relations of the Middle East post-uprisings, asking how the fi eld of Islamist 
politics has evolved as a result of shift s in aspects of international relations 
concerning the connections, alliances, balances of power among actors and 
states. But she extends her inquire beyond economic, political, and military 
dimensions to the ideational realm of ideas and values, including notions of 
‘recognition’ and ‘legitimacy’. Prior to the uprisings, she argues that Islamist 
movements across the region had largely positioned themselves in opposition 
to the ‘pro-Western’ camp comprised of Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
Although varied, much Islamist thought could be described as ‘third-worldist, 
‘anti-imperialist’, resisting not only foreign intervention into the region but 
the regimes propped up by foreign support. But as sectarianism has spread, 
common causes between groups like Hizbollah and Hamas became strained. 
Hamas leader Khaled Mishal, for example, no longer found Damascus a 
hospitable environment, fi nding refuge fi rst in Egypt but the later in Qatar. 
Whereas sectarianism was used by a certain political elite to foment tensions 
and resentments, those ideas have taken hold and now characterise much of 
the regional and international relations of Middle East politics. Th e decline 
or defeat of moderate Islamist opposition movements across the region has 
likewise aff ected broader regional politics, where IS is now a major political 
actor even as it sees its strength in Syria and Iraq challenged. Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar have taken very diff erent positions on moderate groups like the 
Muslim Brotherhood branches, and this has impacted domestic politics across 
the region. Truly regional in scope, Dalacoura’s contribution highlights the 
inter-connections in terms of strategies and commitments as well as the realm 
of ideas and values, demonstrating that no single-country focus on Islamists 
could possibly off er a complete picture of the fi eld of Islamist politics.
Conclusion
Th e contributions to this volume build on the strength of the existing literature 
on Islamist politics while also exploring new theoretical frameworks that 
suggest promising directions and new modes of gaining analytic traction. Th e 
post-uprising Middle East and North Africa is one in which Islamist actors 
are continuing to be centrally relevant, not only for their successes but also 
because strong regimes have focused so much att ention on repressing certain 
Islamist groups and voices. Th ose very regimes, however, oft en deploy their 
own modes of Islamist discourse in their quest to legitimate their repressive and 
sometimes monstrous regimes. Th e contributions to this volume demonstrate 
that rather than moving beyond Islamist politics, we as a scholarly community 
5741_Kraetzschmar & Rivetti.indd   373 05/01/18   6:48 PM
374 Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings
would do well to innovate and experiment with our analytic frameworks in 
order to fi nd new means of identifying and understanding the complex ways in 
which practices of politics shape and are shaped by a wide range ideational and 
epistemological frameworks that give form to the political arena.
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